Langston v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

JIMMY LANGSTON PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 1:24-cv-01091

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL DEFENDANT

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jimmy Langston (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title II of the Social

Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2010), seeking judicial review of a final decision

of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his application for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and a period of disability under Title II of the Act.

The Parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all

proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and

conducting all post-judgment proceedings. ECF No. 12.1 Pursuant to this authority, the Court

0F

issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1. Background:

Plaintiff protectively filed his disability application on April 14, 2021. (Tr. 17). In this

application, Plaintiff alleges being disabled due to broken ribs, nerve problems, arthritis,

depression, sensitive skin, high blood pressure, and sleeping problems. (Tr. 188). Plaintiff alleges

an onset date of December 1, 2020. (Tr. 17). This application was denied initially and again upon

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___” The

transcript pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr” and refer to the document

filed at ECF No. 7. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF

page number.

reconsideration. Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, and this hearing

request was granted. (Tr. 112-146).

On November 8, 2023, the ALJ held an administrative hearing. (Tr. 37-52). At this

hearing, Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel, Matthew Golden. Id. Plaintiff and

Vocational Expert (“VE”) Donald Rue testified at this administrative hearing. Id.

Following the administrative hearing, on January 24, 2024, the ALJ entered a fully

unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Tr. 17-30). The ALJ determined Plaintiff

met the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2025. (Tr. 19, Finding 1).

The ALJ also determined Plaintiff had not engaged in Substantial Gainful Activity (“SGA”) since

December 1, 2020. (Tr. 19, Finding 2).

The ALJ then determined Plaintiff had the severe impairment of lumbar degenerative disc

disease. (Tr. 19, Finding 3). Despite being severe, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 24, Finding 4).

In his decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and determined his

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 25, Finding 5). Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff

retained the RFC to perform full range of medium work. Id.

The ALJ then evaluated Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr. 29, Finding 6). The

ALJ determined Plaintiff was capable of performing his PRW as a welder and welding machine

repairer. Id. Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had not been disabled from

December 1, 2020, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 30, Finding 7).

Plaintiff then requested the Appeal’s Council’s review of this unfavorable decision. (Tr.

1-6). The Appeals Council denied this request on November 8, 2024. Id. Thereafter, on December

13, 2024, Plaintiff appealed his administrative case to this Court. ECF No. 1. The Parties have

consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. ECF No. 12. Both Parties have filed their appeal briefs,

and this matter is now ripe for consideration. ECF Nos. 9, 11.

2. Applicable Law:

In reviewing this case, this Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(2010); Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than

a preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision,

the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would

have supported a contrary outcome or because the Court would have decided the case differently.

See Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). If, after reviewing the record, it is

possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents

the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed. See Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d

1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least

one year and that prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See Cox

v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The

Act defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show that his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities; (3)

whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment

listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education, and work

experience); (4) whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform his

or her past relevant work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts

to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant

can perform. See Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only

considers the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his or her RFC if the final

stage of this analysis is reached. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

3. Discussion:

In his appeal brief, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s disability determination is not supported by

substantial evidence in the record because the ALJ erred (1) in the Step Two evaluation, (2) in the

RFC determination, and (3) in finding he could perform his PRW. ECF No. 9. In response,

Defendant argues the ALJ did not err in any of his findings. ECF No. 11. Because the Court finds

the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s depression as non-severe, the Court will only address this

argument for reversal.

A claimant suffers from a severe impairment if that impairment is more than slight and if

that impairment affects the claimant’s ability to do his or her basic work activities. See

Householder v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 191, 192 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court has also held

that a claimant does not suffer from a severe impairment where the claimant only suffers from

“slight abnormalities that do not significantly limit any ‘basic work activity.’” See Bowen v.

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 155 (1987) (O’Connor, S., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Brown

v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 311, 311-12 (8th Cir. 1987) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s language from

Bowen v. Yuckert). See also Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707-09 (8th Cir. 2007).

Furthermore, the standard for determining whether a claimant suffers from a severe

impairment is a low standard. See Nicola v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 887 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing

the decision of the ALJ and holding that a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning should

have been considered severe because that diagnosis was supported by sufficient medical evidence).

If the ALJ errs by finding a severe impairment is not severe, the ALJ’s disability determination

must be reversed and remanded. See Nicola, 480 F.3d at 887.

In this case, Plaintiff alleged being disabled due to, among other things, depression. The

medical record shows Plaintiff was treated and received medication for depression. (Tr. 1130-

1135, 1153-1154, 1162-1163, and 1165-1202). Plaintiff also testified about the effects this

condition and medications had on him and his ability to work. (Tr. 40-43).

As recognized above, the standard for determining whether an impairment is severe is a

low standard. Based upon the record, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence demonstrating

his depression meet that standard. Thus, this case must be reversed and remanded for further

consideration of this issue and a determination as to whether any of Plaintiff’s other impairments

meet this low standard.

4. Conclusion:

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds the ALJ’s disability determination is not

supported by substantial evidence in the record. As such, this case is reversed and remanded for

further findings consistent with this opinion. A judgment incorporating these findings will be

entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 58.

ENTERED this 5th day of September 2025.

Barry A. Bryant

/s/

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE