Opinion

Hoskins v. Harris County Precinct 5

Court
District Court, S.D. Texas
Filed
Aug 29, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.1%

The opinion

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

September 02, 2025

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

HLEVICTOR A. HOSKINS, JR., §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

§ Civil Action No. H-25-2434

§

HARRIS COUNTY PRECINCT 5, § □

CONSTABLE TED HEAP, AND § .

DEPUTY JEFFERY WEISNER, §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Deputy Jeffery Weisner’s Motion to

Dismiss (Document No. 12). Having considered the Defendant’s motion,

submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that the Defendant’s motion

should be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a matter involving alleged due process violations arising under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pro se Plaintiff Hlevictor A. Hoskins, Jr. (“Plaintiff’) brings suit

against Defendants Harris County Precinct 5, Constable Ted Heap, and Deputy

Jeffery Weisner (“Weisner”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants deprived him of “his property interest in a judgment without due process

of law” ! by failing to perform their duties when levying a writ of execution obtained

by the Plaintiff.

Based on the foregoing, on May 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit pro se in this

Court asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants in this matter

for “violations of due process,” “monell liability,’ and “supervisor liability.”? On

July 17, 2025, Weisner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces

does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than . . . ‘labels

and conclusions.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ail.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “[A] formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “ItJhe

! Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1, § 1.

2 Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1, {§ 27-34.

‘court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.’” In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (Sth Cir.

2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,

467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“Conversely, ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a

claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Cuvillier

v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (Sth Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).

I. LAW & ANALYSIS

Defendant Weisner moves to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, contending that

Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff did not

_ respond to Weisner’s motion to dismiss, failing to rebut or offer evidence to counter

Weisner’s contentions. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond is taken as a

representation of no opposition. S.D. Tex. Local R. 7.4. Regardless of Plaintiff's

failure to respond to Weisner’s motion to dismiss, the Court will consider the merits

of Plaintiff's claim against Weisner.

Plaintiff alleges that Weisner deprived him of “his property interest in a

judgment without due process of law.”? Weisner contends that Plaintiffs complaint

should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it

fails to overcome Weisner’s presumption of qualified immunity and fails to plead

sufficient to support a claim for relief under § 1983. Plaintiff offers no rebuttal.

When government officials are sued for a constitutional violation under

Section 1983, they may assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Porter

v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 612 (Sth Cir. 2004). “Qualified

immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from

[civil] liability ‘unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Glenn v.

City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 312 (Sth Cir. 2001) (quoting Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d

274, 276 (Sth Cir. 1995)). The defense of qualified immunity provides ample room

for mistaken judgments on the government actors’ part and protects “all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Estate of Davis ex rel.

McCully v. City of N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (Sth Cir. 2005) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Qualified immunity is “immunity from

3 Plaintiff's Complaint, Document No. 1, ¥ 1.

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237

(2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

Once qualified immunity is asserted, therefore, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to demonstrate the defense does not apply. See McClendon v. City of

Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (Sth Cir. 2002). This burden requires the plaintiff to

allege sufficient facts showing that: (1) the defendants violated a clearly established

constitutional right; and (2) the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable

under the circumstances, Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (Sth Cir. 2004).

This inquiry also requires a court to “ask whether the law so clearly and

unambiguously prohibited his conduct that every reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates the law.” Morgan v. Swanson, 696 F.3d

359, 370 (Sth Cir. 2011). “In other words, existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.”

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

In the current case, Weisner contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity.

Weisner further contends, based on Fifth Circuit precedent, that “[a] court may not

second-guess an officer’s conduct using hindsight, but instead must consider only

the information available to the officers at the time.”* Weisner argues that Plaintiff

has failed to show that any constitutional deprivation was the result of Defendant

Wiesner’s conduct. Plaintiff offers no rebuttal.

Here, the Court has reviewed Plaintiffs complaint in detail. The Court

construes all pro se filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

A thorough review of the record reveals that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently show that

their constitutional rights were violated or that Weisner’s actions were objectively

unreasonable. Thus, given the Fifth Circuit’s guidance that a plaintiff bears the

burden of alleging sufficient facts showing both a violation of a person’s right and

unreasonable action by the allegedly offending officer, the Court finds that

Plaintiff's claim fails to overcome Weisner’s presumption of qualified immunity.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, and thus, his claim against Weisner should be dismissed.°

4 Defendant Deputy Jeffrey Wiesner’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Original

Complaint, Document No. 12 at 9 (citing Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 587 F.3d 230, 234 (Sth Cir.

2009).

> Considering the Court’s finding that Plaintiff's claim against Weisner fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis of qualified immunity, the Court

declines to consider other arguments related to: (1) subject matter jurisdiction; and (2)

inadequate pleadings.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendant Deputy Jeffery Weisner’s Motion to Dismiss

(Document No. 12) is GRANTED. The Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff Hlevictor A. Hoskins, Jr.’s claim against Deputy

Jeffery Weisner is DISMISSED.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this Lay of August, 2025.

elk

DAVID HITTNER

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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