Moore v. Poplin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00660-KDB-SCR

ANTWON LYNEAL MOORE,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND

ORDER

L. POPLIN JR.,

Defendant.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. No. 2). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the

Motion to Proceed IFP and DISMISS the Complaint.

A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915, is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,

335 U.S. 331, 342-43 (1948)). To achieve its goal, the IFP statute “allows a litigant to commence

a civil or criminal action in federal court in forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit

stating … that [s]he is unable to pay the costs of a lawsuit.” Id. In his IFP motion, Plaintiff states

that his expenses exceed his expected income (see Doc. No. 2); therefore, the Court will grant the

motion, subject to a frivolity review.

B. Frivolity Review

Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court must review the Complaint to determine

whether it is subject to dismissal on the grounds that it is “frivolous or malicious [or] fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In its frivolity review, this Court

must determine whether the Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded

upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 327-28. Furthermore, a pro se complaint must be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, the liberal construction requirement will not permit a district

court to ignore a clear failure to allege facts in the Complaint which set forth a claim that is

cognizable under federal law. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff alleges Defendant, in his individual capacity and acting under color of law,

violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when Defendant arrested him pursuant to a warrant

on May 10, 2022. Doc. Nos. 1 at 1, 5; 1-1 at 2-3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges his Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when Defendant searched him incident to arrest,

“failed to complete a field test” of a substance located in Plaintiff’s pocket, “falsified

documentation in the police system,” improperly disclosed details of the arrest to a third party,

discriminated against him, acted maliciously, and subjected Plaintiff to “cruel and unusual

treatment” and “paper terrorism.” Doc. No. 1 at 7-8.

“The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is borrowed from the applicable state’s statute

of limitations for personal injury actions.” Torres v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 1:24-

CV-00112-MR, 2024 WL 4683300, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2024) (first citing Wallace v. Kato,

549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007), then citing Tommy Davis Constr., Inc. v. Cape Fear Pub. Util. Auth.,

807 F.3d 62, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2015)). In North Carolina, § 1983 claims are governed by the three-

year statute of limitations for personal injury. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52; Brooks v. City of

Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying North Carolina’s three-year statute of

limitations to § 1983 actions); CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 8 (2014) (“North Carolina ...

has a statute of limitations that allows a person three years to bring suit for personal injury or

property damage, beginning on the date that damage becomes apparent or ought reasonably to

have become apparent to the claimant”).

The limitations period for a § 1983 claim begins to run when the “damage becomes

apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent,” to the Plaintiff, whichever comes first.

CTS Corp., 573 U.S. at 8. Put another way, the limitations period begins when the Plaintiff could

have “file[d] suit and obtain[ed] relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Equitable tolling is “reserved

for ‘those rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct—it

would be unconscionable to enforce the limitations period against the party and gross injustice

would result.’” Torres v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 1:24-CV-00112-MR, 2024 WL

4271582, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2024) (quoting Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 718 (4th Cir.

2019)) (additional citations omitted). Typically, “a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the

burden of establishing: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Id. (first citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005); then citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 653 (2010)).

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that the defendant generally bears the

burden of affirmatively pleading. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). However, the statute of limitations

may be addressed sua sponte where a complaint is filed in forma pauperis and the face of the

complaint plainly reveals the existence of such defense. See Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr.,

64 F.3d 951, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court’s finding that complaint was barred

by the applicable statute of limitations and “that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

concluding that the action was frivolous” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)); Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson,

440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (“we have recognized that a statute of limitations defense may

properly be raised sua sponte by a district court in certain narrow circumstances ... [including] a

complaint filed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915”); Brown v. Harris, No. 3:10cv613,

2012 WL 12383, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2012) (explaining that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a

court must dismiss claims barred by the relevant statute of limitations).

It appears on the face of the Complaint that this action is subject to dismissal as time-barred

because it was filed more than three years after the cause of action accrued. Therefore, the Court

will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice, permitting Plaintiff to refile with additional

allegations, if any, that would bring his claims within the statute of limitations.

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's IFP motion (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice; and

3. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.

SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.

Signed: September 3, 2025

Kenneth D. Bell

United States District Judge woe