Saunders v. Nardella

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

CHARMAINE SAUNDERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:25-cv-1361-WFJ-NHA

JUDGE MARY ALICE NARDELLA, et al,

Defendants.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Charmaine Saunders, who is not represented by an attorney,

moves for permission to bring this lawsuit without pre-paying the filing fee.

Doc. 2. Plaintiff sues seven state appellate court judges, a clerk of state

appellate court, and Florida’s Sixth District Court of Appeal, seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief. Doc. 1. I recommend that the Court dismiss

without prejudice Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1), deny without prejudice

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without pre-paying the filing fee (Doc. 2), and give

Plaintiff 21 days from the date of the Court’s order to: (1) file an amended

complaint addressing the problems discussed in this report, and (2) either (a)

pay the filing fee, or (b) file an amended motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that, after she was assaulted, she brought actions in

state court. Compl. (Doc. 1), ¶ 27. There, Plaintiff claims that state trial court

judges—who are not named as Defendants in this action—acted unlawfully.

Id. ¶ 28. For example, Plaintiff alleges that one judge overstepped his authority

and violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by deleting Plaintiff’s motion and

stating “on the record that he alone would decide whether a case would proceed

to jury trial, bench trial, or be resolved on summary judgment.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.

She alleges another judge acted unlawfully by dismissing her complaint on the

merits despite her filing an amended complaint and failing to rule on her

pending motions for sanctions, attorney misconduct, and fraud. Id. ¶¶ 14, 38.

Plaintiff appealed the rulings of the trial court judges to the Sixth

District Court of Appeal but alleges that she was met with additional unlawful

conduct there. Id. pp. 4–14. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Judge Traver, who

serves on the Sixth District Court of Appeal, issued mandates directing further

proceedings in the lower court despite the ongoing misconduct there. Id. ¶¶ 6–

7. And, she alleges Defendant Sixth District Court of Appeal “turned a blind

eye” to the lower court’s unlawful conduct, ignored Plaintiff’s emergency

motions, and acted with bias. Id. ¶¶ 10, 17, 18. She alleges the Sixth District

Court of Appeal’s Clerk, Defendant Stacey Pectol, failed to docket, or deleted,

Plaintiff’s filings. Id., p. 17.

Plaintiff claims she contacted Defendant Judge Yancey, who served as

chief judge on the Tenth Judicial Circuit, to inform him that she perceived

judicial misconduct and fraud in the court. Id. ¶ 1. But Judge Yancey, upon

review of Plaintiff’s complaint, took no action. Id. ¶ 3.

Plaintiff does not appear to allege any specific conduct as to the

remaining Defendants, who are all Sixth District Court of Appeal judges. She

notes only that Defendant Judge Mary Alice Nardella “appeared on nearly

every panel [in the Sixth District Court of Appeal] that denied [Plaintiff]

relief.” Id., p. 17. And, while she names Judges John Brownlee, Brian Mize,

Keith White, and Adrian Gannam as Defendants, she makes no specific

allegations of misconduct against them. See id., pp. 16–21.

Plaintiff brings six claims. Id., pp. 16–26. In Count I, Plaintiff brings a

claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, asserting that Judges Nardella, Brownlee,

Mize, White, Gannam, Lambert,1 Traver, and Yancey, and Clerk of Court

Pectol, all acting in their individual capacities, conspired to interfere with

Plaintiff’s right to due process, access to the courts, and equal protection. Id.

pp. 16–18. In Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

asserting that Judges Nardella, Brownlee, Mize, White, Gannam, Traver, and

Yancey, and Clerk of Court Pectol, all acting in their individual capacities,

1 Judge Lambert is not listed as a Defendant in the case caption. See

Compl. (Doc. 1), p. 1.

denied Plaintiff access to Courts. Id., pp. 18–19. In Count III, Plaintiff claims

that all individual Defendants in their individual capacities violated the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §

1961, et seq., by acting in a coordinated enterprise to obstruct justice, suppress

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and protect government and corporate actors

from liability. Id. pp. 19–21. In Count IV, Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Judges Nardella, Brownlee, Mize, White,

Gannam, Lambert, Traver and Yancey, and Clerk of Court Pectol, all acting in

their individual capacities, retaliated against her for exercising her

constitutional rights. Id. pp. 21–23. Count V alleges a myriad of state law

violations, including abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional

distress, negligent supervision, civil conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and

breach of judicial and ethical duties, against all individual Defendants. Id. pp.

23–24. In Count VI, Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Judges Traver and Yancey for a failure to supervise. Id. pp. 25–26.

While Plaintiff names the Sixth District Court of Appeal as a Defendant, and

seeks injunctive relief against it, Plaintiff does not name it in any count. See

generally Doc. 1.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to halt ongoing

constitutional violations. Id. pp. 27–28. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks

(1) declaratory judgment that Defendants’ acts and omissions violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, (2) an injunction prohibiting Defendants from

denying her access to the courts, suppressing her filings, and retaliating

against her, (3) “a structural injunction or institutional reforms requiring the

Sixth District Court of Appeal and the Tenth Judicial Circuit to implement

transparent panel assignments, judicial disclosures, and procedural

safeguards to prevent future abuses,” (4) an order requiring the Clerk of Court

for the Sixth District Court of Appeal to produce a full docket history, and

(5) an order referring the Defendants judges to judicial oversight authorities.

Id.

II. Applicable Law

The federal statute that governs the right to bring a lawsuit without pre-

paying a filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, “is designed to ensure that indigent

litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Accordingly, the statute permits a litigant to

commence an action in federal court “by filing in good faith an affidavit stating

. . . that he is unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.” Id. “Congress recognized,

however, that a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the

public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Id. To that end, § 1915

provides that a court shall dismiss a case if the court determines the action is

frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous when a complaint lacks an

arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.

Federal courts must hold pro se filings (meaning those papers filed by a

party who represents himself) to “less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). More

specifically, a court must “provide[] pro se parties wide latitude when

construing their pleadings and papers” and “use common sense to determine

what relief the party desires.” S.E.C. v. Elliot, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir.

1992). Nonetheless, courts need not exempt pro se litigants from complying

with the requirements imposed by the law and rules of procedure. See Brown

v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990); Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d

835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

One such rule is Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

requires that a plaintiff describe what a defendant did that violated the law a

plaintiff claims he violated. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. A complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). The pleading standard in Rule 8 does

not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

554, 555 (2007)). Importantly, conclusions and characterizations of conduct are

insufficient; a complaint must allege enough facts to show that each element

of an offense is plausible. Rivell v. Priv. Health Care Sys., Inc., 520 F.3d 1308,

1309–10 (11th Cir. 2008). The allegations in the complaint “must be simple,

concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1).

Another pleading rule is Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

which states, “If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a

separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). It further requires that a complaint “state its claims . . .

in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of

circumstances.” Id.

Independent of the Court’s duty under § 1915(e) to evaluate the claim of

a party proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court also has an obligation to

ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. See FED. R. CIV. P.

12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its

entirety.”).

“Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, or in other

words, they have the power to decide only certain types of cases.” Morrison v.

Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Univ. of S.

Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409–10 (11th Cir. 1999)). First, federal

courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions where (1) the matter in

controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and (2) the parties

are citizens of different states; this is called diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1332. Second, federal courts have jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”; this is called

federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A complaint presents a federal

question where it “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of

action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of

a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers

Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction. Compl. (Doc. 1), p. 2. Thus,

she must establish a viable claim under federal law. She attempts to do so in

Counts I through IV and VI, which assert violations of the Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. §1983, et seq., and RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. Id. Unless Plaintiff

states a viable claim in at least one of these counts, this Court lacks jurisdiction

to hear this case.

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to Comply with Federal Pleading

Standards.

The Complaint cannot carry this case forward, because it does not

comply with the pleading standards in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

First, it does not separate each claim into a separate count or “state its claims

. . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set

of circumstances,” as required by Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Nor does it describe in a “short and plain statement of the claim”

what a defendant did that violated the law, as required by Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules. While the pleading standard in Rule 8 does not require

“‘detailed factual allegations,’ it demands more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Conclusions and characterizations of conduct are

insufficient; a complaint must allege enough facts to show that each element

of an offense is plausible. Rivell, 520 F.3d at 1309.

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains numerous conclusions that are

unsupported by specific factual allegations. See generally Compl. (Doc. 1). For

example, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts concerning Defendants Judges

Brownlee, Mize, White, and Gannam. As another example, to support her

conspiracy claim, Plaintiff alleges, “The uniformity of outcomes [denying

Plaintiff relief] across different [Sixth District Court of Appeal] panels . . .

supports the existence of a tacit or express agreement among Defendants to

suppress Plaintiff’s access to legal redress and to shield lower court

misconduct.” Id., p. 17. While this may incorporate a legal element of a

conspiracy, the paragraph lacks factual allegations that make clear that there

was a conspiracy. “To establish a conspiracy for § 1983 purposes, ‘the plaintiff

must plead in detail, through reference to material facts, the relationship or

nature of the conspiracy between the state actor(s) . . . .’” Brown v. Lewis, 361

F. App’x 51, 54 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d

1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1992)). “A ‘plaintiff attempting to prove such a conspiracy

must show that the parties “reached an understanding” to deny the plaintiff

his or her rights.’” Dye v. Radcliff, 174 F. App’x 480, 482 (11th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (quoting NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990)). But

Plaintiff fails to plead facts explaining which actor(s) conspired, what they

agreed to, how that agreement sought to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, what rights were at risk, and whether the conspirators took actions to

violate them. See Compl. (Doc. 1).

And, Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting her RICO claim, which

“must be pled with an increased level of specificity.” Ambrosia Coal & Const.

Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2007) (“To satisfy the

Rule 9(b) standard, RICO complaints must allege: (1) the precise statements,

documents, or misrepresentations made; (2) the time and place of and person

responsible for the statement; (3) the content and manner in which the

statements misled the Plaintiffs; and (4) what the Defendants gained by the

alleged fraud.”). These are just some examples of conclusory pleading rather

than factual pleading showing that Defendants violated the law.

Another federal pleading rule prohibits “shotgun pleadings.” There are

four types of “shotgun pleadings:”

The most common type . . . is a complaint containing multiple

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding

counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before

and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint. The

next most common type . . . is a complaint that . . . is . . . replete

with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action. The third type of

shotgun pleading is one . . . [does] not separate[e] into a different

count each cause of action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally,

there is . . . asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants

without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for

which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is

brought against. The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun

pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in one way

or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir.

2015). The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that a district court “must

intervene . . . and order a replead[ing]” of a shotgun complaint, even if the

defendant does not move for a more definite statement. Byrne v. Nezhat, 261

F.3d 1075, 1133 (11th Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to fall into the second, third, and

fourth categories of shotgun pleadings. For example, in Count I, Plaintiff

alleges two separate violations of § 1985 in a single count. Id., p. 18. Plaintiff

brings Count IV (Deprivation of Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) against

all individual Defendants (meaning all Defendants except the Sixth District

Court of Appeal) and mentions violations of both the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. Doc. 1, pp. 21–22. The Court cannot discern whether Plaintiff is

alleging each Defendant named in that count violated both of these

Amendments, or whether Plaintiff accuses only certain Defendants of certain

constitutional violations. Similarly, Count V brings a multitude of state law

claims against “all individual Defendants,” without describing the facts

indicating which defendants did what to effect which violations Id., pp. 23–24.

Because it does not comply with the federal pleading standards, the

complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. Should Plaintiff file an

amended complaint, Plaintiff should clearly list which cause of action is being

asserted against which Defendant(s). Plaintiff should concisely state, for each

claim, in plain language, exactly who committed the distinct violation and

what each Defendant did that constituted the specific violation.

B. Plaintiff Should Take Caution When Re-Drafting the

Complaint

Because of the shotgun-style of the Complaint, the Court is not certain

it understands exactly which claims Plaintiff means to bring against which

Defendants, and which requests for relief relate to which claims and

Defendants. It is also difficult to identify which facts support which claims.

However, if the Court has correctly discerned the gist of her claims, it appears

that many of the claims may be prohibited by law. These problems are

discussed below, and the Court cautions Plaintiff to consider these concerns

when redrafting her Complaint.2

1. The Rooker Feldman Doctrine Bars Plaintiff’s Claim

for Declaratory Relief

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, with the

exception of the United States Supreme Court, have no authority to review the

final judgments of state courts. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir.

2 It does not appear that Plaintiff’s claims, as currently written, are

barred by either judicial immunity (she seeks only equitable relief), or the

Eleventh Amendment (she sues the Defendant-Judges and Defendant-Clerk

only in their individual capacities). Gamble v. Fla. Dep't of Health &

Rehabilitative Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1512–13 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Eleventh

Amendment provides no bar to federal court adjudication of suits against state

officers individually.”); Jarallah v. Simmons, 191 F. App’x 918, 920 (11th Cir.

2006) (quoting Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)) (“With respect to state

judges, ‘judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief.’”).

2000) (en banc). The Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by

state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

Here, Plaintiff seeks, among other forms of relief, declaratory judgment

that Defendants’ acts and omissions in their roles in the state appellate court

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Compl. (Doc. 1), p. 27. But, it appears

Plaintiff complains of allegedly errant rulings by the state court, which this

Court lacks jurisdiction to review. “A section 1983 action is neither an

alternative nor a complement to the appeal of a state trial court decision to a

higher state court.” Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir. 1988).

2. Section 1983 Further Limits the Injunctive Relief

Available against the Judge-Defendants.

Plaintiff sues all individual Defendants under § 1983 and its related

conspiracy provision (§ 1985). See Counts I, II, IV, VI. Section 1983 provides

that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission

taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted

unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.’” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Here, Plaintiff cites actions taken by the judges that clearly fell within

their judicial capacity.3 See Compl. (Doc. 1). Therefore, for injunctive relief to

be available, the Court must ask whether the individual Judge-Defendants

violated a declaratory decree or whether declaratory relief was unavailable to

Plaintiff.

Plaintiff fails to allege that any of the individual Judge-Defendants

violated a declaratory decree, nor that no form of declaratory relief is available

to her. For this reason, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for injunctive relief.

3. Plaintiff Appears to Have an Adequate Remedy at Law

“In order to receive declaratory or injunctive relief, plaintiffs must

establish . . . the absence of an adequate remedy at law.” Bolin v. Story, 225

F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, there appears to be an adequate

remedy at law for the violations alleged by Plaintiff in her complaint. See id.

at 1243, n.7 (noting an adequate remedy at law existed through appellate

review or an extraordinary writ).

3 The law is not settled on whether the Clerk-Defendant is also a “judicial

officer.” The Eleventh Circuit has not decided this issue, and district courts

within the Circuit are split as to whether a clerk of court is a “judicial officer”

within the meaning of Section 1983. Compare Courthouse News Serv. v.

Forman, 601 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1246 (N.D. Fla. 2022) (“[T]his Court finds that

“judicial officers,” as used in section 1983, refers only to judges.”) with McCurdy

v. Harper, No. 1:08-CV-2145-WSD, 2009 WL 10692474, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Mar.

23, 2009) (reaching the opposite conclusion).

4. Plaintiff’s Claim for a “Structural Injunction” or

“Institutional Reforms” asks this Court to Overstep its

Role.

Federal courts “should proceed with caution when injunctive relief is

‘sought to be applied to officials of one sovereign by the courts of another.’”

Pompey v. Broward Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hoover

v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1995)).

Here, Plaintiff asks that this Court issue “a structural injunction or

institutional reforms requiring the Sixth District Court of Appeal and the

Tenth Judicial Circuit to implement transparent panel assignments, judicial

disclosures, and procedural safeguards to prevent future abuses.” Doc. 1, pp.

27–28. “[A]n injunction against a state court” or its “machinery” “would be a

violation of the whole scheme of our Government.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at

163. Such an intrusion on the state court system would likely conflict with

principles of equity, comity, and federalism. See United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v.

State of Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 140 (1938) (“The state is entitled to determine the

procedure of its courts, so long as it provides the requisite due process.”).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, I respectfully RECOMMEND:

(1) Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

(2) Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

(3) Plaintiff be given 21 days from the date of the Court’s order to file

an amended complaint addressing the problems with her

complaint, and either (1) pay the filing fee, or (2) file an amended

motion to proceed in forma pauperis. If Plaintiff fails to timely file

an amended complaint and either (1) the filing fee, or (2) file

amended motion to proceed in forma pauperis, I reeommend that

the District Court dismiss the case with prejudice.

SUBMITTED for the District Court’s consideration on August 6, 2025.

□ “|

Mola HIRT ADAMS

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PARTIES

A party has fourteen days from this date to file written objections to the

Report and Recommendation’s factual findings and legal conclusions. A party’s

failure to file written objections waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal

any unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion the district judge adopts

from the Report and Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1. To expedite

resolution, parties may file a joint notice waiving the 14-day objection period.

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