Opinion

DELIU v. FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS

Court
District Court, N.D. Florida
Filed
Aug 6, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.2%

“fundamental rights in the constitutional sense do not include ‘state-created rights.’”

How later courts described this case

  • “fundamental rights in the constitutional sense do not include ‘state-created rights.’”
  • reviewing the Board’s decision to cease processing Webster’s application for admission to the Florida Bar
  • reviewing a decision by the Board that a petitioner was ineligible to apply for admission to the Florida Bar

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

FRANCISCO CATALIN DELIU,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:23-cv-156-MW-MJF

FLORIDA BOARD OF BAR

EXAMINERS, et al.,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In this civil action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff

contends that the Florida Supreme Court violated the Due Process

Clause and Florida law when it created the Florida Board of Bar

Examiners, and the Board violated Plaintiff’s right to due process of law

when the Board failed to review expeditiously Plaintiff’s application for

admission to the Florida Bar. Plaintiff sues the Florida Board of Bar

Examiners, its members, its executive director, and its general counsel—

in their official capacities. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 39. Plaintiff

responded in opposition. Doc. 43. Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim,

the District Court should grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a Florida resident and “an admitted barrister and

solicitor” in other nations that Plaintiff does not specify. Doc. 26 ¶ 4. In

2021, Plaintiff applied for admission to the Florida Bar, and the Florida

Board of Bar Examiners (“the Board”) has not recommended that the

Florida Supreme Court authorize Plaintiff to practice law in Florida. Id.

¶ 3.

Plaintiff contends that the Florida Supreme Court violated Florida

law when it created the Board. Plaintiff further contends that the Board

has violated his constitutional rights by processing his application and

preventing the Florida Supreme Court from considering Plaintiff’s

application to the Florida Bar. Doc. 26 at ¶ 49. For relief, Plaintiff seeks

a court order: (1) compelling the Board to place his bar application before

the Supreme Court for consideration; and (2) precluding the Board from

exercising any jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s application to practice law in

Florida.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes defendants to

move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a claim to survive dismissal, the

“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” rather than the

mere possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to State a Claim for a Denial of “Procedural” Due

Process

In a claim asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff contends

that the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth-Amendment right to

procedural due process of law.1 Doc. 26 at 15–16.

1 Plaintiff also contends that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fifth-

Amendment right to due process of law. Doc. 26 at 16. But the Due

1. “Unconstitutional Delegation of Authority” Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the Florida Supreme Court denied Plaintiff

due process of law by delegating to the Board the Florida Supreme

Court’s authority to admit attorneys to the Florida bar. See Doc. 26 at 10,

16.

Under the United States Constitution, delegation of federal power

is limited by the separation of powers principle incorporated in the first

three Articles of the Constitution. See Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 245

(2021); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 223

(2020). The Constitution, therefore, places limitations on delegations of

federal powers. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472

(2001); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991).

But the United States Constitution does not require “the states to

have a tripartite system of government.” United Beverage Co. of S. Bend

v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 760 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1985).

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “applies only to violations of

constitutional rights by the United States or a federal actor.” Jones v.

City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff does not

assert a claim against the United States or a federal actor. Thus, Plaintiff

has failed to state a Fifth-Amendment due-process claim.

“[M]aintenance of the separation of powers in the States is not, in and of

itself, a concern of the Federal Constitution.” Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.

72, 100 (1959).

Nevertheless, a state’s delegation of legislative power to private

organizations devoid of a “standard by which the power thus given is to

be exercised,” can violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1912);

see City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677 (1976);

Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120

(1928); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 168–70 (1923). A state “legislative

body may not constitutionally delegate to private parties the power to

determine the nature of rights to property in which other individuals

have a property interest, without supplying standards to guide the

private parties’ discretion.” Gen. Electric Co. v. New York State Dep’t of

Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1455 (2d Cir. 1991).

To state a due-process claim that a state unlawfully delegated

authority to a private entity, a plaintiff must allege at least the following:

(1) The state delegated legislative power to a private board;

(2) The state failed to provide the private board any standard by

which to exercise the delegated power;

(3) The state lacks any ability to review meaningfully the board’s

decisions, thus depriving the plaintiff of a process to seek

redress; and

(4) The state deprived the plaintiff of life, liberty, or property.

Roberge, 278 U.S. at 120; Douglas, 261 U.S. at 168–70; Eubank, 226 U.S.

at 143–44; Rice v. Village of Johnstown, Ohio, 30 F.4th 584, 590–91 (6th

Cir. 2022); United Beverage Co. of S. Bend, 760 F.2d at 159.

The Florida Supreme Court Did Not Delegate Legislative

Power to the Board. Under Florida law, the power to admit or deny

admission to the bar is a judicial power, not a legislative power.2 Florida

law specifically states:

2 Florida is not an outlier in this respect. Most states entrust the power

to control admission to the bar to the highest court of a particular state.

See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442 (1979) (per curiam); Middlesex Cnty.

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (New

Jersey); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of the State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232,

248 (1967) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333,

378–79 (1866); Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 732 (11th Cir.

2016) (Alabama). Indeed, this is one of the reasons that attorneys are

sometimes referred to as “officers of the court.” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.

at 378.

• “The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to

regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and

the discipline of persons admitted.” FLA. CONST., art. v § 15.

• “Admissions of attorneys and counselors to practice law in the

state is hereby declared to be a judicial function.” Fla. Stat. §

454.021(1).

• “The Supreme Court of Florida, being the highest court of said

state, is the proper court to govern and regulate admissions of

attorneys and counselors to practice law in said state.” Fla.

Stat. § 454.021(2).

Thus, to the extent the State of Florida delegated power to the

Board to assess the fitness of attorneys to be admitted to practice in

Florida courts, it did not delegate legislative power. Because Florida did

not delegate legislative power to the Board, Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Florida Supreme Court Provided Standards to Govern

the Board. There is a second, independent reason to dismiss Plaintiff’s

“delegation” claim: The State of Florida has provided the Board with

standards to govern its conduct.3

3 In traditional delegation claims, as long as there is an “intelligible

principle” to guide the agency in applying the law, courts will not “disturb

[the] grant of authority.” Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Consumers’ Rsch.,

606 U.S. __, 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2491 (2025). This simply requires that both

The Florida Supreme Court promulgated and approved the Rules

of the Supreme Court Relating to the Admissions to the Bar. See Fla. Bar

Admiss. R. 1-12. The Supreme Court created the Board “to implement

the rules relating to bar admissions.” Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 1-13. The Rules

require the Board to “ensure that each applicant has met the

requirements of the rules with regard to character and fitness, education,

and technical competence prior to recommending an applicant for

admission” and “recommend the admission of every applicant who has

complied with all the requirements of the applicable rules, who has

attained passing scores on the examination and who has demonstrated

the requisite character and fitness for admission.” Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 1-

14.2, 1-16, 5-10. Thus, the Rules require the Board to “conduct an

investigation to determine the character and fitness of each applicant or

registrant.” Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-21.

The Rules also identify the “essential attributes for all applicants.”

Fla Bar Admiss. R. 3-10. Furthermore, the Rules set forth what

the “general policy” that an agency must pursue, and the boundaries of

its delegated authority are clear such that the courts, agency and public

can ascertain whether the agency followed the law. Id.; see Bush v.

Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004).

misconduct may be cause for further inquiry before recommendation of

admission can be made, factors that must be considered in assigning

weight and significant to the prior misconduct, and factors to be

considered in deciding whether an applicant has sufficiently shown

“rehabilitation.” See Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-11, 3-12, 3-13.

The Florida Supreme Court also prescribed the categories of

conduct that make an applicant ineligible to apply for admission. See.

Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-13.

Thus, the Florida Supreme Court provided the Board with

sufficient standards to govern its conduct and did not empower the Board

to act arbitrarily. For this reason, too, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible

due-process claim based on the alleged delegation of authority to the

Board.

The Florida Supreme Court Retains Final Authority to

Review the Board’s Decisions. There is a third independent reason to

dismiss Plaintiff’s delegation claim: The Florida Supreme Court retains

the authority to review and overrule any decision by the Board.

The Board of Bar Examiners was created by the Florida Supreme

Court. LaBossiere v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 279 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla.

1973). The Board also is “subject to the direct control and supervision of

that court.” Ramos v. Tomasino, 701 F. App’x 798, 804 (11th Cir. 2017)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). “Because the Florida

Supreme Court retains plenary authority over the actions of . . . the Board

of Bar Examiners, it retains the ultimate power to make admissions.” Id.

(internal citations and quotations omitted); Uberoi v. Supreme Court of

Florida, 819 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016); Lopez v. Fla. Bd. Of Bar

Exam’rs, 231 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 1969). Indeed, the rules for admission

to the Florida Bar specifically authorize applicants to seek review by the

Florida Supreme Court of the Board’s decisions and actions, including

any undue delay by the Board. See e.g., Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-30.2; Fla.

Bar Admiss. R. 3-40.

Because the Florida Supreme Court retains the authority to review

and overrule any decision by the Board, Plaintiff’s delegation claim also

fails.

2. Claim that the Board Has Failed to Address Plaintiff’s

Application Promptly

Plaintiff also alleges that the Board denied Plaintiff due process of

law by suspending consideration of Plaintiff’s application and by failing

to make a character and fitness determination expeditiously. Doc. 26 ¶¶

15, 17(e).

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state must “provide fair

procedures and an impartial decisionmaker before infringing on a

person’s interest in life, liberty, or property.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d

1550, 1561 (11th Cir. 1994). For a procedural due process claim, the

“deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in

‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is

unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due

process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). In other

words, a claim for a violation of due process under § 1983 “is not complete

when the deprivation occurs” rather it is complete only when “the State

fails to provide due process.” Id. at 126. Thus, to state a claim for a

violation of the right to procedural due process, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property;

(2) governmental deprivation of that interest; and

(3) the state provided inadequate procedures.

Bank of Jackson Cnty. v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1993);

see Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023).

Florida Provided Adequate Procedures to Challenge the

Board’s Suspension of Plaintiff’s Application and the Board’s

Delay. Florida Bar Rules Regarding Admission of Attorneys provided—

and continue to provide—Plaintiff with avenues to challenge: (1) the

Board’s suspension of Plaintiff’s bar application; (2) any undue delay by

the Boad in processing Plaintiff’s bar application; and (3) the Board’s

recommendation to the Florida Supreme Court, if the Board makes an

adverse recommendation.

To the extent Plaintiff challenges the Board’s decision to suspend

his bar application, the rules governing admission to the Florida Bar

provide Plaintiff an opportunity to seek Florida Supreme Court review of

the Board’s decision:

Any applicant or registrant who is dissatisfied with an

administrative decision of the board that does not concern

character and fitness matters may, within 60 days after

receipt of written notice of that decision, file a petition with

the Supreme Court of Florida for review of the action.

Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 2-30.2 (emphasis added); see Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs

re Webster, 3 So.3d 1058, 1059 (Fla. 2009) (reviewing the Board’s decision

to cease processing Webster’s application for admission to the Florida

Bar); Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners re R.L.V.H., 587 So. 2d 462, 463 (Fla.

1991) (reviewing a decision by the Board that a petitioner was ineligible

to apply for admission to the Florida Bar).

Furthermore, the Rules permit applicants “whose character and

fitness investigation is not finished within 9 months from the date of

submission of a completed Bar Application” to petition the Supreme

Court of Florida for an order directing the board to conclude its

investigation. Fla. Bar Admiss. R. 3-40.2.

Additionally, if the Board makes an adverse recommendation

regarding an applicant’s character and fitness, the Rules also permit

applicants to seek judicial review of the Board’s determination. See Fla.

Bar Admiss. R. 3-40.1. Plaintiff does not allege that these avenues of

seeking relief from the Florida Supreme Court are unavailable to him.

Because Florida law provided Plaintiff adequate process to address

the Board’s decision to suspend Plaintiff’s bar application, and any undue

delay by the Board, and any adverse recommendation the Board may

make, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a denial of due process.

B. Failure to State a “Substantive” Due Process Claim

The United States Supreme Court has held that, in addition to its

procedural component, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment encompasses a “substantive” component. County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998); Maddox v. Stephens, 727

F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir. 2013). The substantive aspect of the Due

Process clause, however, protects only “fundamental” rights. See

McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325

(1937)). Fundamental rights are those “deeply rooted in our legal

tradition” and that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”

Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco County, 915 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir.

2019); Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Ala., 114 F.4th 1241, 1296 (11th Cir.

2024). A violation of substantive due process occurs when an individual’s

fundamental rights are infringed, regardless of the fairness of the

procedure. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556.

To state a plausible “substantive” due process claim, a plaintiff

must allege:

(1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutionally protected

interest; and

(2) the deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental

power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort to the stature of a constitutional

violation.

Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 2016); Manzini

v. The Florida Bar, 511 F. App’x 978, 982 (11th Cir. 2013).4

Florida Law Cannot Create a Substantive Right. When

“substantive rights are created only by state law,” they “are not subject

to substantive due process protection . . . because substantive due

process rights are created only by the [United States] Constitution.”

McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556. Plaintiff asserts that, under the Florida

Constitution, he has a “fundamental right” to have the Florida Supreme

Court “exclusively” address his bar application. Doc. 26 ¶ 48. But the

Florida constitution cannot create a fundamental right sufficient to state

a plausible claim for relief on “substantive” due process grounds. See also

Hillcrest Prop., LLP, 915 F.3d at 1298 (“fundamental rights in the

constitutional sense do not include ‘state-created rights.’”).

4 There is a second type of substantive due process claim. “When ‘state

created rights are infringed by a ‘legislative act,’ the substantive

component of Due Process Clause generally protects that person from

arbitrary and irrational government action.” Hillcrest Property, LLP, 915

F.3d at 1299. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that a legislative act

infringed his rights.

Furthermore, even if the Florida Constitution could create a

fundamental right for purposes of a substantive due process claim, as

discussed above, Plaintiff has not been deprived of his Florida

constitutional right to have the Florida Supreme Court address his bar

application. The Florida Supreme Court retains the ultimate decision-

making authority regarding whether Plaintiff is admitted to the Florida

Bar.

There is No Fundamental Right to Practice Law. To the extent

Plaintiff claims that he has the fundamental right to practice law, the

Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally held otherwise: “The right to practice

law is not a fundamental right.” Kirkpatrick v. Shaw, 70 F.3d 100, 103

(11th Cir. 1995) (citing Jones v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Ala. State Bar, 737

F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1984)); Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1390

n.2 (11th Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendants

deprived him of a constitutionally-protected interest, he has failed to

state a substantive due process claim.

C. Plaintiff’s Claim Under Florida Law that the Florida

Supreme Court Violated Florida Law When It Created the

Board

Finally, Plaintiff asks the District Court to invalidate the Florida

Supreme Court’s creation of the Board because Florida law—specifically

the Florida Constitution and Fla. Stat. § 454.021—purportedly did not

authorize the Florida Supreme Court to create the Board. Doc. 26 ¶¶ 19–

44.

Because Plaintiff’s ultra vires claim is based on the Florida

Constitution, the District Court must follow Florida law. Highland

Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937). The construction of a

state statute and state constitution by the state supreme court is binding

on federal courts, and the words of the state supreme court “are the words

of the statute.” N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); Highland

Farms Dairy, 300 U.S. at 612; see also Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v.

Thompson, 754 F.3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 2014); Johnston v. Tampa

Sports Auth., 530 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008).

As noted above, the Florida Constitution vests “exclusive

jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law” in

the Florida Supreme Court. FLA. CONST., art. v § 15. This authority is

also codified in Florida statute. Fla. Stat. § 454.021(2) (“The Supreme

Court of Florida, being the highest court of said state, is the proper court

to govern and regulate admissions of attorneys.”).

The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions and

concluded that its creation of the Board was a lawful exercise of its

exclusive constitutional and statutory authority. LaBossiere, 279 So. 2d

at 289; In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1977); State

ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Evans, 94 So. 2d 730, 734 (Fla. 1957). Because the

Florida Supreme Court has definitively held that its creation of the Board

was an act within the authority entrusted to the Court by the Florida

Constitution, Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim to the contrary.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:

1. GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 39;

2. DISMISS this civil action; and

3. DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 6th day of August, 2025.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PLAINTIFF

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to address all preliminary matters and to make

recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See

N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings

and recommendations must be filed within fourteen

days of the date of the report and recommendation.

Any different deadline that may appear on the

electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only

and does not control. A party who fails to object to the

magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations

contained in a report and recommendation waives the

right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.

See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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