Clements v. Secretary, Department of Corrections LEE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

LOUIS MATTHEW CLEMENTS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:24-cv-294-JES-NPM

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

/

ORDER

Petitioner Louis Matthew Clements has filed an “Emergency

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction

Pending Permanent Injunction.” (Doc. 24).1 Petitioner, who is a

registered sex offender, asks the Court to enjoin the state from

enforcing a Florida statute that does not allow him to reside

within 1000 feet of where children regularly congregate. (Id.)

The motion is denied.

Background

In 2008, Petitioner was 37 years old. (Doc. 24). He was

charged with having sex with a thirteen-year-old child. (Id.) He

faced fifteen years in prison if convicted at trial. (No. 2:17-

cv-396-JLB-NPM at docket entry 25-1, p. 75.) He pleaded guilty

to a lesser charge in exchange for a five-year term of sex offender

1

The Court has reviewed the pleading and concluded that it

does not constitute an emergency.

probation. (Id. at p. 76.) As a result of his conviction,

Petitioner is subject to lifetime registration and residency

restrictions as a sex offender. IDoc. 1 at 1–2). Plaintiff has

completed his term of supervision and seeks to challenge his guilty

plea in a new habeas petition. (Doc. 1).

The Court initially dismissed this petition for lack of

jurisdiction, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in

Clements v. Florida, which held that “[t]he restrictions on freedom

of movement” imposed by Florida’s lifetime registration and

reporting requirements were “not severe enough” to place sex

offenders “in custody” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 59 F.4th 1204,

1215–17 (11th Cir. 2023). On July 9, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit

concluded that the dismissal was premature because the Court did

not consider the restrictions on sex offenders’ residency when

determining that Petitioner was not in custody when he filed the

petition. (Doc. 21). Specifically, the appellate court

determined that the parties should have “the opportunity to develop

the record as to the restrictions imposed by Florida’s sex-offender

residency requirements” so that the district court can “rule on

whether these residency restrictions, considered in combination

with the registration and reporting requirements” render

Petitioner “in custody” for purposes of filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254

habeas corpus petition. (Id. at 7).

In response to the remand, the Court directed the parties to

conduct any necessary research or discovery on the residency

restrictions and reporting requirements for Florida sex offenders

to determine whether the requirements render a petitioner “in

custody” for habeas purposes, even when the petitioner is no longer

in physical custody. (Doc. 23.) Petitioner now argues that he

should not have to continue registering as a sex offender while

awaiting the Court’s consideration of his pending habeas petition.

Discussion

A temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is

appropriate only when the movant demonstrates that: (1) there is

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) injunctive

relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury; (3) the

threatened injury outweighs the harm that injunctive relief would

cause the non-movant; and (4) injunctive relief would not be averse

to the public interest. See Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d

1214, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985). A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary and drastic remedy that should not be granted unless

the movant clearly establishes all four prerequisites. See

McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir.1998).

Petitioner cannot satisfy the first or fourth requirements.

First, in the absence of the parties’ research and argument

on the issue of custody, the Court remains unconvinced that it has

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the instant habeas petition.

But even if the Court determines that it does have jurisdiction,

Petitioner is unlikely to obtain federal habeas corpus relief.

First, unless Petitioner can demonstrate equitable tolling,2 his

federal habeas petition is almost certainly untimely. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Next, Petitioner generally argues in his

petition—as he has argued in several unsuccessful civil rights

cases in federal court—that it is unfair that certain people who

have sex with children do not face prosecution, and he faults his

defense counsel for failing to raise this as a defense. (Doc. 1

at 5–10). However, Petitioner has already unsuccessfully raised

similar arguments in federal court. See, e.g., MDFL Case No.

2:24-cv-197-JES-NPM at docket entry 87 (explaining that

Petitioner’s constitutional claims against the laws governing

2

To obtain equitable tolling, the petitioner must show “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely

filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quotation

omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has defined “the appropriate

standard for gauging when attorney error amounts to an

extraordinary circumstance.” See Cadet v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

853 F.3d 1216, 1221-1222 (11th Cir. 2017). In Cadet, the Court

held that “attorney negligence, even gross or egregious

negligence, does not by itself qualify as an ‘extraordinary

circumstance’ for purposes of equitable tolling.” Id. at 1227.

Petitioner does not even argue for equitable tolling in his

petition. Instead, he asserts that defense counsel was ineffective

for not telling him that the statute was unconstitutional—

notwithstanding that no court has ever made this finding—and that

“[t]he State of Florida did not disclose the unconstitutionality

of Statutes and to this day have not and continue to represent the

statutes as constitutional.” (Doc. 1 at 13.) These arguments do

not explain why Petitioner did not challenge the statutes in a

timely section 2254 petition.

Florida’s sex offender registry “are foreclosed both by his prior

litigation and by precedent”).

Next, Petitioner has not demonstrated that removing the sex

offender designation or the residency requirements of a convicted

sex offender would be in the public’s best interest. The Eleventh

Circuit and the United States Supreme Court have confirmed the

constitutionality of the reporting requirements of sex offenders

because “based on evidence of increased recidivism among a class

of felons, [the requirements are] rationally related to the state’s

interest in protecting its citizens from criminal activity.” Doe

v. Moore, 410 F. 3d 1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Doe, 538

U.S. 84 (2003) (noting that the broad categories of a sex offender

registration statute “and the corresponding length of the

reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of

recidivism”).

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion

for injunctive relief (Doc. 24) is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on September 3, 2025.

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J9GHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE