Baltas v. Chapdelaine

22-2813-cv

Baltas v. Chapdelaine

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit

August Term 2024

Argued: January 31, 2025

Decided: September 3, 2025

No. 22-2813-cv

JOE BALTAS, JASON GOODE, KENYON L. JOSEPH PELLOT-CASTELLANO,

RICHARD RICE, YARDLEY DAVIS, PHILIP RIVERA, NOAH GLADDING,

PETER TARASCO, JOSE ORTIZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CAROL CHAPDELAINE, GIULIANNA MUDANO, AND ANGEL QUIROS,

Defendants-Appellees.*

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut

No. 17-cv-242

Robert N. Chatigny, Judge.

Michael P. Shea, Chief Judge.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption

*

accordingly.

Before: CARNEY, PARK, and NARDINI, Circuit Judges.

Nine Connecticut inmates claim that their confinement in a

special housing unit called Q-Pod violated their constitutional rights.

They sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations

of their First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district

court (Chatigny, J.) granted Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.

We affirm as to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and procedural

due process claims, as well as the free exercise claims of seven of the

nine Plaintiffs. But we reverse as to two Plaintiffs’ free exercise claims

alleging that Defendants denied their requests to participate in Native

American sweat lodge and smudging practices, which are congregate

religious services. Defendants offered no penological justification for

the denials—not to Plaintiffs, the district court, or this Court—so their

refusal to permit participation in religious congregation violated

clearly established law. The judgment and order of the district court

are AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part and the case is

REMANDED with instructions to deny Defendants’ motion as to Joe

Baltas’s and Joseph Tarasco’s denial-of-congregation claims. We also

VACATE the dismissal of Baltas’s and Tarasco’s state-law claims.

JAMES DURLING, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &

Garrison LLP, Washington, DC; William B. Michael,

Andrew Fishman, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &

Garrison LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

2

ZENOBIA GRAHAM-DAYS, Assistant Attorney General, for

William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut,

Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.

PARK, Circuit Judge:

Nine Connecticut inmates claim that their confinement in a

special housing unit called Q-Pod violated their constitutional rights.

They sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations

of their First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district

court (Chatigny, J.) granted Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on qualified-immunity grounds.

We affirm as to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and procedural

due process claims, as well as the free exercise claims of seven of the

nine Plaintiffs. But we reverse as to two Plaintiffs’ free exercise claims

alleging that Defendants denied their requests to participate in Native

American sweat lodge and smudging practices, which are congregate

religious services. Defendants offered no penological justification for

the denials—not to Plaintiffs, the district court, or this Court—so their

refusal to permit participation in religious congregation violated

clearly established law. The judgment and order of the district court

are affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is remanded

with instructions to deny Defendants’ motion as to Joe Baltas’s and

Joseph Tarasco’s denial-of-congregation claims. We also vacate the

dismissal of Baltas’s and Tarasco’s state-law claims.

3

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background 1

Plaintiffs-Appellants are nine current or former inmates in

Connecticut’s MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution who were

detained in the prison’s “Q-Pod” housing unit between 2009 and

2016. Q-Pod, which is separate from the prison’s main building, has

60 cells with two bunks each. It is “used to house inmates who are

transitioning from more restrictive conditions of confinement, such as

punitive segregation, back to general population.” Special App’x at

4. Although Department of Corrections (“DOC”) regulations

consider Q-Pod a “reclassification unit,” Plaintiffs claim that it is a

“punitive unit” with more severe conditions than the prison’s

general-population wings. Joint App’x at 300.

Defendants-Appellees are Carol Chapdelaine, the prison

warden, Giulianna Mudano, the deputy warden, and Angel Quiros,

the district administrator at the time of the alleged confinement.

When a MacDougall-Walker inmate violates the Code of Penal

Discipline, he receives a “ticket” and time in the prison’s Restrictive

Housing Unit (“RHU”). The prison’s Inmate Handbook provides that

“[u]pon release from RHU and upon having been found guilty or

having pled guilty to a charge(s) under the Code of Penal Discipline,

inmates . . . will complete the remainder of their time on Unassigned

Status in” Q-Pod. Joint App’x at 95-96. The Handbook specifies that

inmates will stay in Q-Pod for 90 days for more severe infractions

1 The facts as set forth here are drawn from the record at summary

judgment and are not disputed except as noted.

4

(Class A tickets) or 60 days for others (Class B tickets). Despite these

guidelines, Plaintiffs assert that they were often kept in Q-Pod for five

months or longer, with the longest specific allegation being nine

consecutive months in Q-Pod.

Plaintiffs also complain about five conditions of confinement in

Q-Pod. First, they claim to have faced significant isolation in Q-Pod.

Plaintiffs spent 22 out of 24 hours per day in their cells. During the

other two hours, Q-Pod inmates had access to an outdoor yard with

a basketball court. They were also permitted daily visitation. By

comparison, general-population inmates had three hours of

recreation. Although Q-Pod inmates generally had cellmates,

Plaintiffs allege that some were alone in their cells.

Second, Plaintiffs allege that their Q-Pod cells were unsanitary.

In particular, Q-Pod “had restrictions on flushing the toilet a certain

number of times in a given period, causing the toilets to be turned off

for two to three hours at a time.” Appellants’ Br. at 6. The parties

dispute the intervals on these timers, but Q-Pod inmates are advised

that they can flush the toilet two times in five minutes and then must

wait five minutes before flushing again; otherwise, attempting a third

flush within 10 minutes will lock the toilet for 30 minutes. Defendants

claim that other MacDougall-Walker units have these timers as part

of a municipal water-use agreement, but Plaintiffs deny this and also

claim that Q-Pod officers shut off Q-Pod inmates’ water for hours at

a time.

Third, Plaintiffs claim that Q-Pod officers deprived them of

medical care and drug and alcohol counseling. Although there is a

medical room in Q-Pod, Plaintiffs contend that they “would be denied

5

medical treatment,” Joint App’x at 303, but none alleges a specific

instance of being denied care. Plaintiffs further claim that there was

no drug and alcohol counseling in Q-Pod.

Fourth, Plaintiffs claim that Q-Pod lacked vocational training,

job assignments, and education. The parties agree that these

opportunities are privileges that may be restricted as part of the

disciplinary process. And Plaintiffs do not challenge the disciplinary

process that resulted in their confinement in the RHU, but contend

that their privileges should not be restricted in Q-Pod because it is an

“arbitrary and capricious” sanction.

Fifth, Plaintiffs say that Q-Pod offered limited religious

services. Seven Plaintiffs claim at most that Q-Pod had “[s]egregated

& restricted religious services (if any at all).” See, e.g., Joint App’x at

122. But they fail to allege that they have sincerely held religious

beliefs, that they sought out religious services to exercise those beliefs,

or that Defendants denied any requests for such services.

Two Plaintiffs, however, claim that Q-Pod officials denied their

requests for Native American services. Baltas and Tarasco say they

requested but were denied access to “smudging,” a Native American

ceremony involving burning grasses and tobacco led by an elder or

spiritual leader. Prison officials denied Baltas’s grievance about

smudging, noting that “inmates in Q-unit do not smudge with [the

general] population. They are allowed to dry smudge in their cells

until they move to another unit. The Native American Chapl[a]in

does a service with the inmates in Q unit.” Joint App’x at 78. Tarasco

says he too was barred from smudging, as well as sweat-lodge

services, which involve group prayer in a special sauna at

6

MacDougall-Walker. His former cellmate attests that Tarasco asked

a Native American Services Alder and a Q-Pod counselor about

access to those services. The counselor told Tarasco that the wardens

were aware of his request but might not be able to provide the services

due to staffing issues.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs sued on February 15, 2017, seeking damages and

injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Connecticut state law. As

relevant here, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants violated (1) the

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of

law; (3) the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion; and

(4) the Connecticut Constitution. Defendants denied Plaintiffs’

allegations and asserted qualified immunity.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on qualified-immunity grounds on all federal claims,

declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

claims, and denied Plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief as moot.

As to Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims, the district court

concluded that Q-Pod “did not impose a level of isolation sufficient

to support a constitutional claim.” Special App’x at 12. It also held

that Plaintiffs’ claims regarding toilet-flush restrictions fail because

“[t]emporary deprivations of toilet use that do not result in serious

physical harm or contamination do not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” Id. at 14. The district court concluded that,

in any event, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because

“Plaintiffs have not identified relevant case authority showing that

7

the restrictive conditions they experienced in Q-Pod violated the

Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 16.

The district court also rejected Plaintiffs’ procedural due

process claims. First, the record was “insufficient to permit a

reasoned determination of whether plaintiffs can prove a state-

created liberty interest.” Special App’x at 18. Even assuming such an

interest, the district court concluded that “the conditions in Q-Pod

were not dramatically different from the conditions in general

population.” Id. at 19. Although Baltas and Tarasco had raised a

triable issue as to the deprivation of their religious services, the

district court concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity because “Plaintiffs cite no relevant case authority clearly

establishing that confining them in Q-Pod without procedural

safeguards for the periods at issue violated the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Id. at 25.

Finally, the district court concluded that Defendants were

entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ free exercise claims.

The court found that Baltas and Tarasco—but not the other

Plaintiffs—might “be able to prove that they were deprived of a

constitutional right to participate in congregate religious services.”

Special App’x at 30 (cleaned up). But Defendants were immune

because “[n]o relevant case authority has been cited or found that

addresses the First Amendment free exercise rights of inmates to

participate in sweat lodge or smudging services.” Id. at 32.

Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. The case was

subsequently reassigned and the district court (Shea, C.J.) denied that

motion on June 5, 2023. Plaintiffs timely appealed the grant of

8

summary judgment. We granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis

and appointed counsel from our pro bono panel. 2

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity because they violated clearly established law. We disagree

as to the Eighth Amendment and due process claims and affirm

Defendants’ qualified immunity on those claims. As for the First

Amendment claims, we also affirm the district court’s judgment for

Defendants on qualified immunity grounds, except we reverse and

remand as to two Plaintiffs’ denial-of-congregation claims.

A. Legal Standards

“We review a district court’s denial of a motion for summary

judgment sounding in qualified immunity de novo” and “draw all

factual inferences in favor of, and take all factual assertions in the light

most favorable to, the party opposing summary judgment.” Coollick

v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from

money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the

right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Even if an officer violated

a plaintiff’s clearly established rights, he “will still be entitled to

qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe

that his acts did not violate those rights.” Outlaw v. City of Hartford,

2

The Court thanks Plaintiffs’ pro bono counsel for their service.

9

884 F.3d 351, 367 (2d Cir. 2018). These protections “balance[] two

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable

when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they

perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231 (2009).

“The Supreme Court has repeatedly told courts not to define

clearly established law at a high level of generality, instead

emphasizing that clearly established law must be particularized to the

facts of the case.” Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 146 (2d Cir. 2019)

(cleaned up). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question

beyond debate.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015) (quotation

marks omitted).

B. Eighth Amendment Claims

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and

unusual punishment.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII. To make out an

Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs must prove (1) an “objectively,

sufficiently serious . . . denial of the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities” and (2) that prison officials had a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)

(cleaned up). Plaintiffs claim that the isolation and hygienic

conditions in Q-Pod violated their Eighth Amendment rights. But

Plaintiffs fail to identify cases clearly establishing that the alleged

isolation and toilet restrictions amounted to a sufficiently serious

deprivation.

10

1. Isolation

Plaintiffs argue that their isolation in Q-Pod was cruel and

unusual punishment. They say the district court erred in granting

qualified immunity because “courts around the country have

increasingly held that conditions of confinement that result in

significant isolation—as plaintiffs experienced here—can satisfy the

objective element of the Eighth Amendment.” Appellants’ Br. at 51.

We disagree.

Q-Pod is not solitary confinement. Inmates are permitted two

hours of recreation in groups of up to thirty inmates, as well as daily

visitation. Q-Pod cells also house two inmates per cell, so Q-Pod is

not designed for complete social isolation. Still, granting Plaintiffs’

contention that some Q-Pod inmates had no cellmate, they faced up

to 22 hours per day of social isolation. The physical and psychological

consequences of long periods of social isolation may be severe, but

the 22 hours per day of isolation alleged by Plaintiffs is only one hour

more than the periods of isolation faced by inmates in the general

prison population, and the Supreme Court has never held that 22

hours per day of isolation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

In Hutto v. Finney, the Court recognized that “[c]onfinement in

a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to

scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.” 437 U.S. 678, 685

(1978). But that decision did not establish a bright-line rule. It instead

upheld a district court’s 30-day limit on punitive isolation in a “filthy,

overcrowded cell” with “a diet of ‘grue.’” Id. at 686-87. Those

“isolation” cells were not solitary in the social sense; the issue was

11

overcrowding of the isolation cells. So Hutto does not clearly establish

law that supports Plaintiffs’ social-isolation claims.

This Court also has never held that such isolation is cruel and

unusual. In Reynolds v. Quiros—on which Plaintiffs rely—we noted

only that an inmate facing life in a solo cell for 21-22 hours a day

“could arguably prevail on his claims alleging violations of the Eighth

Amendment.” 990 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2021). But even there, we

vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the inmate

in light of disputed facts. Id. at 295. Dicta about disputed claims that

“could arguably prevail” does not clearly establish that the isolation

in Q-Pod violated the Eighth Amendment. And even if it did,

Reynolds post-dates the challenged conduct and thus cannot

undermine qualified immunity here. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (“A

Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when,

at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are

sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” (emphasis

added) (cleaned up)).

Nor do other circuits’ decisions “clearly foreshadow[] a

particular ruling on the issue” of social isolation. Burns v. Martuscello,

890 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs point to Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th

167 (3d Cir. 2022), in which the Third Circuit held that an inmate’s

“almost complete isolation for seven months by officials who knew

him to be seriously mentally ill” was a serious deprivation. Id. at 180.

But Clark involved the solitary confinement of a seriously mentally ill

inmate for all but three one-hour intervals per week. Id. at 173, 180.

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019), fares

12

no better. The Fourth Circuit held that “conditions of confinement on

Virginia’s death row—under which Plaintiffs spent, for years,

between 23 and 24 hours a day alone, in a small . . . cell” posed a

substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 357 (quotation marks omitted).

Q-Pod, by contrast, is not designed for solitary confinement and

provides more recreation time, as well as daily visitation. 3

It is not clearly established that the level of social isolation in Q-

Pod violated the Eighth Amendment, so we affirm the district court’s

grant of qualified immunity as to these claims.

2. Toilet Restrictions

Plaintiffs argue that they endured unsanitary conditions

because Q-Pod “had restrictions on flushing the toilet a certain

number of times in a given period, causing the toilets to be turned off

for two to three hours at a time.” Appellants’ Br. at 6. They argue

that we have clearly established that such restrictions on toilet use

violate the Eighth Amendment. That is incorrect.

Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has held that

shutting off toilet flushes “for two to three hours at a time” violates

the Eighth Amendment. In LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d

Cir. 1972), we recognized that “[c]ausing a man to live, eat and

perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too

debasing and degrading to be permitted.” Id. at 978. But that case

3

Even if these out-of-circuit cases were on point and clearly

foreshadowed a ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on the isolation issue, they too

would not undermine qualified immunity because they post-date Plaintiffs’

alleged Q-Pod detentions.

13

involved a “Chinese toilet”—i.e., a grate in the ground that collected

waste in the open air until flushed by external control—which is far

more “degrading” than a toilet with a flush timer. Id. at 977. Plaintiffs

also point to Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015), but that

case involved a deprivation of running toilet water for a week or

more. Id. at 66-67. Our caselaw does not clearly establish that a few

hours without a flushing toilet violates the Eighth Amendment, so we

affirm the grant of qualified immunity as to these claims.

C. Due Process Claims

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated their due process right

to be free from Q-Pod confinement. To make out a procedural due

process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a prisoner must

establish that (1) the state has created a liberty interest protected by

the Due Process Clause and (2) limits on that liberty interest

“impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472, 484 (1995). Even if Plaintiffs had a cognizable liberty interest in

freedom from Q-Pod, the alleged durations and conditions of

confinement would not violate their due process rights.

1. Liberty Interest

Plaintiffs argue that they had a liberty interest in freedom from

Q-Pod confinement. Plaintiffs “must establish . . . that the state has

granted its inmates, by regulation or by statute, a protected liberty

interest in remaining free from that confinement or restraint.” Frazier

v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996). They point to the DOC’s

Administrative Directives (“A.D.”) as creating a liberty interest in

freedom from unauthorized punishments. Under A.D. 9.5, an inmate

14

receives a “ticket” for certain infractions, which they can contest at a

hearing. If guilt is established, the inmate serves time in the RHU.

Plaintiffs do not challenge the disciplinary proceedings that initially

landed them in the RHU. They instead challenge their post-RHU

transfer to Q-Pod. So any liberty interest must arise from Plaintiffs’

allegation that prison officials flouted regulations governing post-

RHU confinement to use Q-Pod as an “illegal and off-the-books form

of administrative segregation.” Joint App’x at 38.

The relevant regulations appear in MacDougall-Walker’s

Inmate Handbook and the DOC’s A.D. The Handbook provides that

“[u]pon release from RHU and upon having been found guilty or

having pled guilty to a charge(s) under the Code of Penal Discipline,

inmates . . . will complete the remainder of their time on Unassigned

Status in” Q-Pod. Joint App’x at 95-96. The Handbook states that

inmates will stay in Q-Pod for 90 days for a Class A ticket or 60 days

for a Class B ticket. A.D. 9.5 specifies the penalties that may be

imposed for a disciplinary infraction. Defendants say that any

confinement beyond these periods resulted from new violations, but

they do not identify a regulation that provides for extending Q-Pod

detention rather than reverting the inmate to the same disciplinary

process that led to their placement in the RHU. Defendants also deny

that conditions in Q-Pod amount to an unauthorized penalty.

Because this issue is contested, we assume without deciding that the

relevant regulations create a liberty interest in freedom from Q-Pod

confinement.

15

Plaintiffs allege that they were confined in Q-Pod longer than

the Handbook permits 4 and subject to penalties not set out in A.D. 9.5.

Again assuming that the relevant regulations create a liberty interest,

Plaintiffs may have alleged a deprivation of their right to be free from

Q-Pod confinement.

2. Atypical and Significant Hardships

Plaintiffs argue that they were “confined in Q-Pod for lengthy

periods of time and under particularly harsh and restrictive prison

conditions.” Appellants’ Br. at 42. For a deprivation of liberty to

amount to “atypical and significant hardship,” conditions must

“work a major disruption” in their environment. Sandin, 515 U.S. at

486. Relevant factors “include the extent to which the conditions of

the disciplinary segregation differ from other routine prison

conditions and the duration of the disciplinary segregation imposed

compared to discretionary confinement.” Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d

60, 64 (2d Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). “[E]specially harsh conditions

endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh conditions endured

for a prolonged interval might both be atypical.” Sealey v. Giltner, 197

F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999).

Most of the challenged Q-Pod conditions do not significantly

“differ from other routine prison conditions.” Palmer, 364 F.3d at 64

4

Rivera says he spent nine consecutive months in Q-Pod. Gladding

says he was there for more than seven months consecutively and more than

a year in total. Baltas alleges almost five consecutive months of

confinement and over a year in total. Tarasco says that he was confined for

“about three months and a few days on a Class A Ticket.” Joint App’x at

118. And Rice says that he was confined for over three months.

16

(quotation marks omitted). First, Q-Pod inmates have only one less

hour of recreation per day than other inmates in the general

population. We have never held that such a deprivation of recreation

and socialization constitutes an atypical and significant hardship, 5

even for the intermediate durations of Q-Pod detention alleged by

Rivera and Gladding. 6 To the contrary, the Supreme Court in Sandin

held that an inmate’s segregation—with an average of 50 minutes

each day out of the cell for 30 days—“did not present the type of

atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably

create a liberty interest” because it “did not work a major disruption”

compared to general-population inmates’ eight to twelve out-of-cell

hours. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486 & n.8.

Second, Baltas and Tarasco claim that Q-Pod confinement

deprived them of access to requested religious services, but their

5

In Palmer, we affirmed a district court’s denial of qualified

immunity from an inmate’s procedural due process claim for 77 days in a

special housing unit without exercise, hygiene products, or visitation. 364

F.3d at 67. We explained that “it is possible that Palmer endured unusually

harsh SHU conditions that constituted an ‘atypical and significant

deprivation’ under Sandin.” Id. But the mere possibility of success on a

claim involving different conditions does not “place[] the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate” as needed to defeat qualified

immunity under current doctrine. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

6

Between 101 and 305 days is an “intermediate duration” of

confinement for which a district court must develop a “detailed record of

conditions of confinement relative to ordinary prison conditions.” Palmer,

364 F.3d at 65 (quotation marks omitted).

17

allegations do not rise to a cognizable hardship under Sandin. 7

Baltas’s longest alleged stay in Q-Pod was almost five months. But

there is no caselaw establishing that denial of religious services for

five months imposes an atypical and significant hardship. In Arce v.

Walker, 139 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1998), we rejected an inmate’s procedural

due process claim for eighteen days of segregation during which he

was “entitled to only one hour of exercise per day and could not

attend communal religious services.” Id. at 336. Although we

recognized that these conditions were more severe than those in the

general prison population, we held that the deprivations “were not

more onerous tha[n] those considered, and constitutionally

sanctioned in Sandin.” Id. To be sure, Baltas alleges a longer duration

of religious deprivation in Q-Pod. But our decisions do not clearly

establish a bright-line rule about when such deprivations are

actionable under Sandin.

Plaintiffs’ other alleged conditions also fail under Sandin.

Plaintiffs complain that Q-Pod officials prevented toilet flushes “for

two to three hours at a time.” Appellants’ Br. at 6. They further allege

that they were deprived of job and training opportunities, even

though they admit that the loss of those opportunities is based on an

inmate’s disciplinary record. And Plaintiffs allege inadequate

medical care, but fail to identify any injuries or specific deprivations

7

Seven other Plaintiffs allege that Q-Pod had “[s]egregated &

restricted religious services (if any at all).” But they do not allege an

atypical or significant hardship—or any hardship at all—because they do

not claim to hold religious beliefs or to have been denied access to requested

services for those beliefs. See infra Section II.D.

18

of care. We have never held any of these conditions, whether alone

or together, to be an atypical or significant hardship.

We cannot say that every reasonable officer would know that

Q-Pod confinement, even for the longest periods alleged, violated

Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. Plaintiffs identify no

precedent clearly establishing that any of the alleged conditions

constitutes atypical and significant hardship for the alleged

durations. We thus affirm the district court’s grant of qualified

immunity as to Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims.

D. First Amendment Claims

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their First

Amendment right to free exercise of religion. To make out a free

exercise claim, a “prisoner must show at the threshold that the

disputed conduct . . . burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.”

Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 2014). 8 But “[u]nder the

First Amendment, the law is less generous to plaintiff prisoners; a

generally applicable policy will not be held to violate a plaintiff’s right

to free exercise of religion if that policy is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 536 (2d

Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Absent such a penological

8 We recently “join[ed] those circuits that have held that an inmate

does not need to establish a substantial burden in order to prevail on a free

exercise claim under § 1983.” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 125 (2d Cir.

2023). But that was not clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs’ alleged

Q-Pod confinements in 2015 and 2016. See Wiggins v. Griffin, 86 F.4th 987,

993 (2d Cir. 2023) (“We have not decided whether the substantial burden

test survives Employment Division v. Smith.”).

19

interest, “[i]t is well established that prisoners have a constitutional

right to participate in congregate religious services.” Salahuddin v.

Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993).

Seven of the nine Plaintiffs—Goode, Pellot-Castellano, Rice,

Davis, Rivera, Gladding, and Ortiz—fail to allege any burden on their

sincerely held religious beliefs. They allege only that Q-Pod had

“[s]egregated & restricted religious services (if any at all).” They do

not even claim that they hold religious beliefs, much less that

Defendants burdened their exercise of any such beliefs. 9 So we affirm

the grant of qualified immunity on these Plaintiffs’ claims.

The remaining two Plaintiffs—Baltas and Tarasco—claim that

Defendants denied their requests to access congregate services for

their Native American religion. Defendants declined to offer any

penological justification for refusing Baltas and Tarasco access to

these services. 10

9

Even if these Plaintiffs had alleged a burden on their sincerely held

religious beliefs, their claims fail because they do not allege that Defendants

knew or should have known that they had denied them access to their

desired religious services. See Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 997 (“[M]ere negligence

cannot support a First Amendment free exercise claim, . . . [but] deliberate

indifference clearly suffices.” (quotation marks omitted)).

10These practices involve open flames and require close supervision.

See Baltas v. Jones, No. 3:21-CV-469, 2023 WL 8827880, at *20 (D. Conn. Dec.

21, 2023); Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1548 (8th Cir. 1996). But

Defendants have disclaimed on appeal any penological justification based

on those considerations. See Joint App’x at 146 (“Here, there has been no

limitation or denial of the plaintiffs’ rights to attend religious services, thus

no explanation of a pen[o]logical rationale is necessary.”).

20

Tarasco claims he was “continually being denied [his]

Constitutional right to attend . . . Purification (sweat lodge)” and that

he “was not allowed to attend [his] religious practices or purifications

at all.” 11 Joint App’x at 118. Tarasco’s former cellmate attests that

Tarasco spoke with a Q-Pod official and prison chaplain about his

desire to access sweat-lodge services, so the deprivation is not the

result of “[m]ere negligence.” Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 997. Plaintiffs

describe the sweat lodge as “a congregate Native American Religious

Practice that occurs at MacDougall on a monthly basis, where the gen.

pop inmates are permitted to attend.” Joint App’x at 330. Sweat-

lodge ceremonies may involve healers and participants sitting around

a steam-producing fire in a domed lodge. MacDougall-Walker is one

of the few state prisons to have a sweat lodge.

“It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right

to participate in congregate religious services.” Salahuddin, 993 F.2d

at 308. In the context of MacDougall-Walker, where general-

population Native American inmates hold congregate services in the

prison’s sweat lodge, no reasonable officer would think it lawful to

deny Tarasco this form of congregation absent a legitimate

penological purpose. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of qualified

immunity as to Tarasco’s sweat-lodge claim.

The district court granted qualified immunity because Plaintiffs

identified no caselaw that addresses the “free exercise rights of

inmates to participate in sweat lodge.” Special App’x at 32. Although

we agree with the district court that there is no clearly established

11

Baltas never alleged that he requested and was denied access to

sweat-lodge services.

21

right to demand construction of a sweat lodge, see Baltas v. Erfe, No.

3:19-cv-1820, 2022 WL 4260672, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 2022), there

is a clearly established right to access congregate religious services

where they already exist and are available. MacDougall-Walker had

a sweat lodge for Native American services and Defendants advanced

no penological justification for denying Tarasco access to religious

congregation there, so Defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity.

Similarly, Baltas and Tarasco allege that prison officials denied

their requests for “smudging.” Smudging is a ritual involving

burning organic matter such as tobacco. The record indicates that

smudging is a congregate activity among MacDougall-Walker’s

general-population inmates. In response to Baltas’s grievance about

smudging, a prison official wrote that inmates in “Q-unit do not

smudge with [the general] population. They are allowed to dry

smudge in their cells until they move to another unit. The Native

American Chapl[a]in does a service with the inmates in Q unit.” Joint

App’x at 78.

At MacDougall-Walker, where the general population is

permitted to engage in congregate Native American smudging, no

reasonable officer would think it lawful to deny this form of religious

congregation absent penological justification.

The district court granted qualified immunity because Plaintiffs

presented no authority on the First Amendment right to smudging.

It is correct that there is no clearly established right to smudging or

tobacco use for religious services in prison. But see Williams v. Hansen,

5 F.4th 1129, 1135 (10th Cir. 2021) (recognizing a right to tobacco for

22

religious services). But as with the sweat lodge, this analysis

overlooks the congregate nature of Baltas’s and Tarasco’s desired

smudging services and their availability to other Native American

inmates at MacDougall-Walker. And because Defendants failed to

offer any penological justification for denying Baltas and Tarasco

congregate smudging with the general population, we reverse the

grant of qualified immunity as to these denial-of-congregation

claims. 12

E. State-Law Claims

Finally, the district court declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). But when federal claims are reinstated, “§ 1367(c)(3) no

longer provides a basis for declining to exercise jurisdiction over”

related state-law claims. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 79

(2d Cir. 2003). In light of our decision to reinstate some of Baltas’s

and Tarasco’s federal claims, we vacate the district court’s dismissal

of their state-law claims, but offer no view as to other reasons the

district court might decide on remand to decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction.

12 Baltas’s and Tarasco’s general allegations about access to other

“Native American Services” do not defeat Defendants’ qualified immunity.

Although there is a clearly established right to congregate services, we

cannot say that every reasonable officer would know which Native

American services implicate that right. At any rate, absent an allegation

that Baltas or Tarasco requested access to particular services, they have no

viable First Amendment claim against the Q-Pod officers based on the

officers’ mere ignorance of their desired course of religious practice. See

Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 997-98.

23

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment and order granting

Defendants qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment

and procedural due process claims, as well as the Free Exercise claims

of seven of the nine Plaintiffs. But we reverse as to Baltas’s and

Tarasco’s free exercise claims because they allege denial of their

clearly established right to participate in congregate religious services

absent a legitimate penological justification. Accordingly, the

judgment and order of the district court are affirmed in part and

reversed in part, and the case is remanded with instructions to deny

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on qualified-immunity

grounds as to Baltas’s and Tarasco’s denial-of-congregation claims

and to reinstate their state-law claims.

24