Calohan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 20-572V

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CARI R. CALOHAN, *

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Petitioner, * Special Master Jennifer A. Shah

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v. *

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* Filed: August 5, 2025

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *

HUMAN SERVICES, *

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Respondent. *

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Mark T. Sadaka, Law Offices of Sadaka Associates, LLC, Englewood, NJ, for Petitioner.

Parisa Tabassian, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On May 7, 2020, Cari R. Calohan (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for compensation under

the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine

Act” or “Program”), alleging that she developed neuromyelitis optica spectrum disorder (“NMO”)

caused by the influenza (“flu”) vaccination she received on October 30, 2017. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”).

On September 27, 2021, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) Report, contending that entitlement

to compensation should be denied. ECF No. 32. Thereafter, the parties submitted expert reports

and medical literature. See ECF Nos. 39, 41, 46, 50, 52, 57, 59. On January 15, 2025, Petitioner

1

Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, it must be made publicly

accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, and/or

at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government

Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government

Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In

accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other

information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review,

I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2

National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease

of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa

(2012).

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requested to proceed to an entitlement hearing, which is scheduled for July 13-14, 2026. ECF No.

67; Scheduling Order (non-PDF) dated 2/14/2025.

On January 23, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for interim attorneys’ fees and costs,

requesting a total of $80,694.46, comprised of $54,634.62 for attorneys’ fees and $26,059.84 for

attorneys’ costs. ECF No. 68 (“Fees App.”) at 5; Fees App., Ex. A at 1, 39. Respondent filed a

response on January 27, 2025, deferring to me as to whether Petitioner has met the legal standard

for an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 69 (“Fees Resp.”) at 2. Respondent

noted that Petitioner’s counsel’s “hourly rate has increased by 42% over the past six years.” Id. at

3, Fn. 2. Additionally, Respondent contended that Petitioner’s expert, Lawrence Steinman, M.D.,

had retroactively increased his hourly rate by billing at a higher rate than was quoted in his retainer

agreement with Petitioner’s counsel. Id. at 4, Fn. 3. On February 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply

brief.

This is Petitioner’s first motion for interim fees and costs. Petitioner has not incurred any

personal costs. See Fees App., Ex. A. Mr. Mark T. Sadaka has represented Petitioner for the

entirety of this case.

I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s application and award a total of $78,549.86 in

interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Legal Standard

A. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is

permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed.

Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Cloer, the

Federal Circuit noted that “Congress [has] made clear that denying interim attorneys’ fees under

the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases

where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352.

Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of

litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is

proper for the special master to award interim attorneys’ fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. Avera did not,

however, define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special

masters discretion. See Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 08-

241V, 2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Special

masters have viewed the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings, costly expert testimony,

and undue hardship -- as factors to consider in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352;

see Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl.

Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015).

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The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner;

it also looks at any money expended by a petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2009 WL 775396, at *2.

Referring to Avera, former Chief Special Master Golkiewicz in Kirk found that “the general

principle underlying an award of interim fees [is] clear: avoid working a substantial financial

hardship on petitioners and their counsel.” Id.

B. Good Faith

A petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs only if

the special master finds that the petition was brought in good faith and with a reasonable basis.

§15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1372; Woods v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs, 105 Fed. Cl. 148, 154 (2012); Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 94 Fed. Cl. 323,

334 (2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (2009); Bear, 2013

WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 97-588V, 2012 WL 1450520,

at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 28, 2012). The good faith requirement is met through a subjective

inquiry. Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed.

Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993). It “focuses upon whether [P]etitioner honestly believed he had a

legitimate claim for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007

WL 4410030, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). Without evidence of bad faith,

“petitioners are entitled to a presumption of good faith.” Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). Thus, so long as Petitioner had an honest belief that her claim could

succeed, the good faith requirement is satisfied. See Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.

09-276V, 2011 WL 2036976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Di Roma, 1993

WL 496981, at *1); Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5.

C. Reasonable Basis

Unlike the good faith inquiry, an analysis of reasonable basis requires more than just a

petitioner’s belief in her claim. Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-7. Instead, the claim must be

supported by objective evidence -- medical records or medical opinion. Sharp-Roundtree v. Sec’y

of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-804V, 2015 WL 12600336, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 3,

2015).

Although the statute does not define the quantum of proof needed to establish reasonable

basis, it is “something less than the preponderant evidence ultimately required to prevail on one’s

vaccine-injury claim.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283 (2014). The Court of

Federal Claims affirmed in Chuisano that “[a]t the most basic level, a petitioner who submits no

evidence would not be found to have reasonable basis. . .” Id. at 286. The Court in Chuisano

found that a petition that relies on temporal proximity and a petitioner’s affidavit is not sufficient

to establish reasonable basis. Id. at 290; see also Turpin v. Sec’y Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-

564V, 2005 WL 1026714, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis

when petitioner submitted an affidavit and no other records); Brown v. Sec’y Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 99-539V, 2005 WL 1026713, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no

reasonable basis when petitioner presented only e-mails between her and her attorney). The

Federal Circuit has affirmed that “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof

could provide sufficient grounds for a special master to find reasonable basis.” Cottingham v.

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Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 2019-1596, 971 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding

Petitioner submitted objective evidence supporting causation when she submitted medical records

and a vaccine package insert); see also James-Cornelius v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 984

F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that “the lack of an express medical opinion on causation

did not by itself negate the claim's reasonable basis”).

“[I]n deciding reasonable basis the [s]pecial [m]aster needs to focus on the requirements

for a petition under the Vaccine Act to determine if the elements have been asserted with sufficient

evidence to make a feasible claim for recovery.” Santacroce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 15-555V, 2018 WL 405121, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 2018). Special masters cannot award

compensation “based on the claims of petitioner alone, unsubstantiated by medical records or by

medical opinion.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1). Special masters and judges of the Court of Federal

Claims have interpreted this provision to mean that petitioners must submit medical records or

expert medical opinion in support of causation-in-fact claims. See Waterman v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 123 Fed. Cl. 564, 574 (2015) (citing Dickerson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 35

Fed. Cl. 593, 599 (1996) (stating that medical opinion evidence is required to support an on-Table

theory where medical records fail to establish a Table injury)).

When determining if a reasonable basis exists, a special master may consider myriad

factors, including “the factual basis of the claim, the medical and scientific support for the claim,

the novelty of the vaccine, and the novelty of the theory of causation.” Amankwaa, 138 Fed. Cl.

at 289. This approach allows the special master to look at applications for attorneys’ fees and costs

on a case-by-case basis. Hamrick v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 WL

4793152, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19, 2007).

II. Discussion

A. Undue Financial Hardship

The Federal Circuit has noted that interim fees “are particularly appropriate in cases where

proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352 (Fed.

Cir. 2008). Although Petitioner’s counsel filed the petition in 2020, counsel began working on

this case in 2018 and has not yet been awarded interim fees and costs. ECF No. 1; Fees App., Ex

A. Counsel filed extensive medical records and an affidavit from Petitioner, retained an expert,

and filed three expert reports and supporting medical literature. ECF Nos. 6-7, 9, 19, 24, 39, 41,

50, 57. I find that Petitioner would suffer undue hardship without an award of interim fees and

costs.

B. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis

Respondent has not raised any specific objection to Petitioner’s good faith or reasonable

basis for this claim, and he leaves the determination to my discretion. Fees Resp. at 2. I find that

the petition was filed in good faith.

As discussed above, the threshold for reasonable basis is much lower than the burden to

prove entitlement to compensation, which requires preponderant evidence. Petitioner filed

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extensive medical records and three expert reports. I find that Petitioner has maintained a

reasonable basis for her claim.

As there is no other reason to deny an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, I will

award Petitioner’s reasonable fees and costs as described below.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner requests a total of $54,634.62 in attorneys’ fees for the Law Offices of Sadaka

Associates, LLC (“Sadaka Associates”). Fees App. at 5; Fees App., Ex. A at 1, 39. Petitioner

bears the burden of establishing that the rates charged, hours expended, and costs incurred are

reasonable. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1993).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d

at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for

the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of

[P]etitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed.

Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349).

McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate compensation for

attorneys’ fees based upon the attorneys’ experience. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 09–293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of

Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for

subsequent years.3

Petitioner requests compensation for her counsel, Mr. Mark Sadaka, at the following

hourly rates: $396.00 per hour for work performed in 2018; $405.00 per hour for work performed

in 2019; $422.00 per hour for work performed in 2020; $444.00 per hour for work performed in

2021; $458.00 per hour for work performed in 2022; $482.00 per hour for work performed in

2023; and $563.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Fees App. at 5. Respondent notes that

“[P]etitioner’s counsel’s hourly rate has increased by 42% over the past six years,” but he does

not explicitly object to the requested rates. Fees Resp. at 3, Fn. 2.

Petitioner also requests compensation for work performed by Ms. Michele Curry,

paralegal, at the following rates: $150.55 per hour for work performed in 2018; $156.00 per hour

for work performed in 2019; $163.00 per hour for work performed in 2020; $172.00 per hour for

work performed in 2021; $177.00 per hour for work performed in 2022; $186.00 per hour for

work performed in 2023; and $197.00 per hour for work performed in 2024. Fees App. at 5.

3

The Office of Special Masters Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule for 2015 through 2025 can be

accessed at: https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/osm-attorneys-forum-hourly-rate-fee-schedules. The hourly

rates contained within the schedules are updated based on the decision in McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323.

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The requested rates for 2018-2023 are consistent with what Mr. Sadaka has previously

been awarded; however, Mr. Sadaka’s hourly rate for 2024 has been set by other special masters

at $515.00, not $563.00, as Mr. Sadaka has requested here. Efron v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 20-1405V, 2024 WL 4604594, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 25, 2024) (awarding

Mr. Sadaka a rate of $515.00 per hour for work performed in 2024); Kohlmeyer v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., No. 19-1694V, 2024 WL 4931335, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 5, 2024).

Application of the approved rate results in a $552.00 reduction.4

I find the requested paralegal rates to be reasonable, based on the Office of Special

Masters’ Fee Schedule and what Mr. Sadaka’s staff has previously been awarded. See Efron,

2024 WL 4931335, at *3.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Ultimately, it is “well within the Special Master’s discretion

to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work

done.” Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

In exercising that discretion, special masters may reduce the number of hours submitted by a

percentage of the amount charged. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed.

Cl. 719, 728-29 (2011) (affirming the special master's reduction of attorney and paralegal hours);

Guy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (affirming the special master’s

reduction of attorney and paralegal hours). Further, special masters may reduce awards sua sponte,

independent of enumerated objections from the respondent. Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 208-09 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed.

Cl. 313, 318 (Fed. Cl. 2008), aff’d, No. 99-573V, 2008 WL 2066611 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr.

22, 2008).

A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application

when reducing fees. Broekelschen, 102 Fed. Cl. at 729. Special masters may look to their

experience and judgment to reduce an award of fees and costs to a level they find reasonable for

the work performed. Saxton, 3 F.3d at 1521. It is within a special master’s discretion to make a

global reduction to the total amount of fees requested. See Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“special masters have wide latitude in determining the reasonableness

of both attorneys’ fees and costs”); Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-533V,

2011 WL 3705153 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 25, 2011), mot. for rev. denied, 2011 WL 6292218,

at *13 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (denying review of the special master’s decision and endorsing “a global –

rather than line-by-line – approach to determine the reasonable number of hours expended in this

case”).

While attorneys may be compensated for non-attorney-level work, the rate must be

comparable to what would be paid for a paralegal or secretary. See O’Neill v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 08–243V, 2015 WL 2399211, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 28, 2015). Clerical

4

Applying Mr. Sadaka’s previously awarded rate of $515.00 for work performed in 2024 results in a

$552.00 reduction ($563.00 - $515.00 = $48.00 x 11.5 hrs. = $552.00 reduction).

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and secretarial tasks should not be billed at all, regardless of who performs them. See, e.g.,

McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *26. It is well-established that billing for administrative and

clerical tasks is not permitted in the Vaccine Program. Rochester v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 379,

387 (1989).

The overall hours spent on this matter appear to be largely reasonable; however, a minor

reduction is necessary due to time billed for administrative and clerical tasks. The majority of

these entries bill between 0.1 and 0.5 hours for receiving and reviewing status reports and orders.

See Fees App., Ex. A. Examples include (but are not limited to):

• December 13, 2022: 0.5 hours billed by Ms. Curry to “Draft notice of filing for

medical literature. (exhibit #19-38)”;

• February 23, 2023: 0.1 hours billed by Mr. Sadaka to “Receive/review Order

granting Motion for Extension of Time”; and

• May 7, 2024: 0.1 hours billed by Mr. Sadaka to “Receive/review order granting

motion.”

Id. Cumulatively, Mr. Sadaka and his paralegal billed approximately 3.9 hours for these types of

tasks, resulting in charges of $1,292.60. These issues have previously been raised with Mr.

Sadaka. See Fisher v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 18-1705V, 2022 WL 2299985, at *5

(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 26, 2022); see also Nemmer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-

1464V, 2020 WL 1910695 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 20, 2020). Accordingly, I will deduct

$1,292.60 from the requested attorneys’ fees for these charges.

Accordingly, Petitioner is awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $52,790.02.5

D. Reasonable Costs

Petitioner requests a total of $26,059.84 for attorneys’ costs, consisting of $594.26 for

medical record requests; $40.58 for mailing/distribution costs; $400.00 for court filing fees; and

$25,025.00 for Dr. Steinman’s expert costs. Fees App., Exs. A at 39-40, B.

Petitioner provided documentation for the costs associated with the medical record requests,

mailing/distribution services, and court filing fees. Fees App., Ex. B at 1-19, 21. I find the costs

for these items to be reasonable and award them in full. I discuss Petitioner’s expert costs below.

1. Petitioner’s Expert Costs for Lawrence Steinman, M.D.

Petitioner requests $25,025.00 for Dr. Steinman’s work, at a rate of $550.00 per hour. Fee

App., Ex. B at 23. The records reflect that Dr. Steinman submitted two invoices for his work in this

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This total reflects Petitioner’s $54,634.62 request for attorneys’ fees minus the $552.00 reduction for Mr.

Sadaka’s 2024 rate and the $1,292.60 reduction for paralegal billings. ($54,634.62 - $552.00 - $1,292.60 =

$52,790.02.02).

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case. Fees App., Ex. B at 20, 22-23. The first invoice, dated March 28, 2022, shows that Dr.

Steinman required a “retainer for the first six hours of work in this case at $500/hr for $3000.” Fees

App., Ex. B at 20. The second invoice, dated November 29, 2024, includes an itemization of the

hours billed for 2022-2024. Fees App., Ex B. at 22-23. The November 2024 invoice shows that

Dr. Steinman billed a total of 45.5 hours in this case at a rate of $550.00 per hour, for a total of

$25,025.00. Id. According to the invoice, Dr. Steinman billed for the first six hours of work in this

case at a rate of $550.00 per hour, rather than $500.00 per hour, as the March 2022 invoice provided.

Fees App., Ex. B at 20, 22-23. Respondent maintains that Dr. Steinman “retroactively increased

his hourly rate to $550.00/hour for work performed in 2022, as well as for work in 2023 and 2024.”

Fees Resp. at 4, Fn. 3.

Around the time Dr. Steinman began working on this case in September 2022, other special

masters began approving a $550.00 hourly rate for his work. See Mason v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 2022 WL 4693380, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 8, 2022) (finding that Dr.

Steinman “demonstrated experience with the Vaccine Program has recently been deemed grounds

for a slight rate increase” from $500.00 per hour to $550.00 per hour); Anderson v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., No. 20-440V, 2022 WL 3151737, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 13, 2022) (finding

that “Dr. Steinman’s expertise in the medical field and long-standing participation in the Vaccine

Program” justified an hourly rate of $550.00 even though this was higher than the $500.00

“informal cap on expert fees” in the Program). As Dr. Steinman’s more recent rate of $550.00 per

hour has been approved in other cases, I see no reason to disturb his request with respect to work

not covered by the previously-charged retainer. See Morrison v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs.,

No. 18-386V, 2023 WL 1873254, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2023) (granting $550.00 per

hour for Dr. Steinman’s work performed in 2021 and 2022); see also Gardener v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., No. 17-1851V, 2023 WL 3775170 (Fed. Cl. June 2, 2023) (awarding Dr. Steinman

his $3,000.00 retainer and $550.00 rate for work performed in 2020 and 2021). However, because

Dr. Steinman previously billed for the six hours of work covered by the retainer at a rate of $500.00,

I will not compensate him for those hours at the higher rate. See Fees App., Ex. B at 20, 22-23.

This results in a $300.00 reduction to the award.

Accordingly, I will award $3,000.00 for the first six hours of Dr. Steinman’s work in this

case, and the remaining 39.5 hours of his work will be reimbursed at $550.00 per hour. The total

award for Dr. Steinman’s work is $24,725.00.6

I award Petitioner a total of $25,759.84 in attorneys’ costs.7

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining the propriety of

awards of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, and based on the foregoing, I GRANT IN PART

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This total reflects Dr. Steinman’s $3,000.00 retainer plus the remaining 39.5 hours of work at a rate of

$550.00 per hour. (39.5 hours x $550.00 rate = $21,725.00 + $3,000.00 retainer = $24,725.00 award).

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Petitioner is awarded $594.26 for medical record requests; $40.58 for mailing/distribution costs; $400.00

for court filing fees; and $24,725.00 for Dr. Steinman’s expert costs; totaling $25,759.84.

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Petitioner’s application. Petitioner is awarded interim attorneys’ fees and costs in the total amount

of $78,549.86 as follows:

• A lump sum in the amount of $78,549.86, representing reimbursement of

Petitioner’s interim attorneys’ fees and costs, to be paid through an ACH deposit to

Petitioner’s former counsel’s IOLTA account for prompt disbursement.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of

Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision.8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Jennifer A. Shah

Jennifer A. Shah

Special Master

8

Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice

renouncing their right to seek review.

9