Emma Jane Prospero v. Deputy Ryan Sullivan

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FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10086

____________________

EMMA JANE PROSPERO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DEPUTY RYAN SULLIVAN,

LT RUSSELL PRESCOTT,

All former or current employees of the

Camden County Sheriff’s Office who

are sued in their individual capacities,

Defendants-Appellants,

JANE OR JOHN DOES,

All former or current employees of the

Camden County Sheriff’s Office who

are sued in their individual capacities,

Defendant.

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00110-LGW-BWC

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Emma Jane Prospero has, by her own account, called 911 “a

gazillion times.” Among the issues she complained about,

Prospero often called to report gunshots coming from behind a gas

station near her home that the Camden County Sheriff’s Office

(“the Sheriff’s Office”) repeatedly investigated and concluded were

lawful. Thanksgiving 2018 was no different. That day, Prospero

and her husband called Camden County’s non-emergency phone

number twice, then 911 once, to report gunshots. She did so

despite dispatchers telling her that deputies would not respond to

her calls because the deputies had concluded the gunfire was legal.

After her calls, defendant Deputy Ryan Sullivan and his supervisor,

defendant Lieutenant Russell Prescott (collectively “defendants”),

swore out an arrest-warrant affidavit and had Prospero arrested for

violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2), which prohibits disruptive or

harassing conduct during 911 calls. 1

1 The statute criminalizes misuse of the 911 system providing, in relevant part,

that

[a] person commits the offense of unlawful conduct during a

9-1-1 telephone call if he or she: . . . [c]alls or otherwise contacts

9-1-1, whether or not conversation ensues, for the purpose of

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 3

Prospero then brought this lawsuit after the Camden

County District Attorney’s Office dismissed the charge against her.

Prospero’s operative complaint alleged, in relevant part, 2 a

deprivation of her First Amendment rights, unlawful seizure or

arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and malicious

prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment, all against

Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant Prescott.

This appeal reaches us on the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity to defendants on Prospero’s First Amendment

retaliation claim and her malicious-prosecution claim. We now

must decide (1) whether defendants get the benefit of the 911

dispatchers’ collective knowledge about Prospero’s history of 911

calls about lawful gunfire; and (2) if so, armed with such collective

knowledge, including their knowledge of the events of

Thanksgiving 2018, whether Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant

Prescott had arguable probable cause to arrest Prospero for

violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2). We answer “yes” to both

questions and accordingly conclude that Deputy Sullivan and

annoying, harassing, or molesting a 9-1-1 communications

officer or for the purpose of interfering with or disrupting

emergency telephone service.

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2).

2 The only claims on appeal are Prospero’s claims against Deputy Sullivan and

Lieutenant Prescott; accordingly, we do not discuss the remaining claim or

defendant.

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

Lieutenant Prescott are entitled to qualified immunity. Thus, after

careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we reverse.

I. Background

Prospero moved to Camden County in 2011. Since then,

Prospero estimated that she has called the Sheriff’s Office hundreds

of times. Prospero called 911 to report a variety of issues, but her

most common call was to report the sound of gunshots. The

gunfire often emanated from the same location: private property

behind a Chevron gas station near Prospero’s home. The Sheriff’s

Office repeatedly investigated the gunfire and concluded that the

shots were legal and safe.

Prospero’s serial 911-dialing came to a head on November

22, 2018. That day, Prospero called Camden County’s non-

emergency number and reported, “there’s a ton of shots behind the

Chevron station over here . . . . Can you get somebody over there

to tell them to stop shooting[?]” Prospero emphasized she “just

want[ed] the shooting to stop” because she was “trying to enjoy

[her] Thanksgiving.” The dispatcher on the call, Deputy John

Archibald, told Prospero that someone would respond to the call,

and the call ended. Deputy Archibald called Deputy Sullivan and

told him, “[c]aller is advising she’s hearing shots coming from

behind [the Chevron station]. She wants it to stop so she can enjoy

her dinner.” Deputy Sullivan responded that the area behind the

Chevron is private property, and he was “not going to go back

there and make somebody stop shooting.” Deputy Sullivan,

referring to the shooters, told Deputy Archibald he was “familiar

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with who that is.” Deputy Sullivan testified in his deposition that

before November 22, 2018, he was familiar with the owner of the

land “shooting in the area at his range.”

Four minutes later, Prospero and her husband called the

non-emergency number again. Prospero’s husband again reported

shooting behind the Chevron. This time, Deputy Archibald

responded that the property is a hunting club on private property.

The Prosperos replied that the Sheriff’s Office “need[s] to tell them

to stop” the gunshots and that the Sheriff’s Office had “always

stopped it before.” The Prosperos then declined an opportunity to

speak with a deputy, and Deputy Archibald ended the call by telling

the Prosperos to enjoy the rest of their day. Deputy Archibald did

“nothing” in response to this call, instead returning to “business as

usual.”

Shortly thereafter, Deputy Sullivan contacted the dispatch

center and asked the supervisor, Sergeant Nikki Flowers, “[d]o

people not have anything better to do than to bitch about

somebody shooting on private property?” Deputy Sullivan told

Sergeant Flowers that the gunfire was from “the [owners] back

there shooting on their private property.” 3 Sergeant Flowers

agreed, and Deputy Sullivan reiterated that he was not “going out

there [to] talk to [the owners] about, ‘Hey, man, you can’t shoot

on your private property because you’re disturbing people.’”

3 By this time, however, Deputy Sullivan had not yet traveled to personally

confirm if the gunfire about which the Prosperos complained on this occasion

was lawful.

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

Deputy Sullivan then told Sergeant Flowers to “let [the Prosperos]

leave their fucking address or something or request contact” and

he would “let them know how stupid they are.” Sergeant Flowers

told Deputy Sullivan that the dispatch center was familiar with the

callers. Indeed, Sergeant Flowers later testified in her deposition

that she was familiar with the Prosperos’ history of calls to the

Sheriff’s Office, especially concerning their complaints about

lawful gunfire.

Prospero, unsatisfied by the outcomes of her calls to the

non-emergency number, escalated, dialing 911. Prospero again

reported that “[t]here’s tons of shots and they keep going and going

and going around the Chevron station over there.” Deputy

Archibald, again fielding Prospero’s call, told Prospero “[t]hat’s the

hunting club back there.” Prospero responded that the shots were

“too close to the neighborhood. The shots are coming too close.

They need to stop it.” Deputy Archibald asked if Prospero would

“like to see a deputy about this” and reiterated that deputies told

him the shooting emanated from “the private property hunting

club.” Prospero responded, “because of the noise ordinances,

they’re not supposed to have that. We’ve already been through

this before, and they’ve stopped it. So we want it stopped. We

don’t want to live next to the firing.” Deputy Archibald reiterated

that deputies “are not going to go out there,” but repeated his offer

to send a deputy to the Prosperos’ home to discuss the matter.

Deputy Archibald then transferred the call to Sergeant

Flowers, who told Prospero, “when we gave [Deputy Sullivan] the

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location of where the shots were coming from, he advised that it is

private property. It is a hunting club. They are well within their

rights to shoot on that property.” Prospero insisted “that’s not

what [the Prosperos had] been told because of the noise

ordinance.” Sergeant Flowers told Prospero the noise ordinance

did not apply because the property is “not inside the city limits of

the City of Woodbine.” Prospero retorted, “[r]ight, I understand,

but if—if the shots are coming too close to people’s homes . . . .”

Sergeant Flowers told Prospero that dispatch would send a deputy

to the Prosperos’ home to talk to them about this incident.

Prospero told Sergeant Flowers that she did not want a deputy to

visit and that if one did, she would call “the TV station.” Prospero

also told Sergeant Flowers, “I’m not answering the door. We’re

leaving. Good-bye.”

As promised, Deputy Sullivan arrived at the Prosperos’

home soon after Prospero’s 911 call. He knocked, but nobody

answered. He had the dispatch center call Prospero twice, but

nobody answered either call. After Prospero refused to speak with

anyone, Deputy Sullivan began investigating Prospero’s actions as

a possible crime because, based on “the information that [he] had

received at the time, [he] believed [Prospero’s] intentions were to

be disruptive to the dispatchers until she got the answer or got the

services that she would like.” Deputy Sullivan requested the

Computer-Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) reports of Prospero’s calls, and

he asked the dispatch center to print Prospero’s information.

Deputy Sullivan spoke with another dispatcher who told him that

Prospero “didn’t use offensive language or curse,” she “just was not

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

a happy camper” who wanted deputies to stop the gunshots.

While at the Prosperos’ home, Deputy Sullivan unsuccessfully

tried to contact the owners of the land behind the Chevron to

confirm if the gunfire Prospero heard was legal. Deputy Sullivan

then went to the dispatch center where he believes he spoke with

Deputy Archibald and Sergeant Flowers. Deputy Sullivan testified

in his deposition that the “dispatchers told [him] they felt like they

were disrupted, and that the purpose of [Prospero’s] call was to

interfere with their job duties in order to have the results she

wanted at a faster pace than what she was getting.” Deputy

Sullivan did not listen to recordings of Prospero’s calls, instead

relying on the dispatchers to tell him what happened.

Deputy Archibald, however, denied speaking to Deputy

Sullivan following Prospero’s 911 call. Nevertheless, Deputy

Archibald did believe that Prospero’s 911 call was disruptive and

harassing. And although Sergeant Flowers did not “recall where or

in what manner” she rendezvoused with Deputy Sullivan, she

“specifically recall[ed] telling Deputy Sullivan during the course of

his investigation of the calls on Thanksgiving Day that [she]

believed [Prospero’s] calls and communications with the 911

Center that day were purposefully disruptive.” Moreover,

Sergeant Flowers testified that Prospero’s calls

had become not only harassing but a nuisance in the

fact that with her tying up a 911 line in the way that

she did could have—regardless of whether or not we

were busy at the time, regardless of whether or not it

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was stopping us from doing any work that we could

have been doing or were not doing at the time, it

takes seconds for something to happen and—for an

emergency to happen. And in the time that she’s

tying up one line, five other lines can start ringing,

and it would be someone who is in actual need of

emergency services . . . . And if we have a nuisance

caller on the line who has already repeatedly been

told what is going on, and . . . she’s not satisfied nor

does she want the services that are being offered to

her at that point [she] is harassing the 911 center and

potentially preventing us from helping someone else.

Lieutenant Prescott assisted Deputy Sullivan in his

investigation of Prospero. 4 Lieutenant Prescott was familiar with

the property behind the Chevron station and believed Deputy

Sullivan would also be familiar with the area because Deputy

Sullivan lived in Camden County “all his life.” Moreover,

Lieutenant Prescott testified in his deposition, “[w]e’ve all hunted

in this area and everything between hunting and fishing and stuff

like that—I would know generally what direction the shots would

be coming from without even having to be on scene.” As part of

4 Lieutenant Prescott had responded to some of Prospero’s calls before, but

those incidents occurred years earlier and Lieutenant Prescott, in his

deposition, had little to no memory of those incidents.

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10 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

the investigation, Lieutenant Prescott spoke to a dispatcher,5

telling the dispatcher he and Deputy Sullivan were collecting

information about Prospero’s calls so that they could charge her

with a crime. The dispatcher suggested Lieutenant Prescott and

Deputy Sullivan listen to the tapes of the calls, but Lieutenant

Prescott later explained that standard practice is to receive the

relevant information directly from the dispatchers because the

“dispatchers are sworn in by [the] sheriff just like” the officers are.

At the end of their investigation, Deputy Sullivan decided to

charge Prospero with calling 911 for the purpose of disrupting an

emergency telephone service in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2,

and Lieutenant Prescott agreed with Deputy Sullivan’s decision.

Accordingly, that same day, Deputy Sullivan submitted an affidavit

for an arrest warrant charging Prospero with “[u]nlawful [c]onduct

during [a] 911 [c]all.” Because the contents of the affidavit are the

subject of heavy dispute in this case, we have reproduced it below

in its entirety, and we will discuss certain portions in our analysis

where relevant:

On November 22nd, 2018 at approximately

1442 hours, the Camden County Public Safety

Complex received a call for alleged emergency

service in reference to shots being fired in the area of

84 Magna Carta Drive. The call was taken by

5 This dispatcher was Heather Sievers.She did not receive any of Prospero’s

calls on Thanksgiving 2018, but she “could have listened in” to the calls.

Sievers was not deposed in this case.

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correctional staff and forwarded the call to the

Camden County Emergency Dispatch Center. The

caller, later identified as Ms. Emma J. Prospero,

advised the Camden County Emergency Dispatch

Center that she heard shots being fired from behind her

residence in the area of the hunting club behind the Chevron

Truck Stop. Ms. Prospero advised dispatchers that she

did not want contact from law enforcement but she

wanted the shooting to be stopped. She stated the

shooting needed to be stopped so she could enjoy her

Thanksgiving dinner.

Ms. Prospero ended the phone call by hanging

up after refusing to give any further information. Being

from the immediate area, I knew the shots were being

fired from private property in which the individuals

shooting were well in their rights to be shooting. After

receiving the call for service, I advised the Camden

County Dispatch Center that the subjects allegedly shooting

had every right to do so on the private property of a hunting

club which is the location Ms. Prospero stated the

shots were coming from. Ms. Prospero’s husband

contacted the Camden County Emergency Dispatch

Center by using the non-emergency phone number

at approximately 1452 hours and stated the same

information that was given to dispatcher before by

Ms. Prospero and still refused to speak to law

enforcement.

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Dispatchers relayed the information given by me

stating that the subjects shooting were within their

rights to do so but Ms. Prospero’s husband did not agree

with the answer and hung up the phone. At 1458 hours,

Ms. Prospero contacted 9-1-1, stating that she wanted

the shooting from the hunting club to stop. She was

given the same information that was given to [her]

husband in reference to the subjects being within

their rights to be shooting firearms on private

property. Ms. Prospero began arguing with Emergency

Dispatcher by stating the gun shots were in violation

of noise ordinances and that it needed to be stopped

so she could enjoy her dinner. After being advised

that a Deputy would be en route to her residence to

speak with her, Ms. Prospero repeatedly stated that

she would not answer her door or she would leave

the residence if law enforcement responded to speak

with her. She then stated she would be contacting the

local new[s] stations if a deputy responded to her

residence.

Due to Ms. Prospero calling 9-1-1 which is an

emergency telephone service used for emergency

phone calls and for individuals needing emergency

service, deputies with the Camden County Sheriff’s

Office are required to respond to the residence or

location the call is made from if that information is

known. I arrived at 84 Magna Carta Drive at

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approximately 1515 hours and stood in the driveway

for several moments without hearing any gunshots in

the area. I knocked on the front door of the residence

in an attempt to make contact with Ms. Prospero but

met negative results two separate times. I asked the

Camden County Emergency Dispatch Center to

contact Ms. Prospero’s phone number that was used

to call 9-1-1 but they stated the phone went to

voicemail both times they attempted calling. Contact

was never made with Ms. Prospero while on scene at

her residence. I did not hear any gun shots in the area

while on scene at Ms. Prospero’s residence. Ms.

Prospero contacted 9-1-1 (an emergency telephone

service) after first contacting the non-emergency

number twice and refused to make contact with law

enforcement. Ms. Prospero disrupted an emergency

telephone service for service that was not an

emergency.

(emphasis added). The affidavit also stated that Prospero

“commit[ted] the offense . . . on November 22, 2018 at 02:58 PM to

November 22, 2018 at 03:30 PM.”

In his deposition, Deputy Sullivan conceded that he made

some assumptions about the lawfulness of the gunfire and from

where it emanated when he declined to respond to Prospero’s calls.

And Lieutenant Prescott explained that Prospero’s calls themselves

did not last 32 minutes like the affidavit suggests; instead, the

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14 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

affidavit “refer[s] to the duration of the amount of manpower

utilized towards that call.”

Law enforcement arrested Prospero on January 28, 2019.

She was detained at the Camden County Jail. Prospero was

released on bond on January 30, 2019. Several months later, in

November 2019, the Camden County District Attorney’s Office

dismissed the charge against Prospero.

Then, in October 2020, Prospero brought this suit. As

relevant to this appeal, Prospero’s operative complaint alleged

several claims against Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant Prescott: a

deprivation of her First Amendment rights, unlawful seizure or

arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and malicious

prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After

discovery, Prospero moved for partial summary judgment on the

issue of probable cause and on her malicious-prosecution claim.

Defendants also moved for summary judgment, principally

arguing that they (1) were entitled to qualified immunity on all

claims and (2) had probable cause to charge Prospero. The district

court denied Prospero’s motion for summary judgment and

granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

In its order, the district court granted summary judgment to

Lieutenant Prescott on Prospero’s First Amendment claim, denied

summary judgment to Deputy Sullivan on Prospero’s First

Amendment claim, granted Lieutenant Prescott and Deputy

Sullivan summary judgment on Prospero’s unlawful seizure claim,

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and denied Lieutenant Prescott and Deputy Sullivan summary

judgment on Prospero’s malicious-prosecution claim. The district

court found genuine disputes of material fact concerning

(1) whether Prospero engaged in constitutionally protected speech

by calling 911, (2) whether Deputy Sullivan had probable cause to

arrest Prospero, and (3) whether Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant

Prescott’s warrant application failed to establish probable cause or

included intentional or reckless false misstatements or omissions.

Moreover, the district court stated that it is clearly established that

an officer violates the Fourth Amendment if he makes intentional

or reckless false misstatements or omissions in procuring an arrest

warrant. Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant Prescott timely appealed

the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Prospero’s

First Amendment and malicious-prosecution claims. Prospero did

not file a separate appeal.

II. Discussion

As an initial matter, Prospero argues that this Court lacks

jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, we address this

jurisdictional question first before proceeding to defendants’

arguments concerning qualified immunity as to Prospero’s First

Amendment and malicious-prosecution claims.

A. We have jurisdiction over this appeal

The district court, in relevant part, denied Deputy Sullivan

qualified immunity on Prospero’s First Amendment retaliation

claim and denied both defendants qualified immunity on

Prospero’s malicious-prosecution claim. Defendants appealed this

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16 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

denial. Prospero argues we lack jurisdiction over defendants’

appeal because the appeal “boils down to nothing more than

disagreement with the District Court’s factual findings and

inferences, neither of which are reviewable on an interlocutory

appeal of the denial of qualified immunity.” Defendants respond

that they appeal from the district court’s application of the wrong

legal standards. The defendants are correct, and we accordingly

have jurisdiction.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen

v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). We

“possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”

Id. For us, our power principally includes the ability to hear

“appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added). Conversely, “as a court

of limited jurisdiction, we are generally barred from entertaining

appeals of non-final orders because we have no congressional grant

to do so.” Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2020).

“But as with just about every rule, exceptions exist. The one

applicable here allows interlocutory appeal of a district court’s

denial of qualified immunity, since where it applies, that defense

entitles the holder to immunity from not just liability, but from the

lawsuit altogether.” Patel v. City of Madison, 959 F.3d 1330, 1337

(11th Cir. 2020); see Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir.

2000).

Even this exception, however, has exceptions. “Whether

we have interlocutory jurisdiction to review the denial of summary

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judgment on qualified immunity grounds depends on the type of

issues involved in the appeal.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289,

1295 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). “[W]hen legal questions

of qualified immunity are raised—either to determine whether any

constitutional right was violated or whether the violation of that

right was clearly established—interlocutory appellate jurisdiction

exists.” Hall, 975 F.3d at 1276. “But if the only question before the

appellate court is a factual one, review must wait for a later time.”

Id. In other words, “where . . . the appellant is merely claiming,

‘we didn’t do it,’ interlocutory review is foreclosed.” Id. at 1278

(internal citation omitted).

But where an appellant raises both legal and factual

questions, we have jurisdiction to review both issues. See id. at

1276; Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311–13 (1996); Nelson, 89

F.4th at 1296. In such a case, we have two options, “[w]e may

accept the district court’s findings of fact if they are adequate,” or

“we may conduct our own analysis of the facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1296 (quotations

omitted). But “[e]ven if we chose the latter course, we will not

disturb a factual finding by the district court if there is any record

evidence to support that finding.” 6 Id. (quotation omitted).

6 Additionally, we note that this appeal reaches us on a denial of summary

judgment. “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for

summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds,” accepting the plaintiff’s

version of the facts and drawing all inferences in her favor. Carter v. Butts Cnty.,

821 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2016). “Summary judgment is appropriate only

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Here, defendants raise both legal and factual issues.

Specifically, defendants argue that the district court failed to apply

the correct legal standards governing qualified immunity, noting in

particular the failure to apply the collective-knowledge doctrine to

defendants. 7 We have jurisdiction over those issues. See, e.g.,

Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023) (exercising

jurisdiction over a case in which “defendants argue[d] that the

district court applied the wrong legal standard to assess qualified

immunity” and “under the correct standard, they had arguable

probable cause”). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over this

appeal. See Hall, 975 F.3d at 1276; Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1296.

B. The district court erred by failing to give Deputy Sullivan

and Lieutenant Prescott the benefit of the 911 dispatchers’

collective knowledge of Prospero’s history of 911 calls in

considering whether they have qualified immunity as to

when the moving party demonstrates that no disputed issue of material fact

exists.” Id.

7 The collective-knowledge doctrine is a legal doctrine that allows us to

“aggregate the officers’ knowledge at any given moment” to determine if they

had probable cause for an arrest, rather than evaluate each officer’s actual

knowledge in isolation. United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir.

1985). The doctrine applies so long as the officers “maintained at least a

minimal level of communication [with each other] during their investigation.”

Id.

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both the First Amendment and the malicious-prosecution

claims

Turning to the merits of the claims on appeal, defendants

contend that the district court erred by failing to impute the

collective knowledge about Prospero from the 911 dispatchers to

defendants in evaluating their entitlement to qualified immunity.

Prospero responds that Deputy Sullivan disclaimed reliance on

collective knowledge, and, even if collective knowledge applied,

such knowledge “only further eliminates qualified immunity.”

Defendants reply that Deputy Archibald’s and Sergeant Flowers’s

knowledge of Prospero’s calls helped give defendants probable

cause to arrest Prospero.

We agree with defendants that they get the benefit of

Sergeant Flowers’s knowledge about Prospero and her calls, which

ultimately supports arguable probable cause and defendants’

qualified immunity. To explain why the collective-knowledge

doctrine applies in this case, we first take a step back to explain why

the officers’ or the dispatchers’ knowledge is relevant to their

claims of qualified immunity in the first place.

1. Whether defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity ultimately depends on the officers’

knowledge when they sought Prospero’s arrest

Qualified immunity “shields government officials from

liability for civil damages for torts committed while performing

discretionary duties unless their conduct violates a clearly

established statutory or constitutional right.” Wate v. Kubler, 839

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20 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 2016). When a defendant asserts

qualified immunity, we must answer two questions: (1) whether

the defendant violated the plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional

right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time

of the defendant’s conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735

(2011). 8 As we will explain, for both of Prospero’s claims on appeal,

whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity depends on

whether defendants had arguable probable cause to seek

Prospero’s arrest.

Turning to Prospero’s first claim, a Fourth Amendment

malicious-prosecution claim requires the plaintiff to “prove both

(1) the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution

and (2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable seizures.” Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102, 1111 (11th

Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). The elements of the common-law

tort of malicious prosecution “include: (1) a criminal prosecution

instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice

and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff

accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Id.

(alterations adopted) (quotation omitted). The Fourth

Amendment “adds two elements: The plaintiff must establish

(5) that the legal process justifying her seizure was constitutionally

8 We also ask a threshold question: whether the defendant “acted within the

scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.” Wate, 839 F.3d at 1018. The district court found that defendants

acted “within the scope of their discretionary duties at all relevant times.”

Prospero does not dispute that determination on appeal.

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 21

infirm and (6) that her seizure would not otherwise be justified

without legal process.” Id. at 1111–12 (alterations adopted)

(quotation omitted).

Of those six elements, the first, third, and fourth are

uncontested in this case. Of the remaining elements, we have

explained that “the second element effectively merges into the

fifth” because of the “significant overlap” between those elements.

Id. at 1112 (quotation omitted). And a plaintiff can satisfy the fifth

and sixth elements “by proving that [the defendant] intentionally

or recklessly made misstatements or omissions necessary to

support the warrant that justified his seizure.” Luke v. Gulley, 975

F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). Thus, at

bottom, the second, fifth, and sixth elements collectively require us

to consider (1) whether the defendant intentionally or recklessly

made misstatements or omissions in the arrest affidavit, and

(2) whether the arrest affidavit “still would have established

probable cause” absent the misstatements or omissions. Butler, 85

F.4th at 1116 (quotation omitted). 9 Prospero’s malicious-

prosecution claim thus depends on whether she can show that

defendants lacked probable cause to seek her arrest.

9 We note that when we determine whether an officer made a misstatement

or omission that was intentionally or recklessly false, we must keep in mind

“the leeway that the Fourth Amendment gives law enforcement officers to

make reasonable mistakes.” Butler, 85 F.4th at 1114. “An officer who files an

affidavit in support of an arrest warrant need only have a reasonable belief in

the veracity of the information that she provides, regardless of whether it turns

out to be true.” Id. (alteration adopted) (quotation omitted).

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22 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

The same is true of Prospero’s First Amendment retaliation

claim: it also depends on the absence of probable cause. To

establish her claim, she “must show: (1) she engaged in

constitutionally protected speech, such as her right to petition the

government for redress; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct

adversely affected that protected speech and right to petition; and

(3) a causal connection exists between the defendant’s retaliatory

conduct and the adverse effect on the plaintiff’s speech and right to

petition.” DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289

(11th Cir. 2019). When (as here) the alleged retaliatory conduct is

an arrest, “[t]he presence of probable cause should generally defeat

a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587

U.S. 391, 405 (2019). Thus, “when the governmental defendant has

utilized the legal system to arrest” the plaintiff, the plaintiff must

“plead and prove an absence of probable cause as to the challenged

retaliatory arrest . . . in order to establish the causation link

between the defendant’s retaliatory animus and the plaintiff’s

injury.” DeMartini, 942 F.3d at 1289.

Qualified immunity adds an additional wrinkle to our

probable-cause analysis for both the First Amendment and

malicious-prosecution claims. Because a defendant’s “assertion of

qualified immunity can be defeated only by a showing of ‘clearly

established’ law, we will review not for actual probable cause but

rather for ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116

(emphasis added) (quotation omitted); see also Grider v. City of

Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Redd v. City of

Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Because we hold

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 23

that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Anderson for

disorderly conduct, we must hold that the officers are also entitled

to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs’ First Amendment

claims.”).

The arguable-probable-cause standard, in turn, “asks

whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances and

possessing the same knowledge as the Defendant could have

believed that probable cause existed.” Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116

(alteration adopted) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, for arrests

based on warrants (as we have here), we ask one “controlling

question: Given the (1) information that [the defendant] included

in [his] affidavits and (2) the material information that []he knew but

omitted from those affidavits” or affirmatively misstated, “could a

reasonable officer have believed that probable cause existed to

arrest” the plaintiff? 10 Id. (emphasis added); see also Garcia, 75 F.4th

at 1187–88. If we conclude that “the affidavits (including the

omitted [or corrected] information) would have demonstrated

even arguable probable cause—that a reasonable officer could have

10 As we have explained, however, we cannot consider everything a defendant

knew but omitted from his warrant affidavit. Rather, we consider only

“exculpatory evidence that was omitted from the affidavit.” Sylvester v. Fulton

Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2024). “[A]n otherwise insufficient

affidavit cannot be rehabilitated with information possessed by the officer

when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate.”

Butler, 85 F.4th at 1113 (alterations adopted) (quotation omitted); see Sylvester,

94 F.4th at 1330 (“[I]t is no response to Sylvester’s malicious prosecution claim

that Detective Barnett could have, but did not, present inculpatory evidence

in the affidavit that established probable cause for an arrest.”).

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24 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

believed an offense was committed—then the officers are entitled

to qualified immunity.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1288 (11th

Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted).

In sum, Prospero’s Fourth Amendment malicious-

prosecution claim and her First Amendment retaliation claim both

require Prospero to demonstrate that defendants lacked probable

cause to seek her arrest. But for defendants to receive qualified

immunity, they need only have had “arguable” probable cause for

the arrest. Arguable probable cause depends, in part, on what

defendants knew when they sought Prospero’s arrest pursuant to a

warrant. Accordingly, we next define the boundaries of what

defendants “knew.”

2. Sworn 911 dispatchers’ knowledge may be

imputed to defendants via collective

knowledge

When we determine “what the [defendants] knew at the

time of the [plaintiff’s] arrest,” we consider “the collective

knowledge of law officers if they maintained at least a minimal

level of communication during their investigation.”11 Garcia, 75

11 We reject Prospero’s argument that Deputy Sullivan “disavowed” reliance

on collective knowledge. Deputy Sullivan did not “disavow” collective

knowledge; rather, he testified he did not have actual knowledge of Prospero

or her previous 911 calls when he swore out the warrant affidavit. But of

course, the collective knowledge doctrine only makes a difference in cases

where some officers lack actual knowledge of some information. If we

adopted Prospero’s argument and limited ourselves to reviewing officers’

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 25

F.4th at 1188 (quotation omitted); see also Grider, 618 F.3d at 1257;

Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010).

Typically, we have only applied this collective-knowledge doctrine

among the investigating and arresting police officers—here,

Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant Prescott. See, e.g., Garcia, 75 F.4th

at 1188–89; Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780 F.3d 1108, 1115 (11th Cir.

2015). But the doctrine applies with equal force to the 911

dispatchers in this case: the Camden County dispatchers were law

“officers” with the Sheriff’s Office who were “sworn in by [the]

sheriff just like” any other law enforcement officer. See, e.g., Tillis

ex rel. Wuenschel v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1294, 1302 (11th Cir. 2021)

(imputing to officers’ collective knowledge information that a

caller had given to police on a 911 call). 12 Thus, we treat the

dispatch officers in this case as “law officers” whose knowledge

about Prospero may be imputed to defendants “if they maintained

at least a minimal level of communication during their

investigation.” Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1188 (quotation omitted).

actual knowledge anytime the officers admitted they did not actually know

something, we would never have use for the collective knowledge doctrine.

12 Our decision to consider the dispatchers’ knowledge in this case also finds

support among our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez-Castillo,

324 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he dispatcher’s knowledge is properly

considered as part of our analysis of reasonable suspicion.”); United States v.

Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 327 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[W]here officers are told

to investigate a situation without being told all of the facts justifying

investigation, the court must look beyond the specific facts known to the

officers on the scene to the facts known to the dispatcher.”).

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26 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

Turning to Sergeant Flowers, the record demonstrates that

her knowledge may be imputed to defendants. 13 Sergeant Flowers

was a sworn dispatch officer on Thanksgiving 2018 when she spoke

to Prospero. That day, after Deputy Sullivan declined to respond

to Prospero’s non-emergency calls, Sergeant Flowers agreed that

the calls did not warrant a response and told Deputy Sullivan that

dispatch was familiar with the callers. Specifically, Sergeant

Flowers was familiar with the Prosperos’ history of calls to the

Sheriff’s Office, especially concerning their complaints about

gunfire that turned out to be lawful and safe. Moreover, both

Deputy Sullivan and Sergeant Flowers stated that they later met

and discussed Prospero and her calls during Deputy Sullivan’s

investigation of Prospero, although the details were hazy

concerning when or where that meeting occurred. Accordingly,

we will impute Sergeant Flowers’s knowledge about Prospero’s

past complaints of lawful gunfire to defendants. See id.

C. Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant Prescott had arguable

probable cause to seek Prospero’s arrest

We now decide whether defendants, considering their

actual and collective knowledge, had arguable probable cause to

seek Prospero’s arrest. We conclude that they did. Accordingly,

they are entitled to qualified immunity.

13 Sergeant Flowers’s knowledge suffices to resolve this appeal.

Accordingly,

we do not specifically address Deputy Archibald’s or Heather Sievers’s

knowledge, two dispatchers who also communicated with Deputy Sullivan.

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 27

We begin first with “the elements of the charged crime,”

here, misuse of the 911 system. Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116 (emphasis

omitted). Under Georgia law,

A person commits the offense of unlawful conduct

during a 9-1-1 telephone call if he or she: . . . Calls or

otherwise contacts 9-1-1, whether or not

conversation ensues, for the purpose of annoying,

harassing, or molesting a 9-1-1 communications

officer or for the purpose of interfering with or

disrupting emergency telephone service.

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2). The text of the statute establishes two

elements of this crime: the offender must (1) contact 911 (2) with

the intent to interfere with or disrupt the 911 dispatchers. See id.

The parties agree that Prospero contacted 911; this case turns on

Prospero’s intent when she did so—and by extension, whether a

reasonable officer in Deputy Sullivan or Lieutenant Prescott’s

shoes could have believed there was probable cause Prospero had

such an intent.

With that question in mind, we first consider the

information included in Deputy Sullivan’s warrant affidavit, then

we consider Prospero’s arguments concerning omitted

exculpatory information or misstatements in the affidavit. See

Butler, 85 F.4th at 1113–16; Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1330–31. In our

review for arguable probable cause, we note that “[a]rguable

probable cause does not require an arresting officer to prove every

element of a crime or to obtain a confession before making an

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28 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

arrest, which would negate the concept of probable cause and

transform arresting officers into prosecutors.” Scarbrough v. Myles,

245 F.3d 1299, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2001). Deputy Sullivan’s warrant

affidavit included the following facts:

• On November 22, 2018, Prospero called for “alleged

emergency service.”

• Prospero told dispatch she was calling because “she heard

shots being fired from behind her residence in the area of the

hunting club behind the Chevron Truck Stop.”

• Prospero “did not want contact from law enforcement but

she wanted the shooting to be stopped.”

• Prospero “ended the phone call by hanging up after refusing

to give any further information.”

• Deputy Sullivan “knew the shots were being fired from

private property in which the individuals shooting were well

within their rights to be shooting.”

• Then, Prospero’s husband called the non-emergency

number “and stated the same information that was given to

dispatcher before by Ms. Prospero and still refused to speak

to law enforcement.”

• “Dispatchers relayed the information given by [Deputy

Sullivan] stating that the subjects shooting were within their

rights to do so but Ms. Prospero’s husband did not agree

with the answer and hung up the phone.”

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 29

• Then, Prospero called 911 and stated “she wanted the

shooting from the hunting club to stop.”

• Prospero “began arguing with Emergency Dispatcher by

stating the gun shots were in violation of noise ordinances

and that it needed to be stopped so she could enjoy her

dinner.”

• Prospero rejected opportunities to speak with a deputy and

stated she would contact local news stations.

• Deputy Sullivan arrived at the Prosperos’ home but could

not contact the Prosperos.

Together, the facts in the warrant affidavit establish

arguable probable cause. Specifically, those facts show that when

defendants sought Prospero’s arrest, defendants knew or

reasonably believed (1) Prospero called the non-emergency

number to complain about gunfire coming from behind the

Chevron; (2) such gunfire was lawful; (3) dispatchers told Prospero

that deputies would not respond to the lawful gunfire;

(4) nevertheless, Prospero called 911 to complain about the same

issue; and (5) Prospero declined police contact. From these facts, a

reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed

to arrest Prospero for unlawful conduct during a 911 call. See

Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116.

We now consider whether Prospero “can attack as

inaccurate statements of fact that were in the affidavit [or] present

exculpatory evidence that was omitted from the affidavit” to defeat

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30 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

arguable probable cause. Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1330–31. Prospero

argues that the evidence established several misstatements or

omissions in Deputy Sullivan’s affidavit. According to Prospero,

the misstatements or omissions that she cites demonstrate a

genuine dispute of material fact about whether defendants had

arguable probable cause, precluding summary judgment in

defendants’ favor. But we explain in turn why each of her

arguments is insubstantial pageantry:

• Prospero argues that the affidavit misstates that her first

call was for “alleged emergency service” when she actually

called the non-emergency number. The warrant later

specifies, however, that Prospero called the “non-

emergency number” before calling 911.

• Prospero argues that the affidavit omitted that the Camden

County Emergency Dispatch Center handles both

emergency and non-emergency calls. But this fact is

irrelevant to Prospero’s intent when she called 911.

• Prospero argues that the affidavit mischaracterizes how

uncooperative she was on her first non-emergency call, but

her demeanor on a non-emergency call is irrelevant to her

intent when she called 911.

• Prospero argues that the affidavit misstates the degree of

Deputy Sullivan’s knowledge: Deputy Sullivan did not

know the gunfire lawfully emanated from a private hunting

club when he declined to respond to Prospero’s non-

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 31

emergency calls; rather, he assumed this fact without

verification. This distinction is refuted by Sergeant

Flowers’s knowledge that we have, as discussed, imputed

to Deputy Sullivan. Sergeant Flowers testified that she

recalled several complaints about gunshots emanating

from behind the Chevron station, all from “Mrs. Prospero

and her husband.” Sergeant Flowers also knew that when

officers went to investigate Prospero’s previous calls about

gunshots, the officers “found that it was private property

and a hunting club.” Sergeant Flowers emphasized that by

Thanksgiving 2018, “several deputies had responded

previously to the same area previously for the same

complaints from these same individuals.” Because

Sergeant Flowers’s knowledge is imputed to Deputy

Sullivan, Deputy Sullivan had a factual basis for this

statement in the warrant affidavit.14

• Prospero argues that the affidavit omits exculpatory

information that Prospero sought only to stop the gunfire,

not to disrupt the 911 service. We reject this argument

14 For good measure, we also note that Deputy Sullivan grew up in the area,

knew the owners of the property behind the Chevron station, and knew that

they shot at a range on the property. Deputy Sullivan’s familiarity with the

area and owners also gave him a reasonable belief that the gunfire was legal,

which is an acceptable basis for statements made in a warrant affidavit. See

Butler, 85 F.4th at 1114.

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32 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

because the affidavit repeatedly states that the Prosperos

called because they wanted the shooting to stop.

• Prospero argues that the affidavit misstates that she was on

the phone with 911 for 32 minutes when her calls were only

a few minutes long. We reject this argument because

although the affidavit says Prospero “commit[ted]” the

offense from 2:58 PM to 3:30 PM, the narrative section

describes that Prospero’s 911 call was placed at 2:58 PM,

and by 3:15 PM, Deputy Sullivan had arrived at the

Prosperos’ house and asked dispatch to try calling Prospero

again. Thus, the factual narrative shows that Prospero’s

911 call did not last until 3:30 PM. But in any event, the

relevant inquiry is whether Prospero called 911 with intent

to be disruptive. See O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2). The

degree of her success in actually being disruptive—as

measured by how long she occupied a dispatch officer—is

irrelevant.

• Prospero argues that the affidavit could be read to say that

Prospero mentioned a hunting club when she never did.

But Prospero cites no evidence that this purported

misstatement is anything other than ambiguity in the text

of the affidavit.

• Prospero argues that the affidavit misstates that she called

the non-emergency number twice before calling 911 when

Prospero only called the non-emergency number once.

Her husband called the second time. The factual narrative

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24-10086 Opinion of the Court 33

of the affidavit correctly explains, however, that Prospero’s

husband placed the second non-emergency call.

Thus, Prospero fails to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact about whether Deputy Sullivan made any intentional

or reckless misstatements or omissions in his warrant affidavit.

And as discussed, the undisputed material facts contained in the

warrant affidavit demonstrate arguable probable cause. Based on

the events of Thanksgiving 2018, a reasonable officer could have

believed that probable cause existed to arrest Prospero for calling

911 “for the purpose of interfering with or disrupting emergency

telephone service.” O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2); see Butler, 85 F.4th

at 1116. 15

* * *

As we have explained, the existence of probable cause

defeats Prospero’s First and Fourth Amendment claims premised

on her arrest. See Nieves, 587 U.S. at 405; Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116.

Thus, the existence of arguable probable cause entitles Deputy

15 Throughout her brief, Prospero insists that she made her real purpose clear

on the calls: she just wanted deputies to stop the gunshots. We reject

Prospero’s implication that she could have only one purpose at any given time.

Georgia prohibits all purposefully disruptive 911 calls regardless of whether

those calls are a means to a lawful end or are an end in themselves. See

O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2). In other words, Prospero still broke Georgia law

if she was purposefully disrupting the dispatch center to serve her overarching

purpose of motivating the Sheriff’s Office to respond more quickly to the

gunshots.

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34 Opinion of the Court 24-10086

Sullivan and Lieutenant Prescott 16 to qualified immunity as to both

claims. See Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116; Redd, 140 F.3d at 1383. On this

record, based on Prospero’s own actions, Prospero failed to

demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact that a reasonable

officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest

Prospero for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.2(b)(2). Accordingly,

we conclude that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court should have

granted Deputy Sullivan and Lieutenant Prescott summary

judgment based on qualified immunity. Accordingly, we reverse.

REVERSED.

16 We note that “each defendant is entitled to an independent qualified-

immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and omissions.” Alcocer v.

Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). But we agree with the district court

that in this case, Lieutenant Prescott’s entitlement to qualified immunity

depends on Deputy Sullivan’s conduct and knowledge because Deputy

Sullivan took the lead on the pair’s investigation and swore out the warrant

affidavit. Lieutenant Prescott merely assisted Deputy Sullivan and could have

intervened to stop Deputy Sullivan from seeking a warrant. Because we

conclude that Deputy Sullivan did not violate Prospero’s clearly established

rights, neither did Lieutenant Prescott.