Lu v. Dargie

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

KANG LU, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-30014-KAR

)

ANN E. DARGIE and )

MICHELLE M. BEGLEY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

(Dkt. No. 13)

ROBERTSON, U.S.M.J.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Kang Lu (“Plaintiff), who is self-represented, brings this action against Ann E.

Dargie (“Dargie”) and Michelle M. Begley (“Begley”) (collectively, “Defendants”), two

attorneys who represented his wife, Cindy Shippee (“Shippee”), in child support and custody

proceedings pending in the Probate and Family Court Department of the Massachusetts Trial

Court, Hampden County (“Probate & Family Court”). Before the court is Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Dkt. No. 13). The parties have

consented to this court’s jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 22). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

For the reasons stated below, the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

II. Facts Drawn From the Amended Complaint and Related Documents

Properly Before the Court.

“In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations

in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” Alt. Energy,

Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Beddall v. State St.

Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998)). Ordinarily, in ruling on a motion to dismiss,

a district court may not rely on any document outside the four corners of the complaint unless the

document is attached and incorporated therein. See id. “There is, however, a narrow exception

‘for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public

records; for documents central to plaintiffs’ claims; or for documents sufficiently referred to in

the complaint.’” Id. (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)). See also Trans-

Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008).

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that Plaintiff contends in his opposition that

Defendants have admitted certain facts by failing to contest them in an answer and has further

requested, in a document captioned Request for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts, that the

court take judicial notice of facts that he apparently contends are established by a pleading he

filed in the Probate & Family Court to which Shippee did not respond (Dkt. No. 20). As to the

former contention, as the court explained at the hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, in

responding to the amended complaint, a defendant has a choice between filing an answer

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) or, as one alternative, filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds

that, assuming the factual allegations in the amended complaint to be true, the complaint

nonetheless fails to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Rule 12(b) provides that a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion “must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b). Thus, Defendants had no obligation to admit or deny the allegations in the

amended complaint before filing their motion to dismiss, and their failure to file a responsive

pleading is not an admission of any fact alleged in the amended complaint.

As to the latter contention, a court may take judicial notice of the existence of filings and

decisions in cases in other courts, but “[t]aking judicial notice of a decision in another court … is

not the same as taking judicial notice of a fact within the decision.” Lopes v. Riendeau, 177 F.

Supp. 3d 634, 667 (D. Mass. 2016). A court may take judicial notice of an opinion or filing in a

separate case pending in a different court for purposes of establishing the procedural history and

status of that case but should not accept facts set forth in opinions or filings in the separate case

for their truth. See id. Moreover, Plaintiff has not tendered a judicial decision as a basis for the

facts he asks this court to accept as true. He has instead set forth alleged facts in a document he

authored that, he asserts, Shippee has not contested. This is a far cry from identifying facts that

are suitable for judicial notice. See id. (collecting cases).

Applying the principles set forth above, the court sets out the relevant factual and

procedural background. Plaintiff and Shippee were married in 2006 and divorced in 2010

pursuant to a separation agreement that was approved and incorporated into a judgment of

divorce by a court of law (Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 8). The separation agreement

included a provision in Article Two for a child support payment by Plaintiff to Shipee, that

provided that “the husband will pay child support amount of $322.00 per week by suspended

wage assignment directly to the wife until the child is emancipated as defined in MGL Ch. 208

sec. 28” (FAC ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 14-2 at 4). The agreement further provided, as to Articles One, Two

(the child support provision), Three, and Four, that these articles would merge into the Judgment

of Divorce, would not survive as a separate contract, and could be modified by the court if there

was a significant change in circumstances (Dkt. No. 14-2 at 9).

Plaintiff alleges that a significant change of circumstances arose in November 2017, and,

on this basis, he asked Shipee to agree to a modification of his child support obligation. Shipee

ignored Plaintiff’s overture (FAC ¶ 10). In February 2018, instead of resolving their differences

by discussion, Shippee retained Begley to assist Shippee in collecting child support based on a

fabricated child support order through the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (“DOR”), an

IV-D Agency (FAC ¶¶ 10, 11).1 According to Plaintiff, Begley caused Shippee to misrepresent

herself to the DOR as a recipient of public assistance so that the DOR would aid in the collection

of child support (FAC ¶ 12). After Begley withdrew as Shippee’s attorney on March 29, 2018,

Shippee retained Dargie to represent her (FAC ¶¶ 14, 16). Dargie persisted in assisting Shipee to

represent herself as a recipient of public assistance to enlist the DOR’s assistance in collecting

child support from Plaintiff (FAC ¶¶ 17-19).

III. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss, a “‘complaint must contain enough factual material to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . and state a facially plausible legal claim.’”

Guerra-Delgado v. Popular, Inc., 774 F.3d 776, 780 (1st Cir. 2014) (alteration in original)

(quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011)). In resolving a

motion to dismiss, the court employs a two-step approach. See Medina-Velázquez v. Hernández-

Gregorat, 767 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12).

First, [the court] “must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be

accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be

credited).” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Second, [the court] “must determine whether

the remaining factual content allows a reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Medina-Velázquez, 767 F.3d at 108. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a “proper

vehicle for challenging claims based on … absolute … immunity.” Norris v. Moroney, Civil

1 An IV-D agency is a state agency that has the responsibility for administering or supervising a

state’s plan for child and spousal support under title IV-D of the Social Security Act. See Dep’t

of Revenue Child Support Enf’t v. Grullon, 147 N.E. 3d 1066, 1070 (Mass. 2020) (citing 45

C.F.R. §§ 301.1, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 119A, §§ 1, 2(a)). The IV-D agency for Massachusetts is

the Commonwealth’s Department of Revenue. See id.

Action 1:22-cv-10660-IT, 2023 WL 5310902, at *5 (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 2023) (collecting cases in

which appellate courts have affirmed Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals based on absolute or qualified

immunity). When, as here, a plaintiff is self-represented, the court must construe the complaint

liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–

21 (1972). Nonetheless, the complaint of a self-represented plaintiff “‘must [still] comply with

procedural and substantive law,’” Farr v. Mass. Dep’t of Revenue (Child Support Div.), CIVIL

ACTION NO. 24-40153-MRG, 2024 WL 5508610, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 2024) (citation

omitted), and must “present sufficient facts to state a viable claim.” Kerr v. City of Attleboro,

757 F. Supp. 3d 145, 147 (D. Mass. 2024).

IV. Analysis

The FAC does not identify any specific cause of action asserted by Plaintiff. At the

hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff stated that he was bringing claims of fraud on

the court and abuse of process and contended that Defendants’ conduct had impeded his ability to

obtain relief in the Probate & Family Court. Accordingly, the court construes Plaintiff’s

amended complaint as asserting claims of fraud on the court and abuse of process and a federal

claim that he has been denied access to the Probate & Family Court in violation of his

constitutional right to due process.

A. The amended complaint does not state claims upon which Plaintiff can be

granted relief.

1. Fraud on the Court.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed fraud on the court by causing Shippee to

misrepresent herself as a recipient of public assistance and that this conduct “set in motion an

unconscionable scheme directed at the Court itself, calculated to interfere with the judicial

system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter, which, in fact, deceived the Hampden County

Probate and Family Court” (FAC ¶ 19). In his amended complaint and his opposition to the

motion to dismiss, Plaintiff cites the case of Sahin v. Sahin, 758 N.E. 2d 132 (Mass. 2001), in

which a wife filed a separate action some three years after a final divorce judgment entered,

seeking relief pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which sets forth “a comprehensive

framework for obtaining relief from a final judgment or order ….” Id. at 137. In Sahin, the

plaintiff alleged fraud on the court based on her former husband’s misrepresentations and

omissions about the value of the company he owned and sought to set aside the final divorce

judgment on this basis, invoking a narrow equitable exception authorizing a separate action for

setting aside a judgment based on fraud. See id. at 140. The Sahin court held that the plaintiff

had not shown that upholding the parties’ divorce judgment “would be so contrary to the

principles of equity as to tip what would otherwise be ordinary fraud into the special category

that can invoke a court’s inherent power to breach finality.” Id. at 140.

“‘A “fraud on the court” occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly,

that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with

the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier

or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense.’” Davidson v.

Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 278 (D. Mass. 2002) (quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 892

F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989)). The Sahin case is inapposite because in the instant matter

Plaintiff does not seek to set aside a judgment, nor does he seek relief from an order previously

entered by this court. Instead, he seeks to assert a stand-alone claim in federal court alleging

fraud in litigation that remains pending in the Probate & Family Court. However, “fraud on the

court is not recognized as an independent cause of action in Massachusetts. Even [if] it were to

be assumed that the . . . plaintiff[] could prove all of the improprieties and grievances [he]

allege[s], [he] nonetheless fail[s] to state a cognizable claim.” Nat'l Eng'g Serv. v. Galello, No.

CA9205303, 1995 WL 859241, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 9, 1995)); see also Davidson, 211 F.

Supp. 2d at 276 (same). Under federal law, the result is the same because “[f]raud on the court is

not a recognized independent cause of action in the First Circuit.” Shirokov v. Dunlap, Grubb &

Weaver, PLLC, Civil Action No. 10-12043-GAO, 2012 WL 1065578, at *30 (D. Mass. Mar. 27,

2012); cf. Farris v. Burton, Case No. 15-1286-EFM-GLR, 2016 WL 4015032, at *7 (D. Kan.

July 27, 2006) (a federal court does not have jurisdiction to relieve a party of a judgment entered

in a state court based on an allegation of fraud on the state court).

Plaintiff’s invocation of the phrase “extrinsic fraud,” supported by a citation to

Wikipedia, adds nothing of legal significance to the mix (Dkt. No. 18 at 4). The term extrinsic

fraud, to the extent it is recognized, applies to egregious matters such as bribery or bias of a

presiding judicial officer as a basis for reviewing a judgment entered in a separate adjudicative

event. Cf. Durand v. Mass. Bay Commuter R.R. Co., Civil Action No. 13-11745-JLT, 2014 WL

12781151, at *2-3 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014) (holding that the district court did not have

jurisdiction to review the adverse decision by a Public Law Board because the plaintiff had not

identified a basis for judicial review of the decision; discussing fraud or corruption as a basis for

review). Plaintiff has not alleged fraudulent conduct such as bribery of the judicial officers

presiding in the state court proceedings about which he complains, and the court is not required

to accept his legal characterizations of Defendants’ conduct as criminal or unethical. See A.G. ex

rel. Maddox, 732 F.3d at 80. Further, Plaintiff has not pointed to any case in which the First

Circuit has identified so-called extrinsic fraud as an exception to the general rule that a federal

trial court lacks jurisdiction to vacate a state court judgment and should abstain from interfering

in on-going proceedings pending in a state court, and the court is aware of none.

2. Abuse of Process.

“To establish a claim of abuse of process, a plaintiff must show (1) that ‘process’ was

used against him, (2) for an ‘ulterior or illegitimate purpose,’ and (3) that some harm occurred as

a result.” Kaiser v. Kirchick, 662 F. Supp. 3d 76, 105 (D. Mass. 2023) (quoting Psy-Ed Corp. v.

Klein, 947 N.E.2d 520, 534 (Mass. 2011)). “Abuse of process claims are limited to three types

of process: writs of attachment, process used to institute a civil action, and process related to

bringing criminal charges.” Id. (citing Jones v. Brockton Pub. Mkts., Inc., 340 N.E. 2d 484, 486

(Mass. 1975)).

The record before the court shows that Plaintiff has not alleged the elements of an abuse

of process claim. First, Plaintiff has not alleged that the civil process used to institute Shippee’s

child support action in Probate & Family Court was filed for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose.

According to the amended complaint, in or around November 2017, Plaintiff made a request for

a change in his child support obligation to which Shippee did not respond (FAC ¶¶ 10-11).

Instead, Shippee, represented by Begley, filed an action for modification on February 22, 2018 to

collect child support (Dkt. No. 14-1 at 6; FAC ¶ 11). While Plaintiff has alleged that the

application to the DOR for assistance was illegal, he has not alleged, nor can it be inferred based

on his allegations, that Shippee’s application to the DOR – aided by Defendants – was for any

purpose other than collecting child support. The filing of an action for the collection of child

support based on the terms of a separation agreement and a divorce judgment is not a use of

process for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose. Moreover, the court is not required to accept

Plaintiff’s legal conclusion that it was illegal for Shippee to enlist the assistance of DOR to

collect child support from Plaintiff. To the contrary, under Massachusetts law, DOR can provide

child support services “to children and families whether or not they are the recipients of public

assistance to establish, modify, and enforce child support obligations.” Mass, Gen. Laws ch.

119A, § 2(a). Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants assisted Shippee’s application for

assistance to the DOR for an ulterior or illegitimate purpose unrelated to Shippee’s desire to

collect child support. Thus, even if Plaintiff has alleged that he was harmed, he has not alleged

this second element of an abuse of process claim. Kaiser, 662 F. Supp. 3d at 105; Millennium

Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 925 N.E. 2d 513, 523-24 (Mass. 2010) (holding that a

divorce attorney who obtained an attachment on real estate to protect his client’s financial

interest in property owned by her husband did not abuse process because the attorney initiated

the real estate attachment to protect his client).

Second, to the extent Plaintiff relies on Shippee’s application to the IV-D agency – DOR

– for assistance in the collection of child support to allege abuse of process, he has not identified

a type of process that can be a basis for an abuse of process claim under Massachusetts law. An

application for assistance from the DOR is not process to initiate a civil or criminal action, nor is

it an application for a writ of attachment. See Kaiser, 662 F. Supp. 3d at 106.

3. Due process denial of access to the courts.

It is not apparent from the face of the amended complaint that Plaintiff might be asserting

a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 (“Section 1983”) that Defendants’ acts in enlisting the aid

of DOR deprived him of a federal constitutional right of access to the courts. At the hearing,

however, Plaintiff appeared to argue that Defendants’ actions had denied him meaningful access

to the Probate & Family Court. Out of caution, the court addresses the possibility that the

amended complaint could, read generously, seek to state such a claim.

“’Section 1983 supplies a private right of action against a person who, under color of

state law, deprives another of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law.’” Santiago v.

Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep’t of HUD, 421

F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005)). “A claim under [Section] 1983 has two ‘essential elements’: the

defendant must have acted under color of state law, and his or her conduct must have deprived

the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or by federal law.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513

F.3d 301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Rodríguez-Cirilo v. García, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997)).

Defendants were lawyers representing a private party in state court child support and

modification proceedings. It is well-established that a lawyer representing a client is not, by

virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-

25 (1981); Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir. 1986); Thibeault v. Brown,

C.A. No. 12-10333-PBS, 2012 WL 1865834, at *3 (D. Mass. May 21, 2012) (stating that “courts

have uniformly held that attorneys, whether appointed or retained, are not acting under the color

of law for purposes of [Section] 1983 liability”). Plaintiff has not stated a Section 1983 claim of

denial of access to the Probate & Family Court against Begley or Dargie.

For the reasons set forth above, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s amended complaint

fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly,

Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice on this basis. 2

2 Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.

The court agrees as to Plaintiff’s claims against Begley, who represented Plaintiff for some three

months in 2018. There are three-year statutes of limitations for tort claims, such as abuse of

process, under Massachusetts law, see, e.g., Abdallah v. Bain Capital LLC, 880 F. Supp. 2d 190,

195 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A; collecting cases), and a three-year

statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Brockton, 59 F. Supp.

3d 228, 240 (D. Mass. 2014). Plaintiff alleges that he was aware of Begley’s actions in 2018 and

informed her at that time that he believed her actions to be illegal (FAC ¶¶ 11-14). At the

hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations had not

run on Begley’s actions because he continued to suffer new adverse consequences because of her

actions. A claim, however, accrues when a plaintiff has reason to know of his injury. A plaintiff

need not know the extent or severity of the harm suffered to trigger the statute of limitations.

See, e.g., Sampson v. Town of Salisbury, 441 F. Supp. 2d 271, 275-76 (D. Mass. 2006). Plaintiff

B. The litigation privilege prevents Plaintiff from asserting claims against

Defendants.

Even if Plaintiff’s amended complaint stated any cognizable claim against either

defendant – which it does not – the litigation privilege would bar Plaintiff from pursuing such

claims. Massachusetts law “precludes civil liability based on communications made by a party,

witness, or attorney in connection with judicial proceedings or contemplated litigation.”

Bassichis v. Flores, 189 N.E.3d 640, 642 (Mass. 2022). In Bassichis, a case in which the

plaintiff sought to hold the defendant attorney liable for his conduct while representing a party in

divorce proceedings, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) considered the scope of

the litigation privilege as applied to a party, witness, or attorney in judicial proceedings. Id. The

case required the Court to “determine whether the litigation privilege extends beyond

communications made during the course of judicial proceedings to actions taken by the attorney”

because the plaintiffs sought to hold the defendant attorney liable for orchestrating a scheme to

defraud them. Id. at 651. Citing decisions by supreme courts in multiple states, the SJC held

that “the litigation privilege applies to an attorney’s actions during the course of a judicial

proceeding, just as it does to the attorney’s communications.” Id. at 652. Moreover, the

privilege applies “‘regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious motives on the part of the

lawyer so long as the conduct complained of has some relation to the litigation.’” Button v.

Melcher, 771 F. Supp. 3d 76, 79 (D. Mass. 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-1316 (1st Cir. Apr. 8,

2025) (quoting Bassichis, 189 N.E.3d at 646). Here, all of Defendants’ conduct alleged in the

amended complaint occurred during the litigation initiated to obtain child support payments for

filed the instant action in January 2025 (Dkt. No. 1). The statute of limitations bars any claims

Plaintiff seeks to bring against Begley. As to Dargie, the court cannot discern from the record

before it when Dargie is alleged to have engaged in conduct of which Plaintiff complains.

Shippee from Plaintiff, including by seeking assistance from the DOR. Even assuming that

Defendants encouraged Shippee to assert a position in court that was intentionally false – a

contention that is inconsistent with Massachusetts law – they are shielded from liability to

Plaintiff because all of the conduct of which he complains had a relation to the litigation (FAC ¶¶

4, 5, 11-12, 15, 17-19). Id. at 80. Plaintiff’s reliance on the SJC’s statement in Bassichis that

“the privilege does not shield attorneys from their own wrongdoing,” Bassichis, 189 N.E.3d at

648, is misplaced. This comment was a prelude to the SJC’s observation that there “’are

remedies other than a cause of action for damages that can be imposed’ to discourage and

sanction attorney misconduct” id. (quoting Sims v. Seaman, 69 A.3d 880, 887 (Conn. 2013)),

including sanctions that may be imposed by a court for attorney misconduct or disciplinary

action by the Board of Bar Overseers. See id. The statement did not preserve the right of an

individual in Plaintiff’s position to seek damages from attorneys who allegedly harmed him by

their conduct in the course of litigation to which he was a party. Even if Plaintiff’s amended

complaint stated any viable claim for relief, which it does not, those claims would be absolutely

barred by the litigation privilege, which preempts “frivolous actions brought by disgruntled

individuals in the wake of unfavorable judgments [and orders].” Id. On this basis also,

Defendants are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint with prejudice.

C. Abstention.

Finally, even if Plaintiff’s amended complaint stated viable claims that were not barred

by the litigation privilege, which it does not, to the extent he raises a separation of powers

challenge to the process by which child support obligations are enforced in Probate & Family

Court proceedings, principles of abstention would require this court to refrain from exercising

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ conduct in enlisting the

DOR to collect child support from him deceived the presiding Probate & Family Court judge and

caused him to violate the separation of powers doctrine when he ruled that Plaintiff had a child

support obligation and made rulings to enforce it (FAC ¶¶ 20-26). Plaintiff alleges that he has

been damaged, inter alia, by being required to pay child support and losing the use of his

personal automobile (FAC ¶ 28 a., e.). He seeks to recover compensatory and punitive damages

jointly and severally from Defendants for these injuries (FAC ¶ 29).

While Plaintiff states that his amended complaint should not be construed as a request to

review, or a challenge to, orders of the Probate & Family Court and represents that he does not

allege any injury or violation of a federal or due process right caused by the state court or any

agency, “it is difficult to imagine how the [c]ourt could rule in Plaintiff’s favor without finding

that the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court’s issuance of . . . [orders related to child

support] was ‘not authorized’ or ‘illegal,’” Speight v. Kaelblein, No. 24-cv-12363-PBS, 2025 WL

1824768, at *7 (D. Mass. May 16, 2025), or unconstitutional. In considering whether abstention

is appropriate, the First Circuit has instructed district courts to “look to the reality of what is

really going on.” Irish v. Irish, 842 F.3d 736, 742 (1st Cir. 2016). While Plaintiff seeks damages

as a remedy, he is in effect challenging the process by which the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts satisfies federal law and enforces child support obligations in proceedings in the

Probate & Family Court. See Gray-Bey v. 42 U.S. Code 654(3) Mass. Dep’t of Revenue Child

Support Enf’t Div., Civil Action No. 20-12042-DJC, 2021 WL 8323638, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 17,

2021). This conclusion is supported by Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss,

in which he argues that he is entitled to relief because Defendants’ false claim that there was a

child support order and the illegal application they persuaded Shippee to submit to the DOR

caused her to convert their private dispute into a matter implicating the public welfare laws (Dkt.

No. 18 at 9).

Younger “[a]bstention is appropriate when the requested relief would interfere (1) with an

ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) that implicates an important state interest; and (3) that

provides an adequate opportunity for the federal plaintiff to advance his federal constitutional

challenge.” Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Brooks v. N.H. Sup. Ct.,

80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1996); Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 904 F.2d 772, 777

(1st Cir. 1990)). The court acknowledges that Younger abstention “is most commonly applied to

suits seeking injunctive or declaratory relief …,” id. at 34 (citing Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr.,

Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 70 (1st Cir. 2005)), which this is not. The First Circuit, however,

“has determined that Younger can in fact be applicable to damages actions in appropriate cases.”

Id. at 37 (citing Bettencourt, 904 F.2d at 777; Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 743

(1st Cir. 1980); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1251, 1253-54 (1st Cir. 1974)).

As to the first element, so far as the court is able to determine from the docket, there are

on-going proceedings related to child support and modification pending in the Probate & Family

Court (Dkt. No. 14-6). As to the second element, the court has no doubt that Plaintiff’s claims,

as he has framed them, implicate an important state interest. The Commonwealth is required

under federal law to have an effective ID-V agency to assist in the enforcement of child support

obligations; his claims challenge the DOR’s role as the Commonwealth’s ID-V agency. See id. at

35-36 (the states have important interests in administering certain aspects of their judicial

systems). A Section 1983 “damages award may interfere with a state proceeding because it can

have the same practical effect as a declaratory judgment: the federal court has produced a ruling

on the merits that the federal plaintiff can then use to alter the state proceeding.” Id. at 37. If

this court were to rule that Plaintiff was entitled to a damages award against Defendants, there

would be little difference between that ruling and a ruling that the DOR was precluded from

assisting individuals in Shippee’s position with the collection of child support obligations, a

conclusion that would have a substantial impact on proceedings between Shippee and Plaintiff

and beyond. As to the third element, Plaintiff has not alleged, and the court has no reason to

believe, that Plaintiff has been precluded from raising his arguments about the alleged illegality

of Defendants’ conduct in the pending Probate & Family Court proceedings, although those

arguments presumably have not gained traction.

Thus, because “Plaintiff’s claims relate to aspects of the Massachusetts Probate and

Family Court action that are ongoing, the [c]ourt should decline to interfere under the abstention

principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).” Speight, 2025 WL 1824768, at *9.3

IV. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 13) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for

failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted and because Plaintiffs’ claims are barred

by the absolute litigation privilege. To the extent dismissal is pursuant to Younger abstention, the

dismissal would be without prejudice. See Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 32

n.4 (1st Cir. 2004). The Clerk is directed to close the case.

It is so ordered.

3 On the record before it, the court is not persuaded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to

preclude federal jurisdiction here. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when the injury of

which a plaintiff complains is caused by a final state court judgment because “’only the United

States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.’” Speight, 2025 WL

1824768, at *9 (quoting Pierre v. Cristello, CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-cv-30105-KAR, 2017 WL

4768006, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2017)). It is not clear to this court that a final judgment has

entered in state court proceedings between Plaintiff and Shippee.

Dated: September 2, 2025 Katherine A. Robertson

KATHERINE A. ROBERTSON

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE