Robert K. Bavle v. State of Florida

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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Case No. 5D2024-0003

LT Case No. 2017-CF-2152

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ROBERT K. BAVLE,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County.

Robert W. Hodges, Judge.

W. Charles Fletcher, of Law Office of W. Charles Fletcher,

Jacksonville, for Appellant.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen

Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for

Appellee.

September 5, 2025

PRATT, J.

Robert Bavle (“Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s denial of

his post-conviction motion that alleged ineffective assistance of his

trial counsel. At his second-degree murder trial in 2017, the jury

rejected Appellant’s self-defense claim and convicted him of

manslaughter. In his post-conviction motion, Appellant raised a

variety of grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel, several of

which he now appeals. Each claim on appeal involves an assertion

that trial counsel missed opportunities to present evidence or

testimony corroborating Appellant’s claim that the victim had

threatened him in the hours, days, and weeks before Appellant

shot him. Because Appellant cannot demonstrate that any alleged

deficient performance prejudiced his defense, we affirm.

I.

On June 18, 2017, Appellant shot and killed the victim outside

a restaurant in Ocala. The State charged Appellant with second-

degree murder with a firearm. The case proceeded to a three-day

trial in April 2019.

The trial testimony established that, on the night of the

shooting, the victim initiated a physical altercation with Appellant

by hitting him in the back of the head. In response, Appellant

repeatedly shot the victim, firing thirteen rounds in total. State

witnesses agreed that Appellant fired two initial shots but

continued firing and followed the victim through the parking lot as

the victim retreated. The victim’s retreat ended when he

succumbed to his injuries and fell. Appellant then stood over the

victim, who was lying on the ground, and fired six or seven more

rounds at him. A witness just feet away from where the victim fell

testified that he clearly saw the victim had nothing in his hands.

The victim was not carrying a firearm, although one was later

found in his vehicle.

Appellant did not dispute that he shot and killed the victim;

instead, he asserted self-defense and testified on his own behalf.

Appellant initially met the victim several years before the

shooting. About two months before the shooting, the victim showed

several of his firearms to Appellant. Afterward, the victim accused

Appellant of stealing one of the firearms. Appellant testified that

in the time between that accusation and the shooting, the victim

repeatedly contacted him with increasing aggressiveness about the

purported theft.

On the day of the shooting, Appellant reached out to the victim

to de-escalate the situation. Appellant testified that the victim told

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him that he was looking for him, suggested he knew where

Appellant’s mother lived, and asked that Appellant share his

location. Appellant testified that, early on, he had thought the

accusations and threats were a joke, but as they continued and

increased in severity, he believed that his life was in danger. For

the most part, trial counsel did not introduce evidence, either

documentary or testimonial, to corroborate Appellant’s claims that

he had been threatened prior to the night of the shooting. However,

there was at least one significant piece of corroborating testimony:

a defense witness confirmed that the victim had offered $1,000 for

Appellant’s location.

The jury found Appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense

of manslaughter with the additional finding that Appellant had

used a firearm in the commission of the offense. The trial court

sentenced Appellant to twenty-eight years. Appellant filed a direct

appeal, and this Court affirmed. Bavle v. State, 300 So. 3d 380, 380

(Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (Mem.). Appellant timely filed a post-

conviction motion in which he alleged that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to dismiss

under the Stand Your Ground law and by failing to introduce at

trial various evidence and testimony that would have corroborated

Appellant’s testimony about the victim’s threats.

The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the

motion. At the hearing, the primary focus of Appellant’s post-

conviction counsel was establishing the availability of evidence

and testimony corroborating Appellant’s position that the victim’s

threats placed Appellant in reasonable fear for his life at the time

of the shooting. Such evidence included the victim’s messages to

Appellant, the victim’s conversations with third parties about

Appellant, the victim’s social media posts referencing Appellant,

and the victim’s social media posts indicating he possessed

firearms and might be involved with a gang.

Appellant’s mother explained that trial counsel decided not to

file a motion to dismiss under the Stand Your Ground law at least

in part because of the political climate surrounding local shootings

and the Black Lives Matter movement. Appellant’s trial counsel

noted that he did not file a Stand Your Ground motion to dismiss

because he did not believe it would have been successful, and it

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would have given the State the advantage of previewing the

defense’s case before trial.

The lower court denied Appellant’s post-conviction motion in

a written order. This appeal followed.

II.

Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to: (1) file a motion to dismiss based on the Stand Your

Ground law; (2) introduce at trial the threatening messages he

received from the victim; (3) explain why the courtroom should be

cleared so a defense witness could testify about the victim without

fear of reprisal; (4) refresh a defense witness’ recollection after the

witness could not recall portions of his deposition testimony,

including threats made by the victim; (5) respond to the State’s

hearsay objections in a way that secured the admission of threats

that were admissible state-of-mind evidence; and (6) call

Appellant’s mother at trial to provide evidence of, and further

context for, Appellant’s fear before the shooting.

“When considering a trial court’s ruling on a rule 3.850 motion

after an evidentiary hearing, we defer to the trial court’s factual

findings—provided that they are supported by competent,

substantial evidence—but we review de novo the trial court’s

‘application of the law to those facts.’” Parenti v. State, 225 So. 3d

949, 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting Jennings v. State, 123 So.

3d 1101, 1113 (Fla. 2013)).

To succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, “the defendant

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). When a defendant fails to

establish one Strickland prong, we need not determine whether he

fulfills the other. See Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 996 (Fla. 2009).

To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that but for

counsel’s deficient performance, “a reasonable probability exists

that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”

Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1993). “A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In applying Strickland,

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we are mindful that it “speaks only to the small class of cases in

which counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment at all,” and it “does not operate as a catch-

all mechanism for ‘fixing’ trials we might have conducted

differently.” Bates v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 768 F.3d 1278,

1299–1300 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We need not determine—and, therefore, do not decide—

whether Appellant’s trial counsel performed deficiently. * That’s

because none of the alleged missteps that Appellant assigns to his

trial counsel prejudiced his defense. Even if the entire body of

corroborating evidence and testimony had been admitted—

whether at an immunity hearing, at trial, or both—there is no

reasonable probability of a different result.

Section 776.012(2), Florida Statutes (2017), marks the

boundaries of justified use of deadly force in self-defense:

* We do not decide whether counsel performed deficiently by

failing to file a Stand Your Ground motion to dismiss. However, we

reject any argument that political pressure provides a legitimate

basis for failing to file such a motion. In line with some of the

testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the briefs

suggested that trial counsel decided not to file the motion based at

least in part on a belief that doing so would be fruitless amidst

political pressure stemming from recent shootings and Black Lives

Matter protests. (Appellant’s brief states that the victim in this

case was black while Appellant is white). We firmly reject any

suggestion that it is a legitimate defense strategy to fail to act on

a defendant’s behalf based on counsel’s prognostication that

political pressure will sway the court from its duty to neutrally

apply the law without racial bias. Cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.

35, 47 (1975) (noting “a presumption of honesty and integrity in

those serving as adjudicators”). In the rare instance that counsel

has a legitimate basis to question the court’s impartiality—and the

parties point to nothing in the record to suggest that was the case

here—abandoning a defense that counsel thinks the law and the

facts support is not the solution.

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A person is justified in using . . . deadly force if he . . .

reasonably believes that using . . . such force is

necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily

harm to himself . . . or to prevent the imminent

commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses . . .

deadly force in accordance with this subsection does

not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand

his . . . ground if the person using . . . the deadly force

is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place

where he . . . has a right to be.

Id. Section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2017), part of Florida’s

Stand Your Ground law, provides immunity from prosecution for

those who use justifiable force in self-defense. “An objective

standard is applied to determine whether the immunity provided

by [the Stand Your Ground law] attaches.” Mobley v. State, 132 So.

3d 1160, 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). “That standard requires the

court to determine whether, based on circumstances as they

appeared to the defendant when he or she acted, a reasonable and

prudent person situated in the same circumstances and knowing

what the defendant knew would have used the same force as did

the defendant.” Id. at 1164–65.

Appellant calls our attention to Bouie v. State, 292 So. 3d 471

(Fla. 2d DCA 2020), where the Second District Court of Appeal

grappled with the extent of Stand Your Ground immunity and

justified use of lethal force. In that case, following a car chase

between the defendant, his brother, and the victim, the victim and

the defendant exited their vehicles. Id. at 475–76. The victim, with

whom the defendant and his brother had a “history of animosity”

and “prior violent confrontations,” held a can of pepper-spray or

mace. Id. at 476, 481. According to defense witnesses, the victim

“was banging on [the defendant’s brother’s] window with a black

object that looked like a gun and shouting threats at him.” Id. at

482. The defendant fired twelve rounds at the victim. Id. at 475–

76. During the shooting, the victim began to retreat. Id. The

defendant claimed immunity for his use of lethal force because he

was defending his brother from a risk of imminent death or great

bodily harm. Id. at 473. The trial court found that the State failed

to prove the defendant’s initial use of deadly force was

unreasonable. Id. at 481. However, the trial court denied the

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defendant’s motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that the

shooting became unreasonable when the victim retreated. Id.

The Second District disagreed with the trial court’s

determination that the victim’s retreat ended the defendant’s

justification for use of lethal force. Id. at 483. It reasoned that the

victim could “continue to pose a threat of death or imminent bodily

harm even when he is seeking cover.” Id. at 482. Although the

court in Bouie noted that it did “not mean to say that a defendant’s

reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary can never

become unreasonable as the situation changes,” it held that the

State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

defendant’s use of deadly force became unjustified during the

exchange. Id. at 482–83.

We agree with the Second District that an armed aggressor’s

retreat, by itself, does not necessarily end the imminent lethal

threat he poses. See id. at 482 (“An armed man can continue to

pose a threat of death or imminent bodily harm even when he is

seeking cover behind or inside a car.”). Even a mortally wounded

assailant can continue to pose a lethal threat. However, on these

particular facts, we find Bouie inapplicable. Unlike in Bouie,

Appellant never saw the victim holding anything he thought was

a weapon, and he pursued the victim across a parking lot and then

stood directly over the victim—who was lying on the ground and

had nothing in his hands—while firing six or seven more rounds

at him. On these facts, the jury concluded that Appellant’s actions

exceeded the scope of necessary self-defense, and it convicted him

of manslaughter. Moreover, it rendered its verdict after hearing

Appellant testify, in his own words, about the threats the victim

had directed toward him, his fear of the victim, and his belief the

victim was armed. The testimony and evidence that Appellant

faults his counsel for failing to introduce may have bolstered

Appellant’s explanation for why he fired the initial shots, but it

would not have offered a justification for the final ones. Stated

differently, it is not reasonably probable that introducing the

additional testimony and evidence would have led to a different

outcome (whether at trial or on a Stand Your Ground motion to

dismiss). Thus, any alleged deficiencies in counsel’s performance

did not prejudice the defense.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of

Appellant’s post-conviction motion.

AFFIRMED.

BOATWRIGHT, J., concurs.

SOUD, J., concurs in result only, without opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

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