The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
CHRISTOPHER STEPHEN JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No.: 3:23-CV-9-KAC-DCP
)
FRANK STRADA, )
SHAWN PHILLIPS, )
BRETT COBBLE, )
ALLAN LEWIS, )
TIM MOONEYHAM, )
JESSICA BROWN, and )
ZACK KOCZWARA, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court are a series of motions filed by Plaintiff [Docs. 81, 82, 84, 87, 88] and a
Motion filed by Defendants [Doc. 92]. The Court addresses Plaintiff’s motions, then Defendants’.
I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS [Docs. 81, 82, 84, 87, & 88]
First, Plaintiff requested a seven-day extension of time within which to respond to
Defendants’ February 5, 2025 motion [Doc. 81]. But Plaintiff did not make that request until
Plaintiff had already filed the document that the February 5 motion addressed [See Doc. 79]. And
the Court has already granted the February 5 motion and received the Answer as timely filed.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES this motion [Doc. 81].
Second, citing a prolonged delay in receiving certain documents and a failure to receive
others, Plaintiff asks the Court to send him a copy of any orders entered on January 16, 2025 and
give him with an additional thirty (30) days from postmarking to respond [See Doc. 82]. But the
Clerk already remailed courtesy copies to Plaintiff on March 3, 2025. Therefore, the Court
DENIES as moot the portion of Plaintiff’s motion seeking copies. And because Plaintiff has
already had time to “respond” to these Orders, [see Docs. 89 (filing a purported notice of
interlocutory appeal), 106 (denying interlocutory appeal)], the Court likewise DENIES as moot
the portion of Plaintiff’s motion seeking additional time to respond to the Orders.
Third, Plaintiff requests through May 7, 2025, to submit his “Notice and Substance of
Expert Testimony” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) [Doc. 84]. But the Court’s
Scheduling Order required Plaintiff to disclose his witnesses and their anticipated testimony by
July 7, 2025 [Doc. 77 ¶ 3]. And the Rules provide that expert disclosures need only be made “at
least 90 days before the date set for trial or for the case to be ready for trial[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(D). The trial of this action is not scheduled until December 2, 2025. Therefore, it is not
necessary for Plaintiff to seek an extension of time through May 7, 2025, to make any expert
disclosures. Accordingly, the Court DENIES this Motion [Doc. 84].
Fourth, Plaintiff moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 26(a), “to direct Defendants to turn
over evidence in their possession as well as employee witness locations,” asserting they are
“necessary for evidentiary presentation in this case” [Doc. 87]. Defendants oppose this request,
asserting, in part, that Plaintiff never sought this discovery and did not attempt to confer with them
prior to seeking Court intervention [See Doc. 91]. Plaintiff replied, claiming that Defendants
cannot or will not disclose the sought discovery due to its nature and that he is entitled to an
extension of the discovery deadline since there was a forty-seven-day delay in his receipt of the
Scheduling Order [Doc. 93]. But this Court is not the vehicle by which Plaintiff receives
discovery. He must seek discovery directly from the Defendants. Moreover, the discovery period
in this cause closed on April 7 [See Doc. 77 ¶ 1]. And while Plaintiff complains he did not learn
of the Court’s Scheduling Order until March 10, 2025 [see Doc. 93 at 4], he does not explain why
he did not attempt to seek discovery from Defendants then. Therefore, because Plaintiff’s motion
is both procedurally improper and untimely filed, the Court DENIES the motion1 [Doc. 87].
Finally, Plaintiff filed a Motion under Rule 54(b) to certify “that the subject matter of the
ORDER(s) entered: July 6, 2023; March 5, 2024; September 19, 2024; September 30, 2024; and
January 16, 2025 are final” [Doc. 88]. Rule 54(b) states, in relevant part that, “[w]hen an action
presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the
court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). However,
entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) is appropriate only in the “infrequent” case where doing
so is necessary “as an instrument for the improved administration of justice.” Corrosioneering,
Inc. v. Thyssen Environmental Sys., Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir. 1986) (cleaned up).
Rule 54(b) is intended “to strike a balance between the undesirability of more than one
appeal in a single action and the need for making review available in multiple-party or multiple-
claim situations at a time that best serves the needs of the litigants.” Day v. NLO, Inc., 3 F.3d 153,
155 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2654
(1983)). In striking this balance, the court considers non-exhaustive factors, including:
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the
possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future
developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might
be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of
a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought
to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency
considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense
and the like.
1 Plaintiff also states that he needs “the address of the courthouse where the trial in this case will
be held” [Doc. 87]. The Court’s Scheduling Order notified Plaintiff that a jury trial will be held
in this case “at the United States District Courthouse, Courtroom 3C, 800 Market Street, Knoxville,
Tennessee” [Doc. 77].
Lowery v. Fed. Express Corp., 426 F.3d 817, 821-22 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Gen. Acquisition, Inc.
v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1030 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Here, Plaintiff cites no authoritative caselaw supporting his request for entry of final
judgment. Instead, he only lodges a blanket challenge to every substantive order the Court has
entered. Thus, he has not provided any basis to conclude that this is a rare case where his request
is meritorious. Further, Plaintiff’s claims involve overlapping parties, and the similarity of the
factual and legal issues between the dismissed claims and pending claims weighs against
certification under Rule 54(b). No matter who prevails, the Sixth Circuit would potentially be
required to address the same factual matter in two separate appeals. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for certification under Rule 54(b) [Doc. 88].
II. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION [Doc. 92]
Moving to Defendants’ motion, Defendants sought a seven-day extension of the dispositive
motion deadline [Doc. 92]. They assert that an extension is necessary to obtain signatures on
affidavits to support their summary judgment motion [See Doc. 92 at 1-2]. Because this extension
is brief and Plaintiff did not oppose,2 the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 92]. See E.D. Tenn.
L.R. 7.2. The Court receives “Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment” [Doc. 96] as timely
filed.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/ Katherine A. Crytzer
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER
United States District Judge
2 Plaintiff, too, filed his motion for summary judgment within this extended deadline [See Doc. 94].
And the Court receives his motion for summary judgment as timely filed.