The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
TAMMY JONES, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 2:25-cv-211-JES-NPM
HOGAN SERVICES, INC., a
Missouri corporation,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for
Final Default Judgment (Doc. #11) filed on August 7, 2025. No
response has been filed, and the time to respond has expired.
Subject matter jurisdiction is premised on the presence of a
federal question, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
I.
On March 13, 2025, plaintiff Tammy Jones (plaintiff) filed a
Complaint (Doc. #1) under the ADA for disability discrimination
and retaliation against her employer Hogan Services, Inc.
(defendant or Hogan Services). Plaintiff resides in Lee County,
Florida, and worked primarily in Lee County, Florida, for Hogan
Services, a Missouri corporation having more than 15 employees.
Plaintiff received her Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on December 23, 2024, and
the Complaint was timely filed. In Count I, plaintiff alleges a
violation of the ADA, and in Count II plaintiff alleges retaliation
under the ADA. In the Complaint, plaintiff seeks back pay and
other benefits, front pay, reimbursement of expenses, attorney’s
fees and costs, punitive damages, and compensatory damages.
On June 6, 2025, service was executed on defendant Hogan
Services. (Doc. #8.) After service of process, and finding no
appearance by defendant, plaintiff filed a Motion for Clerk’s
Default (Doc. #9) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). A Clerk’s
Entry of Default (Doc. #10) was issued on July 15, 2025, pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
“The mere entry of a default by the clerk does not in itself
warrant the entry of default by the Court. Rather the Court must
find that there is sufficient basis in the pleadings for the
judgment to be entered.” GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland
Hotel Assocs., Ltd., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002)
(citing Nishimatsu Construction v. Houston National Bank, 515 F.
2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). A complaint must state a claim
in order for default judgment to be granted. Id. The Court finds
that an evidentiary hearing is not required in this case and will
render a decision based on the documents submitted. When a default
judgment occurs, a defendant admits the plaintiff’s well-pled
allegations of fact. If liability is well pled, it is established
by virtue of a default judgment. Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d
359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987).
II.
1. Count I – Disability Discrimination
Under the ADA, “[n]o covered entity1 shall discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). “To establish a prima facie case for disability
discrimination, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to
permit a jury to find that she: (1) is disabled, (2) is a qualified
individual, and (3) was discriminated against because of her
disability.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169,
1179 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff began her employment in September 2022, as an
operations Manager, and was qualified for the position. Plaintiff
performed her assigned duties and received successful performance
reviews until she continued to request accommodations due to her
status as a qualified person with a disability, cancer. (Doc. #1
at ¶¶ 7-9.)
1 A “covered entity” includes an employer “engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year….” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2), (5)(A).
Defendant started treating plaintiff negatively, calling her
“chemo brain”, demoting her, and threatening her with termination
because of her disability status. Plaintiff’s impairments impact
her ability to perform major life activities, such as thinking and
working. Plaintiff has a history of these impairments that limit
major bodily functions and several major life activities. (Id.
at 10-12.)
In Count I, plaintiff states that she is an individual with
a disability with impairments that substantially limit one or more
major life activity and bodily function, she has a record of the
impairment and is regarded as having the impairment. Plaintiff
is a qualified individual who, with a reasonable accommodation,
could perform the essential functions of her job as an employee of
Hogan Services. Defendant discriminated against plaintiff who
suffered negative employment action as a direct and proximate cause
of the violations of the ADA. (Id. at 18-30.)
The term “disability” includes a “physical or mental
impairment”, a record of the impairment and being regarded as
having an impairment, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1), but “[t]he definition
does not set forth a list of specific diseases and conditions that
constitute physical or mental impairments because of the
difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such list. The
term includes, however, such diseases and conditions as … cancer…,”
45 C.F.R. § Pt. 84, App. A. “The term ‘qualified individual’
means an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Clearly, calling plaintiff “chemo brain” and terminating her
supports a finding that she was discriminated against because of
her disability. Default judgment will be granted as to Count I.
2. Count II - Retaliation
Under the ADA, no person shall discriminate “against any
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice
made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42
U.S.C. § 12203(a). “To prevail on her ADA retaliation claim,
Plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in a statutorily
protected expression, (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action, and (3) there was a causal link between the two.” Frazier-
White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Lucas
v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001)).
The first element can be established by showing a request for a
reasonable accommodation. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about May 14, 2024, she made a
formal complaint and participated in a meeting to complain of
disability-based harassment and discrimination. Three weeks
later, plaintiff was placed on a performance improvement plan
against her objection stating that she needed a reasonable
accommodation. Defendant terminated plaintiff on or about June
18, 2024. (Doc. #1 at 13-15.) In Count II, plaintiff states that
she engaged in statutorily protected activity, defendant
retaliated by altering the terms and conditions of her employment
by terminating her, and the protected activity was the proximate
cause of the change in plaintiff’s working conditions, discipline,
and termination. As a direct and proximate result of the
violations of the ADA, plaintiff suffered damages. (Id. at 33-
39.)
Accepting the well-pled allegations, plaintiff states that
she engaged in a statutorily protected expression, that she
suffered an adverse employment action, and that her request for a
reasonable accommodation was the cause of her termination. A
default judgment will be granted as to Count II.
3. Damages
“It is the duty of the district court, after a finding of
discrimination, to place the injured party in the position he or
she would have been absent the discriminatory actions.” Nord v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1470 (11th Cir. 1985). Upon a
finding of intentional discrimination, the Court may order
“reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful
employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date
more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the
Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable
diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall
operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g)(1).
“Back pay is generally calculated from the date of the adverse
employment action until the date of judgment” and is “subject to
a good-faith effort to mitigate damages.” Orrand v. TCF Elec.,
LLC, No. 8:23-CV-2338-TPB-SPF, 2024 WL 3640454, at *3 (M.D. Fla.
July 9, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:23-CV-
2338-TPB-SPF, 2024 WL 3638001 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2024) (citations
omitted). By Declaration, plaintiff states that she worked as
Operations Manager for Hogan Services at an annual salary of
$75,000. In August 2023, she was demoted to Fleet Manager and her
salary was reduced to $70,000, annually. Plaintiff was terminated
on June 18, 2024. Plaintiff estimates her backpay from
termination through August 6, 2025, at a weekly pay rate of
$1,346.15 per week, is $79,422.85, for 59 weeks. Plaintiff has
searched for work since her termination but has been unable to
secure employment due to the specialized nature of her role in the
transportation industry. Plaintiff has earned income from various
sources with gig work or part-time work for a total of $15,112.75.
(Doc. #11-1.) Having mitigated her damages, plaintiff seeks the
difference of $64,310.10, plus the additional weeks since the
filing of the motion through the date of this Order, adding
$4,038.45 for the three weeks since the filing of the motion.
“[A] trial court may award a plaintiff front pay in lieu of
reinstatement.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d
1322, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). In light of the
default judgment, the Court finds that front pay is appropriate.
“Front pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during
the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of
reinstatement.” Armstrong v. Charlotte Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (quoting
Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001)).
In lieu of reinstatement, plaintiff also seeks 26 weeks of front
pay at the same weekly rate for a total of $34,999.90. (Doc. #11,
p. 13.)
Counsel also seeks to recover attorney fees, expenses, and
costs. For an action under the ADA, the Court may allow a
prevailing party “a reasonable attorney's fee, including
litigation expenses, and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The Court
finds that plaintiff is a prevailing party and finds that plaintiff
is entitled to reasonable attorney fees, including litigation
expenses and costs.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Final Default Judgment (Doc. #11)
is GRANTED as follows: (A) back pay damages of $68,348.55
for the period June 18, 2024, through the present; and (B)
front pay damages in the amount of $34,999.90.
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly in favor of
plaintiff and against defendant, terminate all pending
deadlines, and close the file.
3. Plaintiff shall file a supplemental motion as to the amount
of attorney’s fees, expenses and costs within FORTY-FIVE
(45) DAYS of the entry of Judgment pursuant to M.D. Fla.
R. 7.01(c).
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 2nd day of
September 2025.
\ = AA f
ey OM ) & AKL
JGHH E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Counsel of Record