The opinion
Filed 9/2/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JOHN DOE (No. 0136),
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064562
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-01286908)
COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Richard Oberholzer, Judge. (Retired judge of the Kern Sup. Ct. assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Adkisson Pitet and Carl A. Berthold, Jr., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Gutierrez, Preciado & House, Calvin House and Natalia Anthony
for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328 makes “all
information and records obtained in the course of providing services . . . to
either voluntary or involuntary recipients . . . confidential.” (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 § 5328, subd. (a).) Section 5330 authorizes a person who received such
services to bring an action against anyone who unlawfully disclosed such
records. (§ 5330, subd. (a).) If the records were negligently disclosed, the
statute awards the aggrieved party $1,000 and actual damages. (§ 5330,
subd. (b)(1) & (2).) However, if the records were “willfully and knowingly”
disclosed, the statute awards the aggrieved party the greater of $10,000 or
three times the amount of the actual damages. (§ 5330, subd. (a)(1) & (2).)
Robert G. Reyna (Reyna), who worked for the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department, unlawfully disclosed John Doe’s (Doe) confidential
record to Doe’s sister and her attorney who used it to threaten Doe to dismiss
a lawsuit Doe brought against his sister. Doe brought an action against
Reyna and the County of Orange (the County) in which a jury found Reyna
willfully and knowingly disclosed the record. However, the jury apportioned
25 percent of Doe’s damages to Doe’s sister and her attorney based on their
conduct. The trial court then granted Reyna and the County’s motion for
partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict ruling that there was not
substantial evidence to support the finding of willfulness; the court, as a
result, did not treble damages. The trial court apportioned both economic and
noneconomic damages and entered a judgment in favor of Doe.
Doe appeals arguing the trial court erred in concluding there was
not substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding and in apportioning
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
2
damages. On appeal, all parties agree Reyna unlawfully disclosed the
confidential record. But the parties disagree over what it means to “willfully
and knowingly” disclose confidential records within the meaning of section
5330. As we explain, it means Reyna intentionally released Doe’s confidential
record to a person Reyna knew was not entitled to the record and the
disclosure was otherwise unlawful. We then conclude the trial court erred in
granting Reyna and the County’s motion for partial judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
Last, although Reyna willfully and knowingly released Doe’s
confidential record, he was not an intentional tortfeasor. Reyna and the
County, thus, were entitled to have Doe’s noneconomic damages apportioned
to other tortfeasors—but not Doe’s economic damages.
FACTS
In 2018, Doe was placed on an involuntary 72-hour hold pursuant
to section 5150. The Orange County Sherriff’s Department generated a
confidential record of the incident. In 2021, a dispute arose between Doe and
his sister over their father’s estate. Doe filed a lawsuit for elder abuse against
his sister. During the lawsuit, Doe learned his sister’s attorney had obtained
a copy of the 2018 confidential record. The attorney threatened to disclose the
record unless Doe dismissed the lawsuit. Doe believed his sister and her
attorney were blackmailing him which made him fearful.
Reyna testified he worked for the sheriff’s department as an
office specialist where he reviewed incoming requests for information and
determined whether to release such records. In 2021, Reyna received a
request for two reports from Doe’s sister. The first was a report of a welfare
check in which Doe’s sister was the caller, and the second was for the
confidential record. Doe’s sister was entitled to the welfare check report, but
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not the confidential record. Reyna knew Doe’s sister was not entitled to the
confidential record, but he released it to her anyway. Reyna made “a
judgment call”; he believed Doe’s sister was “concerned” about Doe and
testified that his “heart got in the way.”
The parties agreed Reyna’s disclosure was unlawful. The issue
for the jury was whether the disclosure was willful or negligent. The court
instructed the jury that the disclosure was “‘wil[l]ful’” if Reyna “knew of his
legal obligations and intentionally declined to follow them. However, a
violation is not willful if you find that Robert Reyna reasonably and in good
faith believed that the facts did not require him to comply . . . .” The trial
court also instructed the jury that it could apportion a percentage of Doe’s
damages to Doe’s sister and her attorney if they were “at fault,” and if this
fault “was a substantial factor in causing John Doe’s harm.”
The jury found Reyna willfully disclosed the confidential record,
but determined Doe’s sister and her attorney were responsible for 25 percent
of Doe’s damages. The jury awarded Doe $29,000 in economic damages and
$40,000 in noneconomic damages.
Reyna and the County filed a motion for partial judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. They claimed there was not substantial evidence
to support the jury’s determination that the disclosure was willful and
knowing. The trial court granted the motion and therefore did not award
treble damages. Instead, the trial court ruled the entire $69,000 was subject
to apportionment and entered a judgment for $51,750 (75 percent of $69,000)
against Reyna and the County.
4
DISCUSSION
I.
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REYNA’S DISCLOSURE OF
DOE’S CONFIDENTIAL RECORD WAS WILLFUL AND KNOWING
Doe contends the trial court erred in granting Reyna and the
County’s motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The
parties disagree as to what willfulness means within the context of section
5330. Doe believes it means ‘“a purpose or willingness to commit the act or
engage in the conduct in question.’” Reyna and the County argue willfulness
requires knowledge harm will follow or at least reckless disregard of a risk of
harm. As we explain, Doe’s interpretation is closest.
A. Standard of Review
“‘“A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be
granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial
evidence in support. [Citation.] [¶] . . . As in the trial court, the standard of
review [on appeal] is whether any substantial evidence—contradicted or
uncontradicted—supports the jury’s conclusion.””’ (Webb v. Special Electric
Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 192.) In reviewing the evidence, we draw all
reasonable inferences in Doe’s favor and disregard evidence that conflicts
with any evidence which supports the verdict. (Ibid.) “Our determination as
to the requisite substantial evidence is de novo.” (Lurner v. American Golf
Corp. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 121, 133.) We similarly review legal issues, such
as the interpretation of a statute, de novo. (Ibid.)
B. Willfulness Denotes Intentionally Committing the Act in Question
Section 5330 does not define the phrase “willfully and
knowingly.” Therefore, we must turn to principles of statutory construction to
5
determine its meaning. “We begin our analysis by acknowledging that ‘[t]he
goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
Legislature.’ [Citation.] Ordinarily, the language of the statute provides the
most reliable indication of legislative intent. [Citation.] But when the
statutory language is ambiguous, ‘[we] may examine the context in which the
language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute
internally and with related statutes.’ [Citation.]” (Calvillo-Silva v. Home
Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 724 (Calvillo-Silva) disapproved on other
grounds by Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853,
fn. 19.)
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§ 5000 et seq.) (the Act), the
statutory scheme relevant here, “provides for the prompt evaluation and
treatment of mentally disordered persons, developmentally disabled persons
and persons impaired by chronic alcoholism, while protecting public safety
and safeguarding individual rights through judicial review.” (In re Qawi
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 16.) The Act permits law enforcement to take an
individual into custody for a period of up to 72 hours if that person, because
of a mental health disorder, is a danger to themselves. (§ 5150, subd. (a).)
To accomplish its objectives, the Act makes “[a]ll information and
records obtained in the course of providing services under [the
Act] . . . confidential.” (§ 5328, subd. (a).) “Information and records shall be
disclosed only” in specifically enumerated circumstances. (Ibid.) One of the
purposes of section 5328 is to protect the person from the undesired publicity,
embarrassment, or more serious consequences which disclosure could bring.
(In re S.W. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 719, 721.) “Section 5328’s confidentiality
protections are designed ‘to encourage persons . . . to seek treatment on a
6
voluntary basis.” (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015)
60 Cal.4th 940, 953 (State Dept. of Public Health).)
The Legislature authorized a person to bring a civil action
against anyone who “willfully and knowingly” or “negligently” released
“confidential information or records concerning him or her in violation of [the
Act].” (§ 5330, subds. (a) & (b).) In the event the release was negligent, the
aggrieved party is entitled to recover his or her actual damages plus $1,000.
(§ 5330, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) If the release was willful and knowing, the
aggrieved party is entitled to the greater of $10,000 or three times the
amount of his or her actual damages. (§ 5330, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) In either
scenario, “the plaintiff shall recover court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees
as determined by the court.” (§ 5330, subd. (d).)
We first start by defining the term “knowingly” as that is used in
section 5330. The Penal Code defines “‘[k]nowingly’” as “a knowledge that the
facts exist which bring the act or omission” within the meaning of the statute.
(Pen. Code, § 7, subd. (b)(5).) While section 5330 is not a penal statute, “the
Penal Code definition is nonetheless persuasive in determining the intent of
the Legislature in using that word in other statutes.” (Brown v. State
Department of Health (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 548, 554.) Therefore, “knowingly”
as used in section 5330 relates to the defendant’s knowledge of the fact that
the person requesting the record is not entitled to it under the Act.
The concept of willfulness, on the other hand, is not so “easily
captured in a single, uniformly applicable formula.” (Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz
of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 182 (Kwan). The Penal
Code defines willfulness as ‘“simply a purpose or willingness to commit the
act, or make the omission referred to,’ [but] there is no shortage of cases
7
construing the term, in penal statutes, as conveying more than mere
volition.” (Ibid.)
Civil cases contain similar nuances. In Goodhew v. Industrial
Acc. Com. (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 252, the plaintiff sued her husband’s
employer for its “wil[l]ful failure” to secure payment (from insurance or
otherwise) for compensation “‘recoverable for [the] injury or death’” of her
husband. (Id. at p. 254.) The Court of Appeal held the term “wil[l]ful” simply
meant “‘that one intentionally fail[ed] or refuse[d] to perform an act which
[was] required to be done.’” (Id. at p. 257.) Because the employer
“intentionally and deliberately failed to secure coverage,” the employer
violated the statute. (Ibid.)
It is evident the meaning of “willful” is specific to the statutory
scheme at issue, and we must interpret the word in light of the statute’s
purpose. Here, there is no shortage of language in the Act emphasizing its
goal of ensuring privacy to anyone receiving services pursuant to it, such as
its specific guarantee of “[a] right to dignity, privacy, and humane care”
(§ 5325.1, subd. (b)), its requirement that any court-ordered evaluation “be
carried out with the utmost consideration for the [person’s] privacy and
dignity” (§ 5200), and its delineated Legislative intent to protect the personal
rights of those subject to the Act (§ 5001, subd. (h)), to name a few.
But the Act does not prohibit all disclosures of confidential
records. “[T]he bar against disclosure is not absolute but is subject to
numerous exceptions, including disclosure to the courts.” (Devereaux v.
Latham & Watkins (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1585, disapproved on other
grounds by Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP (2007)
40 Cal.4th 780, 785, fn. 7.) To strike a balance between privacy protections
and the Act’s other goals of guaranteeing public safety, providing prompt
8
evaluation and treatment of persons with mental health disorders, and
encouraging the full use of all agencies and professional personnel available,
the Act carefully “enumerates 25 specific exceptions” to its disclosure bar.
(State Dept. of Public Health, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 952.) Examples include
“[i]n communications between qualified professional persons” (§ 5328,
subd. (a)(1)(A)), to courts, “as necessary to the administration of justice”
(§ 5328, subd. (a)(6)), and to law enforcement officers in specified scenarios
(§ 5328, subd. (a)(20)(A)).
Thus, entitlement to recovery under section 5330 must not hinge
on the wrongdoer’s bad faith, intent to harm, or knowledge of some sort of
consequential harm. Instead, the harm occurs the moment a confidential
record is placed in the hands of someone not entitled to it—everyone is
presumed to know as much. Willfulness, then, is tied to the act of disclosing
the record—it simply refers to the fact someone intentionally released records
which are otherwise confidential. Therefore, the protected party does not
need to show the act was coupled with bad faith, ill intent, or the knowledge
that further harm would flow from the wrongful disclosure.
To summarize, taken together with the knowing requirement, a
person “willfully and knowingly” releases confidential records when they
intentionally release information or records to a person they know is not
entitled to the records and the disclosure otherwise violates the Act.
C. There Is Substantial Evidence To Support a Finding of Willfulness
There was substantial evidence Reyna willfully and knowingly
released Doe’s confidential records. Reyna testified he knew Doe’s sister was
not allowed to have the record, but he released it to her “because [his] heart
got in the way . . . [and he] was concerned that [Doe’s sister may] be as well
concerned.” Although Reyna may have had good intentions, the Legislature
9
only permits releasing confidential records in certain situations, and Reyna’s
actions, albeit well-intended, were nonetheless willful and knowing.
Therefore, the court erred in granting Reyna and the County’s
motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR WHEN IT
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
Next, Doe argues the trial court should not have instructed the
jury on apportioning liability. He bases this contention of error on two
grounds: (1) apportionment does not apply to intentional tortfeasors, which
Reyna was; and (2) apportionment does not apply as Doe’s sister and her
attorney were not tortfeasors. We disagree on both fronts.
Although liability for economic damages amongst multiple
tortfeasors is joint and several, it is only several when it comes to
noneconomic damages. (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (a).) “Each defendant shall
be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that
defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a
separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that
amount.” (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (a).)
However, Civil Code section 1431.2, subdivision (a), “does not
authorize a reduction in the liability of intentional tortfeasors for
noneconomic damages . . . .” (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th
1, 29 (B.B.).) Thus, if Reyna was an intentional tortfeasor, the jury had no
right to apportion a percentage of Doe’s damages to Doe’s sister and her
attorney.
10
A. Reyna Was Not an Intentional Tortfeasor
Intentional torts involve “the deliberate or reckless harming of
another.” (Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85, 106
(conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); Willard v. Caterpillar, Inc. (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 892, 917, disapproved on other grounds by Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 18, fn. 4 [intentional tort
requires the actor to intend to cause the harm].) “An intentional tort is one in
which the actor intends to produce the harm that ensues; it is not enough
that he intends to perform the act. He intends to produce the harm when he
desires to bring about that consequence by performing the act.” (Rest.2d
Torts, § 870, com. b.; see also Willard, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 913–914
[quoting language]; McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1006
[insufficient that tortfeasor “intentionally did a particular act. It must also be
shown that such act was done with the intent to cause injury”].)
Here, although the jury found Reyna knew it was unlawful to
disclose the record and he did so anyway, there was no finding Reyna
intended to harm Doe. Nor does the record bear such a conclusion. The only
evidence on the issue came from Reyna who testified he disclosed the record
because he believed Doe’s sister was concerned about Doe’s well-being.
Therefore, if anything, the record establishes Reyna acted with an intent to
help Doe, not to harm him. As such, he was not an intentional tortfeasor and
apportionment was allowed.
B. Apportionment Was Proper as to Doe’s Sister and Her Attorney
Alternatively, Doe contends apportionment does not apply
because Doe’s sister and her attorney were not at “fault” as that term is used
in Civil Code section 1431.2. Doe claims “fault” requires more than just
contributing to the injury; “it means breaching a duty owed to the plaintiff by
11
‘law or contract.’” And because Doe’s sister’s and her attorney’s conduct took
place within the context of litigation, it was privileged. Therefore, as Doe’s
argument goes, they could not have breached a duty owed to Doe and cannot
be assigned some portion of the liability. In making this argument, Doe
primarily relies on Wilson v. Ritto (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 361 (Wilson).
Wilson does not apply here. In Wilson, the plaintiff sued her
podiatrist for malpractice stemming from a bunionectomy on her foot.
(Wilson, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 364–365.) Following the
bunionectomy, the plaintiff experienced great pain and a clicking in her foot.
(Id. at p. 364) The defendant performed successive corrective, but
unsuccessful, surgeries. (Ibid.) After one of the corrective surgeries, the
plaintiff contacted an attorney who referred her to an orthopedic surgeon. (Id.
at p. 365.) The orthopedic surgeon performed a procedure on the plaintiff’s
foot, resulting in it becoming infected. (Ibid.) The defendant requested to add
the orthopedic surgeon to the special verdict form as a joint tortfeasor, but
the trial court denied the request, ruling the defendant did not establish that
the surgeon violated the medical standard of care. (Id. at p. 366.) The Court
of Appeal agreed, holding that “fault” within the meaning of Civil Code
section 1431.2, required more than just showing another’s conduct “affected”
the plaintiff’s injury. (Id. at p. 369.) In a medical malpractice case, “fault is
measured by the medical standard of care.” (Ibid.)
Although Wilson is helpful in understanding that fault requires
more than just causation, courts have limited its holding to the rule “that a
nonparty medical doctor cannot be found comparatively at fault in a personal
injury action unless the defendant proves with expert testimony the doctor
failed to meet the applicable standard of care.” (Chakalis v. Elevator
12
Solutions, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1557, 1561; see also Vollaro v. Lispi
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 93, 102 [same].)
Instead, what we must decide is what effect, if any, the litigation
privilege has on the issue of apportioning liability to a nonparty tortfeasor.
We conclude it has none. In understanding our conclusion, a review of
Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985 (Richards), abrogated
by statute as stated in Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 828, 837, and Taylor v. John Crane, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th
1063 (Taylor) is helpful.
In Richards, the plaintiff worked at a shipyard and sued the
defendant and numerous other manufacturers claiming their products
exposed him to asbestos and caused him respiratory injury and fear of cancer.
(Richards, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 989.) At trial, there was evidence the
plaintiff was a longtime smoker who had an obstructive airway disease most
likely due to smoking. (Id. at p. 990.) The defendant sought to allocate a
share of the plaintiff’s damages to cigarette manufacturers who shared
‘“fault”’ for the plaintiff’s injuries because they supplied harmful tobacco
products to the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 991.) But there was a statute “provid[ing]
that a manufacturer or seller ‘shall not be liable’ in a ‘product liability action’
for injury or death caused by a product which (1) ‘[was] inherently
unsafe . . . such as . . . tobacco . . . .]”’ (Id. at p. 998.) The defendant argued
that the statute did not bar apportionment because it only granted immunity
for “direct ‘liab[ility].’” (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court disagreed,
holding the statute did more and declared the tobacco manufacturers
“breache[d] no duty and [committed] no tort, [and therefore] the statute also
preclude[d] indirect assignment of comparative ‘fault’ or responsibility to
such entities for purposes of [apportionment].” (Id. at p. 1001.)
13
In Taylor, the plaintiff was a former serviceman with the United
States Navy who sued the manufacturer of a product sold to the Navy which
contained asbestos. (Taylor, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065.) The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff but allocated 16 percent of the fault to the
Navy which was not a party to the action. (Id. at p. 1066.) Plaintiff appealed,
arguing the Navy was immune from liability and thus it was improper to
allocate fault to it. (Id. at p. 1067.) The plaintiff relied on a statute which
“bar[red] claims ‘based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty”’ and United States
Supreme Court cases declaring the government was immune from such
claims. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the apportionment and
distinguished Richards on the basis that in Richards, the California Supreme
Court “concluded that [the immunity statute] did not merely confer immunity
from liability for tortious conduct, but constituted a determination by the
Legislature that a company supplying tobacco does not engage in tortious
conduct because it breache[d] no duty to consumers.” (Id. at p. 1069.)
Contrary to Richards, the statutes and United States Supreme Court cases in
Taylor granted immunity to the Navy “even if it ha[d] been negligent.” (Id. at
p. 1071.) Put another way, the Navy’s conduct breached a duty owed to the
plaintiff and, thus, apportionment was proper, even though the Navy was
immune from paying for its share of liability.
Turning to the statute here, the Civil Code provides that a
publication or broadcast is privileged when made in a judicial proceeding.
(Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).) This is referred to as the litigation privilege and
“applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or
14
logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212
(Silberg).) It “afford[s] litigants and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom
of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by
derivative tort actions.” (Id. at p. 213.)
As in Taylor, the litigation privilege does not eliminate a duty
Doe’s sister and her attorney otherwise owed to Doe. Instead, it recognizes
the existence of such a duty but prevents the use of protected conduct from
forming the basis for a breach of that duty. (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th
634, 638, fn. 1 [privilege “preclud[es] use of the protected communications
and statements as the basis for a tort action”]; see, e.g., Silberg, supra,
50 Cal.3d at p. 214 [the privilege prevents litigants from “attack[ing] the
integrity of evidence after the proceedings have concluded”]; Falcon v. Long
Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1276 [litigation privilege
prevented use of negligent laboratory tests as basis for action]; Kenne v.
Stennis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 953, 973 [litigation privilege defeated claims
based on privileged communications].)
Therefore, if there was substantial evidence to support the giving
of the instruction on apportionment, the court did not err in doing so. (Soule
v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 572.) Here, there was
substantial evidence Doe’s sister and her attorney were at fault and should
be apportioned a percentage of liability. It is unlawful for someone to induce
fear in another through threat of exposing a secret of that person or imputing
to that person a deformity, disgrace, or crime. (Pen. Code, § 519, subds. 3
& 4.) Doe testified he believed his sister and her attorney were blackmailing
him with the report and were threatening to disseminate it further. This
made him fearful. And there was evidence they were using the record to
pressure Doe into dismissing the elder abuse lawsuit he filed against his
15
sister. This constitutes substantial evidence from which the jury could
conclude Doe’s sister and her attorney unlawfully instilled fear in Doe by
threatening to release the report unless he dropped the lawsuit.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPORTIONING
LIABILITY FOR DOE’S ECONOMIC DAMAGES
Last, Doe contends the trial court erred in apportioning liability
for economic damages because apportionment only applies to noneconomic
damages. Reyna and the County agree. We also agree. (Civ. Code, § 1431.2,
subd. (a).) The court, therefore, erred.
DISPOSITION
The jury found Doe suffered $29,000 in economic damages and
$40,000 in noneconomic damages. The jury apportioned 25 percent of the
noneconomic damages to Doe’s sister and her attorney. Thus, as to the
noneconomic damages, Reyna and the County were responsible for 75 percent
of $40,000 which is $30,000. We then take the $29,000 in economic damages
and add it to the $30,000 in noneconomic damages for a total of $59,000.
Last, section 5330 required the $59,000 to be trebled bringing the total
damage award to $177,000.
We reverse the trial court’s order granting Reyna and the
County’s motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On
remand, the trial court is ordered to enter an amended judgment in favor of
Doe in the amount of $177,000 and against the County and Reyna, jointly
and severally.
16
All parties to bear their own costs incurred on appeal.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
17