York v. Sarabia

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

VINCENT E. YORK, JR.,

Plaintiff

No. 21 CV 3978

v.

Judge Jeremy C. Daniel

JOSE SARABIA et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on the defendants, Detective Jose Sarabia and

the City of North Chicago’s, motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff, Vincent

York’s, wrongful arrest, unlawful detention, malicious prosecution, and related

claims. (R. 78.) Specifically, the defendants assert that they are entitled to summary

judgment on all claims because (1) Sarabia has absolute witness immunity, (2)

probable cause existed for York’s arrest, (3) Sarabia “did not initiate or commence

any prosecution,” and (4) Sarabia has qualified immunity. (R. 80 at 2.)1 For the

reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1 For ECF filings, the Court cites to the page number(s) set forth in the document’s ECF

header unless citing to a particular paragraph or other page designation is more appropriate.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 submissions,2

the materials cited therein, and other aspects of the record in this case.3

I. CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN YORK AND WILSON

The events of this case started on September 14, 2019. Throughout that day,

York had been caring for his daughter, whom he shared with his ex-partner, Laquitta

York. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 5.) When York went to drop his daughter off with

Laquitta, he was confronted by Laquitta’s boyfriend, Brian Wilson, who “threatened

and pushed [York] away.” (Id. ¶ 7.) After York left, he continued to speak with

Laquitta on the phone; he determined that Laquitta seemed to “want[ ] to work things

out” so he drove back toward her house. (Id. ¶ 9.) They did not meet at Laquitta’s

house, however, but at a nearby Citgo gas station. (Id. ¶ 11.) York exited his vehicle

and approached Laquitta, who was in her car. (Id.) The two continued to argue, and

2 Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def. SOF”) (R. 79); Plaintiff’s

Statement of Additional Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(B)(3)(c) (“Pl. SOF”) (R. 88);

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl. Resp. to

Def. SOF”) (R. 89); Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Facts (“Def.

Resp. to Pl. SOF”) (R. 101.)

3 The defendants have moved to strike York’s exhibits. (R. 100.) First, they argue that

York’s statement of facts should be stricken for including an additional 15 facts in violation

of the local rules. (Id. at 1, ¶ 2.) The Court has discretion to enforce its local rules. See Igasaki

v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 956 (7th Cir. 2021). That said, in its

consideration of the summary judgment motion, the Court found that certain of the

additional facts were material to the disposition of the case. So, it declines to strike them.

The Court will, however, remind York’s lawyer that she is expected to comply with all of the

Court’s rules, including the local rules, going forward. In addition, the defendants’ motion to

strike asks the Court to strike the transcripts of certain grand jury proceedings and an

opinion from a Lake County circuit court judge. (R. 100 at 1–2, ¶ 4.) The Court did not rely

on these documents in coming to its decision on this motion; for instance, certain of those

additional facts cited not to the grand jury transcript, but to Sarabia’s deposition transcript.

As such, the Court denies the motion to strike.

York realized that Wilson was in the passenger seat of Laquitta’s car. (Id. ¶ 12.) As

the argument continued, Wilson grabbed York’s arm through the window and pulled

him close to the car. (Id. ¶ 13.) York and Wilson punched each other, and Laquitta

drove “about 50 feet across the street with Wilson still holding York’s arm.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

York managed to get his arm away from Wilson and “ended up face-first on the

concrete.” (Id. ¶ 15.) “When York looked up, he saw Wilson standing over him with a

gun pointed at him.” (Id. ¶ 16.) York heard a gunshot while he was still on the ground;

he “army crawled into a running position” toward his own car and was hit by an

oncoming car. (Id. ¶ 18.) There were two more gunshots. (Id. ¶ 19.) York dove into his

car, ducked down, and started to drive away. (Id. ¶¶ 20–21.) While driving, York

“stayed down by the wheel well and couldn’t see anything but the seat” so as to “avoid

getting shot by [ ] Wilson.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 1.) “York’s car was going in circles

. . . and [he] heard multiple loud bangs and hit something, which [York] believed to

be a curb or sign.” (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 22.) In fact, during these events, York

struck “Wilson with his car,” leading to Wilson’s death. (R. 80 at 1.)

II. THE 911 CALLS

As York drove away from Citgo, he called 911. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 24.) The

call was routed to the Waukegan Police Department. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶¶ 9, 25.)

This is relevant because the Citgo where the shooting took place was actually in

North Chicago, which shares a border with Waukegan. (See R. 79-2 (“Sarabia Dep.”)

at 71:7–73:7 (describing North Chicago jurisdiction and location of Citgo).) York

reported to the dispatcher that “Wilson fired shots at him in front of the Citgo [g]as

[s]tation.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 2.) York also reported that “he did not know if he

struck Wilson.” (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 25.) York had two more phone conversations

with the Waukegan 911 operator, separate from his initial 911 call. (Def. Resp. to Pl.

SOF ¶ 3.) The operator told York to return to the scene and then to go to the North

Chicago Police Department (NCPD). (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶¶ 27–28.) York was also

asked by the Waukegan dispatcher how Wilson “ended up with a bullet hole in his

head.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 5.) York chose not to return to the scene because

“Wilson was shooting at him [earlier] and he did not feel safe.” (Id. ¶ 4.) He also chose

not to go to the NCPD “because he was being accused of shooting Wilson in the head

and wanted to consult with an attorney.” (Id. ¶ 7.)

III. THE INVESTIGATION

Meanwhile, the NCPD began an investigation into the Citgo incident.

Detective Sarabia was the lead investigator. (Sarabia Dep. at 21:22–22:3.) Sarabia

checked the NCPD 911 call logs and did not see any calls from York’s phone number.

(Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 35.) But “[b]ecause [Waukegan and North Chicago] share a

border, [ ] Sarabia knew that 911 calls can go to the Waukegan or North Chicago

dispatch center depending on the location of the caller.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 8.) A

different officer, Detective Flores, was sent to get records from the Waukegan police

department. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 32.) “Flores did not receive any 911 call logs

from Waukegan PD.” (Id. ¶ 33.) During the investigation, Sarabia and his fellow

detectives “located and interviewed three eyewitnesses to the shooting . . . who all

saw Wilson with a handgun shooting in the air and at York.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF

¶ 14.) Other evidence was collected related to Wilson using a gun at the Citgo. (Id. ¶¶

15–17.)

On September 17, 2019, York self-surrendered to the NCPD. (Id. ¶ 19.) He

was accompanied by an attorney. (Id.) During his interview, York told Sarabia and

Detective Mueller, who was also present in the interview, that “he called 911 and

reported the accident minutes after it happened.” (Id. ¶ 20.) York consented to a

search of his phone; his attorney offered to print out phone logs as well, but the

detectives declined that offer because they had their own technicians to do data

dumps. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) T-Mobile phone logs that were later obtained showed that

York called 911 on September 14, and that minutes later, a Waukegan municipal

number called him twice. (Id. ¶ 25.) York’s phone also showed the calls from the

Waukegan municipal number. (Id. ¶ 26.) The officers made no additional follow-up

regarding any phone records from Waukegan. When the interview was over, York

was placed in a holding cell to await a charging decision. (Id. ¶ 43.)

IV. CHARGING DECISION

After the interview, an Assistant State’s Attorney (“ASA”) from the Felony

Review Unit of the Lake County State’s Attorney’s Office (“LCSAO”) came to the

NCPD to meet with the officers and discuss the case. (R. 79-3 (“Rollins Dep.”) at 33:8–

34:15.) At these “roundtable” discussions, “the lead officer does the presentation.” (Id.

at 37:7–9.) In this case, that would have been Sarabia or Mueller, or both together.

(Id. at 37:17–24.) At his deposition, Detective Rollins, who was present at the

roundtable, testified that he “d[id] not recall [ ] Sarabia telling the Felony Review

ASA about the Waukegan [m]unicipal calls on [York’s] phone[.]” (Def. Resp. at Pl.

SOF ¶ 35.)

The day after the roundtable, Mueller “went to York’s holding cell to explain

that they were going to take him to (Lake) County on a charge of leaving the scene of

an accident because he did not call the police.” (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 53.) Sarabia

ultimately signed the criminal complaint “charging York with violating [Illinois

statute] 625 ILCS 5/11-401 for failing to report an accident or leaving the scene of an

accident resulting in death.” (Id. ¶ 56.)

V. GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS

After York was charged with fleeing the scene, a grand jury session was

convened on October 16, 2019. (Id. ¶ 60.) During that session, Sarabia testified that

“North Chicago 911 dispatch had no record that York called 911 after the incident.”

(Id. ¶ 61.) York asserts that this and related testimony regarding the 911 calls were

lies. (See, e.g., R. 93 at 5–6.) The grand jury returned an indictment for fleeing the

scene (“First Indictment”). (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 62.) However, shortly after this

indictment, the LCSAO learned that “York’s criminal defense attorney possessed 911

calls that York had made to Waukegan 911 dispatch.” (Id. ¶ 63.) Sarabia retrieved

those records from the defense attorney and provided them to the LCSAO. (Id. ¶ 64.)

Once the calls were reviewed, in November 2019, Sarabia returned to the grand jury

for a second time, testifying as to their existence. (Id. ¶ 67.) The LCSAO dismissed

the fleeing-the-scene charges against York. (Id.)

However, nearly eight months later, on July 20, 2020, Sarabia was contacted

by ASA Kenneth LaRue, who “stat[ed] that criminal charges were going to be brought

against York.” (Id. ¶ 69.) Sarabia had not had any contact with LaRue in the

intervening months before this email. (Id.) Sarabia was brought before the grand jury

again on July 22, 2020; LaRue did not prep him in advance. (Id. ¶ 71; Def. Resp. to

Pl. SOF ¶ 46–47.) “Sarabia only learned at the third Grand Jury that the LCSAO was

now pursuing murder charges against York relative to the death of Wilson.” (Pl. Resp.

to Def. SOF ¶ 72.) During the session, Sarabia testified “in the affirmative” that he

“d[idn’t] know anymore about [the gunshot]’ from the Citgo incident. (Def. Resp. to

Pl. SOF ¶ 47.) According to York, that was a lie. (Id. ¶¶ 48–52.) A murder indictment

was returned (“Third Indictment”) but ultimately dismissed in December 2020. (Id. ¶

54.)

VI. THIS CASE

York brought this lawsuit against the defendants—and others who have since

been dismissed—alleging a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (Count I), a Fourth Amendment unlawful detention claim under § 1983 (Count

II), a malicious prosecution claim4 (Count III), a conspiracy claim pursuant to § 1983

(Count IV),5 and an indemnification claim (Count V). (R. 20.)

4 There is no federal claim for malicious prosecution in the Seventh Circuit. Beck v. City

of Chicago, No. 20 C 5329, 2020 WL 7353405, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2020) (citing Manuel v.

City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018)). The Court exercises pendent jurisdiction

over this state law claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

5 In a footnote, York states that “[w]ith the dismissal of [ ] Mueller as a defendant, [York]

will dismiss his conspiracy claim.” (R. 93 at 2 n.1.) The Court treats this as a motion to

voluntarily dismiss that claim and grants the motion as such. See EEOC v. DHL Express, 10

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ if it is one identified by law as affecting the outcome

of the case.” Nat’l Am. Ins. Co. v. Artisan & Truckers Cas. Co., 796 F.3d 717, 722 (7th

Cir. 2015). If a reasonable jury, when viewing the record and all reasonable inferences

from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, could return a verdict for the

nonmovant, then a genuine dispute of material fact exists.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluating a motion for summary

judgment, the Court “construe[s] all facts and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor[.]” Lewis v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir.

2022) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

The defendants argue that all of York’s claims against Sarabia are barred

because he “enjoys absolute witness immunity from liability for his testimony to the

grand juries.” (R. 80 at 3.) In the defendants’ view, Sarabia “had no choice in serving

as a witness before the grand jury,” and even if he “testified falsely, mistakenly, or

incorrectly . . . and/or conspired with any prosecutor to do so,” Sarabia is “absolutely

immune” from liability. (Id. at 3, 5.) York counters that this “oversimplified argument

C 6139, 2011 WL 6825497, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2011) (construing statement that claim

was withdrawn as a “motion to voluntarily dismiss those claims” and acting accordingly).

. . . fails to accept that [ ] Sarabia’s misconduct extended beyond his actual testimony

before the Grand Jury.” (R. 93 at 4.) In support, York describes several aspects of the

case that Sarabia was allegedly involved in, including, among other things, the

investigation into Wilson’s death as “lead investigator” and his meeting with the

felony review prosecutor. (Id. at 4–6; see, e.g., Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶¶ 12, 29–33.)

Grand jury witnesses have absolute immunity “from any § 1983 claim based

on the witness’ testimony.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 (2012). But the

Supreme Court was clear that such absolute immunity does not extend to “all activity

that a witness conducts outside of the grand jury room.” Id. at 370 n.1 (emphasis in

original). In other words, a detective who testifies in front of the grand jury cannot

“retroactively immunize himself from conduct [outside the grand jury] by perfecting

his wrong-doing” through his testimony and then “arguing that the tort was not

completed until a time at which he had acquired absolute immunity.” Avery v. City of

Milwaukee, 847 F.3d 433, 442 (7th Cir. 2017).

To suggest that the Fourth Amendment claims against Sarabia are based

solely on his grand jury testimony is contrary to the record before the Court. There is

no dispute that Sarabia was the lead investigator on Wilson’s death case. (Def. Resp.

to Pl. SOF ¶ 12.) In that role, he located and interviewed eyewitnesses. (Id. ¶¶ 14,

17.) Sarabia also interviewed York after he turned himself in. (Id. ¶ 20; Pl. Resp. to

Def. SOF ¶ 38.) During that interview, York showed Sarabia his phone, which

“showed the calls from the Waukegan municipal number minutes after the accident.”

(Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 26.) Sarabia also participated in the round table discussion

with the LCSAO, and he likely led it, as “primarily, the lead officer does the

presentation.” (Id. ¶ 32; Rollins Dep. at 37:8–9, 13–14.) Though York had told Sarabia

about the 911 calls he made, Rollins testified that he “d[id] not recall Detective

Sarabia telling the Felony Review ASA about the Waukegan Municipal calls on Mr.

York’s phone at the round-table presentation.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 35.) And this

was a crucial issue during that discussion. (Id. ¶ 34 (citing Rollins Dep. at 40:18–22).)

Then, after these investigatory steps were taken, Sarabia testified before the grand

jury. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40; Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶¶ 60–62.) This is not a case where York’s

§ 1983 claims are “based [solely] on [Sarabia’s] testimony.” Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 369.

Rather, the claims are based on a myriad of actions taken by Sarabia, which

culminated in the charges brought against York. There is no absolute immunity for

that. Therefore, the Court denies the defendants’ motion on that basis.

York also argues that Sarabia is not entitled to absolute immunity for “lying

to the grand jury.” (R. 93 at 8.) From York’s perspective, Sarabia testified in his first

grand jury appearance that York did not call 911, and that there was no evidence of

those calls on York’s phone. (Id.; see also Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶¶ 39–40.)6 The

defendants counter that not only is Sarabia absolutely immune for his testimony in

6 The Court notes that York asserted that in Sarabia’s third appearance before the grand

jury, he lied when he said he “knew ‘nothing else about the gunshot,’” and that was the

“factual predicate for York’s Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and unlawful

detention.” (R. 93 at 9.) However, as the Court will discuss, the false arrest and unlawful

detention claims related to York’s murder charge must be dismissed. The Court therefore will

not address whether York has absolute immunity for that purported lie to the grand jury, in

this context.

front of the grand jury, but even if he did lie to the grand jury, the testimony is

irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment claims York brought. (R. 102 at 6.)

While Sarabia is absolutely immune from claims based on his grand jury

testimony, Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 369, that does not render the grand jury testimony

irrelevant. And the defendants’ argument that the grand jury testimony is irrelevant

does not square with their argument that the testimony is what underpinned the

charges. But more importantly, just because the jury cannot find Sarabia liable for

his grand jury testimony, this does not mean that they cannot weigh what, if any,

effect Sarabia’s grand jury testimony has on his credibility here. York says that

Sarabia lied about the 911 calls. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶¶ 39–40.) The defendants

assert that Sarabia testified that North Chicago 911 dispatch “had no record that

York called 911 after the incident.” (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 61.) The first grand jury

returned an indictment for leaving the scene of an accident. (Id. ¶ 62.) Whether

Sarabia’s purportedly false testimony led to this outcome is at issue. See Hurt v. Wise,

880 F.3d 831, 844 (7th Cir. 2018), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. City of

Chicago, 914 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d

418, 423 (7th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that evidence of causation for a

constitutional violation include actions that officers took to further the prosecution

after arrest)). A jury should hear this evidence, which precludes a finding that

absolute immunity applies to Sarabia’s grand jury testimony.

II. MERITS OF YORK’S CLAIMS

York’s Fourth Amendment claims relate to the actions taken with respect to

both the First Indictment and the Third Indictment. (See generally R. 20.) The Court

first addresses the claims stemming from the First Indictment and then turns to

Sarabia’s conduct with respect to the Third Indictment.

A. First Indictment

1. Probable Cause

The defendants argue that all of York’s claims are barred by the existence of

probable cause. (R. 80 at 5.) They assert the indictment returned against York for

violating 625 ILCS 5/11-401 is a “felling blow” to York’s claims because “[a]n

indictment is prima facie evidence that probable cause existed for an arrest.” (R. 80

at 5 (citing Andersen v. Vill. of Glenview, 2018 WL 6192171, at *15–16 (N.D. Ill.

2018)). York counters that “[t]he mere fact that an indictment [was] obtained based

on [ ] Sarabia’s false narrative does not shield him from liability for the false

testimony and misconduct that secured that very indictment.” (R. 93 at 10.) Moreover,

York asserts that “there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was probable

cause as to the first indictment.” (Id. at 11.)

“Probable cause is an absolute defense to a Fourth Amendment unlawful

detention claim, whether it is for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious

prosecution.” Franklin v. Askew, 19 C 4375, 2022 WL 17093358, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov.

21, 2022) (citing Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006)).

“Probable cause exists if the facts available at the time of an individual’s arrest are

sufficient to support a reasonable person believing the individual has committed an

offense.” Muhammad v. Vill. of South Holland, 12 C 275, 2013 WL 178848 at *3 (N.D.

Ill. Apr. 25, 2013) (citing Chelios v. Heavener, 520 F.3d 678. 686 (7th Cir. 2008)). At

summary judgment, “[York] must raise a genuine dispute of material fact to support

the absence of probable cause.” Franklin, 2022 WL 17093358, at *4 (citing Logan v.

Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 926 (7th Cir. 2001)). While typically the existence of

probable cause is a jury question, “a court can determine if probable cause exists

where the underlying facts are not in dispute.” Muhammad, 2013 WL 178848 at *3

(citing Chelios, 520 F.3d at 686).

The focus of the defendants’ argument is that based on the evidence, “there

was probable cause for [York’s] arrest for leaving the scene.” (R. 80 at 5.) First, the

statute requires that a driver in a motor vehicle crash “resulting in personal injury

to or death of any person” stops immediately and remains at the scene of the crash.

625 ILCS 5/11-401(a). If a person failed to stop or remain at the scene of the crash,

they must “report the place of the crash, the date, the approximate time, the driver’s

name and address . . . at a police station or sheriff’s office near the place where such

crash occurred.” Id. at (b). The defendants’ view of the evidence is that York did not

remain at the scene of the vehicle accident. (R. 80 at 7; Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 23.)

And though York called 911, (Pl. Resp. to Def. ¶ 24–25), he failed to either return to

the scene or go to the NCPD. (R. 80 at 7.) In contrast, York asserts that his actions

do not meet the elements of the offense in that he did not know, as the statute

requires, that the accident involved another person. (R. 93 at 11–12); see also Abbott

v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 715 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The existence of probable

cause . . . depends, in the first instance, on the elements of the predicate criminal

offense(s) as defined by state law.”). York maintains that he was fleeing because

Wilson was shooting at him, and that he hit something that he thought was a “curb

or a sign.” (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶¶ 21–22.) He also told the dispatcher that he did

not know what he hit. (Id. ¶ 25.) This demonstrates to the Court that there is a fact

issue as to whether there was probable cause to arrest York for the offense because

he allegedly lacked the required mens rea. See generally People v. Meuris, 51 N.E.3d

1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (explaining how for 625 ILCS 5/11-401(a) offense, a

requirement of the offense is that defendant had knowledge of an accident involving

a person).

There is also the issue of the 911 calls. York posits that the “first grand jury

indictment was based on [ ] Sarabia’s false testimony that he searched for 911 calls

and that York’s phone had ‘no indication’ of any 911 calls.” (R. 93 at 11.) In Sarabia’s

investigation, Sarabia found there were no North Chicago 911 calls from York. (Pl.

Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 35.) Sarabia also had a different officer attempt to obtain records

from Waukegan, but no records were returned. (Id. ¶ 33.) Nonetheless, he did not

arrest York then; he moved forward with York’s interview. (Id. ¶¶ 37–38; Def. Resp.

to Pl. SOF ¶ 19.) York not only told Sarabia that he called 911 and reported the

accident, but he also consented to a search of his phone, which showed calls from a

Waukegan municipal number “minutes after the accident.” (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶

20, 22, 26.) According to York, Sarabia did not follow up on this; the defendants state

that that Sarabia assumed there were no calls (id. ¶ 27), despite what he learned in

the interview with York. Then, Sarabia testified in front of the grand jury that he

found “no indication” of calls on York’s phone, and that he “searched ‘the 911 call

logs’” and there was no evidence of calls. (Id. ¶¶ 39–40.)

Viewing this evidence in York’s favor, whether Sarabia had probable cause to

arrest is in dispute because he had knowledge of a possible report made about the

accident and seemingly ignored it in favor of the evidence he already acquired. To be

sure, “police officers have no duty to investigate extenuating circumstances or search

for exculpatory evidence once probable cause has been established via the accusation

of a credible witness.” Mustafa, 442 F.3d at 548. But that is not what we are talking

about here. Here, the facts show that the investigation included talking to

witnesses—none of whom seemingly described a car accident resulting in injury or

death, (see Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶¶ 14–18)—attempting to obtain phone calls, (id. ¶

13; Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶¶ 33, 35), and then talking to York, who stated he made

those phone calls, (Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 20), before any arrest determination was

made. These demonstrate that there is a fact dispute as to whether Sarabia had

probable cause to arrest and detain York, (see R. 79-9 at 2 (arrest record prepared by

Sarabia).) This dispute also impacts the grand jury testimony Sarabia later gave, that

led to the indictment returned against York. Therefore, the Court denies the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this basis as it pertains to the 625 ILCS

5/11-401 charge.

2. Malicious Prosecution

The defendants argue the malicious prosecution claim should still fail, even if

their absolute immunity and probable cause arguments do not carry the day. (R. 80

at 8.) To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, York must prove “(1)

commencement or continuation of a judicial proceeding, (2) favorable termination, (3)

absence of probable cause, (4) malice, and (5) damages.” Johnson v. Perez, No. 12 C

9225, 2025 WL 1029254, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2025).

The defendants suggest that the malicious prosecution claim also fails because

“there is no evidence that [ ] Sarabia initiated these proceedings [related to the 625

ILCS 5/11-401 charge].” (R. 80 at 8.) That argument fails. “The Seventh Circuit has

consistently recognized malicious prosecution claims against police officers,

particularly when there has been an allegation of misconduct on the part of the

police.” Gardley v. City of Chicago, No. 20 C 5149, 2022 WL 6757610, at *8 (N.D. Ill.

Oct. 11, 2022); see also Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988)

(“[A] prosecutor’s decision to charge, a grand jury’s decision to indict, a prosecutor’s

decision not to drop charges but to proceed to trial—none of these decisions will shield

a police officer who deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced the

decision.”). As has been discussed, York has presented evidence that a reasonable

jury could use to determine Sarabia lied to the grand jury regarding the events from

September 14, 2019, and that these lies led to the grand jury returning an indictment

for fleeing the scene. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 62.) This means there is a factual

dispute, and this claim must go to the jury.

In sum, as it relates to Counts I through III and pertains to the 625 ILCS 5-

11/401 indictment, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied.

B. Third Indictment

1. Probable Cause

With respect to the Fourth Amendment claims relating to York’s murder

charge, the defendants assert that York failed to address that “Sarabia did not arrest

or detain York for murder.” (R. 102 at 3.) This is true; as such, any arguments

regarding Sarabia’s involvement in York’s arrest and detention for murder are

waived. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to

respond to an argument . . . results in waiver.”). Moreover, there is no evidence in the

record that Sarabia arrested York for murder, placed him into custody for that

offense, or signed a criminal complaint against him. He therefore cannot be held

liable. See Gholson v. Lewis, 2008 WL 4976246, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2008)

(explaining that false arrest claim against defendant officer failed because officer did

not arrest plaintiff, place him into custody, or sign a criminal complaint against

plaintiff). To the extent York believes these claims should survive because Sarabia’s

testimony in the third grand jury session was “the factual predicate for York’s Fourth

Amendment claims for false arrest and unlawful detention regarding the murder

charges[,]” that argument fails. “The fact that [ ] grand jury testimony caused the

subsequent arrest is irrelevant [in this context], because testifying and arresting are

two independent acts.” Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus,

whether there was probable cause here matters not, for the false arrest and unlawful

detention claims related to murder must be dismissed against Sarabia because he did

not participate in those acts.

2. Malicious Prosecution

The malicious prosecution claim related to the murder charges must also be

dismissed. When it comes to the commencement or continuation element of malicious

prosecution, when brought against a police officer, “the chain of causation is only

broken if the prosecutor’s decision [to bring charges] is completely independent of any

action on the part of the individual whom the plaintiff is trying to hold liable.” Rivera

v. Lake Cnty., 974 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1191 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing Jones, 856 F.2d at

993). Though Sarabia testified before the grand jury, York admits that ASA LaRue

emailed Sarabia “stating criminal charges were going to be brought against York.”

(Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 69.) This occurred before Sarabia went into the grand jury,

suggesting that the decision to charge was already made prior to the testimony. (Id.

(email on July 20, 2020); Def. Resp. to Pl. SOF ¶ 46 (grand jury proceedings on July

22, 2020)). Sarabia also had no contact with ASA LaRue other than when he was in

front of the grand jury. (Pl. Resp. to Def. SOF ¶ 70.) Because the prosecutor’s decision

to charge was “completely independent” of any action Sarabia took, this breaks the

causal link. See Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996) (“It is

conceivable that a wrongful arrest could be the first step towards a malicious

prosecution. However, the chain of causation is broken by an indictment, absent an

allegation of pressure or influence exerted by the police officers, or knowing

misstatements made by the officers to the prosecutors.”) (citations omitted). The

motion with respect to the murder indictment malicious prosecution charge is

granted.

In sum, as they relate to the Third Indictment, the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on Counts I through III is granted.

III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The defendants assert that Sarabia is also entitled to qualified immunity

because it was “reasonable to believe that arguable probable cause to arrest York was

present.” (R. 80 at 12 (citing Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 908 (7th Cir.

2018)). “[T]he doctrine of qualified immunity ‘shields officers from civil liability so

long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Muhammad, 900 F.3d at

903 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). It is the plaintiff’s burden to

overcome the invocation of qualified immunity; to do so, he must show that (1) “the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right” and (2) “that the right was ‘clearly

established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. Qualified immunity is typically

determined before trial, Carroll v. Vill. of Homewood, No. 97 C 2747, 2001 WL

1467708, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2001), and is a legal determination made by the

Court, not a jury, Payne v. Maher, No. 11 C 6623, 2014 WL 625480, at *4 (N.D. Ill.

Feb. 18, 2014).

Though this is not a jury question, the Court cannot resolve this issue prior to

trial. See id. (declining to address qualified immunity prior to trial because finding

revolved around fact disputes, and indicating willingness to address at trial if need

be). As discussed, York has presented evidence to create a dispute as to whether there

was probable cause to arrest him, detain him, and prosecute him for a violation of

625 ILCS 5-11/401. “In short, the same factual disputes that preclude a finding on

summary judgment that there was probable cause likewise preclude entry of

summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” Id. Therefore, the motion for

summary judgment on this basis is denied. Should the parties wish to raise this issue

again at trial, the Court will entertain it.

IV. INDEMNIFICATION CLAIM

Finally, the defendants argue that because there are no underlying

constitutional violations, York’s indemnification claim fails. (R. 80 at 15.) Because the

Court has not granted summary judgment on all claims, the indemnification claim

survives. The motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated in this Order, the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment [78] is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, as it relates to the

plaintiff's indictment for a violation of 625 ILCS 5-11/401, the motion as to Counts I

through III is denied. As it relates to plaintiff's murder indictment, the motions as to

Counts I through III is granted. The motion is further granted as to Count IV. The

motion is denied as to Count V. The defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiffs

exhibits [100] is denied. The parties shall confer and file a status report by September

8, 2025, indicating the anticipated length of trial and their availability for trial

starting December 1, 2025, December 8, 2025, or July 6, 2025.

CSS

Date: September 3, 2025

JEREMY C. DANIEL

United States District Judge

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