Haynes v. Zordan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

TAMARA A. HAYNES CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0801

SECTION P

VS.

JUDGE JERRY EDWARDS, JR.

TANNER ZORDAN, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tamara A. Haynes,1 who proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this

proceeding on approximately June 6, 2025, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She names the following

Defendants: State Trooper Tanner Zordan, State Trooper Jacob Robinson, and the Louisiana

State Police Department.2 For reasons that follow, the Court should stay Plaintiff’s claims of

false arrest, unlawful detention, unlawful search, and excessive force. The Court should dismiss

Plaintiff’s remaining claims.

Background

On January 18, 2025, State Trooper Tanner Zordan stopped Plaintiff's vehicle on

Highway 139 in Monroe, Louisiana; he did not provide a reason for the stop. [doc. # 1-3, p. 3].

Plaintiff writes that a “backup” officer arrived, instructed her to exit the vehicle, and, when

Plaintiff asked why she needed to exit, the officer cited Pennsylvania v. Mimms. [doc. # 5, p. 1].

Plaintiff exited the vehicle; she claims that Zordan then arrested her without probable cause in

1 Plaintiff also refers to herself as Tamara Andrianne Hardmon. [doc. # 1-2, p. 1].

2 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under

28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 1-2, p. 2; 5, p. 2]. Zordan charged

Plaintiff with resisting an officer and unlawful window tint. [doc. # 1-3, p. 3]. Plaintiff

maintains that she is innocent of the charges. [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 1-2, p. 2]. She adds that after her

arrest, a judge issued an arrest warrant. [doc. # 5, p. 3]. Her charges are pending. Id.

Plaintiff also claims that Zordan unlawfully searched her purse, her person, and her

automobile without a warrant. [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 5, p. 2].

Plaintiff claims that when Zordan pursued her before stopping her vehicle, his actions

constituted "stalking and harassment . . . under the Protection from Harassment Act of 1997."

[doc. # 1-2, pp. 1].

Plaintiff claims that Zordan used excessive force during the arrest, body slamming her

into his vehicle and injuring her shoulder. [doc. # 5, p. 2]. When he used force, she was

handcuffed and allegedly did not pose a threat or resist. [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 5, p. 2]. She “had her

phone in her hand recording the Defendant’s action.” [doc. # 5, p. 2].

Plaintiff claims that a towing company stole her vehicle by towing it following her arrest.

[doc. #s 1, p. 4; 1-2, p. 2; 1-3, p. 3]. She also claims that Zordan towed and impounded her

vehicle “without warrant or court order[.]” [doc. # 5, p. 2].

Plaintiff claims that after Zordan arrested her, he did not bring her “before a proper Judge

or Court as is required by due process.” [doc. # 5, p. 4].

Plaintiff claims: “Due to the unlawful actions of the Defendant, the Plaintiff suffered a

series of assaults and batteries upon her person, including arrest, handcuffing, imprisonment,

physically searched, forced fingerprinting and booking procedures, harassment, and stalking.”

[doc. # 5, pp. 4-5].

On May 5, 2025,3 State Trooper Jacob Robinson stopped Plaintiff's vehicle on Highway

139. [doc. #s 1-3, p. 4; 5, p. 5]. When Robinson asked Plaintiff for her driver’s license, Plaintiff

gave him her passport and stated that she was “not required to be a licensee.” [doc. # 5, p. 5].

She alleges that Robinson searched her person after another unnamed deputy arrived and told

Robinson that Plaintiff had a gun. [doc. # 5, p. 6]. “Another State trooper showed up and started

searching the Plaintiff’s automobile without a warrant[.]” Id. Robinson subsequently arrested

her, allegedly without probable cause, and charged her with “improper lane use, vehicle license

required, driver must be licensed, expired inspection sticker, criminal sanctions for operating a

motor vehicle not covered by insurance, [and] resisting an officer.” [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 1-2, p. 3; 1-

3, p. 4; 5, p. 5]. Plaintiff maintains that she is innocent of the charges. [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 1-2, p. 3].

Plaintiff suggests that Robinson used excessive force during the arrest by striking her.

[doc. # 1, p. 7]. She maintains that she "did not pose a threat and did not resist[.]" Id.

Plaintiff states that after both arrests, she endured pain, suffering, emotional distress,

medical expenses, and lost wages. [doc. # 1, p. 5].

Plaintiff alleges that when she arrived at the jail, she was assigned to a padded cell, which

had a hole in the floor “to use the bathroom.” [doc. # 5, p. 7]. A deputy at the jail told her, “I’m

going to put you somewhere they will never find you.” Id. When Plaintiff’s family attempted to

call her, the deputy told her family that she was not at the jail. Id. Another “night deputy”

retaliated against Plaintiff because she refused to talk. Id.

Plaintiff claims that after Robinson arrested her, he did not bring her “before a proper

Judge or Court as is required by due process.” [doc. # 5, p. 9].

3 In her initial pleading, Plaintiff stated that the relevant date was May 6, 2025. [doc. # 1-3, p.

4].

Plaintiff states that on June 30, 2025, a judge issued a warrant for her arrest. [doc. # 5, p.

8].

For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensation, punitive damages, and the dismissal of her

charges. [doc. #s 1, p. 5; 1-2, p. 9; 5, p. 5].

Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, her Complaint is subject to screening

under § 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or

any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Id.

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies

somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of

the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.

In making this determination, the court must assume that all the plaintiff’s factual

allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the

same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not

satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614

F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to

make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53

(5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim

if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A.

(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).

A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926

F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991).

“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638

(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a

“[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional

conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).

2. Heck v. Humphrey and Wallace v. Kato

As above, Plaintiff claims that State Trooper Zordan unlawfully stopped her vehicle and

detained her, unlawfully searched her person, purse, and vehicle, and arrested her without

probable cause. Zordan charged Plaintiff with resisting an officer and unlawful window tint.

[doc. # 1-3, p. 3]. Likewise, Plaintiff claims that Robinson unlawfully stopped her vehicle and

detained her, unlawfully searched her person, arrested her without probable cause, and charged

her with: "improper lane use, vehicle license required, driver must be licensed, expired

inspection sticker, criminal sanctions for operating a motor vehicle not covered by insurance,

[and] resisting an officer." [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 1-2, p. 3; 1-3, p. 4; 5, p. 5]. Plaintiff maintains that

she is innocent of her charges, which are all pending. [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 1-2, pp. 2-3].

Plaintiff also claims that Zordan used excessive force during the arrest, body slamming

her into his vehicle and injuring her shoulder. [doc. # 5, p. 2]. When he used force, she was

handcuffed and allegedly did not pose a threat or resist. [doc. #s 1, p. 7; 5, p. 2]. She “had her

phone in her hand recording the Defendant’s action.” [doc. # 5, p. 2]. Plaintiff similarly

suggests that Robinson used excessive force during the arrest by striking her. [doc. # 1, p. 7].

She maintains that she "did not pose a threat and did not resist[.]" Id.

If Plaintiff is convicted of her pending charges, she may not be entitled to seek relief for

the claims above until any convictions are reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A successful civil rights action

that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff first shows that the conviction or sentence has been reversed,

expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

While the rule in Heck does not extend to pending criminal matters, successful claims

under Plaintiff’s allegations could necessarily imply the invalidity of any future convictions.4

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007) (finding that the Heck rule applies only when

there has been a conviction or sentence that has not been invalidated, not to pending criminal

charges).

Prevailing on the unlawful stop/detention claim could necessarily imply the invalidity of

a future conviction. Such claims are predicated on a lack of reasonable suspicion and necessarily

constitute collateral attacks on a conviction if the conviction is founded on evidence derived

from an officer’s reasonable suspicion and subsequent stop. See Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d

175, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Heck to an unlawful vehicle stop clam); Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, n.5 (2007) (“[A] Fourth Amendment claim can necessarily imply the invalidity of a

conviction . . . .”) Agard v. Sanders, 2006 WL 2128079, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2006) (finding

that the plaintiff’s unlawful traffic stop claim would, if proved, implicate the validity of his

guilty plea because the evidence discovered following the stop would be subject to suppression).

Likewise, Prevailing on the unlawful search claims could necessarily imply the invalidity

of a future conviction because the claims are predicated on the absence of probable cause for the

4 A successful claim will not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction “if the factual basis

for the conviction is temporally and conceptually distinct from” the claim. Bush v. Strain, 513

F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008).

searches and, therefore, would constitute a collateral attack on any future conviction founded on

any evidence derived from the searches.5 See Hall v. Lorenz, 48 F. App'x 481 (5th Cir. 2002)

(“Hall's claims regarding his allegedly illegal arrest and illegal search and seizure, if successful,

would undermine the validity of his felony drug conviction.”).6

Prevailing on the false arrest claims—and establishing that the officers lacked probable

cause to charge Plaintiff—could also necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction because the

claims are essentially a collateral attack on a criminal judgment’s validity. Thomas v. Pohlmann,

681 F. App’x 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Cormier v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 493

Fed. App’x. 578, 583 (5th Cir. 2012)); Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[The

plaintiff’s] proof to establish his false arrest claim, i.e., that there was no probable cause to arrest

5 While “a suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the

challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial . . . [b]ecause of

doctrines like independent source[,] inevitable discovery, and [] harmless error,” Plaintiff’s

allegations do not suggest that any of these doctrines would, following a finding by this Court

that the officer lacked probable cause to search, validate Plaintiff’s potential conviction. See

Heck, 512 U.S. at n.7 (alterations to original and cited sources omitted); see also Hudson v.

Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1996) (“If proved, however, [the plaintiff’s] false arrest claim

necessarily would call into question his conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm.

Specifically, if the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest Hudson for burglary and the

arrest is invalid, the firearm discovered in Hudson’s possession as a result of the arrest would be

subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment as the ‘fruit’ of an illegal arrest. Moreover,

it is improbable that doctrines such as independent source, inevitable discovery and harmless

error would permit the introduction of the firearm as evidence in this case . . . .”).

6 See also Handshaw v. Hilliard, 2015 WL 5177623, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 4, 2015) (finding a

false arrest claim “Heck barred” and reasoning that “if Defendants’ stop of Plaintiff, the

occurrences surrounding his being taken into custody, and the subsequent search incidental to

arrest [which revealed the drugs that were essential to the criminal charge] were determined

unconstitutional . . . , such a holding would cast into doubt or potentially invalidate Plaintiff’s

drug possession charge.”); Lister v. Perdue, 2015 WL 864834, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2015);

Scallion v. Red River Par., 2006 WL 2524159, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2006).

[for the crime he was convicted of], would demonstrate the invalidity of [the conviction].”).7

Prevailing on Plaintiff’s excessive force claims could necessarily imply the invalidity of a

future conviction. As above, Plaintiff was charged with resisting arrest following both alleged

uses of force. Plaintiff, however, does not conceptually or temporally distinguish the factual

bases of her criminal charges from the bases of her civil claims.8 She does not, for instance,

concede that she is guilty of resisting arrest yet claim (i) that the uses of force were excessive

beyond what was necessary to secure her arrests or (ii) that the uses of force were excessive

because they occurred only before or after she resisted. Plaintiff states that she did nothing

wrong and is not guilty of resisting arrest, maintaining that she was already handcuffed and did

not pose a threat.

If Plaintiff prevails on her excessive force claims—by establishing inter alia that any

force used was excessive because she was handcuffed and did not pose a threat, the ruling here

could necessarily imply that she did not commit the charged crimes of resisting arrest. See

Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 F. App’x 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding, where a plaintiff

alleged that he did nothing wrong and was viciously attacked for no reason, that the claim was

barred because it squarely challenged the factual determination that underlay his conviction for

resisting an officer); Ducksworth v. Rook, 647 F. App'x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding, where

7 See also Queen v. Purser, 109 Fed. App’x. 659 (5th Cir. 2004) (a former inmate’s false-arrest

claim necessarily challenged whether the evidence, which an officer seized following an

allegedly illegal stop, and which led to his subsequent conviction, supplied probable cause for his

arrest; thus, the claim was not cognizable absent a showing that the conviction had been

invalidated); Chande v. Moore, 606 F. App’x 238, 239 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Because a showing that

there was no probable cause for the challenged entry, search, seizure, and arrest would call into

question the validity of [plaintiff’s] resulting conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone,” the plaintiff’s claims were barred by Heck);

Goldston v. City of Monroe ex rel. Monroe Police Dep’t, 621 F. App’x 274 (5th Cir. 2015).

8 See Bush, supra.

the plaintiff was convicted of resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and assault on a police officer,

that the plaintiff’s excessive-force claims were barred under Heck because “[h]is complaint

present[ed] a single narrative of an unprovoked police attack; his ‘broad claims of innocence

relate[d] to the entire arrest encounter, and not merely a discrete part of it.’”) (quoting Daigre v.

City of Waveland, Miss., 549 F. App'x 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2013)).

Successful excessive force claims could imply the invalidity of a future conviction for

another reason. Under LA. REV. STAT. § 14:18(7), “The fact that an offender’s conduct is

justifiable, although otherwise criminal, shall constitute a defense to prosecution for any crime

based on that conduct. This defense of justification can be claimed . . . [w]hen the offender’s

conduct is in defense of persons or of property under any of the circumstances described in

Articles 19 through 22.” Under Article 19, “The use of force or violence upon the person of

another is justifiable . . . [w]hen committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense

against the person . . . , provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and

apparently necessary to prevent such offense.” LA. REV. STAT. § 14:19(A)(1)(a). Here, for

instance, if Plaintiff proved that the officers used excessive force before she used any force or

violence in response to the officers’ force, she could essentially prove that her actions (if any)

following the excessive force amounted to justifiable self-defense, thus undermining a potential

conviction.9

9 In Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana

conviction for battery of an officer—a crime for which justification is an affirmative defense—

prevented the plaintiff from suing for excessive force in connection with the incident. The court

reasoned that “if the plaintiff proved his excessive force claim, he would essentially be proving

that his battery was justified, which would undermine his conviction.” Arnold v. Town of

Slaughter, 100 F. App’x 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing Hudson). Similarly, in Arnold, 100

F. App’x at 323, the court reasoned: “[C]ertain convictions will prevent a plaintiff from bringing

an excessive force claim. For example, we have held that a Texas conviction for aggravated

assault on a police officer bars claims for excessive force related to the same conduct. . . . Texas

Federal courts should stay civil rights claims that attack the legality of a detainee’s arrest,

prosecution, and detention until the allegedly improper state prosecution concludes. See Kato,

549 U.S. at 393-94. Critically, “If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been

convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or

anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court . . . to stay the civil action

until the criminal case . . . is ended.” Id. (emphasis added); see Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744,

746 (5th Cir. 1995) (opining that courts should stay proceedings “until the pending criminal case

has run its course . . . .”).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims above are related to rulings that will likely be made concerning

her pending charges. Accordingly, the Court should stay these claims pending the outcome of

Plaintiff’s ongoing criminal prosecution.10

3. Protection from Harassment Act of 1997

Plaintiff claims that when Zordan pursued her before stopping her vehicle, his actions

constituted "stalking and harassment . . . under the Protection from Harassment Act of 1997."

[doc. # 1-2, pp. 1].

law permits an officer to use any force-even deadly force-to protect against an aggravated

assault. Sappington, 195 F.3d at 237. Because any force was justified in response to an assault,

a finding that the officers used excessive force would necessarily mean that the plaintiff had not

committed aggravated assault.” See State v. Ceaser, 2002-3021 (La. 10/21/03), 859 So. 2d 639

(“An individual in Louisiana has a time-honored right to resist an illegal arrest.”).

10 See Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746 (“At this point it is simply premature to determine whether or not

Mackey’s damage claims are barred under Heck. . . . The court [should] stay proceedings in

the section 1983 case until the pending criminal case has run its course, as until that time it may

be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between the two.”); Davis v. Zain, 79 F.3d 18, 19

(5th Cir. 1996) (“[I]f some presently unforeseen or unarticulated conflict arises between the

criminal retrial and the pending § 1983 case, the district court may consider the propriety of a

stay . . . .”).

By all accounts, however, the “Protection from Harassment Act of 1997” is an Act of

Parliament of the United Kingdom11 and, therefore, has no force or effect in the sovereign

United States of America. See DECL. OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776. The Court should dismiss

this claim.

4. Towing Plaintiff’s Vehicle

Plaintiff claims that a towing company stole her vehicle by towing it following her arrest.

[doc. #s 1, p. 4; 1-2, p. 2; 1-3, p. 3]. She also claims that Zordan towed and impounded her

vehicle “without warrant or court order[.]” [doc. # 5, p. 2].

As to the towing company, Plaintiff does not identify it, name it as a defendant, or

otherwise seek relief from it. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this ostensible claim.

As to Defendant Zordan, Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim. “The community

caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement allows the police to

impound a vehicle for noninvestigatory purposes when it is reasonable to do so (say, to remove

an impediment to traffic or to protect a vehicle from theft or vandalism).” United States v.

Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, n.2 (1st Cir. 2010). “Public caretaking typically applies when the owner of

the vehicle has been arrested while the vehicle is on the public streets. In that situation, the

public caretaking exception to the warrant requirement allows police to impound the vehicle to

protect the vehicle, its contents, and the surrounding roadways.” Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368,

387 (5th Cir. 2015). “The reason that officers can impound a vehicle under the community

caretaker exception after the driver has been arrested is irrelevant to the reason for which the

driver was arrested (i.e., the probable cause). Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 756-57 (5th

Cir. 2024) (cited source omitted). “When a driver is arrested, the police need to get the vehicle

11 Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, c. 40 (Gr. Brit.).

off the road so that it does not impede traffic or jeopardize public safety and to protect the

vehicle itself.” Id. (citing United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding

that the community caretaking exception applied where a vehicle could have become a nuisance,

damaged, or stolen; the driver had no proof of insurance; and the vehicle's registration sticker

was expired)). “The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding

traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” S. Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).

Here, Zordan arrested Plaintiff. Thus, under the public caretaking exception to the

warrant requirement, he was lawfully permitted to, without a warrant, impound Plaintiff’s

vehicle to protect it, its contents, and the surrounding roadways.12 The Court should dismiss this

claim.13

5. Failure to Bring Plaintiff Before a Judge

Plaintiff claims that after arresting her, Zordan did not bring her “before a proper Judge

or Court as is required by due process.” [doc. # 5, p. 4]. She raises the same claim against

Robinson. Id. at 9.

12 Plaintiff does not allege that Zordan impounded or towed her vehicle for reasons other than

protecting her vehicle, its contents, or the surrounding roadways. Nor does she claim that any

defendant unlawfully searched her impounded vehicle. Rather, and to reiterate, she only claims

that Zordan lacked a warrant to impound the vehicle.

13 See Allen v. City of Dallas, 2023 WL 8285097, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 8285199 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2023) (“Plaintiff's allegations

are too vague and sparse to state claim. To the extent that officers stopped him while he was

driving and then arrested him, the impoundment was permissible so long as it was carried out in

furtherance of a community caretaking function; there are no facts to suggest otherwise.”); Silver

v. City of San Antonio, 2019 WL 13273235, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 6, 2019) (“And once a driver

is legitimately arrested, his vehicle may be impounded.”).

“[A] warrantless arrest supported by probable cause is constitutionally permissible. To

continue to detain the suspect, the state must obtain a fair and reliable determination of probable

cause by a neutral magistrate promptly after arrest.” Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., Miss., 678 F.3d

344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal footnotes and quoted sources omitted). “The Court elaborated

on this in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin: ‘a jurisdiction that provides judicial

determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with

the promptness requirement of Gerstein.’” Id. (quoting Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500

U.S. 44, 56 (1991)). “If the determination of probable cause is delayed by more than 48 hours

the burden shifts to the government, and its showing of reasonableness will, virtually by

definition, demand a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance, which does not

include intervening weekends or efforts to consolidate [additional] pre-trial proceedings.” Id.

(quotation marks and quoted sources omitted). “McLaughlin provides the 48-hour timeline as a

useful benchmark, but does not hold that determinations of probable cause made after the lapse

of 48 hours are always unreasonable.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff only alleges that when Zordan and Robinson brought her to the jail, they

(i) “made no attempt to bring [her] before a proper Judge or Court as is required by due process”

and (ii) failed “to take her to a Judge or Court to decide” “how to deal with” her. [doc. # 5, p. 4].

She does not claim that she lacked a probable cause hearing within forty-eight hours of her

arrest; rather she alleges that Zordan and Robinson did not bring her before a judge or court

when they brought her to the jail. “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not compel an immediate

determination of probable cause upon completing the administrative steps incident to arrest.”

See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53-54 (1991). Accordingly, the Court should

dismiss these claims.

6. Formulaic Claims

Plaintiff claims: “Due to the unlawful actions of the Defendant, the Plaintiff suffered a

series of assaults and batteries upon her person, including arrest, handcuffing, imprisonment,

physically searched, forced fingerprinting and booking procedures, harassment, and stalking.”

[doc. # 5, pp. 4-5].

At bottom, Plaintiff presents only labels, conclusions, and formulaic verbiage. She

alleges “assaults and batteries,” but absent more her examples—arrest, imprisonment,

fingerprinting, booking procedures, harassment, and stalking)—are not remotely related to an

assault or battery under Louisiana law.14 With respect to her suggestion that her handcuffing

constituted an assault or battery, she does not specify which arrest (or both) to which she refers,

and she does not provide enough information to state a plausible claim. So too, as to her

suggestion that she was assaulted or battered during a search, she does not specify which search

(i.e., a search from the first arrest, a search from the second arrest, or a search at the jail) to

which she refers, and she does not explain how any search constituted an assault or battery.

Even construing these allegations liberally and in her favor, Plaintiff only presents threadbare

recitations of causes of action which do not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The Court

should dismiss these claims.

7. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff alleges that when she arrived at the jail, she was assigned to a padded cell, which

had a hole in the floor “to use the bathroom.” [doc. # 5, p. 7]. A deputy at the jail told her, “I’m

14 “Assault is an attempt to commit a battery, or the intentional placing of another in reasonable

apprehension of receiving a battery.” LA. REV. STAT. § 14:36. “Battery is the intentional use of

force or violence upon the person of another; or the intentional administration of a poison or

other noxious liquid or substance to another.” La. Rev. Stat. § 14:33.

going to put you somewhere they will never find you.” Id. When Plaintiff’s family attempted to

call her, the deputy told her family that she was not at the jail. Id. She claims that she “had to

sleep on the cold hard floor with no food, water, [or] shoes,” and she lacked “phone calls for two

days[.]” Id. Another “night deputy” retaliated against Plaintiff because she refused to talk. Id.

It is unclear whether Plaintiff is raising claims or if she is simply providing

background/narrative concerning what happened after her arrest. To the extent she is attempting

to raise claims for relief, she does not name the jail deputies as defendants or otherwise seek

relief from them. In this respect, the Court should dismiss the ostensible claims.

Insofar as Plaintiff faults Defendant Robinson for her conditions of confinement after

Robinson arrested her and transported her to the jail, she does not state a plausible claim.

Specifically, she does not plead plausible causation. Her ostensible claim, as the undersigned

understands it, is essentially that if Robinson never arrested her and if she was never

incarcerated, she would not have experienced the conditions of confinement at the jail. Plaintiff,

however, does not allege that Robinson was personally involved in or causally connected to the

conditions of confinement at the detention facility. While Plaintiff would not have been

incarcerated but for her arrest, Robinson’s involvement is too attenuated to establish plausible

causation. The Court should dismiss this claim.

8. Louisiana State Police Department

Plaintiff names “Louisiana State Police Department” as a defendant. [doc. # 5, p. 1].

Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only applies to “person[s]” who deprive others of rights

secured by the Constitution. “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities

are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

The Division of State Police is a division under the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:1301, 40:1371 (“[T]he department of state police has

been reduced to [a] division in the department of public safety.”);15 see also Allemang v.

Louisiana Through Dep't of Pub. Safety (Louisiana Off. of State Police, Troop D), 2022 WL

3226620, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2022) (“The Louisiana State Police Department is a sub-unit of

the Louisiana Department of Public Safety, an independent executive agency of the state

government . . . .”).

The Department of Public Safety and Corrections is not a “person” under Section 1983.

Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (finding that the Michigan Department of State Police is not a “person”

under Section 1983); Washington v. Louisiana, 425 F. App’x 330, 333 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The

State and [Department of Public Safety and Corrections] are not persons . . . .”). Accordingly,

the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against this defendant.

Recommendation

For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Tamara A. Haynes’s false

arrest, unlawful detention, unlawful search, and excessive force claims be STAYED under the

following conditions:

a. If Plaintiff intends to proceed with these claims, she must, within thirty (30)

days of the date the criminal proceedings against her conclude, file a motion to

lift the stay;

b. If the stay is lifted and the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims would impugn

the validity of her conviction, the action will be dismissed under Heck; if no such

finding is made, the action will proceed absent some other bar to suit;

c. Plaintiff should not file any more documents concerning these particular

claims (other than an objection to this Report and Recommendation if she

chooses) in this action until the state court proceedings conclude; and

15 “Act No. 97 of the 1983 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature . . . merged the

Department of Corrections with the Department of Public Safety . . . .” LA. REV. STAT. § 36:401.

d. Defendants shall not be required to answer these claims during the stay, and

Plaintiff may not seek a default judgment or conduct any discovery during the

stay.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs remaining claims be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE as legally frivolous and for failing to state claims on which relief may be

granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by

this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation

to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or

response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the

proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen

(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the

legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See

Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996).

In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 5“ day of August, 2025.

Hal Ce Me Chus Lexy

United States Magistrate Judge

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