BENDER-MATHIS v. THE CITY OF ERIE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHARHEA BENDER-MATHIS, )

Plaintiff, )

)

VS. ) C.A. No. 1:23-CV-208

)

THE CITY OF ERIE, )

JOSEPH SCHEMBER, )

DAN SPINARZY, )

JASON TRIANA, ) □

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

U.S. D.J. Susan Paradise Baxter

I. Introduction

This pro se § 1983 action arises from Plaintiff Sharhea Bender-Mathis’s arrest, detention, an

prosecution. Defendants—the City of Erie, Mayor Joseph Schember, Police Chief Dan Spinarzy,

and Detective Sergeant Jason Triana—are sued in their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff's initial Complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim but leave to amend wa

granted. See ECF No. 31. The Amended Complaint was filed and Defendants have moved t

dismiss. ECF No. 33; 34.

If. The Allegations of the Amended Complaint

On April 19, 2022 Det. Jason Triana applied for a search warrant of the residence of 2020

East 10th Street. ECF No. 33-1 at 20. The search warrant! details that he and other detectives

' Attached to the Amended Complaint are many court records related to the criminal case against

Plaintiff. Courts within the Third Circuit have held that a court may take judicial notice of court

using a confidential informant, performed multiple controlled buys of drugs from Dajean William

who is alleged to cohabitate with Plaintiff. Jd. at 21. It is also averred that identifiable “buy money’

was used in the controlled purchases. Jd. at 22. During the investigation Dajean Williams wai

observed leaving 1055 Rankine Avenue—which appears to be Plaintiffs primary residence

arriving at 2020A East 10th Street and, after a short time inside, completing alleged dru

transactions with a confidential informant. Jd. Both 1055 Rankine Avenue, and 2020A East 10t

Street are controlled, possessed, or leased by Plaintiff. ECF No. 33 52.

On April 20, 2022—the day of the search warrant execution—Plaintiff was surveilled by Eri

police officers as she drove from her residence at 1055 Rankine Avenue to a nearby Planet Fitness

where she remained for over an hour engaging in lawful activity. Jd. at 10-11. Upon exiting th

gym, plainclothes Officers Chodubski and Suchy, approached her in the parking lot, seized he

phone and keys, searched her person, and arrested her stating that they had a warrant for the Dodg

Durango she was driving. /d. J 13. Officers also notified Plaintiff that police were presently at bot

of her residences investigating the alleged crimes committed by Dajean Williams. Jd. { 13. Th

arrest occurred at approximately 10:20 am. Jd. § 12. Plaintiff states that she was handcuffed,

questioned, transported to the police station, and booked without being read her Miranda rights o

shown a warrant. Id. □□ 16-17.

The application for search warrant produced by Plaintiff particularly describes only 2020

East 10th Street as the “specific description of premises and or persons to be searched.” ECF No.

dockets at the motion to dismiss stage. See In re Congoleum Corp., 426 F.3d 675, 679 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2005) (taking judicial notice of “state court proceedings insofar as they are relevant”);

Mollett v. Leith, 2011 WL 5407359, at *2 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (“A court may also take judicial

notice of the docket in Plaintiffs underlying criminal trial.”) aff'd sub nom. Mollett v. Leicth,

511 Fed. App’x 172 (3d Cir. 2013). Accordingly, this Court will take judicial notice of these

documents because they are court records and because their authenticity is undisputed.

33-1 at 20. Plaintiff sought to procure all warrants related to the search of 2020A East 10th Street

1055 Rankine Avenue, and for the Dodge Durango. ECF No. 33 § 37. No additional search warran

was made available to Plaintiff upon her request. ECF No. 33-1 at 15. None of th

“Inventory/Receipt” documents provided by Plaintiff contain applicable “warrant contro

numbers” such that it can be ascertained at this stage whether additional warrants exist. Jd. at 17-

18. Plaintiff also states that she was never personally served with any warrants or inventory sheet

as detailed in the “return of service/inventory” paperwork alleging that multiple warrants justifyin

all the searches do not exist. /d. at 16-19 (inventory and return of services documents indicatin

that Plaintiff was personally served with the relevant warrant); ECF No. 33 § 37 (alleging that onl

one search warrant exists).

Nevertheless, searches of Plaintiff's properties at 1055 Rankine Avenue and 2020A East 10t

Street commenced at 10:30 a.m. and 10:40 a.m. ECF No. 33 4 18-19; ECF No. 33-1 at 17-18.

search of the Dodge Durango began at 1:19 p.m. ECF No. 33-1 at 19. Inventory sheets documente

the seizure of $18,532—among other drugs and paraphernalia—from these locations and he

vehicle. ECF No. 33 § 45. Plaintiff avers that the inventory sheets omitted any reference to th

alleged “buy money” later cited in the criminal complaint. Jd. 4 46.

It is unknown when the Police criminal complaint was signed—authorizing the arrest o

Sharhea Williams—however it is timestamped as filed at 5:17p.m. ECF No. 33-1 at 9-12. Plaintifi

was released on bond April 21, 2022. ECF No. 33 9 31. Plaintiff was ultimately charged with drug

related offenses based on evidence found during the searches. Jd. 4 22. The charges wer

withdrawn on January 4, 2023, without a preliminary hearing or explanation. Jd. § 43.

Based on these factual averments, Plaintiff identifies several legal claims:

- “Violation of Fourth Amendment rights — unlawful search warrant based on fals

information)”;

- “Violation of Fourth Amendment rights —unlawful arrest and seizure at Planet Fitness”;

- “False Imprisonment”;

- Violation of Fourth Amendment rights -unlawful arrest and seizure due to lack o

probable cause”;

- “Fabrication of Evidence”;

- “Fabrication of Evidence — false claim of personal service”; and

- “Monell.”

The only named Defendants are: the City of Erie, Mayor Joseph Schember, Police Chief Da:

Spinarzy, and Detective Jason Triana. As to Defendants Mayor Schember and Police Chie

Spinarzy, Plaintiff alleges only that they had direct oversight over police officers and failed t

properly train and supervise them in the execution of search warrants and arrests. ECF No. 33 P

6, 7, 116, 117.

Ill. Standards of Review

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the lega

sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (d Cir. 1993). In deciding

motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true all well pled factual allegations in the complaint an

views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3

383, 388 Gd Cir. 2002).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficien

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 □□□□□□□

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court t

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. A cou

need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences. Doug Grant, Inc. v.

Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000). Similarly, “[t]hreadbare recital

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only th

allegations contained in the complaint, any exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters o

public record. Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.2002).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations of her complaint must be “liberall

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The Court must “apply the applicable law,

irrespective of whether [Plaintiff] has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688

(3d Cir. 2002); See also Higgs v. Att'y Gen. of the US., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) “O

policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is “driven by the understanding that implicit i

the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonabl

allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because o

their lack of legal training. Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471,475 (2d Cir.

2006).”). Notwithstanding this relaxed pleading standard, however, “pro se litigants still mus

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala vy. Crown Bay Marina, 70

F.3d 239, 245 Gd Cir. 2013).

IV. Discussion

A. Lack of Probable Cause — the Unlawful Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims

Plaintiff brings two claims related to her arrest at Planet Fitness: unlawful arrest and false

imprisonment. ECF No. 33, P P 72-78 and 79-84. Both legal claims ultimately turn on the same

fundamental question: whether the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See

Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). See also, Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

The Court recognizes several difficulties with how Plaintiff has framed these claims: First,

the allegations focus principally on the conduct of Officers Suchy and Chodubski during the arrest.

While she mentions these officers by name elsewhere in her complaint, she has not named eithe

of them as Defendants to this action.

Second, Plaintiff seeks to hold Sergeant Triana liable based on his supervisory role

alleging the arrest occurred “under [his] direction.” ECF No. 33 § 77. But the law generall

requires more than supervisory status to establish liability. Plaintiff would instead be required t

plead—with particularity—that Triana knowingly provided false, material information leading t

Plaintiff's arrest and detention in light of how her claims are styled. See O'Hara y. Hanley, 2009

WL 2043490, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2009); see also, e.g., Thorpe v. Little, 804 F. Supp. 2d 174,

184 (D. Del. 2011)(describing supervisory liability pleading); [gbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[t]hreadbar

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do no

suffice.”).

Third, Plaintiff references statements by the arresting officers about having “a warrant fo

the vehicle.” ECF No. 33 § 13. There may be confusion about the scope of the warrant Trian

obtained on April 19, 2022. See, e.g, ECF No. 33-1 at 20 (warrant application). While Plaintifi

contends the warrant did not authorize actions regarding the Dodge Durango, 1055 Rankin

Avenue, or her arrest, she has not alleged facts showing Triana knowingly gave false informatio

to the arresting officers about the warrant's scope bringing about her arrest or the unlawfu

searches,

Because Plaintiff has not named the arresting officers as Defendants, and because he

allegations against Triana do not sufficiently establish his personal involvement in an

constitutional violation, these claims cannot proceed in their current form. Should Plaintiff wis

to pursue these claims, she would need to either: (1) name the arresting officers as Defendants an

allege facts showing they lacked probable cause for the arrest; or (2) as to Triana, provide specifi

factual allegations demonstrating his personal involvement in any constitutional violation. Th

Court nevertheless analyzes Plaintiffs claim below.

As previously noted, for a § 1983 claim based on false arrest, the inquiry is “whether th

arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.’

Dowling v. Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1995). See also James v. City of Wilkes-Barre

700 F.3d 675, 682-83 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A false imprisonment claim under § 1983 which is base

on an arrest made without probable cause ... is grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s guarante

against unreasonable seizures.”). Critical to Plaintiff's claim is that a false arrest claim turns o

whether law enforcement lacked probable cause at the moment of apprehension. See Wright v. Ci

of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2005) (probable cause is evaluated as of the time of th

arrest). Examining Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and the attached exhibits, we find she ha

presented a plausible case that her arrest preceded the establishment of probable cause.

Plaintiff's version of events—that she was arrested before officers secured the evidenc

purportedly justifying her detention—is plausible both independently and in light of th

Defendants’ position. The Defendants’ rationale behind the arrest relies on evidence obtaine

either after or during searches conducted at 10:30 AM (1055 Rankine Avenue) and 10:40 A

(2020A East 10th Street) or based solely on the fact that a search warrant existed. ECF No. 35 a

6 (“The searches and seizures performed by law enforcement here were predicated on searc

warrants and Sergeant Triana’s filing of the Criminal Complaint resulted in the arrest o

Plaintiff.”).

Defendants assert that probable cause for the search is prima facie probable cause for th

arrest. See id. at 7 (“Because the execution of a search warrant by an independent district justic

‘constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute’ ... and the search and seizur

here were conducted pursuant to duly authorized warrants, there is a presumption that Sergean

Triana acted with probable cause....”).

This Court disagrees with Defendants’ position. While probable cause for arrest and

warrant are analytically similar, the Supreme Court has explained:

“Tt does not follow, however, that probable cause for arrest would justify the

issuance of a search warrant, or, on the other hand, that probable cause for a search

watrant would necessarily justify an arrest. Each requires probabilities as to

somewhat different facts and circumstances—a point which is seldom made

explicit...”

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 557 n.6 (1978); United States v. Outlaw, 138 F Ath 725

726 (3d Cir. 2025) (“Though they are often discussed in tandem, probable cause to search is no

the same as probable cause to arrest.”). The justification by Defendants for their arrest of th

Plaintiff coupled with the plausibly pled allegations in the Amended Complaint as to the timelin

of the arrest creates a reasonable inference that officers may have arrested Plaintiff before securin

the evidence needed to justify that arrest.

The chronology of events, as detailed in the Amended Complaint and the supportin:

exhibits, is as follows:

10:20 a.m.: Plaintiff arrested by Officers Suchy and Chodubski*

2 ECF No. 33 (Amended Complaint), PP 12, 13.

10:30 a.m.: Search of 1055 Rankine Avenue?

10:40 a.m.: Search of 2020A E. 10th Street*

10:54 a.m.: Plaintiff booked at Erie Police Jail?

5:15 p.m.: Police Criminal Complaint is filed®

This timeline raises constitutional concerns when examined against the four-page crimina

complaint (ECF No. 33-1 at 9-12), which cites evidence obtained during the 10:40 a.m. search|

For the criminal complaint to have established probable cause justifying Plaintiff's arrest by th

10:54 a.m. booking, police would have needed to: complete both searches (the last concluding a

10:40 a.m.); draft the detailed complaint; and obtain the necessary signatures—all within a 14

minute window. This compressed timeframe presents serious questions about whether the crimina

complaint could have properly informed the arrest decision.

Further, the inference of post-hoc justification is strengthened by Plaintiff's allegation tha

during her initial detention, officers demanded information about “the key to Franklin Terrac

[2020A] and whether Dajean Williams was inside the home” (ECF No. 33 § 14) -- querie

inexplicable if they had already secured the apartment and discovered the evidence allegedly foun

there. Compare, ECF No. 33-1 at 10 with ECF No. 33-1 at 17. Either (1) the arrest documentatio

reflects a near impossible administrative feat or (2) officers arrested first and documented thei

probable cause later.

3 Id. at P 18.

4 Td.

ECF No. 33-1, page 1 (Booking Card indicating time of booking as 10:54 a.m.).

ECF No. 33-1, pages 9-12 (Criminal complaint timestamped between 17:15 and 17:20).

This Court acknowledges that facts supporting Defendants’ version of events may ver

well be uncovered at a later stage in this proceeding. Police departments can operate with nea

perfect coordination and efficiency in matters of grave consequence. Should evidence of an arres

warrant be found to exist before the arrest of Plaintiff, this Court will analyze Plaintiff's clai

under the appropriate standard, as Plaintiff also later pleads that the criminal complaint contain;

materially false information. See ECF No. 33 at |? 98; See also, Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786

(3d Cir. 2000). In light of that consideration, Plaintiff s alternative narrative—that she was arreste

first and the evidentiary basis was established afterward—is at least plausible at this stage. Th

accuracy of Plaintiffs timeline remains to be determined through further proceedings, but th

|| Amended Complaint clears the plausibility threshold for the first element.

As earlier discussed, also critical to the inquiry is the whether the arresting officers ha

probable cause. See Dowling, 855 F.2d 136 at 141. Here, while Plaintiff pleads that probable caus

may not have existed at the time of the arrest, the arresting officers are not parties to this □□□□□□□

Plaintiff explicitly names Officers Chodubski and Suchy as her arresting officers. ECF No. 33

1} 13. Thus, the probable cause analysis set forth above applies to those officers, and her claim fo

false arrest must then name those officers as Defendants for the Court to proceed with this claim.

Her claim for false arrest on these grounds is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

As to Defendant Triana, § 1983 liability can extend beyond the arresting officer to othe

officials whose intentional actions set the arrest in motion. See Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3

261, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2000). When the named defendant is not the officer who personally arreste

or detained the plaintiff, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knowingly provided false,

material information leading to the plaintiff's arrest and detention. O'Hara, 2009 WL 2043490, a

*6-7; Wilson v. Borough, 2017 WL 467974, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017) [I]n order to state

10

false arrest claim against [Defendant], plaintiffs are obligated to allege facts from which it coul

be inferred that her arrest was based on false and material information provided by [Defendant].”).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead that Defendant Triana knowingly provided false information to

Officers Suchy or Chodubski, leading to her unlawful arrest. Therefore, this claim also canno

proceed as plead and is dismissed without prejudice.

Since the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and has plausibly stated that probable cause did no

exist at the time of her arrest but failed to include the correct parties, this Court must consider th

proper course under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Circuit’s precedent. The Thir

Circuit, like others, adheres to a liberal approach in permitting amendments—particularly for pro

se litigants, whose pleadings are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted b

lawyers” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520(1 972). Further, Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rule

~ of Civil Procedure instructs that leave to amend should be “freely given when justice so requires,’

(Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)) a principle that carries particular weight where, as here, Plaintiffs failur

to name necessary parties appears inadvertent rather than strategic or dilatory. Foman v. Davis,

371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undu

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencie

by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowanc

of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, b

‘freely given.”).

The appropriate remedy is thus to dismiss Plaintiffs false arrest and false imprisonmen

claims at this stage without prejudice to allow Plaintiff to file a second amended Complaint

provided, of course, that such amendment would not be futile or unduly prejudicial to the existin

parties. The Court will then have afforded Plaintiff two opportunities to amend her Complaint!

11

Although we do not—and may not—offer legal guidance, our opinions have outlined th

shortcomings in Plaintiff's pleadings. It remains Plaintiff's obligation to carefully review thos

rulings and conform any future filing to the requirements discussed therein. Should Plaintiff fai

to remedy the identified deficiencies again, the Court may have no alternative but to dismiss th

action with prejudice (without further leave to amend).

B. The Fabrication of Evidence Claim

Plaintiff brings a claim styled as “Fabrication of Evidence under §1983.” ECF No. 33 P

94-102. She alleges that the criminal complaint falsely stated that “$460 of pre-recorded ‘bu

money’ was found at 1055 Rankine Avenue” while the official inventory sheets from the search:

which meticulously recorded all seized currency—did not mention such funds. Jd. at § 96-97.

Plaintiff contends this discrepancy demonstrates the alleged buy money was fabricated, and tha

this false inclusion in the criminal complaint directly led to her prosecution and the seizure o

$18,532 in property. Id. at ] 99. The claim focuses on Defendant Triana as the officer who drafte

the challenged criminal complaint.

To prevail on a fabrication-of-evidence claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “there is

reasonable likelihood that, absent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not have bee

criminally charged.” Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 372 (3d Cir. 2016). This require

showing both a “meaningful connection” between the alleged fabrication and the prosecution, id.

and that the evidence “was so significant that it could have affected the outcome of the crimina

case,” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 295 (3d Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff's claim fails to meet this standard. While she alleges the $460 “buy money” foun

at 1055 Rankine Avenue was fabricated, the criminal complaint identifies substantial independen

evidence supporting the charges—including 1,198 grams of fentanyl, drug packaging equipment

12

cutting agents, and $7,776 in cash—all discovered at 2020A East 10th Street, a property Plaintifi

acknowledges owning. See ECF No. 33-1 at 11 (Plaintiff owns the property); ECF No. 33-1 at 1

(police criminal complaint detailing items found at 2020A East 10th Street). These averment

alone provided probable cause for the charges of drug trafficking and related offenses as stated 1

the criminal complaint. Plaintiff has not alleged that the absence of the $460 would have prevente

her prosecution. Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed with prejudice.

C. Fourth Amendment Claims Related to Probable Cause and Search Warrants

Plaintiff brings two additional claims under the Fourth Amendment that she styles a

“Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights (Unlawful Search Warrant based on False Information)’

(ECF No. 33 at P P 65-71) and “Violation of Fourth Amendment Rights (Unlawful Arrest an

Seizure Due to Lack of Probable Cause).” Jd. at 85-93. These claims, while similar, presen

two distinct legal theories: First, Plaintiff alleges officers conducted unlawful searches of both

Dodge Durango and the 1055 Rankine Avenue property, when the sole warrant authorized only

search of 2020A East 10th Street. /d. at P 37. These allegations concern searches conducted b

Officer Suchy. ECF No. 33-1 at 18-19. Second, Plaintiff contends the warrant applicatio

contained false information, rendering any probable cause for her arrest invalid. ECF No. 33 at

87. This portion of the claim targets Defendant Triana as the officer who prepared the warran

application. ECF No. 33-1 at 20.

The Court notes a threshold deficiency: Plaintiff has not named Officer Suchy as

defendant. Accordingly, the claims related to the allegedly unlawful searches of the Dodg

Durango and 1055 Rankine Avenue property must be dismissed without prejudice.’

7 The executed search warrant authorizes only the search of “2020A E. 10th St. Apt #3.” ECF No|

33-1 at 20. The accompanying affidavit, while appearing to request authorization to search thre

locations (1055 Rankine Avenue, the apartment, and a gray Dodge Durango), was not incorporate

Plaintiff challenges the warrant application's alleged omissions and misrepresentation.

regarding probable cause. While we have previously addressed the warrant's geographi

limitations, we examine these additional arguments to provide complete resolution of the issue

presented.

To prevail on a claim for false arrest based on a warrant, the plaintiff must establish tha

the defendants: (1) “knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, mad

false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant”; and (2) that “suc

statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson v.

Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 3

Cir.1997)). First, we identify any potentially reckless omissions or assertions. Second, w

reconstruct the affidavit by inserting omitted facts and removing false ones. Finally, we asses

whether the reconstructed affidavit would still establish probable cause. Dempsey v. Bucknel

Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 470 (3d Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff identifies three main omissions. First, Plaintiff claims that the affidavit allegedl

failed to name Plaintiff as the properties' owner or connect her to criminal activity. But searc

warrants target property, not persons. United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1055 Gd Cir. □□□□□□

Moreover, the affidavit specifically notes Plaintiff's residence at both locations and her relationshi

to Williams, the investigation's target. These facts were properly disclosed.

by reference into the warrant. Under Third Circuit precedent, the particularity requirement mus

be judged solely by the warrant's terms. Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 239 (3d Cir. 2004). Plaintifi

suggests that the included warrant, which was limited to a search of 2020A Rankine Avenue, wa:

the only warrant obtained by police. See ECF No. 33-1 at 15. While Defendants reference multipl

“warrants” (ECF No. 35 at 8), they have produced no others. The warrant's plain terms fail t

authorize the searches of the 1055 Rankine Avenue property or the Dodge Durango. Thes

allegations could support a Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Suchy, who conducted th

searches. As previously noted however, because Plaintiff has not named Officer Suchy as

Defendant, the claim must be dismissed without prejudice.

14

Second, Plaintiff contends the Dodge Durango could not have taken part in earlie

transactions because it only arrived in Erie on April 2, 2022. This argument fails because th

affidavit limits its allegations to activity from March 31 “til present,” with observed transaction

beginning approximately “two weeks” (April 5, 2022) prior to April 19. 2022. ECF No. 33-1 a

21-24. The vehicle's purchase history is immaterial to its later observed use in drug transactions.

Third, the undisclosed parole address does not affect the probable cause determination.

Parole residency requirements do not preclude criminal activity elsewhere, and detectives directl

observed Williams conducting transactions at the subject properties. None of these allege

omissions, whether considered separately or together, demonstrate reckless disregard for the truth!

Even a reconstruction of the Affidavit of Probable Cause bears little support for Plaintiff

position. The affidavit sets forth: Investigators suspected Dajean Williams, also known a

“Spanky,” of selling narcotics from the property located at 1055 Rankine Avenue. Williams i

listed as the owner, occupier, or possessor of 1055 Rankine Avenue. This suspicion was based o

controlled purchases arranged through a confidential informant. During one such operation, th

informant provided detectives with a phone number used to coordinate a drug transaction,

Detectives observed a charcoal gray Dodge Durango bearing temporary license plate numbe

47624V8 engage in a brief exchange with the informant. Following this interaction, the informan

turned over a substance that field-tested positive for fentanyl and identified “Spanky” as th

individual who had provided it. Further investigation revealed that the Durango was registered to

Dajean Williams. The informant subsequently confirmed, through Williams’s license photograph,

that he was indeed “Spanky.” Over the preceding two weeks, detectives conducted additiona

surveillance where they observed the same gray Dodge Durango—still bearing temporary plat

47624V 8—parked outside 1055 Rankine Avenue several times. During another controlled buy,

15

detectives watched Williams exit the front door of 1055 Rankine Avenue, enter the Durango, an:

drive to 2020A East 10th Street. There, he entered Apartment #3 before returning to the vehicle.

Soon after, he engaged in a “window-to-window” exchange with the informant, who later provide

detectives with another substance confirmed to contain fentanyl. Detectives subsequently verifie

that Sharhea Mathis resided at 2020A East 10th Street and 1055 Rankine Avenue. Thes

observations, taken together, formed the basis for probable cause in the warrant application. Se

ECF No. 33-1 at 20-24.

Including the fact that Williams was paroled at a different address, and ultimately that th

Dodge Durango was recently purchased does not materially affect the statements set forth in th

affidavit of probable cause such that it undermines the heart of the averments made or th

determination of probable cause.

Unlike omissions, assertions can be made with reckless disregard for the truth even if the

involve minor details—recklessness is measured not by the relevance of the information, but th

demonstration of willingness to affirmatively distort truth. Reckless disregard for the truth can b

shown by statements made with a “high degree of awareness of [the statement’s] probable falsity.’

Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1501 Gd Cir.1993) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.

64, 74 (1964)). An assertion is made with reckless disregard when “viewing all the evidence, th

affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reason

to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported.” Russo, 212 F.3d at 788 (citing United State

v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 801 n.6 (8th Cir.1995)).

Plaintiff challenges only one assertion in the affidavit which has already been addressed

Plaintiff claims similarly—as with the omission argument—that Triana inserted false informatio

related to the Dodge Durango. As earlier discussed, this claim is contradicted by Plaintiff's o

16

exhibits showing the affidavit's temporal limitations.® Plaintiff's claim regarding the assertion o

information related to the Dodge Durango fails as plead. Plaintiffs claims on these grounds ar

dismissed with prejudice.

D. Procedural Due Process Claim — False Claim of Personal Service

Plaintiff brings a claim styled as “Fabrication of Evidence - False Claim of Persona

Service.” ECF No. 33 at P P 103-112. The crux of this claim appears to be that officers falsel

claimed to have personally served her with the search warrant, thereby depriving her of procedura

due process. She contends this alleged fabrication caused her “significant harm...includin,

emotional distress, loss of property, and the denial of her constitutional rights,” particularly th

ability to challenge the searches and seizures. Jd. at P 112.

The Fourth Amendment does not require the executing officer to serve the warrant on th

owner before commencing a search. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n. 5 (2004). In Unite

States v. Grubbs, the Supreme Court re-emphasized that the Fourth Amendment does not requir

service of the warrant before its execution. 547 U.S. 90 (2006). Rejecting the lower court’

conclusion that an anticipatory search warrant must set forth the “triggering condition,” the Cow

explained that:

“This argument assumes that the executing officer must present the property owner

with a copy of the warrant before conducting his search. In fact, however, neither

the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 imposes such a

requirement. “the absence of a constitutional requirement that the warrant be

exhibited at the outset of the search, or indeed until the search has ended, is ...

evidence that the requirement of particular description does not protect an interest

in monitoring searches.”

When exhibits contradict pleadings, the exhibits control. Vorchheimer vy. Philadelphian Owners

Ass'n, 903 F.3d 100, 112 Gd Cir. 2018); Sunquest Info. Sys., Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

40 F. Supp. 2d 644, 649 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (“[I]n the event of a factual discrepancy between the

pleading and the attached exhibit, the exhibit controls. ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855,

859 n. 8 3d Cir.1994).”).

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Id. at 97-99 (cleaned up). The failure to personally serve Plaintiff, alone, does not offend the

constitution.

Liberally construing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also appears to argue that the fals

service harmed her ability to contest the warrant(s). ECF No. 33 at P 109. This misunderstands th

nature of search warrants. “The absence of a constitutional requirement that the warrant b

exhibited at the outset of the search, or indeed until the search has ended, is ... evidence that th

requirement of particular description does not protect an interest in monitoring searches.” Unite

States y. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7" Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The Constitutio

protects property owners not by giving them license to engage the police in a debate over the basi

for the warrant, but by interposing, ex ante, the “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial office

... between the citizen and the police,” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-482 (1963)

and by providing, ex post, a right to suppress evidence improperly obtained and a cause of actio

for damages. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90 at 99. Thus, Plaintiffs claim on these grounds is dismissed wit

prejudice as she is not only presently availing herself of ex post remedies, but the Constitutio

does not require that Plaintiff be able to contest search warrants at the scene.

E. The Monell Claim

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the City of Erie maintained an unconstitutional policy o

custom permitting officers to conduct searches, seizures, and arrests without proper probable caus

documentation. Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Schember and Police Chief Spinarzy? had direc

? A Monell claim may be brought only against the municipality itself, because local governments

can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief whereas suits

against municipal officials in their official capacities generally represent only another way of

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. See Monell, 436 U.S. 690;

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Estate of Lagano v. Bergen Cnty.

Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 2014). While Plaintiff has pled that her Monell

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oversight over police officers and failed to properly train and supervise them in the execution o

search warrants and arrests. While serious, these allegations fail to meet the exacting standards fo

municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Municipalities cannot be held responsible for constitutional violations solely on a theo

of respondeat superior. Monell v. Department of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather

liability attaches only when the execution of an official policy or longstanding custom causes th

constitutional injury. To establish such liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) he possessed

constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality being sued had a policy; (3) th

policy 'amounted to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiffs constitutional right; and (4) the polic

was the 'moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S,

378, 389-91 (1989). Municipal liability may also attach on a failure-to-train or supervise theory!

While there is a “close relationship between policy-and-custom claims and failure-or-inadequac

claims, the avenues remain distinct: a plaintiff alleging that a policy or custom led to his or he

injuries must be referring to an unconstitutional policy or custom, and a plaintiff alleging failure

to-supervise, train, or discipline must show that said failure amounts to deliberate indifference t

the constitutional rights of those affected.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019).

The present Amended Complaint falls short of these pleading requirements. Plaintiff

generalized allegations about improper police practices lack the specificity needed to state

cognizable Monell claim. She identifies no formal policy authorizing unconstitutional conduct, no

does she allege facts showing a widespread custom sufficient to establish municipal awareness an

claim is against the City, Spinarzy and Schember, the only appropriate defendant on any Monell

claim is the municipal entity.

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acquiescence. Moreover, she fails to identify any alleged deficiency in the city’s training progra:

which she must in order to state a claim.

At bottom, the Plaintiff's theory of municipal liability rests on conclusory assertions rathe

than factual allegations that satisfy the pleading standard. Where, as here, a complaint fails t

identify a specific policy or custom, demonstrate deliberate indifference, or establish causation

dismissal is appropriate. The Monell claim cannot proceed as pleaded and will be dismisse

without prejudice.

F. Qualified Immunity

Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity

protects [government officials] who make wrong but reasonable judgment calls absent clearl

established law.” Ortiz v. Cnty. of Cumberland, 2025 WL 2473703, at *7 (D. N.J. Aug. 28, 2025),

Qualified immunity requires a two-prong analysis. Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4 184, 188 G3

Cir. 2024). First, the court “must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has shown make out

violation of a constitutional right. And second, [the court] must determine whether the right a

issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Jd. (cleaned up).

Because, at this point in the proceedings, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged sufficien

facts to make out the violation of her constitutional rights and all of her claims are being dismissed,

this Court will not undertake a full immunity analysis at this juncture.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 34) will b

granted. The Amended Complaint fails to state viable claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and will b

dismissed in its entirety. The dismissal is with prejudice as to Plaintiff's fabrication of evidenc

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claims, Fourth Amendment warrant falsity claims, and procedural due process claims, a

amendment would be futile. The dismissal is without prejudice as to Plaintiff's false arrest/fals

imprisonment claims, unlawful search claims, and Monell claims but only to the extent tha

Plaintiff may file a Second Amended Complaint within 30 days pursuant to the discussion above.

No new claims or theories may be asserted without prior leave of Court. Should Plaintiff fail t

file an amended pleading within the prescribed timeframe, the dismissal shall convert to a dismissa

with prejudice as to all claims.

An appropriate order follows.

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