Opinion

Brown v. City of Dallas

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
Jul 30, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.1%

“using force, such as punches, to gain control of a non-compliant suspect is not clearly excessive”

How later courts described this case

  • “using force, such as punches, to gain control of a non-compliant suspect is not clearly excessive”

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The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DOUGLAS DEON BROWN, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Case No. 3:24-cv-00218-B-BT

§

ROBERT LYONS, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court in this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is

Defendant Robert Lyons’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity (ECF No. 67). For the reasons stated, the Court should GRANT

Defendant’s motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.

Background

Plaintiff Douglas Deon Brown, proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit on

January 26, 2024 against the City of Dallas, Dallas Police Department (DPD) Chief

Eddie Garcia, and DPD Officers Holly Harris and Robert Lyons. See generally

Compl. (ECF No. 3). The Court dismissed with prejudice Brown’s claims against

the City, Chief Garcia, and Officer Harris, and denied Brown leave to amend to add

another defendant. See FCR (ECF No. 62); Order Accepting FCR (ECF No. 65);

Partial J. (ECF No. 66). Accordingly, Officer Lyons is the sole remaining defendant

in this action.

Brown’s claims arise from his June 4, 2022 arrest, where he alleges he was

“arrested and beaten” by Lyons, specifically “punched in the face with [a] closed

fist while on the ground handcuffed” and that his “head was raised [and] then

slammed into the concrete.” Compl. 4. Brown alleges that he lost three teeth and

suffered facial lacerations. Id. The Court construes these allegations as a Fourth

Amendment excessive force claim.

Lyons filed his motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 67), arguing that

because he did not violate Brown’s constitutional rights, he is entitled to summary

judgment, and even if he did violate Brown’s constitutional rights, Brown cannot

surmount Lyons’s qualified immunity defense. See Def.’s Br. 12 (ECF No. 68).

Lyons submitted the following evidence in support of his motion: the June 4, 2022

Arrest Report (Def.’s App. 1–39), Public Integrity Unit and Internal Affairs

Division Investigations (Def.’s App. 40–185), body worn camera (BWC) footage

from DPD Officers Byron Luciano, Holly Harris, and Ricardo Grejada (Def.’s App.

186–89), a recording of a prison interview with Brown (Def.’s App. 190), and

Lyons’s declaration (Def.’s App. 192–93). After the Court granted in part Brown’s

requests pertaining to summary judgment evidence (ECF No. 89)1, Brown filed his

1 After Brown filed numerous requests pertaining to Lyons’s summary judgment

evidence (ECF Nos. 74, 75, 79, 85, 86), the Court ordered the TDCJ staff to provide

the evidence to Brown and permit him a meaningful opportunity to review it

pursuant to reasonable policies in place for use of the unit law library and also

granted Brown’s request to present additional evidence that is in his possession or

control—by directing him to present it in his Response to Lyons’s motion for

summary judgment. Order 1–2 (ECF No. 89). The Court denied Brown’s requests

response (ECF No. 92), and Lyons filed his reply (ECF No. 93). Therefore, the

motion is ripe for determination.

Legal Standards

The Court’s analysis “involves multiple legal standards, corresponding to

qualified immunity, summary judgment, . . . and the Fourth Amendment.” Joseph

ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020).

A court will grant summary judgment when the record shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323–25 (1986); Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th

Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a

motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all facts and

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all

factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp.

Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, a court “may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion for summary

judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000);

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254–55.

to compel Lyons to produce his own BWC footage, because that footage was not

preserved and cannot be produced. Id. at 2.

Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case, the party opposing the motion must come

forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine

dispute of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). On the other hand, “if the movant bears the burden of proof on an

issue, either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an

affirmative defense, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential

elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v.

Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). “[When]

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

587 (citation omitted). Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary

judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated

assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not

competent summary judgment evidence. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994).

“The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific

evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence

supports his or her claim.” Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty

on the court to “sift through the record in search of evidence” to support the

nonmovant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. (citing Skotak

v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)). “Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If

the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

“A plaintiff makes out a § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the

Constitution or of federal law, and then shows that the violation was committed by

someone acting under color of state law.’” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293–94

(5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir.

2008)). But the affirmative defense of qualified immunity “shields public officials

sued in their individual capacities ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.’” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 328 (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

“When a public official makes ‘a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity,’

that ‘alters the usual summary-judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff

to show that the defense is not available.’” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329–30 (quoting

Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016)). So, to shift the burden of

proof, “the public official need not show (as other summary-judgment movants

must) an absence of genuine disputes of material fact and entitlement to judgment

as a matter of law.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330 (citing King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650,

653–54 (5th Cir. 2016)).

Once a public official asserts qualified immunity, the “inquiry is two-

pronged.” Thompson v. City of Dallas, 2024 WL 4999189, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept.

24, 2024) (citing Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2020)),

adopted by, 2024 WL 4648155 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2024). First, “[d]o the facts,

viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the

official’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Second, “[w]as the right at issue . . . clearly established at the

time of the alleged misconduct?” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In other words, “a plaintiff seeking to defeat qualified immunity must show: (1)

that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right

was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Morgan v.

Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). “Particularly applicable in pro se cases, ‘verified complaint[s]

and other verified pleadings serve as competent summary judgment evidence.’”

Thompson, 2024 WL 4999189, at *3 (citing Falcon v. Holly, 480 F. App’x 325, 326

(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)). But evidence that is “neither sworn nor declared

under penalty of perjury to be true and correct” “is not competent [summary

judgment] evidence.” Thompson, 2024 WL 4999189, at *4.

Courts may “analyze the prongs in either order or resolve the case on a single

prong.” Cunningham, 983 F.3d at 191 (quoting Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596,

600 (5th Cir. 2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Qualified immunity is appropriately resolved at the summary judgment

stage when (1) a plaintiff has established that the defendant engaged in the conduct

at issue, or (2) the court “skip[s], for the moment, over . . . still-contested matters

to consider an issue that would moot their effect if proved.” Haverda v. Hays

Cnty., 723 F.3d 586, 599 (5th Cir. 2013) (brackets and ellipses in original) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). If resolution of qualified immunity at the

summary judgment stage involves a fact question as to what the defendant did,

rather than whether the defendant is immune for what he did, then “the case is

inappropriate for summary judgment on the basis that the defendant did not

engage in conduct violative of the plaintiff’s rights.” Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d

1107, 1123–24 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981). However, a defendant can pretermit the

question of whether he engaged in the offending conduct to present the qualified

immunity issue because “[t]here is no point in going to trial to determine whether

the officer engaged in the complained-of conduct if the officer would be immunized

from liability even if he did engage in that conduct.” Id. at 1124. Even so, where a

defendant establishes beyond dispute that he did not engage in the offending

conduct, then summary judgment may still be appropriate. Id. But “[a] summary

judgment on [those] grounds . . . has nothing to do with the qualified immunity

defense; rather, it is based on the plaintiff’s inability to prove the facts essential to

recovery . . ..” Id. (internal citation omitted). Similarly, when the offending

conduct, even if it did occur, does not amount to a violation of the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, then summary judgment may be proper, though “[that]

summary judgment would not be based on qualified immunity grounds, but

instead on the lack of a legally sufficient predicate for section 1983.” Id.

Analysis

To satisfy his burden at this summary judgment stage and demonstrate that

Lyons is not entitled to qualified immunity, Brown must point to competent

summary judgment evidence (1) that Lyons violated a statutory or constitutional

right and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct. After

reviewing the summary judgment evidence, the Court finds that Brown has not

carried his burden.

1. The facts do not show that Lyons used excessive force against Brown.

To defeat summary judgment based on Lyons’s qualified immunity, Brown

“must show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that a jury could

return a verdict entitling [him] to relief for a constitutional injury.” Thompson,

2024 WL 4999189, at *3 (citing Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330). That is, “the facts, viewed

in the light most favorable to [Brown], show that [Lyons’s] conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Cunningham, 983 F.3d at 190–91.

“When considering this showing, the Court must accept [Brown’s] version

of the facts (to the extent reflected by proper summary judgment evidence) as

true.” Thompson, 2024 WL 4999189, at *3 (internal quotations and citations

omitted). But “the Court need not accept [Brown’s] version of the facts, if that

version is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could

believe it.” Id. at *4 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “When one party’s

description of the facts is discredited by the record, [a court] need not take his word

for it but should view ‘the facts in the light depicted by the [video recordings taken

at the scene].” Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007)).

“[A] free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force

in the course of making an arrest . . . [is] properly analyzed under the Fourth

Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 388 (1989). “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the

right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree

of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968)). The amount of force that is reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment “‘is not capable of precise definition of mechanical application,’” and

“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”

Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). To bring an excessive force

claim, a plaintiff must establish “‘(1) an injury (2) which resulted directly and only

from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need and (3) the force used

was objectively unreasonable.’” Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730,

740 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.

1999)). “To gauge the objective reasonableness of the force used by a law

enforcement officer,” a court “must balance the amount of force used against the

need for force, paying careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each

particular case.” Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 129 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted). The reasonableness inquiry, however, is

fact-specific and “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on

the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”; this allows for the fact

that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in

circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount

of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97.

Brown’s claims are rooted in his contention that he was “beaten” by Lyons,

specifically “punched in the face with [a] closed fist while on the ground

handcuffed” and that his “head was raised [and] then slammed into the concrete,”

while he was in handcuffs and not resisting. Compl. 4; see also Resp. 1 (ECF No.

92) (“Plaintiff after sitting on the ground was rushed by officers who began to use

unjustified force. Plaintiff was punched in the face by Defendant with a closed fist

while [D]efendant crushes [sic] Plaintiff[’s] neck area so forceful[ly] that

Plaintiff[’s] face is smashed into the concrete.”); see also Resp. 3 (“The injuries

suffered by Plaintiff were those from [Defendant] slamming his knee into

Plaintiff’s neck, which crushed Plaintiff’s face into the concrete.”). Brown argues

that the body worn camera (BWC) footage “clearly shows [Defendant punch

Plaintiff in the face].” Resp. 2. But he also argues that “the one angle [of the

footage] that could show Defendant slam his knee into Plaintiff’s neck and crush

his face into the concrete is the [BWC] footage of Defendant,” which was not tagged

for retention and was deleted—so it is not evidence before the Court.2 Resp. 4.

Lyons argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s Fourth

Amendment claim because the evidence proves that he never used excessive force.

Def.’s Br. 12. Lyons argues that he “deployed a single strike to [Brown] after

multiple verbal warnings did not result in [Brown] complying with officer

demands,” as is compliant with “DPD policy and Fifth Circuit jurisprudence” on

reasonable force. Id. at 1. He further argues that none of the three officers’ BWC

footage shows any officer acting as Brown alleges, and there are no gaps in the

video where the alleged conduct could have occurred. Id.

Brown’s sworn complaint as to his version of the facts is competent

summary judgment evidence. So the question becomes whether his allegations are

blatantly contradicted by the video footage. See Edwards v. Oliver, 2021 WL

881283, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2021) (“Qualified-immunity cases often involve

competing versions of events—this case is no exception. When the facts are

disputed, the Court must use Plaintiff[’s] version of the facts, unless it is blatantly

contradicted by the record, to evaluate whether the officer is entitled to qualified

2 As addressed in the Court’s Order regarding Brown’s requests for evidence (ECF

No. 89), “it was discovered Lyons activated his body worn camera during an arrest

and then failed to properly tag and categorize the video for retention.” Def.’s App.

40–185 at 2; see also Def.’s App. 40–185 at 11 (“Axon Video Evidence documents

Senior Corporal Lyons’[s] body worn camera was activated and uploaded, but not

tagged for retention. Lyons’s BWC was deleted prior to Internal Affairs receiving

this case.”) (citing Attachment #14).

immunity.”), adopted by, 2021 WL 873190 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2021). And the

Court “assign[s] greater weight, even at the summary judgment stage, to the facts

evident from video recordings taken at the scene.” Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th

415, 421 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627

(5th Cir. 2012)).

Although the footage from the cameras worn by Officers Grajeda, Luciano,

and Harris, see Def.’s App. 186, 187, 189, does not provide a perfect view of Lyons’s

conduct during the short, relevant period when Brown alleges Lyons punched him

and slammed his head into the pavement,3 it certainly contradicts Brown’s

allegations. Specifically, the BWC footage does not show that Lyons beat Brown

“while on the ground handcuffed” nor does it show, Lyons slammed Brown’s face

on the ground. Rather, the footage shows the responding officers approaching

Brown in a motel parking lot. See Def.’s App. 186, 189, 192. Lyons and another

officer used force against Brown after he did not immediately comply with their

commands to stop and “get on the ground.” See Def.’s App. 186, 189. Lyons forced

Brown to the ground by grabbing his arm, see Def.’s App. 186, 189, and, when

Brown resisted the officers’ attempts to place him in handcuffs, Lyons struck

Brown in the face. See id. Once Brown is in handcuffs, Lyons and the other officers

3 For example, Grajeda’s camera faces Lyons’s back which obscures Grajeda’s view

of Lyons’s use of force (Def.’s App. 189, 0:53–1:05); Luciano’s camera is pointed to

the pavement for several seconds during the relevant time of Lyons’s use of force

(Def.’s App. 186, 0:55–1:01); and Harris’s camera is not turned on until after Brown

is in handcuffs, after the use of force occurred (Def.’s App. 187).

raised him to his feet. See Def.’s App. 186, 189, 192. The entire encounter lasted

less than one minute. See id.

Moreover, “[w]hen the offending conduct, even if it did occur, does not

amount to a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, then summary

judgment may be proper, though ‘[that] summary judgment would not be based

on qualified immunity grounds, but instead on the lack of a legally sufficient

predicate for section 1983.’” Sipe v. Norris, 2019 WL 1430434, at *3 (N.D. Tex.

Mar. 6, 2019) (citing Barker, 651 F.2d at 1123–24), adopted by, 2019 WL 1434564

(N.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2019). Here, even if Lyons punched Brown and slammed his

head into the concrete, as alleged, the conduct would only amount to a violation of

Brown’s constitutional rights if the use of force was clearly unreasonable—which

the Court discusses below. See Thompson, 2024 WL 4999189, at *2 (“The

reasonableness of the official’s conduct and the degree to which the particular right

in question was clearly established are thus merged into one issue for purposes of

the qualified immunity analysis.”).

2. Brown has not shown that Lyons violated a federal right that was clearly

established.

Even if the evidence supported Brown’s characterization of Lyons’s conduct,

he has not carried his burden as to the clearly established prong to overcome

Lyons’s assertion of qualified immunity.

This analysis requires determining “whether the defendant’s conduct was

objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the

incident.” Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 511 (citation omitted). In other words,

“[a] clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Mullenix

v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012)). “[O]vercoming qualified immunity is especially difficult in excessive-force

cases . . .. [T]he law must be so clearly established that—in the blink of an eye, []—

every reasonable officer would know it immediately.” Morrow v. Meachum, 917

F.3d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

“There are two ways to demonstrate clearly established law.” Thompson,

2024 WL 4999189, at *5 (quoting Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 726 (5th Cir.

2021)). First, the plaintiff can “‘identify a case’ – usually, a ‘body of relevant case

law’ – in which ‘an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have

violated the Constitution.’” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330 (cleaned up) (quoting District

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018)); see also Morgan, 659 F.3d at 371–

72 (explaining the plaintiff may show that the existence of the right that was

allegedly violated was “beyond debate” by “point[ing] to controlling authority—or

a ‘robust consensus of persuasive authority’—that defines the contours of the right

in question with a high degree of particularity”) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

Second, the plaintiff may ask that the Court to look to “the ‘rare’ possibility

that, in an ‘obvious case,’ analogous case law ‘is not needed’ because ‘the

unlawfulness of the [challenged] conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing

precedent does not address similar circumstances.’” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330

(quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64). Meeting this standard typically requires extreme

circumstances or particularly egregious facts. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 745 (2002)) (obvious cruelty by prison guards while prisoner was handcuffed

to hitching post in the sun for seven hours). “No doubt ‘obvious’ excessive force

cases can arise. But they are so rare that the Supreme Court has never identified

one in the context of excessive force.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th

1159, 1167 (5th Cir. 2021).

The “objective-reasonableness” inquiry is “fact-intensive,” and turns on “the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th

Cir. 2009) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

Here, the record shows that officers responded to the motel parking lot

because a person matching Brown’s description attempted to steal a DPD “bait”

car, which would constitute a felony offense. Def.’s App. 021; Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 31.03(e)(4)(A). When the officers encountered Brown, they did not know

whether he was armed. Def.’s App. 192–93. Brown refused to stop and give the

arresting officers his hands despite repeated commands to do so. Id. at 193. Brown

continued to resist after Lyons and another officer forced him to the ground, and

he attempted to move his hands closer to his body, causing them to fear he was

reaching for a weapon. Id. at 192–93. Lyons struck Brown once—in the face to gain

compliance. Id. at 193.

Lyons argues that his “use of force comports with Fifth Circuit jurisprudence

on force necessary to effect an arrest,” and even if the Court were to find his

conduct violated Brown’s constitutional right, Brown cannot show such a

constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Def.’s Br. 15,

20. Lyons argues that “no caselaw in this circuit put” him on notice that his actions

were clearly established as unconstitutional. Id. at 20.

“The Fifth Circuit has found that a police officer uses excessive force when

the officer strikes, punches, or violently slams a suspect who is not resisting arrest.”

Vasquez v. Landon, 2020 WL 905360, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2020) (citing

Darden v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, 880 F.3d 722, 731 (5th Cir. 2018)). However,

a suspect’s resistance to arrest alters what the Fifth Circuit considers reasonable

force. See Escarcega v. Jordan, 701 F. App’x 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2017) (“using force,

such as punches, to gain control of a non-compliant suspect is not clearly

excessive”) (citing Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 316 (5th Cir. 2016)); see also

Candee v. Maldonado, 2022 WL 2342571, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2022) (“But

when a detainee is actively resisting arrest and that resistance continues even after

he has been wrestled to the ground, the use of strikes and chokeholds may be

reasonable.”); see also Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 181 (5th Cir.

2021) (“Distraction strikes and even kicks designed to gain compliance to being

handcuffed are measured or ascending responses to an actively resisting suspect.”)

(cleaned up). And “use of force is reasonable if an officer uses measured and

ascending actions that correspond [] to [a suspect’s] escalating verbal and physical

resistance.” Craig v. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

Here, the summary judgment evidence, including the officers’ BWC footage,

shows that, as officers approached Brown, they issued multiple, strong (and

profane) verbal commands for Brown to “get down” and “give [them] [his] hands.”

See Def.’s App. 186, 189. Brown did not immediately comply, and Lyons and the

other officers forced Brown to the ground. See id. Brown writhed on the ground

and pulled his hands away from the officers, resisting their attempts to put him in

handcuffs. See id. Lyons struck Brown—once—in the face and placed his knee

briefly on the back of Brown’s neck. See id.; see also Def.’s App. 192. Once Brown

was in handcuffs and stopped struggling, Lyons discontinued all use of force. See

Def.’s App. 186, 187, 189.

Brown has not identified any controlling authority establishing that an

officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the

Constitution. And the facts here do not present the type of “obvious” case that

would establish the unlawfulness of the challenged conduct is sufficiently clear

even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances. Brown has

thus failed to meet his burden to show that it was clearly established at the time of

his arrest that Lyons’s use of force was unlawful.

Accordingly, Lyons is entitled to qualified immunity on Brown’s Fourth

Amendment claim.

Recommendation

Based on the summary judgment record, a reasonable jury could not find

that Lyons’s conduct violated clearly established law—or that Lyons used excessive

force against Brown—so the District Judge should grant Lyons’s motion for

summary judgment (ECF No. 67) and dismiss Brown’s remaining claims with

prejudice.

SO RECOMMENDED.

July 30, 2025. -

XA | A

REBECCA RUTHERFORD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to

which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in

the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or

refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file

specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted

by the district judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United

Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

18

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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