Teleties, LLC v. 1-18 As Identified in Schedule "A"

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

TELETIES, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-539-JSS-RMN

DEFENDANTS #1-18 AS

IDENTIFIED IN SCHEDULE “A,”

Defendants.

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ORDER

Plaintiff and twelve Defendants move for entry of a stipulated permanent

injunction prohibiting these Defendants from “making, using, selling, offering for sale,

and/or importing any product that infringes [Plaintiff’s] intellectual property rights

including, but in no way limited to, U.S. Design Patent No. D1,031,161.” (Dkt. 107-1

at 3 (emphasis added).) This proposed injunction does not comply with Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 65(d)(1), which requires “[e]very order granting an injunction” to

“state the reasons why it issued,” “state its terms specifically,” and “describe in

reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act

or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). Although Rule 65 generally

concerns preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, Rule 65(d) applies

to permanent injunctions, as well. See Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1531

(11th Cir. 1996) (applying Rule 65(d) to a permanent injunction). The proposed

injunction should set forth its terms “with specificity” and describe the acts restrained

proscribed.’” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Rivers, 272 F.R.D. 607, 608 (M.D. Fla. 2011)

(quoting Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1185 (11th Cir. 2010)).

The parties contend that “[a] defendant’s agreement to the terms of a permanent

injunction [is] alone sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 65(d).” (Dkt. 107 at

2.) To support this contention, they cite Rivers, 272 F.R.D. 607. (Dkt. 107 at 2–3.)

However, Rivers illustrates that “the agreement of a defendant to the terms of a

permanent injunction is alone sufficient to satisfy Rule 65(d)(1)(A)” in particular. 272

F.R.D. at 608 (citing Chathas v. Local 134 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 233 F.3d 508, 513

(7th Cir. 2000)). In other words, a defendant’s agreement may explain why an

injunction issues. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(A). Rivers does not support that a

defendant’s agreement to an injunction’s terms ensures that the injunction “state[s]

[the] terms specifically” and “describe[s] in reasonable detail—and not by referring to

the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 65(d)(1)(B)–(C). In fact, Rivers analyzes these requirements separately. See 272

F.R.D. at 608 (“The [c]ourt additionally finds that the terms of the injunction are set

forth with specificity and that the acts restrained or required are described in sufficient

detail . . . .” (emphasis added)).

Because the proposed injunction (Dkt. 107-1) does not fully satisfy Rule 65(d),

the parties’ motion (Dkt. 107) is DENIED without prejudice. See Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.

Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1223 (11th Cir. 2000)

(“The specificity requirement of Rule 65(d) is no mere technicality; the command of

specificity is a reflection of the seriousness of the consequences which may flow from

a violation of an injunctive order.” (alteration adopted and quotation omitted));

Hughey, 78 F.3d at 1531 (“[A]n ordinary person reading the court’s order should be

able to ascertain from the document itself exactly what conduct is proscribed.”

(quotation omitted)).

ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on September 2, 2025.

| Aiea

JUVIE S. SNEED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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