discussing district courts’ “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket”
How later courts described this case
- discussing district courts’ “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LASHARON BROWN, individually )
and on behalf of all others similarly )
situated, )
) No. 24-cv-6560
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings
v. )
)
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
The Court has reviewed defendant’s motion to dismiss, (Dckt. ##10, 11), and the briefs
related thereto, (Dckt. ##15, 16). For the following reasons, and within its discretion, the Court
terminates defendant’s motion to dismiss, (Dckt. #10), without prejudice and with leave to renew
(with any appropriate supplementation) and sua sponte stays this matter until after the resolution
of the pending appeal before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case captioned as
Cisneros v. Nuance Communications, Case No. 24-2982 (7th Cir.).
To begin, “the Court has the inherent authority to stay proceedings to ‘control the
disposition of causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants.’” Purchase v. FaceApp Inc., No. 23-CV-2735-SPM, 2024 WL 4164753, at *9 (S.D.Ill.
Sept. 12, 2024), quoting Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “This
authority exists even in the absence of a procedurally valid motion to stay.” Purchase, 2024 WL
4164753, at *9 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (discussing district courts’
“broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket”)). “In
determining whether to grant a motion to stay, courts consider (1) whether the stay will simplify
the issues and streamline the trial; (2) whether the stay will reduce the burden of litigation on the
Court and the parties; and (3) whether the stay will unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage
the non-moving party.” Bernstein v. Coinbase Glob., Inc., No. 25-CV-05313, 2025 WL 2418409,
at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 21, 2025).
Here, as the parties agree, the issues presented in defendant’s fully briefed motion to
dismiss before this Court turn on a pure question of law regarding the construction of the Illinois
Biometrics Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), and—more specifically—the scope of the
financial institution exemption set forth in Section 25(c) of BIPA. See 740 ILCS 14/25(c).
(“Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to apply in any manner to a financial institution or an
affiliate of a financial institution that is subject to Title V of the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999 and the rules promulgated thereunder.”). Moreover, currently at issue in the pending
appeal before the Seventh Circuit in the Cisneros case, are the following questions (among
others): (1) Did the District Court err in dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint based on an
affirmative defense (1.e., the financial institution exemption under 25(c)) on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion? and (2) Did the District Court err in dismissing plaintiff’s amended complaint after
holding defendant is a financial institution subject to Title V of the GLBA and therefore,
pursuant to Section 25(c), exempt from any obligations under BIPA? Cisneros, Case No. 24-
2982, Dekt. #9.
Given these issues, it “seems likely” that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’
forthcoming decision in Cisneros “will have significant effect on the ultimate disposition of the
instant matter.” Jackson v. Van Kampen Series Fund, Inc., No. 06-CV-944-DRH, 2007 WL
1532090, at *2 (S.D-IIl. May 24, 2007) (ordering a stay sua sponte). Indeed, although the Court
acknowledges the factual differences in the application of the financial institution exemption at
issue in Cisneros, at a minimum the appeal will address whether the exemption is an affirmative
defense appropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.
On the whole, because the “Seventh Circuit has the opportunity to clarify the scope of
Section 25(c) of BIPA [in Cisneros], including whether a district court can rule on the
applicability of the financial institution exemption at the motion to dismiss stage,” the Court
finds that a stay will streamline the issues and reduce the burden on the Court and the parties,
with no apparent prejudice to either party. Bernstein, 2025 WL 2418409, at *3. In light of the
stay, the Court terminates defendant’s motion to dismiss, (Dckt. #10), without prejudice and with
leave to renew (with any appropriate supplementation) following the resolution of the appeal in
Cisneros.
The parties shall file a joint status report within 14 days of the resolution of the Cisneros
appeal. The previously set September 26, 2025 tracking status hearing is stricken and re-set to
November 24, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. (to track the case only, no appearance is required).
Date: September 2, 2025
□□ I. Cummings C
United States District Court Judge