The opinion
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
Present: The Honorable Stephanie S. Christensen, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Teagan Snyder n/a
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
None Present None Present
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order to Show Cause
On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff Joshua L. Lyons filed this civil rights
action pro se alleging many wrongs, including some related to a state
unlawful detainer proceedings. This is not his first civil rights action
filed in this district nor his first related to the unlawful detainer
proceedings.
On June 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a previous action and a request to
proceed in forma pauperis. Case no. 5:25-cv-01622-JAK (SSCx) (the
1622 Action). (1622 Action ECF 1, 6.) The defendants included the
Riverside County Superior Court and several of its judges. (1622 Action
ECF 1 at 1.) Plaintiff alleged violations of his constitutional rights due
to proceedings that had occurred in three cases in the Riverside County
Superior Court: (1) Case No. UDCO2500480 (the Unlawful Detainer
Action); (2) Probate Case No. PRRI2500109 (the Probate Action); and
(3) Case No. RIF2206272 (the Criminal Action). (1622 Action ECF 1 at
3, 5.) Plaintiff had sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
damages. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff had also requested a temporary
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
restraining order in an effort to stay the writ of possession issued
against him in the Unlawful Detainer Action. On July 1, 2025, an order
issued dismissing the action without leave to file an amended complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (1622 Action ECF 10.) The order
denied the requests to proceed in forma pauperis and for a temporary
restraining order as moot. (Id.)
Approximately one week later, Plaintiff filed this action.1 Again,
he requested to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF 3.) In addition to
1 In addition to the 1622 Action and the instant action, Plaintiff
has filed at least two other cases in this district: (1) Case no. 5:23-cv-
530-JAK-SSC (the 530 Action); and (2) Case no. 5:25-cv-211-JAK-SSC
(the 211 Action). In the 211 Action Plaintiff sought to enjoin the
Riverside County Superior Court and one of its judges claiming that his
constitutional rights were being denied in the Criminal Action. (211
Action ECF 5 at 2.) The request to proceed in forma pauperis was
denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the action due to the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the defendants. (Id.) The 530
Action was a suit against the State of California, the California
Highway Patrol (CHP), and a CHP officer alleging constitutional
violations relating to a December 2022 arrest that was seemingly also
the basis for the Criminal Action. (530 Action ECF 9.) The then-
assigned magistrate judge dismissed the original complaint with leave
to amend based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, among other
deficiencies. (530 Action ECF 7.) When the first amended complaint
repeated the immunity defects and added more, this Court ordered
Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF
12.) Plaintiff then moved to dismiss the 530 Action voluntarily and his
motion was granted. (530 Action ECF 13–14.)
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
claims stemming from the Unlawful Detainer Action, the complaint
includes new allegations against various law enforcement defendants
regarding excessive force, false arrest, and retaliation for protected
speech stemming from an arrest on December 24, 2024 (which arrest
was different in time and nature from the Criminal Action). (ECF 1.)
On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Emergency Stay of
Eviction, which sought to stay the pending eviction proceeding. (ECF
4.) An order issued on July 11, 2025, referring the in forma pauperis
request to the undersigned. (ECF 10 at 2.) The order also denied the ex
parte application for the reasons stated in the July 1, 2025 order
dismissing the 1622 Action, and dismissed with prejudice the fourth,
fifth, and eighteenth causes of action without leave to amend because
they realleged the same causes of action that were dismissed in 1622
Action. (ECF 10 at 2.) The order concluded that “[t]he re-filing of them
in this new action was improper.” (ECF 10 at 2.)
Indeed, the impropriety of this action goes beyond those claims
that have been dismissed. Because Plaintiff is seeking to proceed in
forma pauperis, the Court must screen the complaint to determine
whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Key among
the deficiencies are those discussed below.
1. Plaintiff Has Misjoined Claims That Belong In Separate
Suits
Plaintiff cannot combine in a single § 1983 action claims
stemming from the Unlawful Detainer Action, and claims stemming
from his December 24, 2024 arrest. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Those
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
two separate incidents neither “aris[e] out of the same transaction[ or]
occurrence” nor raise “question[s] of law or fact common to all
defendants.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B). Both conditions must be
met to join claims and defendants in a single action. See id. So, if
Plaintiff wishes to pursue both sets of distinct claims, he must sever
them by dismissing one set here (it does not matter which) and refiling
that set in a separate action with a new case number. See Visendi v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870–71 (9th Cir. 2013). The
remaining set of claims for the other incident can then retain the
existing case number here. This path assumes, however, that Plaintiff
can overcome the further pleading deficiencies discussed below.
2. Plaintiff Has Improperly Named Defendants Who Are
Immune From Suit
Whether properly severed or not, Plaintiff’s action names too
many defendants who are immune from suit. For one, the judges,
commissioners, and court staff assisting them are immune from suits
arising out of the exercise of their judicial functions. Mireles v. Waco,
502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 346–47 (1872).
This is trued even though Plaintiff includes conclusory statements of
“animus” and legal error (e.g., ECF 1 at 15). See Stump v. Sparkman,
435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability
for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the
commission of grave procedural errors.”). “‘A judge will not be deprived
of immunity because the action [she or] he took was in error, was done
maliciously, or was in excess of [her or] his authority; rather, [she or] he
will be subject to liability only when [she or] he has acted in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.’” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev.,
828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–
57) (other citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
Relatedly, law enforcement who assisted with the eviction
proceedings share this judicial immunity as they were enforcing court
orders. In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Absolute
judicial immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to
nonjudicial officers for ‘all claims relating to the exercise of judicial
functions.’” (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))); Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. &
Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the
defendant “enjoys absolute quasi-judicial immunity for executing” a
valid court order, after observing that other circuits “have held that
persons who faithfully execute valid court orders are absolutely immune
from liability for damages in civil rights actions challenging conduct
authorized by the order.” (citations omitted)); Duenas v. Freitas, No. C
13-0836 SBA, 2013 WL 3298249, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2013)
(“Plaintiffs allege only that service of the eviction notice was improper
ostensibly because the foreclosure of the property and resulting
unlawful detainer judgment were improper. Because the sole
allegations against the Sheriff Defendants relate to its mandatory duty
to enforce the Superior Court’s Writ of Possession, they are entitled to
absolute immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims.” (citations omitted)); see also
Mansor v. Flores, No. 5:23-CV-00486-MWF (MAA), 2023 WL 8870587,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2023) (collecting cases), report and
recommendation adopted, No. EDCV 23-486-MWF (MAA), 2023 WL
8870571 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2023). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against
such defendants are deficient.
3. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Prohibits This De Facto
Appeal Of The Unlawful Detainer Action
As Plaintiff has been warned before, under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, the Court has no authority or jurisdiction as to the Unlawful
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
Detainer Action in which Plaintiff seeks to advance a de facto appeal of
the judgment that was entered. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d
1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). “The United States District Court, as a
court of original jurisdiction, has no authority to review the final
determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.” Worldwide
Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Garau v. Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Dep’t, 2022 WL 229095, at *1
(9th Cir. 2022) (challenge to unlawful detainer proceedings barred by
Rooker-Feldman); Ramirez v. County of El Dorado, 2022 WL 1744108,
at *1 (9th Cir. 2022) (same).
Among Plaintiff’s requested relief is to enjoin the enforcement of
the unlawful detainer judgment. (ECF 1 at 23.) This would require
this Court to review the propriety of orders and decisions in the
Unlawful Detainer Action and to reach a determination that the state
court’s rulings were erroneous, effectively nullifying the state court’s
judgment. The Court lacks jurisdiction to do so.
4. Only Those Acting Under Color Of State Law Can Be Liable
Under § 1983
Plaintiff names private citizen Armand Vasquez in several
constitutional claims, e.g., counts six, nine, seemingly alleging that
Vasquez had Plaintiff evicted unlawfully. Section 1983 creates a cause
of action against a person who, acting “under color of any statute . . . of
any State,” deprives another of rights guaranteed under the
Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Thai v. County of Los Angeles, 127
F.4th 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2025) (same). A private defendant does not
act under color of state law merely by “utiliz[ing] foreclosure and
eviction procedures made available by the state.” Vachon v. Reverse
Mortg. Sols., Inc., No. EDCV 16-02419-DMB (KES), 2017 WL 6628103,
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017) (finding allegations that the defendant
filed successful unlawful detainer action against plaintiff in state court
and obtained a writ of possession were insufficient to show that
defendant acted “under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 5:16-cv-02419-DMG (KES), 2017 WL
6626649 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2017); see also Harper v. Fed. Land Bank of
Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989) (“the fact that a state
permits the use of foreclosure procedures and subsequent sheriff sales
as the execution of a judgment is not sufficient to constitute state
action.” (citations omitted)); but see Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380,
382, 384 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding private defendants acted under color of
state law where “the [defendants], with police aid, used self-help to evict
[the plaintiffs] without providing proper notice and a prior judicial
hearing” and the “[p]olice were on the scene at each step of the
eviction”).
To the extent that Plaintiff intended to plead joint action by
Vasquez and officials to effect a deprivation of constitutional rights,
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012), his
threadbare allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to show state
action, Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161
(9th Cir. 2003).
5. The Complaint Does Not Comply With Rule 8
Plaintiff fails to plead allegations as to each defendant sufficient
to meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, at a minimum, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
provide “fair notice” of both the particular claim being asserted and “the
grounds upon which [the particular claim] rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 & n.3 (2007) (cleaned up). If a complaint
does not clearly and concisely set forth factual allegations sufficient to
provide defendants with notice of which defendant is being sued, on
which theory, and what relief is being sought against them, the
complaint fails to comply with Rule 8. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84
F.3d 1172, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 1996) (a complaint must make clear “who
is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to
guide discovery”); Exmundo v. Kane, 553 F. App’x 742, 743 (9th Cir.
2014) (affirming district court dismissal of § 1983 claims where
plaintiff’s allegations “were unclear as to the timing and nature of [the
defendant’s] actions”).
To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible,
which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably
infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv.,
572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). As for the nature of what is “facially
plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “where the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, the “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the plausibility standard.
Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Here, the complaint violates Rule 8 because it fails to provide each
defendant with fair notice of how their actions, or inaction, resulted in
the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. To state a § 1983
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
claim, a plaintiff must establish individual fault based on the duties
and responsibilities of each defendant. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628,
633 (9th Cir. 1987).
Moreover, government officials acting as supervisors only “cause”
a deprivation for which they were not physically present if the
constitutional injury can be “directly attributed” to the supervisor’s
wrongful conduct or “training, supervision, or control of his
subordinates.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied 566 U.S. 982 (2012). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks
to hold some defendants liable who were acting as supervisors, he must
demonstrate that they participated in, directed, or otherwise directly
caused the constitutional violation to occur. Plaintiff has failed to do so
here in violation of Rule 8.
6. Plaintiff Has Failed To Plead Properly A Monell Claim
Plaintiff sues some government officials in their official capacities
and also brings an independent Monell claim. 2 (ECF 1 at 3, 16.)
However, official-capacity suits “‘generally represent only another way
of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Accordingly,
2 Relatedly, Plaintiff may not proceed in an action for damages
against an official-capacity defendant. Officials sued in their official
capacities for damages are not persons for purposes of § 1983. See
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 (1997);
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991). Accordingly, claims for damages
must be against defendants in their individual capacities.
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
official-capacity claims against city/county officials in their official
capacities are duplicative of claims against the city/county itself. Vance
v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
A plaintiff can establish Monell liability in one of three ways.
First, by commission, “when implementation of its official policies or
established customs inflicts [a] constitutional injury.” Monell, 436 U.S.
at 708 (Powell, J. concurring); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591
F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that this category of conduct
giving rise to municipal liability is sometimes referred to as “acts of
commission.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),
overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d
1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Second, by omission, “when [the
municipality’s] omissions amount to the local government’s own official
policy.” Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1249 (citation omitted). And third, by
ratification, “when the individual who committed the constitutional tort
was an official with final policy-making authority or such an official
ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis
for it.” Id. at 1250 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
One form of omission is a failure to train. Id. at 1249; Merritt v.
County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (“if the training
program is deemed inadequate, it may justifiably be said to constitute a
city policy”). However, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation
of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to
train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has set a high standard for proving that category of
culpability, permitting liability only where “the government’s
omission . . . amount[s] to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a constitutional
right,” meaning “‘the need for more or different training is so obvious,
and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have
been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1249
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). This high
standard is necessary because:
In virtually every instance where a person has had his or her
constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983
plaintiff will be able to point to something the city “could
have done” to prevent the unfortunate incident. Thus,
permitting cases against cities for their “failure to train”
employees to go forward under § 1983 on a lesser standard of
fault would result in de facto respondeat superior liability on
municipalities—a result we rejected in Monell. It would also
engage the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-
guessing municipal employee-training programs. This is an
exercise we believe the federal courts are ill suited to
undertake, as well as one that would implicate serious
questions of federalism.
Harris, 489 U.S. at 392 (citations omitted).
In sum, a plaintiff must plead facts tending to show that: (1) the
training program is inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular
officers must perform”; (2) the county officials were deliberately
indifferent “to the rights of persons with whom the [local officials] come
into contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “‘actually caused’
the constitutional deprivation at issue.” Merritt, 875 F.2d at 770
(quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 388, 390, 391); see also Belay v. City of
Gardena, No. CV 15-8063-CAS (JCx), 2015 WL 9239717, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 17, 2015) (to state a Monell claim “based on failure to train, a
plaintiff ‘must identify the . . . failure to train, explain why it is
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
deficient, and state how it harmed plaintiff.’” (quoting Lopez v. County
of Los Angeles, No. CV 15-01745-MMM (MANx), 2015 WL 3913263, at
*7 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2015))).
Similarly, “[a] failure to supervise that is ‘sufficiently inadequate’
may amount to ‘deliberate indifference’” but “[m]ere negligence in
training or supervision . . . does not give rise to a Monell claim.”
Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir.1989)).
Government officials acting as supervisors only “cause” a deprivation
for which they were not physically present if the constitutional injury
can be “directly attributed” to the supervisor’s wrongful conduct or
“training, supervision, or control of his subordinates.” Starr, 652 F.3d
at 1205–06, cert. denied, 566 U.S. 982 (2012).
Further, to state a claim for municipal liability, Plaintiff must
show how the alleged constitutional deprivation resulted from a
municipal policy or custom rather than the independent acts of
individual municipal employees. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (a county may not be held responsible for the
acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability);
Kirkpatrick v. County of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 793 (9th Cir. 2016) (en
banc) (to state a § 1983 claim against a municipal entity, “a plaintiff
must go beyond the respondeat superior theory of liability and
demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the product
of a policy or custom of the local governmental unit.” (citation
omitted)).
Here, the complaint does little more than recite the elements of a
Monell claim for failure to train or supervise, and thus, fails to plausibly
plead facts meeting the high culpability standard. (ECF 1 at 16); see
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or
‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’
Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
557)). Plaintiff does not identify what the relevant training practice
was, how it was deficient, or how it caused his alleged injuries. Such
“threadbare” allegations do not provide defendants with sufficient
notice regarding how it allegedly failed to train or supervise its
employees. See Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900 (finding that the plaintiff’s
Monell claim “lack[s] any factual allegations that would separate [it]
from the ‘formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements’ deemed
insufficient by Twombly”); Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d
1141, 1150 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“without identifying the training and
hiring practices, how those practices were deficient, and without an
identification of the obviousness of the risk involved, the Court cannot
determine if a plausible claim is made for deliberately indifferent
conduct”).
Further, Plaintiff’s attempt to allege “systemic violations” by the
Riverside County Sheriff’s Department by referencing other lawsuits is
inadequate. Plaintiff fails to allege when the incidents related to these
suits arose. “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on
isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of
sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has
become a traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates,
99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Gonzalez,
289 F. Supp. 3d at 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (“contemporaneous or
subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of violations that would
provide ‘notice to the [municipality] and the opportunity to conform to
constitutional dictates . . . . ” (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
51, 63 n.7 (2011))). More importantly, the facts alleged regarding the
nature of these lawsuits (e.g., defamation, cashless bail class action,
inmate deaths) are so dissimilar to Plaintiff’s alleged grievances that
they cannot establish a pattern amounting to a custom/practice. See
Meehan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988)
(“Local government liability under section 1983 attaches ‘where—and
only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from
among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for
establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’”
(cleaned up)). Plaintiff’s allegations of a pattern by the Riverside Police
Department fail similarly. (ECF 1 at 13.)
7. Plaintiff Fails To Allege Compliance With The California
Government Claims Act For His Pendant Claims
Plaintiff alleges several non-federal causes of action, e.g., counts
eleven, twelve, fourteen, sixteen, seventeen. (ECF 1 at 17–21.) A
federal district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state law
claim when: “(1) the complaint asserts a valid claim arising under
federal law”; “(2) the complaint asserts a claim arising under state law
which shares ‘a common nucleus of operative facts’ with the federal
claim”; and “(3) the state law claim is such that a plaintiff ‘would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in a single judicial proceeding.’”
Grid Sys. Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033, 1043
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966)).
The Court notes, however, that before bringing a pendent state
law claim for damages against a California employee or entity, the
plaintiff must comply with the claims presentation requirements of the
California Government Claims Act (CGCA). Under the CGCA, a
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
plaintiff may not bring a state law claim for damages against a
California public employee or entity unless he first presents a written
claim to the governmental entity within six months of the accrual of the
action. See Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dept. of Public Social
Services, 237 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001) (CGCA requires the
“timely presentation of a written claim and the rejection of the claim in
whole or in part” as a condition precedent to filing suit. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); Cal. Gov’t Code § 811.2 (defining
“public entity” to include counties and cities). “The [CGCA] applies to
state law claims wherever those claims are brought, and the
requirement that a plaintiff must affirmatively allege compliance with
the [CGCA] applies in federal court.” Butler v. Los Angeles Cty., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 994, 1001 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that he “timely filed a Government Tort
Claim with Defendant City of Riverside.” (ECF 1 at 9.) He does not
discuss to which among the many violations/acts alleged this claim
applied, nor discuss claims made to other public entities he has sued.
Plaintiff is admonished that if he raises state law claims in any
amended complaint or severed action, he must either plead compliance
with the CGCA’s claims presentation requirement or explain why the
failure to comply should be excused.
***
For all these reasons, Plaintiff is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE
on or before September 29, 2025, why this action should not be
dismissed—in whole or in part—based on the factual and legal
deficiencies outlined above. Plaintiff may satisfy this order by
voluntarily dismissing this action using the attached form CV-09.
Alternatively, Plaintiff may file (an) amended complaint(s) containing
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 5:25-cv-01720-JAK-SSC Date: August 29, 2025
Title Joshua L. Lyons v. Jacqueline C. Jackson, et al.
only well-pleaded, actionable claims against non-immune defendants
that fix the curable deficiencies—including by severing any incidents
that cannot be combined in the same complaint under Rule 20.
(Severed claims must be filed separately a new action with a separate
in forma pauperis application or full payment of the filing fee.)
Plaintiff is cautioned, though, that he may be denied further leave
to amend if he cannot “state a viable claim without contradicting any of
the allegations of his original complaint.” Garmon v. County of Los
Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff is further cautioned that failure to file a timely
response to this order to show cause will result in a
recommendation to the district judge to dismiss this case for
failure to comply with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); L.R.
41-1.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
:
Initials of Preparer ts