Goodeaux v. Calcasieu 14th JDC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

TERRY JAMES GOODEAUX DOCKET NO. 2:25-cv-00313

D.O.C. # 317866 SECTION P

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

CALCASIEU 14TH JDC MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

by Terry James Goodeaux, who is proceeding pro se in this matter. Goodeaux is an inmate in the

custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and is currently incarcerated

at the Allen Correctional Center in Kinder, Louisiana. This matter is referred to the undersigned

for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing

orders of the court.

I. Background

Goodeaux challenges his conviction in the 14th Judicial District Court on one count of

sexual battery and one count of attempted sexual battery and the twenty-five-year sentence that

followed. Doc. 4, p. 1. It is unclear from the instant petition, which was filed on May 12, 2025,

what claims Goodeaux seeks to bring before this Court, whether they have been properly

exhausted, or whether the petition is timely.

II. Law & Application

A. Rule 4 Review

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes preliminary review of such

petitions, and states that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition

and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at Rule 4. To avoid

summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition must contain factual allegations pointing to a “real

possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut v. Maine,

431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly, we review the pleadings and exhibits before us

to determine whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the petition must be dismissed.

B. Timeliness

Federal law imposes a one-year limitation period within which persons who are in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court may seek habeas review in federal court. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). This period generally runs from the date that the conviction becomes final. Id. The

time during which a properly filed application for post-conviction relief is pending in state court

is not counted toward the one-year limit. Id. at § 2244(d)(2); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 512

(5th Cir. 1999). However, any lapse of time before proper filing in state court is counted. Flanagan

v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 199 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1998).

A state application is considered pending both while it is in state court for review and

during intervals between a state court’s disposition and the petitioner’s timely filing for review at

the next level of state consideration. Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2001). The

limitations period is not tolled, however, for the period between the completion of state review and

the filing of the federal habeas application. Rhines v. Weber, 125 S.Ct. 1528 (2005). Accordingly,

in order to determine whether a habeas petition is time-barred under the provisions of §2244(d)

the court must ascertain: (1) the date upon which the judgment became final either by the

conclusion of direct review or by the expiration of time for seeking further direct review, (2) the

dates during which properly filed petitions for post-conviction or other collateral review were

pending in the state courts, and (3) the date upon which the petitioner filed his federal habeas

corpus petition.

C. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Exhaustion and procedural default are both affirmative defenses that may be considered

waived if not asserted in the respondent’s responsive pleadings. E.g., Cupit v. Whitley, 28 F.3d

532, 535 (5th Cir. 1994). However, the federal district court may also consider both doctrines on

its own motion. Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 357–59 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, we

consider any assertions by respondent under these doctrines, in addition to conducting our own

review.

1. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

The federal habeas corpus statute and decades of federal jurisprudence require that a

petitioner seeking federal habeas corpus relief exhaust all available state court remedies before

filing his federal petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); e.g., Whitehead v. Johnson, 157 F.3d 384, 387

(5th Cir. 1998). This is a matter of comity. Ex parte Royall, 6 S.Ct. 734, 740–41 (1886). To satisfy

the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must have “fairly presented” the substance of his federal

constitutional claims to the state courts “in a procedurally proper manner according to the rules of

the state courts.” Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2001); Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d

699, 702 (5th Cir. 1988). Each claim must be presented to the state’s highest court, even when

review by that court is discretionary. Wilson v. Foti, 832 F.2d 891, 893–94 (5th Cir. 1987). The

exhaustion requirement is not satisfied if the petitioner presents new legal theories or entirely new

factual claims in support of his federal habeas petition. Brown v. Estelle, 701 F.2d 494, 495 (5th

Cir. 1983).

In Louisiana the highest court is the Louisiana Supreme Court. See LSA–Const. art. 5, §

5(a). Thus, for a Louisiana prisoner to have exhausted his state court remedies he must have fairly

presented the substance of his federal constitutional claims to the Louisiana Supreme Court in a

procedurally correct manner, based on the same general legal theories and factual allegations that

he raises in his § 2254 petition.

2. Procedural Default

When a petitioner’s claim is dismissed by the state court based on state law grounds, and

those grounds are independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment, he

may not raise that claim in a federal habeas proceeding absent a showing of cause and prejudice

or that review is necessary “to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v.

Thompson, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2553–54, 2564 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). Procedural default

exists where (1) a state court clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of the petitioner’s

constitutional claim on a state procedural rule and that procedural rule provides an independent

and adequate ground for the dismissal (“traditional” procedural default), or (2) the petitioner fails

to properly exhaust all available state court remedies and the state court to which he would be

required to petition would now find the claims procedurally barred (“technical” procedural

default). In either instance, the petitioner is considered to have forfeited his federal habeas claims.

Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 254–5 (5th Cir. 1999). This is not a jurisdictional matter, but

instead a doctrine “grounded in concerns of comity and federalism.” Trest v. Cain, 118 S.Ct. 478,

480 (1997). The grounds for traditional procedural default must be based on the actions of the last

state court rendering a judgment. Harris v. Reed, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043 (1989). To serve as

adequate grounds for a federally cognizable default, the state rule “must have been firmly

established and regularly followed by the time as of which it is to be applied.” Busby v. Dretke,

359 F.3d 708, 718 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted).

D. General Principles

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

governs habeas corpus relief. The AEDPA limits how a federal court may consider habeas claims.

After the state courts have “adjudicated the merits” of an inmate’s complaints, federal review “is

limited to the record that was before the state court[.]” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398

(2011).

To overcome AEDPA’s re-litigation bar, a state prisoner must shoehorn his claim into one

of its narrow exceptions. Langley v. Prince, 962 F.3d 145, 155 (5th Cir. 2019). As relevant here,

he must show the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was [1] contrary

to, or [2] involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

The first exception to the re-litigation bar—the “contrary to” prong—is generally regarded

as the narrower of the two. Id. A state-court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal

law only if it “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question

of law or if” it resolves “a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Id. (citing Terry Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000).

The other exception to § 2254(d)(1)’s re-litigation bar is the “unreasonable application”

prong, which is almost equally unforgiving. Id. at 156. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held

that it is not enough to show the state court was wrong. Id.; see also, Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct.

1855, 1862 (2010) (“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” (quotation omitted)); Schriro v. Landrigan,

127 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (2007) “"The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes

the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a

substantially higher threshold.”). Rather, the re-litigation bar forecloses relief unless the prisoner

can show the state court was so wrong that the error was “well understood and comprehended in

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. (citing Shoop v. Hill, 139

S. Ct. 504, 506 (2019) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). In other words, the unreasonable-

application exception asks whether it is “beyond the realm of possibility that a fairminded jurist

could” agree with the state court. Id. (citing Woods v. Etherton, 136 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016) (per

curiam); see also Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555, 2558 (2018) (per curiam) (asking

“whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are

inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court” (quotation omitted)).

Overcoming AEDPA’s re-litigation bar is necessary, but not sufficient, to win habeas

relief. Even after overcoming the bar, the prisoner still must “show, on de novo review, that [he

is] ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Id. (citing

Salts v. Epps, 676 F.3d 468, 480 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)); see also Berghuis

v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010) (“[A] habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of

habeas corpus if his or her claim is rejected on de novo review [under] § 2254(a).”).

Section 2254(d)(2) speaks to factual determinations made by the state courts. Federal

courts presume such determinations to be correct; however, a petitioner can rebut this presumption

by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

II. Amend Order

Before reaching the merits of a habeas claim, a preliminary review of the pleadings and

exhibits is conducted in order to determine whether the petitioner has exhausted all available state

remedies prior to filing his petition in federal court, whether the petition is time-barred by the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and/or whether any of the claims raised are subject to the

procedural default doctrine.

IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner amend his pleading within forty (40) days of this

order and provide the following information and documents:

1. List and number each separate federal constitutional claim Petitioner intends to

raise before this Court in the instant habeas proceedings;

2. Provide copies of all post-conviction pleadings filed by petitioner in the 147

Judicial District Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Louisiana

Supreme Court;

3. Copy of the Orders/Judgments/Reasons for Judgment of the 14'™ Judicial District

Court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Louisiana Supreme Court

addressing petitioner’s post-conviction claims.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 29th day of August, 2025.

AS P. LEBLANC

UNITED ST**TES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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