BLACKFORD-WEBB v. GLOBAL SCHOLARS ACADEMY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

AVA-GAYE BLACKFORD-WEBB, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24cv1071

)

GLOBAL SCHOLARS ACADEMY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the Motion to Dismiss

(Docket Entry 6) (the “Motion”) filed by Global Scholars Academy

(at times, the “GSA”). For the reasons that follow, the Court

should grant in part the Motion, in that the Court should dismiss

all federal claims and should remand all state claims to state

court.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from the tenure of Ava-Gaye Blackford-Webb

(the “Plaintiff”) at GSA. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 3 (the

“Complaint”) at 2-3.)1 Alleging that she experienced

“[d]iscrimination” and “harassment” (id. at 1) due to her national

origin (see id. at 2), along with conduct giving rise to six other

“cause[s] of action” (id. at 8 (all-cap and bold font omitted); see

1 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

id. at 1, 8-15), Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit in Durham

County Superior Court (see id. at 1), “as Plaintiff worked in the

County of Durham” (id. at 2) for GSA, which “operate[s] in Durham

County” (id.). Asserting that federal “[j]urisdiction exists under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended [(‘Title

VII’)] because Plaintiff claims [GSA] violated her employment

rights based on her national origin” (Docket Entry 1 at 2), GSA

removed the action to this Court on the basis of so-called federal

question jurisdiction (see id. at 1). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil

actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (authorizing

exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law

claims) .*

GSA subsequently moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to

Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the

“Rules”), asserting that the Complaint, inter alia, “fails to state

a claim for which relief can be granted.” (Docket Entry 6 at 1.)°

2 Per the Complaint, Plaintiff and GSA both qualify as

residents of North Carolina (see Docket Entry 3 at 1-2), depriving

this Court of so-called diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a) (1) (providing jurisdiction over actions “between .. □

citizens of different States”).

3 Notwithstanding that it removed this action to federal

court, GSA also purports to seek dismissal pursuant to Rule

12 (b) (1) on the grounds that “[t]he [C]omplaint does not establish

subject matter jurisdiction” (id.). However, GSA fails to develop

(continued...)

Plaintiff responded in opposition to the Motion by filing an

affidavit (see Docket Entry 10) (the “Affidavit”), along with more

than two hundred pages of exhibits (see Docket Entries 10-1 to 10-

21) and twelve videos (see, e.g., Docket Entry 10-6 at 1 (“See

recording on flash drive!” (bold font omitted)); see also Docket

Entry dated Jan. 30, 2025 (noting receipt of flash drive); Docket

Entry 12 at 2 (emphasizing that Plaintiff’s response “included 21

exhibits, 12 of which are recordings, and 2 recordings are not

identified as an exhibit”)). In addition to responding to various

dismissal arguments, the Affidavit elaborates upon and supplements

the Complaint’s allegations. (See Docket Entry 10 at 1-27.)

Contesting the propriety of Plaintiff’s responsive materials, GSA

filed a reply in support of its Motion. (See Docket Entry 12.)

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 12(b) (6) Standards

A Rule 12(b) (6) motion “tests the sufficiency of a complaint,”

but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of

a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of

N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, in

reviewing a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the Court must “accept the facts

3(...continued)

an intelligible jurisdictional argument; at best, GSA appears argue

that the Complaint does not establish that GSA violated Plaintiff’s

rights. (See generally Docket Entries 7, 12.) Rule 12(b) (6), not

Rule 12(b) (1), constitutes the appropriate vehicle for such a

challenge.

alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App.,

626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., Coleman v. Court

of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012). The Court must also “draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (Ath Cir.

2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, a pro se complaint must “be liberally construed”

and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “But liberal construction does not mean

overlooking the pleading requirements under the [Rules].” Seabrook

v. Driscoll, No. 20-1961, F.4th =, □□ 2025 WL 2202135, at *2

(4th Cir. Aug. 4, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Rather, “[l]iberal construction means only that[,] if the [C]ourt

can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which

the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so.” Bright v. United

States Dep’t of Just. DEA, Civ. Action No. 4:07-3002, 2008 WL

4335535, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2008), aff’d, 318 F. App’x 243

(4th Cir. 2009). Importantly, “[a] court may not construct the

plaintiff’s legal arguments for h[er], nor should a court conjure

up questions never squarely presented.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775

F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Even in the case of pro se

litigants, [courts] cannot be expected to construct full blown

claims from sentence fragments[] ... .”)}.

Moreover, in analyzing any complaint, the Court “will not

accept legal conclusions couched as factS or unwarranted

inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” United States

ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)

(explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine [the] requirement that

a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). The Court can also “put aside any naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” SD3, LLC v.

Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015), as

amended on reh’g in part (Oct. 29, 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

To avoid Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). To qualify as plausible, a claim needs sufficient factual

content to support a reasonable inference of the defendant’s

liability for the alleged misconduct. See id. “Where a complaint

pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s

liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). This standard “demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

In other words, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Id. Moreover, “where the well-pleaded facts do not

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint” cannot “survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”

Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “At bottom, determining whether a

complaint states . . . a plausible claim for relief . . . will ‘be

a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679).

Finally, in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court

evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as documents

attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont, 637

F.3d at 448. The Court may also consider documents “attached to

the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the

complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572

F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). Generally, a “court cannot go

6

beyond these documents” without “convert[ing] the motion into one

for summary judgment,” an action from which courts should refrain

“where the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable

discovery.” E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 448.

II. Title VII Discrimination Claim

Under Title VII, “an employer” may not, inter alia, “discharge

any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . .

national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).4 For Title VII

purposes, an “‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry

affecting commerce who [employs a certain number of employees]

. . . and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). As

the Fourth Circuit has explained:

[u]ltimately, a plaintiff bringing an employment

discrimination claim under Title VII . . . must provide

supporting evidence through one of two methods:

(1) direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination

motivated the employer’s adverse employment decision, or

(2) the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework that requires

the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated

4 In other words, Title VII “do[es] not provide a cause of

action against co-employees or supervisors; the cause of action is

against the employer.” Rageh v. University of N.C., No. 1:24cv336,

2024 WL 5056448, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2024); see also Lissau v.

Southern Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 178 (4th Cir. 1998)

(explaining that “[e]mployees are not liable in their individual

capacities for Title VII violations”).

7

permissible reason for taking an adverse employment

action is actually a pretext for discrimination.

Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 617 n.8 (4th Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Absent direct evidence, the

elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII

are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job

performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different

treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected

class.” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190. Nevertheless, “an employment

discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of

discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss.” Bing, 959 F.3d at

616 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Instead, a Title VII

plaintiff is required to allege facts to satisfy the elements of a

cause of action created by that statute.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Accordingly, [the present] inquiry is whether

[Plaintiff] alleges facts that plausibly state a violation of Title

VII above a speculative level.” Id. at 617 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Liberally construed, the Complaint alleges that GSA

discriminated against Plaintiff, due to her Jamaican national

origin, by (1) demoting her from the Literacy Coach and Testing

Coordinator role to a classroom teacher and Testing Coordinator

role for the 2023-2024 school year, and potentially demoting her

from the Testing Coordinator role during the 2023-2024 year,

(2) firing her from her from her role in the After-School program

8

in November 2023, and (3) terminating her employment at the end of

January 2024, with the termination effective as of February 29,

2024. (See Docket Entry 3 at 1-17.) To establish a connection

between these actions and Plaintiff’s nationality, the seventeen-

page Complaint includes only the following eight paragraphs:

Plaintiff[] is informed and believes and on that

basis[] alleges that Defendant(s) Global Scholars Academy

is a charter school operated by the Head of School who

along with other staff members discriminated against the

plaintiff, subjected the plaintiff to different terms and

conditions of employment, harassed the plaintiff, demoted

the plaintiff to a less desirable position due National

of [sic] Origin, Jamaica, made physical threats and

defamed the plaintiff’s character causing immense

emotional distress. This affected the plaintiff’s

ability to conduct her job because of the hostile/toxic

environment that was created and the humiliation she had

to endure.

(Id. at 2 (capitalization in original).)

The plaintiff alleges that throughout her tenure at

the school on are [sic] about July 11, 2022-January 29,

2024 she experienced unwelcome and persistent conduct

that created a hostile work environment. The plaintiff

was harassed, threatened in and outside of the

defendant’s location, verbally abused, subjected to

working in a hostile working environment/condition and

told every single day that she should go back to Jamaica

by different staff members. The plaintiff was also told

that she had better leave the school before they have to

drag her out. Remarks were also passed on more than one

occasion that the plaintiff is going to be shot in her

head. The plaintiff was also called a thief. Misleading

information was also spread in and out of defendant’s

location and it escalated when the plaintiff filed a

charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(EEOC). Mention and remarks were also made about members

of the plaintiff’s family on many occasions. This

affected the plaintiff’s emotional well-being, and

overall job satisfaction. The plaintiff made a number of

attempts to address the issue: such as efforts to resolve

the harassment internally, like requesting a meeting with

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the Board of Directors. This was not honored until the

plaintiff received a termination letter and had to

request a due process hearing with the Board of Directors

which resulted in the BOD upholding the defendant’s

decision to terminate the plaintiff’s contract, even

though the plaintiff was not at fault and she was not

given the opportunity to resign. During the meeting the

plaintiff posed a number of questions in order to seek

clarity. None of the questions were answered during the

meeting.

(Id. at 2-3.)5

On or about July 16, 2023, the plaintiff was demoted

from her post as a Literacy Coach and Testing Coordinator

to a less desirable position due to National of [sic]

Origin, during an End of Year meeting without following

protocol and no reasonable cause (plaintiff went above

and beyond to accomplish all that was required and laid

out in the job description). The demotion negatively

impacted the plaintiff’s career progression, professional

reputation, and earning potential. The plaintiff

believes that the demotion was based on discriminatory

motives, and was unjustified based on the plaintiff’s

performance. Plaintiff was told by the defendant that

the teachers were pushing back and she [sic] could only

offer the plaintiff a classroom teacher position. The

defendant told the plaintiff that she will never be a

coach and if the plaintiff does not want the job as a

classroom teacher she should go to another school. The

plaintiff was also told that she is not a good fit for

the school. The defendant also made mention of the

beginning of the year zoom meeting where she [sic] had

the plaintiff’s picture displayed in front of the entire

staff saying that she [sic] has to get the plaintiff on

the right seat on the bus, which was very humiliating.

The plaintiff was presented with a contract that said

3rd, 4th or 5th Grade classroom Teacher. Subsequently, the

defendant agreed that the plaintiff could also keep the

Testing Coordinator position. On or about July 13, 2023,

the plaintiff was subjected to different terms and

conditions and was sent an email that the plaintiff’s

5 The EEOC charge that Plaintiff submitted with her Complaint

(compare Docket Entry 1-2 at 1, with Docket Entry 3 at 1) reflects

a filing date after her termination from GSA (see Docket Entry 1-2

at 3).

10

teaching assignment for the 23-24 school year is Middle

School ELA/Social Studies, without even consulting with

the plaintiff. This was a breach of contract and the

plaintiff was subjected to different terms and conditions

of employment.

(Id. at 3-4 (capitalization in original).)

The plaintiff was treated differently than others

due to national of [sic] origin. On July 16, 2023, the

Defendant, without justification, demoted Plaintiff from

the position of Literacy Coach & Testing Coordinator to

the position of Middle School ELA Teacher (the plaintiff

made a request to retain the Testing Coordinator job),

which involved significantly reduced responsibilities,

and a diminished level of authority. The demotion was a

direct result of discriminatory and retaliatory reasons.

The Defendant’s actions were intended to harm Plaintiff’s

career prospects. These actions negatively affected the

plaintiff, such as being fired, or receiving unequal

treatment compared to others similarly situated. The

plaintiff was made to appear as if she was stupid and was

also told that she does not know anything.

(Id. at 9 (capitalization in original).)

The defendant employed another Literacy Coach while

the plaintiff was hired as a Literacy coach. The

defendant kept passing remarks that they can’t have a

Jamaican coaching Americans. Passed remarks everyday

that I should go back to Jamaica. In a meeting held at

the beginning of the school year the defendant displayed

the plaintiff’s picture and said that she [sic] has to

get the plaintiff on the right seat on the bus. The

defendant assigned my role as a Testing Coordinator to

another teacher after she [sic] told me that she [sic]

can take my job and give it to the same teacher. The

assistant head of school kept asking the plaintiff, ‘Are

you for the devil or for the Lord?’ for no apparent

reason. The plaintiff was baptized on April 10, 2022.

On or about June 16, 2023, I was told that I am not a

good fit for the school.

(Id. (single quotation marks in original).)

11

On or about July 11, 2022-January 29, 2024, the

defendant discriminated against the plaintiff and told

her every single day to go back to Jamaica.

(Id.)

The plaintiff was wrongfully terminated on January

29, 2024 and was escorted off campus by a police officer.

During the defendant’s [sic] tenure at Global Scholars

Academy the defendant [sic] was told everyday that she

should return to Jamaica.

(Id. at 10.)

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant

continuously shares misleading information in and out of

the defendant’s location even after the defendant [sic]

was fired. The defendant has contacted the plaintiff’s

current employer in an effort the [sic] jeopardize the

plaintiff’s job. The defendant has shared offensive and

derogatory information, racial or ethnic comments and

provided an unwelcoming work environment. The defendant

has uttered comments about the plaintiff’s religion. On

a number of occasions, the defendant asked the plaintiff

“Are you for the devil or are you for the Lord?”

Comments have been made about the plaintiff’s appearance.

The plaintiff also faced intimidation or aggressive

pressure. The plaintiff was discriminated against

because of Nationality [sic] of [sic] Origin. The

defendant subjected the plaintiff to different terms and

conditions of employment, demoted the plaintiff to a less

desirable position due National [sic] of Origin, Jamaica,

and made physical threats. The defendant kept harassing

the plaintiff about her Master’s Degree. The defendant

stated “You have a Master’s Degree in Educational

Administration and Leadership right? Why don’t you go to

another school to become principal.” This was said in a

very abusive manner. Comments were also passed about why

the plaintiff has multiple degrees etc. As a result of

this harassment, the Plaintiff is owed a total of

$300,000. The harassment occurred as a result of the

plaintiff’s Nationality [sic] of Origin.

(Id. at 14-15 (capitalization in original) (stray marks omitted).)6

6 The Complaint requests a total of more than $1.2 million in

(continued...)

12

Notably, the Complaint contains more than eighty references to

“the defendant” (see id. at 1-17), which references, from context,

clearly do not signify GSA, the actual defendant in this case.

Moreover, the Complaint uses the term “the defendant” to refer to

multiple different individuals, without identifying such

individuals. (See, e.g., id. at 5 (using male and female pronouns

to refer to “the defendant”).) For instance, in one paragraph, the

Complaint alleges that, on August 30, 2023, as Plaintiff “sternly

explained to [students],” whom the Complaint describes as “being

disrespectful,” how they needed to behave, “[t]he defendant came to

the class and a student opened the door,” after which Plaintiff

“explained to the defendant what happened,” and “[h]le then called

[Plaintiff] to his office and had [Plaintiff] escorted off campus

by a police officer.” (Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added).) In the next

paragraph, the Complaint asserts that,

[o]n or about October 25, 2023 the defendant called the

plaintiff to her office and verbally abused her. The

defendant was very disrespectful and was asking weird

questions and continued to yell at the plaintiff. The

defendant asked the plaintiff why she likes to hold on to

things and if she knows that she can take her job and

give it to another teacher; which she did. The defendant

told the plaintiff that she does not know anything. When

the defendant [sic] didn’t respond or over react [sic] to

this verbal abuse the defendant got angry and told the

plaintiff that it was a passive type thing. When the

plaintiff tried to gain clarity, the defendant yelled at

6(...continued)

damages (id. at 15), with $200,000 attributable to Plaintiff’s

discrimination claim (see id. at 8-9).

13

the plaintiff and the defendant slammed her hand down on

the table in a loud angry manner. ...

(Id. at 5 (semicolon in original) (emphasis added); see also, e.g.,

id. at 7 (“On or about January 29, 2024 the plaintiff assigned a

benchmark for 8 Grade students to complete and a student was

disrespectful and said to the plaintiff that he is not the one who

is about to be fired. I asked the Student Relations Officer to

speak to the student and the defendant came instantly and sent the

student to wait in her office and then asked the police officer to

escort the plaintiff off campus.” (emphasis added)).)

Contending that “Plaintiff makes no factual allegations to

support a claim for national origin discrimination” (Docket Entry

7 at 6 (bold and italicized font omitted)), GSA urges dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim (see id. at 6-9). (See

also id. at 1 (“Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege claims for

national origin discrimination under Title VII because she offers

only conclusory allegations and speculation.”).) In so doing, GSA

emphasizes that, “[t]hroughout her [C]lomplaint, Plaintiff has made

it unclear as [sic] to who [sic] she is referring to [sic] when she

states ‘the defendant.’” (Id. at 7; see also, e.g., id. at 3 n.6

(“Plaintiff refers to the defendant anda ‘he’ but did not identify

who the person was that called her to his office. It is unclear

what occurred other than the police escorted [Plaintiff] off

campus.”).) Nevertheless, GSA correctly notes that the Complaint

does not connect any of the statements regarding Plaintiff’s

14

Jamaican nationality to “any decision maker or administrator” (id.

at 7) involved in Plaintiff’s (demotion(s) and) termination (see

id. at 7-8). (See generally Docket Entry 3.) Accordingly, GSA

maintains that “Plaintiff offers no direct evidence suggesting that

national origin discrimination motivated GSA to fire her.” (Docket

Entry 7 at 8.)

As for the “pretext” approach, GSA contends that “Plaintiff

proffers no comparators to state a claim for national origin

discrimination” (id. (bold and italicized font omitted)) using the

prima facie approach to asserting a Title VII discrimination claim.

(See id. at 8-9.) In addition, GSA maintains that the Complaint

fails to “identify any specific ways in which [Plaintiff] was

treated differently than other employees due to her national

origin,” instead offering only the conclusory assertion that

Plaintiff “received unequal treatment compared to others similarly

situated.” (Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).) GSA

further emphasizes that, per her Complaint, Plaintiff’s

“termination occurred the day after she had to be escorted off

campus by police, a third incident alleged in her [C]omplaint.”

(Id. at 8.)

In response to these arguments, Plaintiff submitted a lengthy

affidavit that elaborates upon various allegations in the Complaint

and adds additional allegations, including regarding events that

happened months after her termination from GSA. (See Docket Entry

15

10; see also Docket Entries 10-1 to 10-21 (supporting exhibits).)

Like the Complaint, the Affidavit continues to use the term “the

defendant” to refer to actions by various individuals, not GSA.

(See generally Docket Entry 10.) Unlike the Complaint, a handful

of the Affidavit’s more than 250 references to “the defendant”

clarify the actor. (See, e.g., id. at 9-10 (“There was one

incident where a teacher called the plaintiff a thief after she was

asked by the defendant (Head of School) to go to the class to

assist her.”), 16 (“[A student] replied that he was going to open

the door for the defendant (assistant head of school).”).)

Moreover, a comparison of the Affidavit to its more than two

hundred pages of accompanying exhibits reveals the identity of the

actor(s) involved in certain events. (Compare, e.g., id. at 15-16

(discussing letter in which, inter alia, “the defendant mentioned

that ‘students expressed that they are afraid of you’”),

with Docket Entry 10-16 at 9-11 (containing referenced letter,

which details various events noted in Affidavit).) Those

incidents, however, do not involve any allegations regarding

Plaintiff’s nationality. (See Docket Entries 10 to 10-21.)

As for the allegations regarding Plaintiff’s nationality, the

Affidavit largely fails to associate them with any specific actor.

(See Docket Entry 10 at 1-27.) At best, the twenty-seven-page

Affidavit contains four nationality-related allegations that

16

provide at least some identification of relevant actors, as

follows:

The Plaintiff was hired as a Literacy Coach and Testing

Coordinator for GSA on or about July 11, 2022. The

plaintiff was told daily that she should go back to

Jamaica. An administrator reiterated that they can’t

have a Jamaican Coaching Americans. Subsequently another

coach was hired while the plaintiff was a Literacy Coach.

This coach that was hired worked on similar tasks that

the plaintiff worked on with the teachers. Federal laws

prohibit discrimination based on national origin in

employment. . . .

(Id. at 2 (capitalization in original).)7

The defendant demoted the plaintiff on or about July

16, 2023. . . . The explanation given was discriminatory

where the defendant mentioned that the teachers were

pushing back obviously because the plaintiff was

Jamaican.

(Id. at 4; cf. Docket Entry 3 at 4 (“Plaintiff was told by the

defendant that the teachers were pushing back and she could only

offer the plaintiff a classroom teacher position.”).)

The plaintiff went above and beyond every day while

completing her tasks as a Literacy coach and Testing

Coordinator all while members of staff passed racial

slurs and comments that the plaintiff should go back to

7 The Affidavit indicates that this individual and Plaintiff

worked together as literacy coaches. (See, e.g., id. at 4-5

(alleging that, “despite being qualified, the plaintiff was demoted

from the position[,] and the Literacy Coach who was hired remained

in the position after the plaintiff’s termination” (capitalization

in original)), 7 (“As a Literacy Coach the plaintiff was asked to

substitute for absent teachers on many occasions even when

sufficient notice was given that a teacher was going to be absent.

This was not the plaintiff’s main duty. The other Literacy coach

who was hired was never asked to act as a substitute. It would be

understandable if this was done occasionally. However, as soon as

a teacher is absent the plaintiff is the one sent to the class.”

(capitalization in original)).)

17

Jamaica. To rectify the problem a professional

development on Discrimination in the Workplace would have

been a step in the right direction. This [demotion from

Literacy Coach] was entirely based on national of [sic]

origin. . . .

(Docket Entry 10 at 5 (capitalization and bold font in original).)

During the school year different members of staff

including administrators passed remarks about the

plaintiff’s nationality including that they can’t have a

Jamaica[n] coaching Americans. Remarks were also passed

every day that the plaintiff should go back to Jamaica.

They would further add that the plaintiff’s ‘time was

up’. This caused the plaintiff emotional distress and

created an unwelcoming and hostile environment. These

kinds of statement convey a sense that the plaintiff is

not supposed to be at GSA. The defendant told the

plaintiff that she wasn’t a good fit for the school.

Such phrases are deemed by the United States federal

government and the court system to be discriminatory in

the workplace. This is a racist or xenophobic epithet

and unlawful workplace conduct by co-workers. The

statements above were also accompanied by insults,

taunting, or ethnic epithets, such as making fun of the

plaintiff’s speech which are deemed to be “harassment

based on national origin.” . . . The defendant including

co-workers and administration created a hostile working

environment in an effort to get the plaintiff to

quit. . . .

(Id. at 8-9 (bold font and single quotation marks in original).)

Title VII “do[es] not make employers vicariously liable for

the discriminatory acts and motivations of everyone in their

employ, even when such acts or motivations lead to or influence a

tangible employment action.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics

Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 287 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), overruled

in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557

U.S. 167 (2009); see also id. (“On the contrary, by defining

employer to include ‘any agent’ of the employer, Congress evinced

18

an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which

employers are to be held responsible.” (brackets, ellipsis, and

certain internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, an employer

possesses liability for the discriminatory actions of “its

employees holding supervisory or other actual power to make

tangible employment decisions.” Id.; see also id. at 291

(“Regarding adverse employment actions, an employer will be liable

not for the improperly motivated person who merely influences the

decision, but for the person who in reality makes the decision.

This encompasses individuals who may be deemed actual

decisionmakers even though they are not formal decisionmakers

. . . .”). The Complaint does not connect the comments regarding

Plaintiff’s nationality to any particular individual, let alone an

individual with supervisory or other actual decisionmaking

authority regarding Plaintiff’s role and employment at GSA. (See

Docket Entry 3 at 1-17.)

The Complaint likewise offers only conclusory assertions that

(1) national origin animus motivated Plaintiff’s demotion from

literacy coach and eventual termination and (2) that “similarly

situated” (id. at 9) employees experienced different treatment from

Plaintiff. (See id. at 1-17.) Such conclusory assertions fail to

establish a viable claim. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; SD3,

801 F.3d at 422. Moreover, the Complaint reveals that Plaintiff

experienced friction with classroom teachers in her role as a

19

literacy coach (see, e.g., Docket Entry 3 at 7 (“[A] teacher

chas[ed] the plaintiff out of her class room [sic] and passed a

remark that the plaintiff was a thief. This occurred while the

plaintiff was employed a[s] a Literacy Coach and she was asked to

go to the teacher’s room to assist her.”)) and that, in changing

Plaintiff from a literacy coach to classroom teacher, “the

defendant” told Plaintiff “that the teachers were pushing back and

she could only offer the plaintiff a classroom teacher position”

rather than the coach position (id. at 4). The Complaint further

reveals that between August 30, 2023, and Plaintiff’s termination

on or about January 30, 2024, inter alia, (1) police escorted

Plaintiff from GSA on at least two occasions (see id. at 4-5, 7,

10); (2) Plaintiff resisted instruction from “an administrator”

(id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted)) on at least one

additional occasion; and (3) Plaintiff left during the After-School

program, with at best limited notice to relevant personnel, on the

same day that some unspecified incident “occurred during

dismissal,” resulting in Plaintiff’s firing from the After-School

program (id. at 5-6).8 These factual allegations render

8 Plaintiff disputes whether she appropriately notified

school officials before leaving during the After-School program and

whether she appropriately documented the incident (see id.) and

thus whether, as an email associated with her firing from the

After-School program stated, she “put the safety of the students at

risk and the overall liability of the school in jeopardy” (id. at

5 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Although [Plaintiff]

disputes the [description of her actions], she has alleged no

(continued...)

20

implausible the Complaint’s contention that national origin

discrimination motivated Plaintiff’s demotion and various firings,

warranting dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII employment

discrimination claim. See, e.g., Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855

F.3d 639, 649 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[U]nder Iqbal and Twombly, the

Court must consider the plausibility of inferring discrimination

based on [the plaintiff’s] allegations in light of an ‘obvious

alternative explanation’ for the conduct. In other words, while

[the plaintiff] need not establish a prima facie case at this

stage, . . . [the Court] must be satisfied that the [defendant’s]

explanation for [the contested action] does not render [the

plaintiff’s] allegations implausible.” (citation omitted) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682)); Nathan, 707 F.3d at 455 (explaining that,

in analyzing Rule 12(b)(6) motions, courts “will not accept legal

conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences,

unreasonable conclusions, or arguments” (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The Affidavit and supporting exhibits fail to salvage

Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim. As an initial matter,

GSA correctly notes that “parties cannot amend their complaints

8(...continued)

factual basis to support the conclusion that discriminatory bias,

rather than [such perception] of [her actions], was the [relevant

actor(s)’] true motivation for [firing] her,” Seabrook, __ F.4th at

__, 2025 WL 2202135, at *3, undermining her Title VII claim. (See

Docket Entry 3 at 5-6.)

21

through briefing” (Docket Entry 12 at 4 (internal quotation marks

omitted)). See, e.g., Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s

Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th

Cir. 2013) (“It is well-established that parties cannot amend their

complaints through briefing or oral advocacy.”). In any event, if

the Court treated the Affidavit as an amended complaint, it would

still fail to establish a viable Title VII discrimination claim.

To begin, the Affidavit largely relies on speculative and

conclusory assertions regarding discriminatory motives. (See,

e.g., Docket Entry 10 at 4 (“The explanation given [for Plaintiff’s

role change] was discriminatory where the defendant mentioned that

the teachers were pushing back obviously because the plaintiff was

Jamaican.”).) Moreover, although the Affidavit alleges that “[a]n

administrator reiterated that they can’t have a Jamaican [c]oaching

Americans,” the Affidavit provides no details regarding the context

of this statement, including any indication whether the

“administrator” possessed any decisionmaking authority regarding

Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. at 2.) Notably, the Affidavit

asserts that only certain administrators possessed supervisory

authority regarding Plaintiff’s role. (See, e.g., id. at 22

(maintaining that Plaintiff did not engage in insubordination for

failing to comply with instructions from “an administrator” because

that individual “was not the plaintiff’s direct supervisor” and

“refusing to follow instructions from someone outside of the

22

plaintiff’s reporting structure is not typically classified as

insubordination”).)

Additionally, the Affidavit contains excerpts from Plaintiff’s

termination correspondence (see, e.g., id. at 14-15), which appear

in the exhibits thereto (see, e.g., Docket Entry 10-16 at 2-8

(emails regarding After-School program termination), 9-11 (letter

regarding employment termination recommendation)). These materials

indicate that the incidents involving police escorting Plaintiff

from campus and Plaintiff refusing to comply with directives and

protocols, as well as Plaintiff leaving students unsupervised and

Plaintiff’s students stating that they feared her, prompted the

relevant termination decisions. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 10 at 14-

16, 22; see also Docket Entry 10-16 at 2, 5 (outlining bases for

After-School termination, including leaving students unattended and

failing to notify appropriate staff regarding a “hitting incident”

between students), 9-11 (outlining bases for termination

recommendation, including repeated instances of yelling at students

and refusing to follow directives, explaining that GSA “cannot

allow any adult to yell and scream aggressively at students at any

given moment” and that “some of [Plaintiff’s] students have

expressed that they are afraid [Plaintiff],” and further observing

that “[c]hildren cannot learn in an environment in which they have

fear”).) These circumstances render implausible Plaintiff’s

contentions that national-origin discrimination motivated GSA’s

23

adverse employment decisions. See Woods, 855 F.3d at 649; see also

Bing, 959 F.3d at 617 (“The facts [the plaintiff] pled about his

termination cannot be construed to plausibly state a claim that he

was terminated because of his race. In fact, [the plaintiff]

specifically alleged a non-racial reason for the termination.”).

Thus, even if considered, Plaintiff’s Affidavit fails to plausibly

allege a viable Title VII discrimination claim, necessitating its

dismissal. See, e.g., Bing, 959 F.3d at 618 (“[The] complaint

fails not because of unsophisticated language or the failure to

adhere to formalities. It fails because [the plaintiff] pled a

non-discriminatory basis for his termination and no facts to

support his conclusory allegations about the [events that led to

his termination].”).

III. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim

As for Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim, “[a]

hostile environment that violates Title VII exists when the

workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,

and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Seabrook, __ F.4th at __, 2025 WL 2202135, at *4

(internal quotation marks omitted). “To make such a claim,

[Plaintiff] must show she was subjected to (1) unwelcome conduct,

(2) based on her [national origin], that was (3) severe or

pervasive enough to make her work environment hostile or abusive

24

and (4) imputable to [GSA], her employer.” Bazemore v. Best Buy,

957 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2020). “Importantly, the existence of

unwelcome conduct, based on an employee’s [national origin], that

is severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment,

is not on its own enough to hold an employer liable.” Id. at 200-

01. “For an employer to be liable, the harassing employee’s

conduct must also be imputable to the employer. And to survive a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an employee must allege sufficient

facts to plausibly satisfy the imputability requirement.” Id. at

201.

More specifically, “[i]f the harasser is a co-worker, then the

employee must show that the employer was negligent in controlling

working conditions — that is, the employer knew or should have

known about the harassment and failed to take effective action to

stop it.” Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 332 (4th Cir.

2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the harasser is a

supervisor, then the employer may be either strictly or vicariously

liable for the supervisor’s actions,” id. at 333, “depend[ing] on

whether the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible

employment action,” id. at 333 n.6 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[A] supervisor is an individual who has been empowered

to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to

effect a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,

firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly

25

different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant

change in benefits.” Id. at 333 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also id. (observing that, in adopting this standard,

“the [United States Supreme] Court rejected the more open-ended

approach which ties supervisor status to the ability to exercise

significant direction over another’s daily work” (internal

quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).

As noted above, the Complaint contains only two (non-

conclusory) factual allegations regarding national origin

harassment, namely that “[P]laintiff was . . . told every single

day that she should go back to Jamaica by different staff members”

(Docket Entry 3 at 2; see also id. at 9, 10) and that “[t]he

defendant kept passing remarks that they can’t have a Jamaican

coaching Americans” (id. at 9). The Complaint does not, however,

provide a sufficient basis upon which to impute this conduct to

GSA. To begin, the Complaint does not identify the individuals who

uttered such comments, beyond noting that “different staff members”

(id. at 2) told Plaintiff she should return to Jamaica. (See,

e.g., id. at 2, 9, 10.) Accordingly, the Complaint fails to

connect these comments to a qualifying supervisor, let alone to any

tangible adverse employment action by such individual. (See id.)

Alternatively, assuming Plaintiff’s coworkers uttered these

comments, the Complaint still fails to plausibly allege grounds for

imputing this conduct to GSA. At best, the Complaint asserts that

26

Plaintiff took “efforts to resolve the harassment internally, like

requesting a meeting with the Board of Directors,” which request

“was not honored” until after she “received a termination letter.”

(Id. at 3.)9 Without more, Plaintiff’s unspecified “efforts” and

the denial of her request for a meeting with GSA’s Board of

Directors does not establish that GSA “knew or should have known

about the harassment and failed to take effective action to stop

it.” Strothers, 895 F.3d at 332 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, the Complaint fails to allege a viable Title VII

hostile work environment claim.

Even if considered, the allegations in the Affidavit fare no

better. The allegations regarding comments by unspecified “members

of staff” (Docket Entry 10 at 5, 8) lack a factual basis for

concluding that GSA “knew or should have known about the

harassment,” Strothers, 895 F.3d at 332 (internal quotation marks

omitted). See Howard v. Winter, 446 F.3d 559, 567 (4th Cir. 2006)

(“[A]n employee may not impute liability on an employer under a

theory that the employer must exercise an all-seeing omnipresence

over the workplace.”). As for the allegation that “[a]n

administrator reiterated that they can’t have a Jamaican [c]oaching

9 Notably, the Complaint includes this assertion after

detailing a litany of primarily non-nationality-related “unwelcome

and persistent conduct,” such as calling Plaintiff a thief, saying

she “[wa]s going to be shot in her head” and “had better leave the

school before they have to drag her out,” and spreading unspecified

“[m]isleading information” both before and after Plaintiff filed

her EEOC charge. (Id. at 2-3.)

27

Americans” (Docket Entry 10 at 2), the Affidavit fails to establish

that said administrator possessed any supervisory authority over

Plaintiff (cf. id. at 22 (denying “an administrator” qualified as

Plaintiff’s supervisor)). Moreover, the Affidavit indicates that

such comment occurred long before Plaintiff’s demotion from the

literacy coach position (see id. at 2 (alleging that,

“[s]ubsequent[]” to said comment, “another coach was hired while

the plaintiff was a Literacy Coach”)), which further undercuts any

inference that the speaker “ha[d] been empowered to take tangible

employment actions against [Plaintiff],” Strothers, 895 F.3d at 333

(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff thus fails to plead

a viable national-origin-based Title VII hostile work environment

claim.

IV. Remaining Matters

GSA asserts that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Title

VII claims with prejudice. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 7 at 2.) The

Complaint qualifies as a version of a “shotgun pleading” wherein,

rather than “assert[ing] multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants are

responsible for which acts or omissions,” Doe v. Wyndham Hotels &

Resorts, Inc., No. 2:24cv204, 2025 WL 725268, at *10 (E.D. Va. Mar.

6, 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Complaint asserts

multiple claims against one defendant based on the actions of

multiple (largely undifferentiated) nonparties without identifying

28

which nonparty bears “responsib[ility] for which acts or

omissions,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See Turton v.

Virginia Dep’t of Educ., No. 3:14cv446, 2014 WL 12539403, at *2

(E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2014) (“[T]his Amended Complaint is the

quintessential ‘shotgun pleading’ that presents many different

transactions, occurrences, and series of transactions or

occurrences and that is presented in such a conclusory form that it

is virtually impossible to ascertain what claims are asserted

against which defendants and on what legal basis the respective

claims are founded . . . .”); see also, e.g., Votaw v. Carthens,

No. 1:21cv354, 2021 WL 3773409, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 25, 2021)

(“Vagueness as to which party the phrase ‘the Defendants’ refers

fails to provide each defendant the factual basis for the claims

specifically against him or her and ‘deprives them and the court of

the opportunity of determining whether there are sufficient facts

to make a claim against each Defendant plausible.’”).

“The chief evil caused by these types of pleadings is that to

one degree or another, defendants are not afforded adequate notice

of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim

rests[,] thereby impeding a meaningful response.” United States v.

Premier Med., Inc., No. 6:18cv165, 2023 WL 9060896, at *14 (D.S.C.

Sept. 28, 2023) (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks

omitted). “Not only do pleadings of this sort fail to apprise the

opposing party of the particular claims against it (and the

29

potential extent of its liability), they also water down the rights

of parties to have valid claims litigated efficiently and waste

scarce judicial resources.” Id.; see also, e.g., Watt v. HAL

Antillen N.V., No. 2:24cv155, 2024 WL 4436966, at *2 (W.D. Wash.

Oct. 7, 2024) (“Defendants are correct, however, that the repeated

use of the undifferentiated word ‘defendants’ . . . is confusing in

light of the allegations and claims. . . . . In this context, use

of the term ‘defendants’ to identify the entities that . . .

breached a duty owed to plaintiff would force defendants to guess

what each of them is supposed to have done.” (citation omitted)).

Notably, despite GSA alerting Plaintiff to this deficiency in

moving to dismiss the Complaint (see, e.g., Docket Entry 7 at 3

n.7), Plaintiff continued to use the term “the defendant” to refer

to the actions of various unidentified nonparties throughout her

Affidavit (see generally Docket Entry 10). Moreover, the Affidavit

veers into the delusional as it attempts to expand Plaintiff’s

Title VII claims to include a conspiracy involving unnamed members

of the public harassing Plaintiff in various ways and locations,

ranging from Walmart stores to her home to her new school (where

she has similarly experienced termination from an After-School

program), following her termination from GSA. (See, e.g., id. at

2-3; see also id. at 24 (“The plaintiff also does not feel safe in

public spaces because the plaintiff has been followed around

wherever she goes for leisure time or with family. This is in an

30

effort to get others to treat the plaintiff badly. The plaintiff

has observed a number of unusual and weird happenings which is very

frustrating. The plaintiff has been in different public spaces and

remarks have been passed in relation to my past employer. I would

like the [C]ourt to have the defendant to cease and desist from all

malicious activity. This unlawful conduct is unacceptable.”).)10

Under the circumstances, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s

Title VII claims with prejudice. See, e.g., Jackson v. Early

Warning, Civ. Action No. 15-1233, 2016 WL 7228866, at *3-5, 9 (D.

Md. Dec. 13, 2016) (dismissing pro se complaint with prejudice

where, inter alia, “[the] [o]riginal [c]omplaint was a textbook

example of a shotgun pleading” and “[the] [s]upplemental

10 To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert a Title

VII retaliation claim based on these allegations (see id. at 24

(“The defendant has been retaliating against the plaintiff because

she filed a complained [sic] about discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, then requested a Right to Sue

and filed a charge with the court system.”)), such claim fails,

among other reasons, on frivolity grounds. See, e.g., Henderson v.

Wells Fargo, N.A., No. 5:23cv38, 2024 WL 1376487, at *8 (E.D.N.C.

Mar. 29, 2024) (“Frivolous complaint are subject to dismissal

pursuant to the inherent authority of court, even when the filing

fees has been paid. A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable

basis in either law or fact. A claim lacks an arguable basis in

fact when it describes factual contentions that are clearly

baseless or it describes fantastic and delusional scenarios. [The

plaintiff] theorizes that his failure to get hired is part of some

grand conspiracy to drive him out of Fayetteville and North

Carolina; he hypothesizes that people are afraid of his education,

which makes them cowards. These statements and others peppered

throughout [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and response, evince that

his claims have no grounding in fact. They are frivolous.”

(emphasis in original) (brackets, citations, and internal quotation

marks omitted)).

31

[c]omplaint hardly fares better,” explaining that, “[e]ven

supplemented, the [c]omplaint continues with unsupported,

conclusory allegations that preclude Defendants from providing

meaningful responses” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

With the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims, only

state-law claims remain. (See generally Docket Entry 3.) The

Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

[state-law] claim” if it, inter alia, “dismisse[s] all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). As

the Supreme Court recently explained, in such “context[], federal

law is not where the real action is. So although supplemental

jurisdiction persists, the district court need not exercise it:

Instead, the court may (and indeed, ordinarily should) kick the

case to state court.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

604 U.S. 22, 32 (2025). Given the early stage of this litigation,

the Court should decline to continue exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining (state-law) claims. See,

e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)

(identifying “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the

lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain” as an

example of a situation in which “a case properly belongs in state

court”).

The Court should also remand this action to the Durham County

Superior Court rather than dismissing it. See Hinson v. Norwest

32

Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder the

authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), authorizing a federal court to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a district court has

inherent power to dismiss the case or, in cases removed from State

court, to remand, provided the conditions set forth in § 1367(c)

for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction have been

met.”). When deciding “whether to remand the case to State court,”

the Court should, as relevant here, “consider principles of

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). Particularly given the volume of

material that Plaintiff has already submitted in this matter,

remand to state court rather than dismissal best serves such

principles. As the Supreme Court has explained:

Both litigants and States have an interest in the prompt

and efficient resolution of controversies based on state

law. Any time a district court dismisses, rather than

remands, a removed case involving pendent claims, the

parties will have to refile their papers in state court,

at some expense of time and money. Moreover, the state

court will have to reprocess the case, and this procedure

will involve similar costs. Dismissal of the claim

therefore will increase both the expense and the time

involved in enforcing state law.

Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 353 (recognizing that, “[e]ven when

the applicable statute of limitations has not expired, a remand may

best promote the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity”).

33

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s federal claims fail as a matter of law, rendering

appropriate remand of Plaintiff’s remaining claims to state court.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Motion (Docket Entry 6)

be granted in part as follows: (1) Plaintiff’s Title VII

discrimination and hostile work environment claims should be

dismissed with prejudice, after which (2) this case should be

remanded to the Durham County Superior Court.

This 3rd day of September, 2025.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

34