Sanchez, Lorenzo v. State of Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 24-62003-CIV-DAMIAN

LORENZO SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

/

ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner, Lorenzo Sanchez’s (“Sanchez” or

“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), filed pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF No. 1]. In the Petition, Sanchez attacks the constitutionality of his

convictions and sentence entered in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward

County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Sanchez, No. 21-000265CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2021).

The State of Florida (“State”) filed a Response [ECF No. 10 (“Response”)] to the Petition

pursuant to this Court’s Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 8], along with a supporting appendix

[ECF No. 12] and state court transcripts [ECF No. 11]. Petitioner filed a Reply. [ECF No. 14

(“Reply”)]. The Petition is now ripe for review.

THE COURT has considered the Petition and the above-referenced filings, the

pertinent portions of the record, and relevant legal authority and is otherwise fully advised.

For the reasons that follow, the Petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Charges

On May 1, 2014, the State charged Sanchez with attempted first-degree murder and

felon in possession of a firearm. [ECF No. 12-1 at 4–5].

B. Trial and Sentencing

Sanchez proceeded to trial. [ECF No. 11, Trial Transcripts, hereinafter, Tr. at ___].

Sanchez represented himself at trial. [ECF No. 12-1 at 31–44]. The jury found Sanchez guilty

of both counts. Id. at 243–55. The trial judge sentenced Sanchez to life in prison for the

attempted murder count and fifteen years for the felon in possession of a firearm count. Id. at

245, 248.

C. Direct Appeal and Collateral Proceedings

Sanchez filed a direct appeal in Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth

DCA”). Id. at 287–88. On appeal, Sanchez alleged eight trial court errors: (1) denial of his

discovery objections to the victim’s police statements and lab reports, Dr. Kikhudt’s

disclosures as a medical, bullets, and ballistics expert, and Detective Plaska’s testimony; (2)

denial of Petitioner’s special jury instruction that the State must prove that Petitioner’s killing

of the victim was not justifiable or excusable; (3) denial of Petitioner’s motion to suppress; (4)

striking a juror for hardship; (5) limiting the cross examination of Mr. Schaefer; (6)

consideration of Petitioner’s lack of remorse at sentencing; (7) comments to the jury regarding

the firearm count; and (8) trial by a six-person jury. [ECF No. 12-2 at 2–74]. On March 16,

2023, the Fourth DCA per curiam affirmed without written opinion in Sanchez v. State, 358 So.

3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

Sanchez returned to the state trial court on April 12, 2023, by filing a Motion for

Postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. at 192–203. In that

Motion, Sanchez raised two grounds for relief:

(1) A Gilglio claim that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony from the

victim and eyewitness Hanes when they testified how many times the victim was

shot and the locations of the bullet wounds; and

(2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Petitioner to testify at the motion to

suppress hearing to establish standing to contest Petitioner’s arrest.

During the pendency of his Rule 3.850 motion, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his

conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm by challenging the charging document

in the 2005 drug case that rendered him a convicted felon. Id. at 205–07.

The trial court denied all of Sanchez’s claims with prejudice. Id. at 217–22. Sanchez

moved for rehearing. Id. at 224–29. The court denied the motion because Sanchez failed to

present anything the trial court “overlooked or misapprehended.” Id. at 159. Sanchez twice

appealed, which the Fourth DCA consolidated into a single appeal. Id. at 161–99. On July 3,

2024, the Fourth DCA per curiam affirmed without written opinion and without requiring a

response from the State. Id. at 200; see also Sanchez v. State, 390 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024).

D. The Instant Petition

On October 15, 2024, Sanchez initiated the instant proceedings under Section 2254.

See Petition. Construing the Petition liberally, consistent with Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520–21 (1972), Sanchez presents the following claims for relief:

Claim One: The government suppressed statements of Willard Robinson that

were exculpatory to the defense, contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963). Petition at 4.

Claim Two: The government suppressed scientific and medical evidence and

export reports, contrary to Brady. Id. at 8.

Claim Three: The government suppressed the police report of Detective

Dennis Plaska, contrary to Brady. Id. at 11.

Claim Four: Violation of Fourth Amendment when trial court denied

Petitioner’s motion to suppress because Petitioner was arrested without an

arrest warrant. Id. at 14.

Claim Five: Violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when trial court limited

Petitioner’s cross-examination of a witness. Id. at 18.

Claim Six: Violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights

when trial court denied Petitioner’s requested jury instruction. Id. at 20.

Claim Seven: Violation of the Sixth Amendment when Petitioner was tried by

a six-person jury. Id. at 21.

Claim Eight: Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call Petitioner at the

motion to suppress hearing regarding Petitioner’s warrantless arrest. Id. at 21.

Claim Nine: The government knowingly used perjured testimony, contrary to

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Id. at 23.

Claim Ten: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments on

grounds Petitioner was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm because

the underlying felony conviction was based on an erroneous information. Id. at

34.

This Court addresses Petitioner’s claims for relief in turn below.

II. EXHAUSTION AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The State asserts that the Petition appears to be timely as to Claims One through Nine

but argues that Claim Ten is time-barred. Response at 5. The State further asserts that Claims

One through Six and Ten are unexhausted. Id. at 7. The Court considers each below.

A. Legal Standard As To Exhaustion.

Petitioner’s federal habeas case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See also Abdul–

Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331 n.9 (11th

Cir. 2007). “AEDPA limits the scope of federal habeas review of state court judgments . . . .”

Pittman v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 871 F.3d 1231, 1243 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)). “The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas

relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,

and not as a means of error correction.” Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison,

818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

“Habeas petitioners generally cannot raise claims in federal court if those claims were

not first exhausted in state court.” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and Kelley v. Sec’y for Dept. of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343 (11th

Cir. 2004)). “In order to be exhausted, a federal claim must be fairly presented to the state

courts.” Id. (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). “It is not sufficient merely that

the federal habeas petitioner has been through the state courts . . . .” Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1343–

44 (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 275–76, and Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). “Rather,

in order to ensure that state courts have the first opportunity to hear all claims, federal courts

‘have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon

the federal courts.’” McNair, 416 F.3d at 1302 (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275). “While

[federal habeas courts] do not require a verbatim restatement of the claims brought in state

court, [they] do require that a petitioner presented his claims to the state court ‘such that a

reasonable reader would understand each claim’s particular legal basis and specific factual

foundation.”” Id. (citing Kelley, 377 F.3d at 1344–45); see also McNair, 416 F.3d at 1303 (“We

therefore hold that ‘[t]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than

scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.’” (quoting Kelley, 377

F.3d at 1345)). Importantly, “the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims

asserted present federal constitutional issues. ‘It is not enough that all the facts necessary to

support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law

claim was made.’” Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson,

459 U.S. at 5–6; see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (“Respondent did not

apprise the state court of his claim that the evidentiary ruling of which he complained was not

only a violation of state law, but denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment.”).

In order to properly exhaust a claim in state court, the habeas petitioner must also raise

his federal claim in the state court system in the manner and at the time dictated by the state’s

procedural rules. Marshall v. Dunn, 497 F. Supp. 3d 1124, 1140 (N.D. Ala. 2020). If “a

petitioner fails to raise his federal claims in compliance with relevant state procedural rules,

the state court’s refusal to adjudicate the claim ordinarily qualifies as an independent and

adequate state ground for denying federal review.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 465 (2009). If

the petitioner fails to do so, the federal habeas court must dismiss claims that either (1) have

been explicitly ruled procedurally barred by the highest state court considering the claims, see

e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989), or (2) are not exhausted but would clearly be

barred if returned to state court. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991). See

also Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 957 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a claim

is procedurally barred “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which

the petitioner would be required to present [the claim] in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claim[] procedurally barred”) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at

735 n.1). Thus, “[f]ederal courts are precluded from addressing claims that have been held to

be procedurally defaulted under state law.” Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 210 (11th Cir. 1993).

B. Discussion As To Exhaustion.

1. Claims One Through Three

Claims One through Three were raised as discovery violations and trial court error

under Claim I in Petitioner’s direct appeal: “The court erred in its rulings as to the state’s

many failures to make timely discovery, and the lack of procedural prejudice does not

affirmatively appear in the record.” See ECF No. 12-2 at 29–50. Petitioner headed Claim I on

direct appeal as “THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT’S

DISCOVERY OBJECTIONS.” Id. at 29. Petitioner alleged that:

The record shows repeated instances of late discovery by the state. The court overruled

Appellant’s objections without complying with the legal requirements for disposition

of discovery issues. The record does not show the absence of procedural prejudice

beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction should be reversed.

Id. at 29.

On appeal, Petitioner alleged Claim One as “WR’s police statement and the lab

report.” Id. at 35. Petitioner also alleged that the state failed to timely disclose the taped

testimony of Willard Robinson, the victim. Id. at 35–38. And Petitioner argued that the trial

court erred when it found “there is no Discovery Violation.” Id. at 36; Tr. at 400. Despite four

pages of alleged trial court errors, Petitioner failed to make any reference to the Constitution

in his direct appeal. See ECF No. 12-2 at 35–39. Thus, Petitioner failed to present Claim One

to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.

Petitioner alleged Claim Two as “The bullets and the ballistics expert” in his direct

appeal. Id. at 42. Petitioner argued that various trial court errors and discovery violations

related to the State’s ballistic expert. Id. at 42–47. Petitioner’s only reference to constitutional

claims was in paraphrasing his own testimony to the trial court. Id. at 43 (“[Petitioner] alleged

violations of the discovery rule, due process, the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section

9 of the state constitution and Brady.”). Petitioner’s paraphrasing his own passing references

to the trial court about constitutional violations, with no argument or substance, are nothing

more than “makeshift needles in the haystack.” McNair, 416 F.3d at 1303. Thus, Petitioner

failed to present Claim Two to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.

Petitioner alleged Claim Three as a “discovery issue during Det. Plaska’s testimony”

in his direct appeal. See ECF No. 12-2 at 47. Petitioner argued that the trial court erred when

it found that no discovery violation occurred regarding the disclosure of Plaska’s police report.

Id. at 49. Again, Petitioner’s only reference to a constitutional claim was in paraphrasing his

own testimony to the trial court during Plaska’s testimony, which falls short of raising a

constitutional issue. Id. at 49 (“Appellant said he had not time to investigate it and did not

know bullets were recovered and did not have time to depose the witnesses with an expert, it

was a violation of rule 3.220 and the state and federal constitutions.”). Thus, Petitioner failed

to present Claim Three to the state court, and it is therefore unexhausted.

2. Claims Four Through Six

The Court addresses Claims Four through Six on the merits below.

3. Claim Ten

In Claim Ten, Sanchez seeks to attack the charging documents underlying his 2005

drug conviction, which was used as a basis for his current conviction. Petition at 34. Sanchez

is no longer in custody pursuant to that conviction and, therefore, fails the “in custody”

requirement for federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,

492 (1989) (“The question presented by this case is whether a habeas petitioner remains ‘in

custody’ under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because

of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for

any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted. We hold that he does not.”). “When the

second sentence is imposed, it is pursuant to the second conviction that the petitioner is

incarcerated and is therefore ‘in custody.’” Id. at 492–93. Therefore, Claim Ten must be

denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Conclusion As To Exhaustion

In his Reply, Petitioner alleges that he “did exhaust these claims by citing to the state

court the specific provision of the constitution relied on in his Habeas petition” and by “fairly

presenting in his claim the substance of [his] federal claims.” [ECF 14 at 1]. However,

Petitioner cannot raise a constitutional claim by pleading his factual allegations. Snowden, 135

F.3d at 735 (“It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were

before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made.”) (quoting

Anderson, 459 U.S. at 5–6).

The Eleventh Circuit has held that even where, as here, the claims are unexhausted

and procedurally barred, the petitioner is entitled to federal habeas review of the claim if

petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Raleigh, 827 F.3d at 957 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at

735 n.1). Here, Petitioner does not establish, or even allege, cause for the default, actual

prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See generally Petition. His claims are,

therefore, unexhausted and procedurally barred. Because Petitioner can never return to state

court to rectify this problem, his Petition is due to be denied with prejudice as to Claims One,

Two, Three, and Ten.

The Court addresses the remaining claims below.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO 2254 CLAIMS

A. Deference Under Section 2254.

Under AEDPA, federal habeas corpus review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly

circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential,’” Ledford, 818 F.3d at 642 (quoting Hill v. Humphrey,

662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)), and is generally limited to the record that was before

the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Id. (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S.

170, 182 (2011)).

The federal habeas court is first tasked with identifying the last state court decision, if

any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d

1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court is not required to issue an opinion explaining its

rationale, because even the summary rejection of a claim, without explanation, qualifies as

an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,

100 (2011); Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Wilson v. Sellers,

584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018); Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U.S. 961, 964–65 (2018).

Where the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in the state forum, Section 2254(d)

prohibits relitigating the claim unless the state court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” 1 or, (2) “based on an unreasonable determination

1 “[C]learly established Federal law” consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the

dicta, set forth in the decisions of the Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); Harrington, 562 U.S. at 97–98; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13. When relying

on Section 2254(d)(2), a federal court can grant relief if the state court rendered an erroneous

factual determination. Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016).

Because the “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners

whose claims have been adjudicated in state court,” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013),

“[f]ederal courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a manner so

‘well understood and comprehended in existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that

‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102–03). This standard is intentionally difficult to meet. Harrington,

562 U.S. at 102.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees criminal

defendants the right to the assistance of counsel during criminal proceedings against them.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984). When assessing counsel’s performance

under Strickland, the court employs a strong presumption that counsel “rendered adequate

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment.” Id. at 690.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must

demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the petitioner suffered

prejudice as a result of that deficiency. Id. at 687. To establish deficient performance, the

decision. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

412 (2000)).

petitioner must show that, in light of all the circumstances, counsel’s performance was outside

the wide range of professional competence and “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88; see also Cummings v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1356

(11th Cir. 2009). The court’s review of counsel’s performance should not focus on what is

possible, prudent, or appropriate but should focus on “what is constitutionally compelled.”

Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987).

Regarding the prejudice component, the Supreme Court has explained “[t]he

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. A court need not address both prongs of Strickland if the defendant makes an

insufficient showing on one of the prongs. Id. at 697. Further, counsel is not ineffective for

failing to raise non-meritorious issues. Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001).

Nor is counsel required to present every non-frivolous argument. Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d

1267, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013).

Furthermore, a Section 2254 petitioner must provide factual support for his or her

contentions regarding counsel’s performance. Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1406–07 (11th

Cir. 1987). Bare, conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient to satisfy the

Strickland test. See Boyd v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1332–34 (11th Cir. 2012).

IV. DISCUSSION

With the foregoing in mind, this Court addresses each of the exhausted grounds

asserted in the Petition in turn.

A. Claim Four

In Claim Four, Sanchez alleges a Fourth Amendment violation on grounds the trial

court denied his motion to suppress based on Sanchez’s warrantless arrest. Petition at 18.

Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 58], where his

claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez v. State, 358

So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

Claim Four is not cognizable under federal habeas review. “[W]here the State has

provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state

prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained

in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 494–95 (1976) (footnotes omitted). Thus, Claim Four must be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

B. Claim Five

In Claim Five, Sanchez alleges a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights on grounds the trial

court limited Petitioner’s cross-examination of a witness, John Schaefer. Petition at 19.

Sanchez alleges that he was unable to cross-examine Shaefer to show that the shooter wore a

mask and that there was a “scuffle” prior to the shooting. Id.

“[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned

to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other

things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation

that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679

(1986). Further, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-

examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,

the defense might wish.’” Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). Here,

Sanchez was given the opportunity to cross-examine Schaefer regarding his statements on

whether the shooter wore a mask and whether there was a “scuffle” prior to the shooting. See

Tr. at 568–69; 581; 590–92. The state court records reflect that Sanchez repeatedly attempted

to improperly question Schaefer. See id. at 566–67. Nevertheless, after a lengthy discussion

outside the presence of the jury, the trial court allowed Sanchez to further question Schaefer.

See id. at 584–88. To the extent Sanchez seeks to raise a constitutional issue because the trial

court enforced Florida evidentiary rules, Sanchez’s claim must fail. The Eleventh Circuit has

plainly stated that it is within the trial court’s discretion to limit or circumscribe a pro se

defendant’s cross examination in order to comply with the rules of evidence. United States v.

Rodriguez, 735 F. App’x 638, 644 (11th Cir. 2018) (considering a pro se defendant’s allegation

that the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause when it limited the cross-examination

of two witnesses and holding “the court was trying to ensure that the testimony was taken in

accord with the Federal Rules of Evidence and to minimize delay. This was comfortably

within the district court’s discretion.”).

To the extent Sanchez seeks to question the trial court’s ruling on state evidentiary

issues, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not

the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.”).

Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 63–67],

where his claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez

v. State, 358 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). The state court’s rejection of this claim is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal constitutional principles and should not

be disturbed here. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Sanchez is, therefore, not entitled to relief

under Claim Five.

C. Claim Six

In Claim Six, Sanchez contends that the jury instructions violated his Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Petition at 20. The Eleventh Circuit has held that

in order to merit federal habeas review, jury instructions must render the trial fundamentally

unfair. Jones v. Dugger, 888 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]mproper jury instructions

can never be the basis for federal habeas corpus relief unless the instruction rendered the whole

trial so unfair as to amount to a denial of due process.” (citation omitted)).

Sanchez challenged the trial court’s ruling on direct appeal [ECF No. 12-2 at 52],

where his claim was considered and summarily rejected per curiam without opinion. Sanchez

v. State, 358 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Sanchez has not shown that the jury instructions

rendered his trial fundamentally unfair or even alleged any prejudice from the instructions.

Therefore, the state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. Sanchez is, therefore, not entitled to relief under Claim Six.

D. Claim Seven

In Claim Seven, Sanchez claims a violation of the Sixth Amendment on grounds he

was tried by a six-person jury. Petition at 21. The Supreme Court settled this exact issue over

fifty-years ago. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court considered

Florida’s use of a six-person jury for non-capital offenses. The Court held that “petitioner’s

Sixth Amendment rights, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, were

not violated by Florida’s decision to provide a six-man rather than a 12-man jury.” Id. at 103.

Therefore, Claim Seven is without merit and is due to be denied.

E. Claim Eight

In Claim Eight, Sanchez claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call

Sanchez at the motion to suppress hearing regarding his warrantless arrest. Petition at 21.

Sanchez alleges that he should have been called in order to establish standing to object to the

warrantless arrest. Id.

In Florida, a warrant is not required if an arrest is based on probable cause. Chaney v.

State, 956 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Elliot v. State, 597 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA

1992). “Probable cause to arrest or search exists when the totality of the facts and

circumstances within an officer’s knowledge sufficiently warrant a reasonable person to

believe that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed.” League v. State, 778 So. 2d

1086, 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citation omitted). “A finding of probable cause does not

require absolute certitude.” Curtis v. State, 748 So. 2d 370, 374 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Therefore, police needed probable cause, not a warrant, to properly arrest Sanchez.

Sanchez does not allege that, had he testified, the court would have found Sanchez

was arrested without probable cause. Therefore, whether Sanchez could establish standing to

challenge the warrantless arrest is immaterial—because no warrant was needed. Thus,

Sanchez cannot show that, had he been called, “the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Claim Eight plainly fails under Strickland.

The state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. Therefore, this Court finds Claim Eight of the Petition to be without merit.

F. Claim Nine

Under Claim Nine, Sanchez argues that the State committed a Giglio violation when

it presented evidence that the victim was shot six times—in the chest, arms, back and neck—

but a police report did not reflect a gunshot to the neck and listed only four gunshot wounds

rather than six. Petition at 21.

“In order to prevail on a Giglio claim, a petitioner must establish that the prosecutor

‘knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was

false testimony,’ and that the falsehood was material.” Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327,

1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 1995)).

Further, “the suggestion that a statement may have been false is simply insufficient; the

defendant must conclusively show that the statement was actually false.” Maharaj v. Sec’y for

Dep’t of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005).

Here, a review of the state court records shows that Sanchez’s claim is without merit.

At trial, the State questioned the officer about the discrepancy in the police report:

Q: Did he have any gunshot wound to his neck?

A: Per my report no. But when I was at the hospital they were doing all of

the medical care. I am not sure of the end result if they found the wound,

but mine was a quick synopsis of what I initially saw.

Q: How many wounds did he have to the back, sir?

A: I never roll the victim over when they are in a trauma hospital. He was

intubated. I don’t roll the victim over. I don’t want to dislodge any tracheal

tube so I leave it as is. I take the doctor’s word on what we got initially. Later

down the road they will be doing surgery and things of that sort. I am not sure

what’s on his back, because I never rolled him over. I just photograph what I

see with the bandages on his arms, the chest, the lung, tubes, and things of that

sort.

Tr. at 677. Thus, the police report reflects what the officer saw when the victim was in critical

condition at the hospital. However, the medical reports Sanchez included in one of his

postconviction motions show that the victim suffered “multiple gunshot wounds and is now

paraplegic.” [ECF No. 12-3 at 21]. The reports also show that bullets were recovered from

the victim’s neck while he was on life support: “Bullet fragments are again seen overlying the

left chest and midline neck.” Id. at 30. The fact that further inspection revealed more gunshot

wounds that were not readily apparent does not create false or perjured testimony.

The state court’s rejection of this claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal constitutional principles and should not be disturbed here. See Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. Therefore, this Court finds Claim Nine of the Petition to be without merit.

For the above discussed reasons, this Court finds that each of the grounds for relief

asserted in the Petition is due to be denied. Thus, this Court must consider whether to issue a

certificate of appealability.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District

Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when

it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” If a certificate is issued, “the court must state

the specific issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” 28

U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must still be filed, even if the court issues

a certificate of appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings, Rule 11(b), 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.

After review of the record, this Court finds that Sanchez is not entitled to a certificate

of appealability. “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To merit

a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists would find

debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural issues he or she

seeks to raise. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); see also Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d

926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001). Because this Court finds that the claims raised are clearly without

merit, Sanchez cannot satisfy the Slack test and, therefore, a certificate of appealability shall

not issue as to the claims asserted in the Petition.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that the Petitioner has failed to set

forth an entitlement to habeas relief.2

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1] is

DENIED.

2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.

2 Because the Court can “adequately assess [Petitioner’s] claim[s] without further factual

development,” an evidentiary hearing is not required. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003).

3. The Clerk of Court is INSTRUCTED to CLOSE this case.

4. All pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at the Southern District of Florida, this 31st

day of August 2025.

MELISSA Y Jab

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Lorenzo Sanchez, Pro Se

L58882

Florida State Prison

Inmate Mail/Parcels

7819 NW 228th Street

Raiford, FL 32026

Jessenia J Concepcion

Office of the Attorney General

1515 North Flagler Drive

9th Floor

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

jessenia.concepcion@myfloridalegal.com

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