The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No.: 3:23-CV-9-KAC-DCP
)
FRANK STRADA, )
SHAWN PHILLIPS, )
BRETT COBBLE, )
ALLAN LEWIS, )
TIM MOONEYHAM, )
JESSICA BROWN, and )
ZACK KOCZWARA, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s (1) “Motion for Extension of Time and Reopening of
Discovery to Respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc. 104], (2) “Motion to
Toll and Extend Time” [Docs. 110, 111], (3) “Motion to File Summary Judgment Response Under
Seal” [Doc. 112], (4) “Motion for Extension of Time” to file his Pretrial Narrative Statement
(“PNS”) [Doc. 114], (5) “Motion to File Pretrial Narrative Summary Under Seal” [Doc. 116], and
(6) “Notice and Motion of Correction to Pretrial Narrative Summary” [Doc. 119]. Defendants
oppose Plaintiff’s motion to extend time and reopen discovery [See Doc. 109]. But they agree to
Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file a PNS, provided that Defendants receive a
reciprocal extension [See Doc. 126]. The Court addresses each motion below.
I. MOTION TO REOPEN DISCOVERY [Doc. 104]
In his Motion to Reopen Discovery, Plaintiff argues that under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(b), he should be able to reopen discovery and file a later response to Defendants’
motion for summary judgment [See Doc. 104 at 1-2]. Plaintiff states that Defendants’ summary
judgment motion “raise[s] a number of issues which necessitate discovery be reopened to Plaintiff
for the express purpose of responding to Defendants’ motion” [Doc. 104 ¶ 4]. He maintains that
Defendants “volunteer a number of. . . ‘facts[]’ that Plaintiff though[t] he would only need to rebut
at trial” [Id. ¶ 3]. Defendants oppose the request, maintaining that (1) Plaintiff has failed to explain
his failure to seek discovery within the time permitted; (2) Defendants would be prejudiced by
reopening discovery after filing their summary judgment motion; and (3) granting the request
would require the Court to reset the trial [See Doc. 109].
The deadline to complete discovery in this action was April 7, 2025 [Doc. 77 ¶ 1]. Rule
16 provides that a scheduling order may be modified “only for good cause and with the judge’s
consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Because Plaintiff filed his motion after the discovery deadline
passed, Rule 6(b)(1)(B) is also implicated. Rule 6 provides that after a deadline has expired, the
moving Party must show “good cause” and that “the party has failed to act because of excusable
neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). A party must “demonstrate that he or she diligently attempted
to meet the original deadline” to show “good cause[.]” Gatza v. DCC Litig. Facility, Inc., 717 F.
App’x 519, 521 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 906 (6th Cir. 2003)).
Here, the Parties had almost three (3) months to conduct discovery after the Scheduling
Order was entered, and Defendants maintain that Plaintiff submitted no discovery request to
Defendants during that time [See Doc. 109 at 2]. Plaintiff has not contradicted this assertion. And
he has not demonstrated diligence in attempting to meet the discovery deadline. Therefore,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated “good cause.”
Nevertheless, even if Plaintiff could show “good cause,” he has not shown “excusable
neglect.” The “excusable neglect” determination is “at bottom an equitable one.” Morgan v.
Gandalf, Ltd., 165 F. App’x 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick
Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). The Sixth Circuit has identified five non-exhaustive
factors to consider in making this equitable determination: (1) the reason for the delay, (2) whether
the delay was within the reasonable control of the moving party, (3) any prejudice to the
nonmoving party, (4) the length of the delay and its impact on the judicial proceedings, and
(5) whether the late-filing party acted in good faith. Nafziger v. McDermott Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d
514, 522 (6th Cir. 2006).
Here, Plaintiff’s excuse for not conducting discovery timely is that he “though[t] he would
only need to rebut [certain facts] at trial” [See Doc. 104 at 1-2]. But failure to prepare your case
before trial is not excusable neglect. And Plaintiff was in control of his choices regarding
discovery. Defendants would be prejudiced by the extension Plaintiff seeks—they have already
spent significant time, effort, and money preparing and filing a motion for summary judgment.
And the time for trial is fast approaching. These relevant factors thus weigh against the request.
And Plaintiff’s status as a pro se prisoner does not mitigate his failures. Pro se litigants are not
exempt from following the discovery process and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See E.D.
Tenn. L.R. 83.13 (“Parties proceeding pro se shall be expected to be familiar with and follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and these rules.”). Because Plaintiff has not shown “good cause”
and “excusable neglect,”1 the Court DENIES his motion [Doc. 104].
1 No Party cites or relies on Rule 56(d) as a basis to consider Plaintiff’s Motion. But liberally
construing Plaintiff’s motion, Rule 56(d) could provide a source of law to support his request. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). However, even applying Rule 56(d), Plaintiff’s motion would fail because
he has not satisfactorily “indicate[d]” to the Court the “need for discovery, what material facts [he]
hopes to uncover, and why [he] has not previously discovered the information.” See Doe v. City of
Memphis, 928 F.3d 481, 490 (6th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
II. MOTIONS TO TOLL AND EXTEND TIME [Docs. 110, 111, 114]
First, Plaintiff filed two motions seeking an eight-day extension of the deadline to respond
to Defendants’ summary judgment motion [Docs. 110, 111]. Plaintiff maintains that his housing
facility went into lockdown during his response time and that he lacked access to the relevant
“material components” to respond [Id.]. This establishes good cause to grant Plaintiff’s first
motion [Doc. 110]. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s first motion to toll and extend
time [Doc. 110] and DENIES Plaintiff’s second motion [Doc. 111], which is a handwritten version
of the first, as moot.
Second, Plaintiff seeks to extend the time to file his PNS by a few days due to facility
disruptions that prevented him from using the law library [Doc. 114]. Defendants do not
substantively oppose [See Doc. 126]. With no opposition and a showing of good cause, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 114]. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.2, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. The Court
receives Plaintiff’s PNS [Doc. 117] as timely filed. By reciprocal extension, Defendants’ PNS
deadline is extended to September 2, 2025.
III. MOTIONS TO FILE UNDER SEAL [Docs. 112, 116]
Plaintiff filed motions to seal his summary judgment response [Doc. 112] and PNS
[Doc. 116]. Plaintiff maintains that these documents contain “affidavits from inmates concerning
acts of wrongdoing by prison staff”; that they agreed to assist Plaintiff only on the condition that
their cooperation “would not bring retaliation upon them or be used against them”; and that their
identities, along with the identities of testifying prison staff, “will also need protection from
Defendants” [Docs. 112, 116].
Local Rule 26.2 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, rule, or order, all
pleadings and other papers of any nature filed with the Court (“Court records”) shall become a part
of the public record of this Court.” E.D. Tenn. LR 26.2(a). As the Sixth Circuit recently put it
succinctly:
Our court has held again and again that ‘[o]nly the most compelling reasons can
justify non-disclosure of court records.’ That does not mean, as CoreCivic asserts
here, that ‘[s]ealing documents is warranted if the interests supporting
nondisclosure outweigh the interests supporting access[.]’ To the contrary, the
whole point of the ‘strong presumption of openness regarding court records’ is
that—in every case where a judicial record is sealed from public view—the interests
favoring non-disclosure must be compelling. Moreover, even when ‘a party can
show a compelling reason why certain documents or portions thereof should be
sealed, the seal itself must be narrowly tailored to serve that reason.’
Grae v. Corr. Corp. of Am.,134 F.4th 927, 931-32 (6th Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted). A
party seeking to seal records must show a “clearly defined and serious injury” that would result if
the judicial records were not sealed. Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d
299, 307 (6th Cir. 2016). “[C]onclusory allegations of injury” are not “sufficient to overcome the
presumption in favor of public access.” In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d 908, 915
(E.D. Tenn. 2009) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has not met this exacting standard here. Plaintiff’s lawsuit is proceeding on claims
that Defendants retaliated against him [See Doc. 10 at 30-31]. None of the witness statements
Plaintiff filed contain sensitive information beyond the identity of the witnesses him or herself
[See Doc. 113-2; Doc. 117]. And Defendants are likely already aware of the identify of these
individuals [See Doc. 113 at 25; 117 at 6]. Further, Plaintiff offers only generalized assertions of
anticipated injury from anticipated retaliation, not “specific facts showing clearly defined and
serious injury.” See In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 666 F. Supp. 2d at 915 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motions [Docs. 112, 116]. Within fourteen
(14) days of entry of this Order, Plaintiff MUST (1) advise the Court that he wishes for his PNS
and summary judgment response to be publicly filed and considered by the Court or (2) submit
new versions of his PNS and summary judgment response that will be publicly filed. The Court
WARNS Plaintiff that if he fails to timely comply with this Order, the Court will dismiss this
action for failure to prosecute and comply with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
IV. NOTICE AND MOTION OF CORRECTION TO PNS [Doc. 119]
Finally, Plaintiff filed a notice and motion seeking to correct his PNS to indicate (1) that
the date a witness observed a conversation and event was December 21, 2021, and (2) the address
of witness [See Doc. 119 (referencing Doc. 117)]. Plaintiff’s request is well-taken. The Court
GRANTS the motion [Doc. 119]. Plaintiff’s PNS [see Doc. 117] is hereby modified as set forth
in Plaintiff’s notice and motion [Doc. 119].
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/ Katherine A. Crytzer
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER
United States District Judge