Benjamin v. Transport Risk Solutions Risk Retention Group Inc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

CRAIVEN L. BENJAMIN CASE NO. 3:24-CV-00993

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

TRANSPORT RISK SOLUTIONS RISK MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

RETENTION GROUP INC., ET AL.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the undersigned Magistrate Judge, on reference from the District Court, are multiple

motions, including (1) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Motion

to Stay Pending Arbitration [doc. #21] filed by Defendants KLLM Transport Services, LLC,

KLLM Driving Academy, Inc., and Hinds Community College; (2) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to

Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration [doc. #24] filed by

Defendant Dentavious L. Brown; (3) Motion for Leave to File Second Amended and Re-Stated

Complaint [doc. #38] filed by Plaintiff Craiven Benjamin; and (4) Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss

for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. #52] filed by Defendant Dentavious L. Brown. The

motions are opposed. [docs. #32, 50, 57].

For reasons detailed below, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Second

Amended and Re-Stated Complaint [doc. #38] filed by Plaintiff Craiven Benjamin is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration [doc. #21] filed

by Defendants KLLM Transport Services, LLC, KLLM Driving Academy, Inc., and Hinds

Community College and the Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration [doc. #24] filed by Defendant

Dentavious L. Brown are DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim [doc. #21] filed by Defendants KLLM Transport Services, LLC, KLLM Driving Academy,

Inc., and Hinds Community College and the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State

a Claim [doc. #24] filed by Defendant Dentavious L. Brown be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. #52] filed by Defendant Dentavious L. Brown be GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Background

Plaintiff Craiven Benjamin (“Benjamin”) initiated this action on July 25, 2024, against

Transport Risk Solutions Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“Transport”), KLLM Transport Services,

LLC (“KLLM Transport”), KLLM Driving Academy, Inc. (“KLLM Driving”), Hinds Community

College (“Hinds”), and Dentavious L. Brown (“Brown”). [doc. #1]. She asserted that the Court

had subject matter jurisdiction over her action under 28 U.S.C. 1331, federal question jurisdiction,

based on her Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claims, and supplemental jurisdiction over

her remaining claims. Id. at p. 2.

Benjamin alleges that on February 21, 2022, she completed the application for KLLM

Driving through Hinds’ Commercial Truck and Bus Driving program. Id. On that same day,

Benjamin received an email from Hinds informing her of scholarships available through the

partnership between Hinds and KLLM Transport. Id. at p. 3. This scholarship opportunity

included a $4,000 scholarship to drive with KLLM Transport for one year for regular pay and

incentive bonuses. Id. The email also contained a career opportunity including a job with KLLM

Transport upon completion of the program, which included comprehensive benefits and 401K

eligibility after six months of employments. Id.

On March 10, 2022, Benjamin received a Driver Conditional Offer Letter from KLLM

Transport that was signed by company representative, Tanner Havard. Id. Benjamin applied and

acquired the scholarship that was offered through the partnership of Hinds, KLLM Transport, and

KLLM Driving. Id. On April 28, 2022, Benjamin signed a “Loan Agreement/Employment

Contract,” which outlined her week-by-week balance owed for the duration of the one-year

contract period. Id. at p. 4. On May 18, 2022, Benjamin received a Certificate of Completion

from KLLM Driving acknowledging that she met the educational requirements and passed the

required tests. Id. As a result, Benjamin began her tenure as a trainee and as a passenger of the

vehicle operated by Brown. Id.

Benjamin asserts that Brown (1) held her against her will; (2) threatened her with a gun;

(3) verbally berated her; (4) physically harmed her; (5) asked her for penetrative and oral sex; (6)

made inappropriate sexual comments; (7) drove recklessly with her in the truck; (8) caused a motor

vehicle accident; (9) threatened to report her; (10) accelerated and braked suddenly to cause

Benjamin to fall from the top bunk as she was sleeping; (11) did not allow Benjamin to wash her

clothes or to shower; and (12) consumed alcohol on the job and drove under the influence. Id. at

pp. 5-7, 10-11. These actions occurred as Brown and Benjamin drove across the country in the

states of Mississippi, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Virginia, West Virginia, Tennessee, Texas,

Maryland, Arkansas, Oklahoma, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Ohio, Alabama,

Missouri, and Wisconsin. Id. at pp. 5-10. In Wisconsin, Benjamin was able to leave the vehicle

and inform security. Id. at p. 10. Police were dispatched and assisted Benjamin in retrieving her

items from the vehicle. Id. As a result of the car accident and the fall from the top bunk, Benjamin

sustained physical injuries. Id. at pp. 6, 10.

According to Benjamin, KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, Hinds, and Amanda Pickell

(“Pickell) were aware of the situation between Benjamin and Brown, but they failed to protect her.

Id. at p. 12; [doc. #35]. Benjamin texted Pickell, an employee coordinator, and she was told to

remain with Brown. Id. In Wisconsin, Brown was removed from the KLLM Transport truck and

was subsequently terminated. Id. at p. 13. She was unable to continue her employment because

of her physical and mental condition after these events. Id. Although Benjamin completed the

required 240 hours of supervised driver training, id. at p. 11, since these events, Benjamin has been

unable to hold employment. Id. at p. 13.

On December 8, 2022, James E. Peavy II (“Peavy”), on behalf of KLLM Transport, gave

notice to Benjamin that she violated her one-year employment contract and needed to satisfy the

Loan Agreement with KLLM Transport. Id. KLLM Transport has attempted to collect this debt.

Id. Benjamin asserts that KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, and Hinds breached their contract

with her and negligently hired, trained, and supervised Brown. Id. at pp. 14, 15. Benjamin seeks

the full amount of tuition paid, plus interest from the date of payment, and all damages available.

Id. at p. 14. Benjamin asserts that she has suffered a lifetime of damages, including (1) injuries to

her back, shoulder, and neck; (2) Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”); (3) lost wages, past

and future; (4) loss of earning capacity; (5) loss of enjoyment of life; (6) mental and physical

disability; and (7) punitive damages. Id.

On December 17, 2024, KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, and Hinds filed a Rule 12(b)(6)

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration. [doc.

#21]. They argue that the Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants under Title VII, the

sole basis for the invocation of this Court’s federal question subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at p.

1. They contend that the Title VII claim should be dismissed because Benjamin failed to exhaust

her administrative remedies by not filing a complaint with the EEOC. [doc. #21-1, p. 6]. Further,

Benjamin signed a Mutual Arbitration Agreement with KLLM Transport which contained an

agreement that she file an arbitration proceeding or make a demand for arbitration before filing

suit. Id. at p. 8. Finally, they ask for all costs and attorney’s fees incurred in defending this

litigation. [doc. #21, p. 2].

On December 23, 2024, Brown filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State

a Claim and Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration. [doc. #24]. He argues that the Court should

dismiss the Complaint or stay these proceedings for the reasons argued by his Co-Defendants.

[doc. #24-1]. That same day, KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, and Hinds were permitted to file

a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of their motion. [doc. #26]. Therein, they argue that

although the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) may not be used to compel the arbitration of disputes

involving contracts of employment of transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce, the

arbitration agreement stated that common law of the State of Mississippi would apply. [doc. #27,

p. 2]. Under Mississippi law, they argue that arbitration is required. Id. at p. 5.

On March 14, 2025, Benjamin filed an opposition to both motions. [doc. #32]. Benjamin

does not contest the dismissal of the Title VII claims as they relate to KLLM Transport, KLLM

Driving, Hinds, and Brown. Id. at p. 1. However, she maintains the dismissal should be without

prejudice to her ability to pursue the myriad of additional claims plead in the Complaint. Id. at p.

2. Benjamin does oppose staying these proceedings pending arbitration, because she cannot be

compelled to arbitration when she falls within the transportation worker exception under the FAA.

Id. at pp. 2-3.

Hinds, KLLM Transport, and KLLM Driving filed a reply in support of their motion on

March 20, 2025. [doc. #37]. Therein, all Defendants consent to the withdrawal of the request for

arbitration without prejudice. Id. at p. 2. However, Defendants argue that this dismissal of

Benjamin’s Title VII claims should be with prejudice, and the dismissal should include Defendant

Transport. Id. Otherwise, Transport would be forced to file the same motion to dismiss. Id.

On March 14, 2025, Benjamin sought leave to file her Amended Complaint [doc. #33],

which was granted on March 19, 2025. [doc. #35]. Benjamin sought this leave to add an additional

defendant, Pickell. In her Amended Complaint, Benjamin alleges the same facts as the Original

Complaint, but she adds allegations against Pickell.1 Benjamin asserts that jurisdiction is proper

under “28 U.S.C. § 1331 Diversity Jurisdiction,” making it unclear whether she asserts diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.

at p. 2. Benjamin is a citizen of Louisiana while Transport is a South Carolina corporation, KLLM

Transport is a Texas LLC, KLLM Driving is a Texas corporation, Hinds is a Mississippi institution,

Brown is a Louisiana citizen, and Pickell is a “resident of the State of Mississippi.” Id. at pp. 2-3.

When Benjamin began her tenure as a student, she was under the direction of Student Support

Representative, Pickell. Id. at p. 5. Pickell facilitated and furthered Brown’s actions by failing to

act. Id. at pp. 5, 14. While in the state of Virginia, Benjamin contacted Pickell about the incident

1 An “amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect, unless

the amended complaint specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier

pleading.” King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Boelens v. Redman Homes,

Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1985)). Here, there is no indication that the amended complaint

adopted or referenced the earlier pleading.

involving Brown yanking a Diesel Exhaust Fuel pump out of Benjamin’s hands. Id. at p. 8. Pickell

instructed Benjamin to talk with Brown about everything and to try to work it out. Id. Pickell

never spoke to anyone with KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, and/or Hinds about removing

Benjamin from the truck. Id.

On March 24, 2025, Benjamin filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Amended and

Restated Complaint. [doc. #38]. She seeks to file a Second Amended Complaint to assert

jurisdiction under Title 18 of the United States Code, specifically the “Trafficking Victims

Protection Act.” Id. On April 7, 2025, KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, Transport, and Hinds

filed an opposition to Benjamin’s second motion to amend. [doc. #50]. Since Benjamin conceded

that there were insufficient facts to establish a claim under Title VII, there is no basis to invoke

this Court’s jurisdiction. Id. at pp. 1-2. According to the Amended Complaint, both Benjamin and

Brown are Louisiana residents. Id. at p. 2. The Defendants state that the Second Amended

Complaint “cannot confer jurisdiction that now does not exist with the prospective dismissal of

the Title VII claims,” and since it does not meet the threshold for establishing federal jurisdiction,

it is futile. Id. at pp. 4-5.

On April 9, 2025, Brown filed a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction. [doc. #52]. Brown argues that Benjamin has waived the Title VII claims pled

in her initial Complaint, leaving no federal question at issue, and complete diversity of citizenship

not existing, so Benjamin’s First Amended Complaint “must” be dismissed. Id. at p. 1. Brown

further requests that all costs and attorney’s fees incurred in defending this litigation be assessed

against Benjamin. Id. at p. 2.

On May 1, 2025, Benjamin filed an opposition to Brown’s motion. [doc. #57]. Benjamin’s

motion to file her proposed second amended complaint specifically addresses and remedies the

“very jurisdictional issue that forms the basis of [Brown]’s present motion.” Id. at p. 1. Benjamin

filed her second motion to amend prior to the filing of this motion to dismiss. Id. at p. 2. Since

the proposed Second Amended Complaint properly invokes federal question jurisdiction, Brown’s

motion is substantively moot. Id. Further, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held that 28 U.S.C. §

1653 should be liberally construed to permit amendments to cure defective jurisdictional

allegations. Id. at p. 3. The First Amended Complaint also cures any jurisdictional defects in the

original pleading. Id. Benjamin’s First Amended Complaint relates back to the original filing

date. Id.

Briefing is complete. Accordingly, the matter is ripe.

Law & Analysis

I. Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(A), “[a] party may amend its pleading once

as a matter of course . . . 21 days after serving it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A). Alternatively, if

“the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required,” a party may amend once as a

matter of right within “21 days after service of either a responsive pleading or . . . a motion under

Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(B).

If the time for a party to amend as a matter of course has expired, then the party may amend

with the written consent of the opposing party or with leave of court. The court shall grant a party

leave to amend its pleading “freely . . . when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).

“Whether leave to amend should be granted is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district

court . . .” Quintanilla v. Texas Television, Inc., 139 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoted source

omitted). Yet, “[i]n the context of motions to amend pleadings, ‘discretion’ may be misleading,

because Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a) ‘evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.’” Martin’s

Herend Imports v. Diamond & Gem Trading United States of Am. Co., 195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir.

1999) (quoting Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1981)). A district

court must have a “substantial reason” to deny a request for leave to amend. Lyn-Lea Travel Corp.

v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

In deciding whether to grant a party leave to amend, the court considers the following

factors: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies

by previous amendments, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) futility of the

amendment. Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v.

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Absent any of these factors, leave should be granted. Smith v.

EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). “An amendment

is futile if it would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Briggs v. Miss., 331 F.3d 499,

508 (5th Cir. 2003)). Therefore, courts review the proposed amended complaint under “‘the same

standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).’” Id. (quoting Stripling v. Jordan

Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000)).

A pleading states a claim for relief, inter alia, when it contains a “short and plain statement

. . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). To withstand a motion

to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains

sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies

somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the

same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading

comprised of “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the

cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.,

632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the

court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556. Nevertheless, a court is compelled to dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if

it is premised upon an invalid legal theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989).

All Defendants assert that since Benjamin conceded she does not have a claim that arises

from Title VII, this Court lacks jurisdiction. As a result, they argue her proposed Second Amended

Complaint is futile. Benjamin contends that she should be allowed to file her Second Amended

Complaint to assert claims under Title 18 of the United States Code, specifically the Trafficking

Victims Protection Act, which would allow the Court to exercise federal question jurisdiction.

In 2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protecting Act, creating criminal offenses

for forced labor and sex trafficking to “combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary

manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and

effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.” David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No.

CIV.A. 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at *17 (E.D. La. Jan. 4, 2012) (quotation omitted). Three

years later, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”),

18 U.S.C. § 1595, adding a civil right of action by victims of trafficking against their traffickers.

See Doe (K.E.C.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 750 F. Supp. 719, 728 (E.D. Tex. 2024). Section 1595 provides

trafficking victims with a private right of action to pursue claims against perpetrators of trafficking

(“direct liability”) or those who knowingly financially benefit from trafficking (“beneficiary

liability”). See E.S. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 3d 420, 426 (N.D. Tex. 2021). Section 1595

states that:

[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action

against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to

benefit, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture

which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of

this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover

damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

(1) Defendant Brown

Perpetrator liability applies to whoever knowingly “in or affecting interstate or foreign

commerce. . . harbors, transports, . . . maintains, . . . or solicits by any means a person . . . [by]

means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . to engage in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a)(1)-(2). For purposes of this section, “commercial sex act” is defined as “any sex act, on

account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3).

“Anything of value,” for purposes of this statute, has been broadly interpreted. See Reed v. Barnes,

No. 3:24-CV-1500-D, 2025 WL 963072, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2025); see also Ramsbottom v.

Ashton, 2024 WL 4993391, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2024) (“Courts grappling with the definition

of ‘commercial sex act’ generally agree that the term ‘anything of value’ is defined very broadly.”).

Benjamin alleges that Brown threatened her with a gun, made sexually threatening

remarks, held her captive in the truck, used his seniority to coerce her to stay in the truck with him,

physically harmed her, drank alcohol while driving, and verbally berated her. She also alleges that

Brown attempted to solicit sex from her. However, these allegations do not plausibly state a claim

for sex trafficking under § 1591. That provision imposes perpetrator liability on those who use

force, threats, or coercion to cause a person to engage in a commercial sex act, which is defined as

any sex act where anything of value is given or received. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3). Although courts

interpret “anything of value” broadly, the Second Amended Complaint does not allege that Brown

received or expected to receive anything of value in connection with any sex act or that Benjamin

engaged in any such sex act. See Reed, 2025 WL 963072, at *3 (“But it is necessary that there be

a casual connection between the sex act and the exchange of the thing of value.”). Benjamin’s

claims that Brown threatened to harm her sexually and solicited sex from her are serious and

disturbing, but do not constitute force or coercion to engage in a commercial sex act.

The other provisions of the TVPRA include 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581 (peonage), 1589 (forced

labor), 1590 (trafficking), and 1592 (document servitude). Peonage under Section 1581 is a form

of involuntary servitude. “‘Peonage is a status or condition of compulsory service or involuntary

servitude based upon a real or alleged indebtedness.’” Treadway v. Otero, No. 2:19-CV-244, 2020

WL 7090702, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 2020) (quoting Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th

Cir. 1945)). Here, there are no allegations that Brown compelled Benjamin to work in order to

satisfy a debt or obligation or that she was indebted to him in any way. Thus, § 1581 is

inapplicable.

Section 1589 prohibits any person from “knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the labor or

services of a person” by means of (1) “force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of

physical restraint to that person or another person;” (2) “serious harm or threats of serious harm to

that person or another person;” (3) “the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;” or (4)

“any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not

perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical

restraint.” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)-(4). “‘[T]he phrase by means of refers to familiar principles of

causation and requires a proximate causal link between one or more of the unlawful means

enumerated in § 1589(a) and the labor actually obtained.’” Harris v. Henry, No. 1:22-CV-00366-

LY, 2022 WL 16825200, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2022) (quoting Martinez-Rodriguez v. Giles, 31

F.4th 1139, 1155 (9th Cir. 2022)). While Benjamin alleges that Brown engaged in threatening,

abusive, and coercive conduct, including threats to shoot her if she touched his Xbox or liquor,

demands for sexual contact, and repeated refusals to bring her home, none of these alleged actions

are tied to her provision of labor or services. Benjamin asserts that she felt stuck in the truck with

Brown, but she does not allege that his threats or conduct compelled her to continue providing

labor or services. Instead, the threats related to Brown’s control over the environment and her

personal autonomy, not to securing labor. These actions and alleged threats may certainly violate

other laws and statutes, but they are not a violation of § 1589(a).

Likewise, § 1590 requires allegations that defendant knowingly recruited, transported, or

harbored the plaintiff for the purpose of forced labor. 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a); see Adia v. Grandeur

Mgmt., Inc., 933 F.3d 89, 93-93 (2d Cir. 2019). Brown’s conduct, though, again, abusive and

coercive, is not alleged to have been part of a trafficking scheme in which he moved or harbored

Benjamin with the purpose of exploiting her labor. Finally, § 1592 prohibits the unlawful

confiscation, destruction, removal, or concealment of documents to further trafficking offenses.

18 U.S.C. § 1592(a). The Second Amended Complaint contains no allegation that Brown took

Benjamin’s identification or legal documents to force her to work or remain with him. As such,

the Second Amended Complaint fails to state any plausible federal claim against Brown.

(2) Defendants KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, Hinds, Pickell, & Transport

“Section ‘1595(a) creates civil liability for two categories of defendants: (1) those who

have themselves committed a criminal offense under § 1591 of the TVPRA (i.e., perpetrator

liability), and (2) those who are not themselves subject to criminal liability but who knowingly

benefitted from participation in a venture that they knew or should have known was committing

an offense under § 1591 of the TVPRA (i.e., beneficiary liability).’” Doe v. Wyndham Hotels &

Resorts, Inc., No. 1:24-CV-00109-DAE, 2024 WL 4224915, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2024)

(quoting A.D., v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 19-120, 2020 WL 8674205, at *2 (E.D. Va.

July 22, 2020)). To state a direct beneficiary claim under § 1595, a plaintiff must allege that

defendants (1) knowingly benefitted) (2) “from participation in a venture” (3) that it “knew or

should have known has engaged in” trafficking the plaintiff. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)).

Participation in a venture means “knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of

subsection (a)(1).” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4). Further, participation in a venture requires plaintiffs

to “allege that the franchisors took part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and

potential profit.” Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 725 (11th Cir. 2021).

First, the only allegation against Transport is that it served as the insurance carrier for

KLLM Transport. The Second Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations suggesting that

Transport engaged in, assisted with, or benefitted from any conduct that could give rise to a federal

claim under the TVPRA or any other federal statue.

As for KLLM Transport, KLLM Drive, Hinds, and Pickell, the Second Amended

Complaint likewise fails to state a claim under the TVPRA. Because there are no allegations that

these Defendants directly committed a trafficking offense, Benjamin must rely on a theory of

beneficiary liability under § 1595(a). Here, the Second Amended Complaint contains no factual

allegations indicating that Brown, the alleged perpetrator, engaged in a “commercial sex act” as

required under § 1591 or violated §§ 1581, 1589, 1590, 1591, or 1592. Without a predicate

trafficking violation, no beneficiary claim under § 1595 can survive. Moreover, even if the

allegations demonstrate sexual harassment, such conduct is not the same as sex trafficking under

the TVPRA. There are no facts suggesting that KLLM Drive, KLLM Transport, Hinds, or Pickell

knowingly participated in any “common undertaking” or venture with Brown involving risk and

potential profit. The communications alleged between Benjamin and Pickell do not reasonably

support an inference that Pickell or any other Defendant was aware or should have been aware of

any trafficking conduct. Thus, the Second Amended Complaint fails on its face to allege a viable

federal claim against any Defendant under the TVPRA, rendering the amendment futile.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Leave to File Second Amended and Re-Stated

Complaint [doc. #38] filed by Plaintiff Craiven Benjamin is DENIED.

II. Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and to Stay Pending Arbitration

KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, and Hinds filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration. [doc. #21]. Brown also filed a

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Motion to Stay Pending

Arbitration. [doc. #24]. These motions were filed after the original Complaint but before the First

Amendment and Re-Stated Complaint [doc. #35]. Based on Benjamin’s opposition memorandum

and Defendants’ reply, the parties came to an agreement regarding these motions. Specifically,

“[Benjamin] does not contest the dismissal of the Title VII claims as they relate to Defendants

[KLLM Transport], [KLLM Driving], [Hinds], and [Brown].” [doc. #32, p. 1]. However,

Benjamin maintains that the dismissal of the Title VII claims should be without prejudice to her

ability to pursue “the myriad of additional claims plead.” Id. at p. 2. Defendants argue that the

dismissal should be with prejudice, and the dismissal of Benjamin’s Title VII claims should be as

to all Defendants, including Transport. [doc. #37, p. 2]. All Defendants consent to the withdrawal

of the request for arbitration without prejudice. Id.

Confusingly, Benjamin’s First Amended Complaint still states that she brings claims

pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. [doc. #35, p. 2]. Nonetheless, “defendants

should not be required to file a new motion to dismiss simply because an amended pleading was

introduced while their motion was pending.” Rountree v. Dyson, 892 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 2018)

(quotation and quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[i]f some of the defects raised in the original

motion remain in the new pleading, the court simply may consider the motion as being addressed

to the amended pleading.” Id. at 683-84 (quotation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court

will consider the pending motions to dismiss [docs. #21, 24] as being addressed to Benjamin’s

First Amended Complaint.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for

relief, inter alia, when it contains a “short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Because Benjamin has conceded that her Title VII claims against KLLM Transport, KLLM

Driving, Hinds, and Brown should be dismissed, the undersigned recommends dismissal of

Benjamin’s Title VII claims against these Defendants. However, in their reply, Defendants argue

this dismissal should also include Transport, even though it did not file the motion to dismiss with

the other Defendants. Benjamin’s concession and the Defendants’ argument apply with equal force

to Benjamin’s Title VII claim against Transport. Where, as here, a defending party establishes that

a plaintiff has no cause of action, and the plaintiff agrees, this defense should inure to similarly

situated defendants. See Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see

also Baggiolini v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 419CV00156ALMCAN, 2019 WL 8331423, at *8 (E.D.

Tex. Dec. 12, 2019). “The policy rationale for this rule is that it would be incongruous and unfair

to allow some defendants to prevail, while not providing the same benefit to similarly situated

defendants.” Id. (citation omitted). The only allegation against Transport is that it is the insurance

carrier of KLLM Transport. Thus, if the Title VII claims against KLLM Transport are dismissed,

there would be no basis of recovery against Transport.

All Defendants consented that the request for a stay pending arbitration be withdrawn,

mooting their request for a stay pending arbitration.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim [doc. #21] and the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [doc. #24]

be GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Benjamin’s Title VII claims.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Benjamin’s Title VII claims against KLLM

Transport, KLLM Driving, Hinds, Brown, and Transport be DISMISSED WITH2 PREJUDICE.3

IT IS ORDERED that the request for a stay pending arbitration is DENIED AS MOOT.

III. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Brown filed a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction seeking

for this Court to dismiss all of Benjamin’s claims as this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

[doc. #52]. Brown contends that since Benjamin waived her Title VII claims, leaving no federal

question, and there is no diversity of citizenship among the parties, the Court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. at p. 1. Benjamin argues that her motion to file her Second Amended

Complaint specifically addresses and remedies the jurisdictional defect that Brown raises in his

motion. [doc. #57, p. 2].

2 While a voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) is ordinarily without

prejudice, that is not the posture of this case. Here, in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,

Benjamin conceded that she could not allege facts sufficient to state a claim under Title VII. In

such circumstances, it is within the Court’s discretion to determine whether dismissal should be

with or without prejudice. Considering Plaintiff’s express concession and the absence of any basis

for amendment, the Court finds that dismissal with prejudice is warranted.

3 It appears to the Court that Pickell has not been served as no returned summons has been filed

into the record. Additionally, Pickell has not made an appearance in this matter. According to the

Fifth Circuit, Pickell “never became a party” to Benjamin’s suit. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.

Tullos-Pierremont, 894 F.2d 1469, 1472 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, the undersigned cannot recommend

dismissal of the Title VII claims against Pickell. It is worth noting, however, that if Pickell were

a party, dismissal would be proper because there is no Title VII action against a supervisor directly.

Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 449 (5th Cir. 2002) (Fifth Circuit finding that Title VII does

not impose individual liability). Further, the proposed Second Amended Complaint is futile as it

failed to allege any plausible claim against Pickell under the TVPRA. Accordingly, even if Pickel

had been added as a defendant, this Court would still not enjoy subject matter jurisdiction.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the presiding court lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction.4 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). As a Rule 12(b)(1) motion concerns the trial

court’s jurisdiction, the court is free to weigh relevant evidence and satisfy itself that it has the

power to hear the case. Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mortensen v.

First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir. 1977)). Consequently, jurisdiction may

be found lacking based upon (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the

court’s resolution of disputed facts. Id. (quoting Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161

(5th Cir. 2001)). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion should only be granted if it appears certain that the

plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of her claim entitling her to relief. In re FEMA

Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir.

2012).

No parties dispute that there is no diversity of citizenship among the parties. Accordingly,

for this Court to have subject matter jurisdiction, a federal question must exist. “The presence or

absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which

provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of

the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)

(citing Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936)). “The rule makes the plaintiff

the master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state

law.” Id. “[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the

plaintiff’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that

4 The federal courts have limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate claims absent a statutory

conferral of jurisdiction. In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286

(5th Cir. 2012).

Constitution.” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). In other words,

a district court’s federal question jurisdiction extends over

only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal

law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily

depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law . . . in that federal law

is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded . . . claims.

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of

State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983)).

In a case of original federal question jurisdiction in which the plaintiff is invoking the

jurisdiction of the federal court, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction in the first

instance. Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 507-08 (5th Cir. 1985). “[T]he plaintiff

must be held to the jurisdictional consequences of a voluntary abandonment of claims that would

otherwise provide federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 508. “Our conclusion that [courts] must look to the

amended complaint in assessing original federal question jurisdiction is consistent with the general

rule that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original. . .” Id.

Benjamin has expressly acknowledged that, “after careful consideration of the applicable

law and the facts of the case,” her Title VII claims should be dismissed. The Court has found that

a second amendment is futile and would fail to serve to confer federal question jurisdiction. Given

the absence of a viable federal claim, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.

Thus, dismissal is appropriate under 12(b)(1).

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. #52] be GRANTED to the extent Brown seeks for this Court to

dismiss this suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Benjamin’s remaining state law claims be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.5

IV. Costs and Attorney’s Fees

KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, and Hinds request “all costs and attorney’s fees incurred in

defending this litigation assessed against plaintiff.” [doc. #21, p. 2]. Additionally, Brown requests

that this Court grant “judgment herein in his favor after due and deliberate proceedings had, with

all costs and attorney’s fees incurred in defending this litigation [assessed] against Plaintiff.” [doc.

#24, p. 2]; [doc. #52, p. 2]. In Benjamin’s oppositions to the motions filed by KLLM Transport,

KLLM Driving, Hinds, and Brown, she does not make any arguments regarding the costs and

attorney’s fees. [doc. #32, 57].

(1) Costs

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “costs—other than

attorney’s fees—should be allowed.” FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d)(1) contains a strong

presumption that the prevailing party will be awarded costs. Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125,

131 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit has held that the prevailing party is prima facie entitled to

costs. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation and internal quotation

marks omitted). A court “may neither deny nor reduce a prevailing party’s request for costs without

first articulating some good reason for doing so.” Schwarz, 767 F.2d at 131 (quoted source and

quotation marks omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 1919 states that “[w]henever any action or suit is dismissed

5 When, as recommended here, all claims which confer federal subject matter jurisdiction are

dismissed, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639

(2009) (“A district court’s decision whether to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing

every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”).

in any district court, the Court of International Trade, or the Court of Federal Claims for want of

jurisdiction, such court may order the payment of just costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1919.

The Court finds that, as the prevailing parties in part due to the dismissal of the Title VII

claims and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1919 after the finding that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, Hinds, and Brown are entitled to an award of costs.

However, the Court limits the costs to those permitted under Rule 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920.6

KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, Hinds, and Brown must file a bill of costs pertaining to the

litigation of this matter within fifteen days of the judgment being filed.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim [doc. #21] and the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [doc. #24]

be GRANTED to the extent they seek costs pertaining to the litigation of this matter.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. #52] be GRANTED to the extent Brown seeks costs pertaining

to the litigation of this matter.

6 “A judge . . . may tax as costs the following: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed

or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and

disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making

copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket

fees under section 1923 of this title; [and] (6) Compensation of court appointed experts,

compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation

services under section 1828 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

(2) Attorneys’ Fees

“Attorneys’ fees may be appropriate under an independent statutory authority for an

award.” W. Falcon, Inc. v. Moore Rod & Pipe, LLC, No. CIV.A. H-13-2963, 2015 WL 3823629,

at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2015) (citation omitted). Congress has authorized the award of attorney’s

fees to the “prevailing party” in numerous statues, such as the one present in this case, Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k). See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal

Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 413-14 (1978). While a prevailing Title VII plaintiff

ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances, the Supreme Court has

set out a much more rigorous standard for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants. Id.

at 422-23. “A prevailing defendant may recover its attorney’s fees only where it establishes that

the plaintiff’s actions were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though the action

was not brought in subjective bad faith.” Pisharodi v. Valley Baptist Med. Ctr., 393 F. Supp. 2d

561, 577-78 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (citation omitted).

First, the Court notes that KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, Hinds, and Brown have not

cited any authority establishing that they are entitled to attorney’s fees. Instead, they merely

requested that this Court grant judgment in their favor with all costs and attorney’s fees incurred

in defending this litigation assessed against Benjamin. Further, they have failed to demonstrate to

this Court that Benjamin’s claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. The mere fact that

the Court ruled in favor of them does not, by itself, establish that Benjamin’s claims lacked merit.

A claim is not considered frivolous simply because it was unsuccessful; rather, it must be so lacking

in arguable merit as to be entirely baseless. Here, KLLM Transport, KLLM Driving, Hinds, and

Brown have not provided any argument or evidence showing that Benjamin’s claims met this high

standard. Without such a showing, there is no basis for awarding attorney’s fees.

Accordingly,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim [doc. #21] and the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [doc. #24]

be DENIED to the extent they seek attorney’s fees pertaining to the litigation of this motion.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. #52] be DENIED to the extent Brown seeks attorney’s fees

pertaining to the litigation of this motion.

Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File Second Amended and Re-Stated

Complaint [doc. #38] filed by Plaintiff Craiven Benjamin is DENIED. 7

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration [doc. #21] filed

by Defendants KLLM Transport Services, LLC, KLLM Driving Academy, Inc., and Hinds

Community College and the Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration [doc. #24] filed by Defendant

Dentavious L. Brown are DENIED AS MOOT.

7 Although the undersigned has ruled on Benjamin’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended

and Re-Stated Complaint and Defendants KLLM Driving, KLLM Transport, Hinds, and Brown’s

Motions to Stay Pending Arbitration within a Report and Recommendation and Memorandum

Order, these motions are not excepted in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and not dispositive of any claim

on the merits within the meaning of Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore,

these orders issue of the date of this Report and Recommendation and Memorandum Order. Any

objection/appeal must be made to the district judge in accordance with Rule 72(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure within fourteen (14) days of this date.

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim [doc. #21] filed by Defendants KLLM Transport Services, LLC, KLLM Driving Academy,

Inc., and Hinds Community College and the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State

a Claim [doc. #24] filed by Defendant Dentavious L. Brown be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction [doc. #52] filed by Defendant Dentavious L. Brown be GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Craiven L. Benjamin’s Title VII

claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Craiven L. Benjamin’s remaining

state law claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the parties have

fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written

objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A courtesy copy of any objection or

response or request for extension of time shall be furnished to the District Judge at the time of

filing. Timely objections will be considered by the District Judge before he makes a final ruling.

A PARTY’S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS

REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICE SHALL

BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR, FROM

ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL FINDINGS

AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

In Chambers, at Monroe, Louisiana, on this 30 day of July, 2025.

} =" / 0

Ub Ky Me ( WS AL

KAYL:) DYE MCELUSKY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

26