Opinion

Tellez v. Harris County Texas

Court
District Court, S.D. Texas
Filed
Sep 4, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.1%

The opinion

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

September 04, 2025

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT , Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

GABRIELLA TELLEZ, □ §

§

Plaintiff, § □

§

Vv. § Civil Action No. H-24-4058

§

HARRIS COUNTY TEXAS AND § .

CHRISTOPHER ROGERS § .

| §

Defendants. §

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss

(Document No. 8); and Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss

(Document No. 10). Having considered the Defendants’ motions, submissions, and

applicable law, the Court determines that Defendant Harris County’s motion should

be denied, and Defendant Christopher Rogers’ motion should be granted,

‘L_BACKGROUND

This is a matter involving alleged violations of the United States Constitution. ©

Plaintiff Gabriella Tellez brings suit against Defendants Harris County and

Christopher Rogers (“Rogers”) (collectively, “Defendants”. Plaintiff alleges that.

Defendants deprived her of her Second and Fourth Amendment rights by detaining

her, arresting her, seizing her property, charging her, and jailing her, “all without

warrant or reasonable suspicion or probable cause” during Plaintiff's employment

Mills Auto Storage, an impound lot used by law enforcement for impounded

vehicles. !

On December 10, 2022, a nonparty to this matter, Alvin Riggins (“Riggins”),

came to Mills Auto Storage to retrieve his car after being released from jail. Plaintiff.

contends that Riggins was unable to show proof of ownership, and thus, Plaintiff

denied Riggins entry to the lot causing him to become angry. Plaintiff further

contends that Riggins pushed open the gate and begin approaching Plaintiff. At that

point, Plaintiff deployed her personal firearm and pointed it at Riggins. Plaintiff

alleges that Riggins turned away and walked out of the impound lot. Shortly

thereafter, officers from the Harris County Sherrif’s Department arrived on the scene

and Plaintiff was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon.

Based on the foregoing, on October 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court

asserting claims against the Defendants for “violations of the Fourth Amendment,”

“violations of the Second Amendment,” and “municipal liability.”? On November

18, 2024, Harris County filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. On November 25, 2024, Rogers filed a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On December 9, 2024,

! Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1, § 9.

? Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1 at 14-16.

Plaintiff responded to the Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss. On December

16, 2024, both Defendants replied in support of their motions to dismiss.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces

does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ .. . it demands more than . . . ‘labels

and conclusions.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[t]he

‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (Sth Cir.

2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,

467 (Sth Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a

claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier

v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).

il. LAW & ANALYSIS

Harris County and Rogers both move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint,

contending that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Court will consider, in turn, the merits of each pending motion before the Court.

A, Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that Harris County is municipally liable for

Rogers’ actions because they failed to properly train Rogers. Harris County moves

_ to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, contending that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Harris County argues that they cannot be found liable if

qualified immunity is found to apply to Rogers’ actions and that Plaintiffs

allegations are conclusory. Plaintiff contends that the pleadings are sufficient to

satisfy the applicable pleading requirements and survive a motion to dismiss.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality may be liable if execution of the

government’s policy results in constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To succeed on a claim

for municipal liability, a plaintiff must prove “a policymaker; an official policy; and

a violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy of custom.”

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (Sth Cir. 2001). However, the Fifth

Circuit has made clear that overcoming a motion to dismiss requires only that the

plaintiff “plead facts that the challenged policy was promulgated or ratified by the

city’s policymaker.” Gorden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 285 (Sth Cir. 2016). A

plaintiff is not required to reference a specific municipal policy in their pleadings.

id.

Here, Harris County relies on Supreme Court precedent arguing that “[i]f the

Deputies are not liable, then Defendant [Harris County] cannot be liable.” See City

of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475. U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (holding that a jury’s conclusive

finding that an officer did not violate a constitutional right necessarily precluded a

finding that the city itself violated a constitutional right).* Harris County further

alleges that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because it makes conclusory

allegations regarding training and supervision. In response, Plaintiff contends that

she has plead sufficient facts to meet the pleading stage requirements.

A thorough review of the record in this case reveals that Plaintiff has plead

3 Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 8, { 34.

4 The Court has independently reviewed Los Angeles v. Heller. In doing so, the

Court notes that Heller is distinguished from this current case because Heller did not

address the question of qualified immunity. It is long established that a municipality can

be held liable for policies that result in constitutional violations. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

sufficient facts giving rise to her municipal liability claim against Harris County.°

Thus, given the Fifth Circuit’s guidance that a Plaintiff must only plead facts

suggesting that the municipality promulgated a policy that resulted in a

constitutional violation, and that facts pleaded must only make a claim plausible, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently plead their municipal liability claim.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Harris County’s motion to dismiss should be

denied. The Court will now consider Rogers’ pending motion to dismiss.

B. Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss

Rogers moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, contending that Plaintiff fails

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rogers contends that he is entitled

to qualified immunity and thus, immune from suit. In response, Plaintiff contends

that she has plead sufficient facts showing that there was a clearly established

constitutional right that was violated and thus, that Rogers’ motion should be denied.

When government officials are sued for a constitutional violation under

Section 1983, they may assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Porter

v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 612 (Sth Cir. 2004). “Qualified

immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from

> A review of the Plaintiff's complaint reveals that Plaintiff plead facts including

“fajny training and supervision on these issues [an individual’s right to own and properly

use a firearm] would have prevented the violation of Gabriella’s well-established

Constitutional rights.” Plaintiffs Complaint, Document No. 1, § 97.

[civil] liability ‘unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Glenn v.

City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (Sth Cir. 2001) (quoting Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d

274, 276 (Sth Cir. 1995)). The defense of qualified immunity provides ample room

for mistaken judgments on the government actors’ part and protects “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Estate of Davis ex rel.

McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (Sth Cir. 2005) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Qualified immunity is “immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237

(2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

Once qualified immunity is asserted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

demonstrate the defense does not apply. See McClendon vy. City of Columbia, 305

F.3d 314, 323 (Sth Cir. 2002). This burden requires the plaintiff to allege sufficient

facts showing that: (1) the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional

right; and (2) the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the

circumstances. Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (Sth Cir. 2004). This inquiry

also requires a court to “ask whether the law so clearly and unambiguously

prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 696 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011).

“In other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question confronted by the official beyond debate.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S.

765, 779 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

In the current case, Rogers contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Rogers further contends, based on Supreme Court precedent, that “Plaintiff has no

clearly established right to an exhaustive investigation of potential defenses prior to

arrest.” See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979). In response, Plaintiff

argues that “[a] constitutional right is ‘clearly established’ if no reasonable officer

would have thought the officer’s acts passed constitutional muster.”’ Plaintiff

contends that they have pleaded sufficient facts to show that there was a clearly

established constitutional right.

Here, Rogers contends that “[t]he allegations against the Deputies show they

are entitled to qualified immunity.”® Rogers further contends that Fifth Circuit case

law makes clear that “[t]he existence of an affirmative defense does not vitiate

probable cause to make an arrest.”’ In response, Plaintiff offers limited rebuttal,

raising only the affirmative defense that Plaintiff had a clearly established

6 Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 10, { 27.

7 Plaintiff's Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Documents 8 & 10,

Document No. 11, 4 19.

8 Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 10, 27.

° Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss, Document No. 10, { 28; see

also Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 780 (Sth Cir. 2022).

constitutional right allegedly violated by Rogers. The,Court has reviewed the record

in this matter in detail. A thorough review of the record reveals that Plaintiff fails to

sufficiently show that Rogers’ actions were objectively unreasonable given the

circumstances. Thus, given the Fifth Circuit’s guidance that a plaintiff bears the

burden of alleging sufficient facts showing both a violation of a person’s rights and

unreasonable action by the allegedly offending officer, the Court finds that

Plaintiff's claim fails to overcome Rogers’ presumption of qualified immunity.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, and thus, her claims against Rogers should be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendant Harris County’s Motion to Dismiss (Document No.

8) is DENIED. The Court further

ORDERS that Defendant Christopher Rogers’ Motion to Dismiss (Document

No. 10) is GRANTED. The Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff Gabriella Tellez’s claims against Christopher Rogers

are DISMISSED.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this i} day of September, 2025.

‘DAVID HITTNER

United States District Judge

10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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