Beatty v. Gardner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KYLE BEATTY, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:23-CV-364

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Neary)

:

v. :

:

CLINTON GARDNER and CALVIN :

IRVIN, :

:

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Law enforcement officers have two key responsibilities. The first is to protect

and defend the communities they serve from those who are alleged to have

offended the law. And the second is to respect the legal protections afforded to

these alleged offenders while the officers engage in their law enforcement duties.

This case concerns the latter responsibility.

Plaintiff Kyle Beatty alleges seven constitutional and state law claims against

defendants Officer Clinton Gardner and Detective Calvin Irvin resulting from the

parties’ interactions at a Williamsport gas station in August 2021. (Doc. 1).

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims. (Docs. 22, 26). The

court will grant these motions insofar as they relate to Beatty’s federal claims,

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, and dismiss

those state law claims without prejudice.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History1

At issue here is whether Officer Gardner and Detective Irvin violated

Beatty’s constitutional rights and state tort law during the parties’ encounter on

August 31, 2021. That day, police saw Beatty and his girlfriend, Anaise Lopez,

running errands in downtown Williamsport, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 25 ¶ 5). Beatty

stopped at a Turkey Hill gas station to fuel up on gas and purchase food and drink;

a police vehicle then parked near Lopez’s Nissan Altima that Beatty had been

driving. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 9-11). It is undisputed the police did not stop the vehicle. (Id. ¶

10). Beatty and Lopez exited the Altima and went inside the gas station, leaving the

driver’s side window down. (Id. ¶ 12). Officer Gardner then walked over to the

vehicle, looked inside the open window with a flashlight, and signaled for Detective

Irvin to come to the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 15; Doc. 31-2 (“Detective Irvin 1”) at 0:00:00-

0:00:26).

What happened next is disputed by the parties. Defendants claim Officer

Gardner “immediately detected the odor of marijuana coming from the Vehicle”

and “observed a marijuana joint and marijuana flakes inside the vehicle,” as did

1 Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise

statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving

party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. PA. L.R. 56.1. A party

opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of material

facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party’s

statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise noted, the

factual background herein derives from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements of

material facts. (See Docs. 25, 27, 31, 35). To the extent the parties’ statements are

undisputed or supported by uncontroverted record evidence, the court cites

directly to the statements of material facts.

Detective Irvin (Doc. 25 ¶¶ 16-18; Doc. 25-3 (“Detective Irvin Dep.”) at 12:1-5, 14:3-6;

Doc. 25-5 (“Officer Gardner Dep.”) at 13:18-14:21). Beatty denies the presence of

marijuana or any “drugs or residue within the vehicle.” (Doc. 31 ¶¶ 16). Officer

Tyson Minier, who also was on the scene but is not a named defendant, testified

that while he recalls Officer Gardner telling him that there was marijuana in the

vehicle, he did not remember whether he saw any marijuana when he looked into

the vehicle. (Doc. 31-8 at 9:15-23).

Turning back to what the record clearly reflects, Lopez exited the gas station

and approached the defendants, inquiring about what was happening. (Doc. 27 ¶

25g-h). Officer Gardner told Detective Irvin to “stay with her,” and thereafter

entered the gas station and patted Beatty down while Detective Irvin remained

outside with Lopez. (Doc. 25 ¶ 21; Doc. 31-2 (“Officer Gardner 1”) at 0:00:38-0:00:50).

Before Officer Gardner searched Beatty, Beatty stated “Do you want to search me?

Go ahead.” (Officer Gardner 1 at 0:00:54-0:00:56). Officer Gardner escorted Beatty to

the vehicle while telling Beatty to “come out and chat” and that he “just want[s] to

talk about the roach and the weed in [Beatty’s] car.” (Officer Gardner 1 at 0:00:58-

0:01:12). Meanwhile, Detective Irvin informed Lopez she was under investigation

due to marijuana in the vehicle and she needed to walk to, and remain outside of,

the car with Detective Irvin. (Doc. 27 ¶ 25h-i; Detective Irvin 1 at 0:00:40-0:01:20).

Once Officer Gardner returned with Beatty and rejoined Detective Irvin and

Lopez around the Altima, Lopez stated there was no marijuana in the vehicle, and

Officer Gardner responded there was a “roach in the cupholder” and “scraps of bud

on the driver’s floor.” (Officer Gardner 1 at 0:01:24-0:01:34). Officer Gardner

instructed Beatty and Lopez that they could either consent to Officer Gardner

searching the vehicle or Officer Gardner would tow the vehicle and apply for a

search warrant. (Doc. 27 ¶ 25n). Beatty responded to Officer Gardner with “you can

search it right now,” and Lopez added “there’s literally nothing in it.” (Doc. 27 ¶

25o). Before either defendant initiated a search of the vehicle, defendants asked

Beatty and Lopez if they had any identification. (Officer Gardner 1 at 0:02:08-

0:02:11). Detective Irvin then asked Beatty for his name, Beatty replied with “I’m

not under arrest” and told Lopez not to let defendants search the vehicle, an

instruction with which Lopez complied. (Id. at 0:02:12-0:02:18; Doc. 25 ¶ 24).

After Lopez revoked her consent, Officer Gardner proceeded to place Beatty

in handcuffs with Detective Irvin’s help, and defendants similarly restrained Lopez.

(Detective Irvin 1 at 0:02:16-0:02:36). Officer Gardner claims there was “escalation in

their demeanor . . . [s]o ultimately they were handcuffed” and that Beatty was

antagonizing Lopez. (Officer Gardner Dep. at 19:13-20:8). Defendants told Lopez to

stop as Lopez repeatedly and increasingly in volume requested a female officer, and

defendants pressed Beatty’s chest to have him sit on the hood of the vehicle.

(Officer Gardner 1 at 0:02:48-0:03:40). Beatty said to defendants, “You’re real

tough;” Detective Irvin turned Beatty around, placed him face-down on the hood of

Lopez’s vehicle, and searched his pockets. (Id. at 0:03:40-0:04:00). Detective Irvin did

not find any contraband on Beatty in this search. (Detective Irvin Dep. at 19:16-17).

After removing a phone and wallet from Beatty’s pockets and while Lopez

continued speaking loudly to Officer Gardner, Detective Irvin quietly conversed

with Beatty about the marijuana and Beatty assured him that he could convince

Lopez to agree to a search of her vehicle. (Detective Irvin 1 at 0:03:51-0:04:08; Doc.

27 ¶ 25x). Lopez admitted that there was a marijuana roach from two days before in

the car. (Gardner 1 at 0:04:24-0:04:37). Detective Irvin escorted Beatty to the

backseat of the squad car and the two spoke as Detective Irvin stood outside the

open back door, where Beatty provided his first and last name and discussed

Lopez’s behavior. (Detective Irvin 1 at 0:04:18-0:06:00; Doc. 27 ¶ 25z). Defendants

cannot pinpoint at what point in time backup assistance was called, but

Williamsport City Officer Zachary Geary arrived while Beatty and Detective Irvin

were talking at the squad car and assisted Officer Gardner with escorting Lopez

and placing her inside the backseat of another squad car. (Officer Gardner Dep. at

22:24-24:12; Officer Gardner 1 at 0:05:06-0:05:42).

Officer Gardner returned to inform Beatty that Lopez was under arrest for

aggravated assault; Beatty maintained that he and Lopez did not do anything to

warrant these events, and Detective Irvin replied that “with the marijuana and the

smell and the actual roach in the car, there was an investigation” during which

Beatty vehemently objected. (Detective Irvin 1 at 0:06:02-0:06:37). Williamsport City

Officer Tyson Minier arrived at the scene and defendants gave him their summary

of the situation at hand, as well as pointed him to look in Lopez’s vehicle through

the window. (Doc. 27 ¶ 25jj; Doc. 31-2 (“Officer Gardner 2”) at 0:00:34-0:01:11).

Officer Gardner opened the squad car door to Beatty, still handcuffed in the

backseat, and asked for his name. (Doc. 27 ¶ 25mm). Beatty did not offer his name to

Officer Gardner, reasoning defendants already possessed his identification, and

Officer Gardner told Beatty, “I’ll arraign you as a John Doe. Until you decide to give

the court your name, you can sit in jail.” (Id. ¶ 25nn-oo, rr). Detective Irvin retrieved

Beatty’s driver’s license from his wallet, ran Beatty’s name and date of birth on

radio, discovered that Beatty’s license is subject to ignition interlock restrictions,

and noted to Officer Gardner there is no ignition interlock in Lopez’s vehicle. (Id. ¶

25uu-ww). Defendants returned to the squad car to discuss the incident and to

inform Beatty they would take him to City Hall once a tow arrived for Lopez’s

vehicle, when Beatty explained that he is from Pennsylvania, but Lopez is from

Boston, Massachusetts and drove to Williamsport from there; he had warned her of

the difference in legality and treatment of marijuana between the two states. (Id. ¶

25xx-yy).

Officer Gardner drove Detective Irvin and Beatty from Turkey Hill to City

Hall and Detective Irvin brought Beatty into an interview room. (Doc. 27 ¶ 26;

Detective Irvin 2 at 0:00:00-0:00:15). Beatty and Detective Irvin remained in the

interview room together making casual conversation for approximately twelve

minutes before Officer Gardner joined, bearing latex gloves, and Detective Irvin

shut his bodycam off. (Id. at 0:00:15-0:12:30). Beatty was then strip-searched, which

he claims was without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and performed in

retaliation against protected speech activity. (Doc. 25 ¶ 42; Doc. 31 ¶ 43). Officer

Gardner contends the strip search was necessary and was justified by his

experience in the Narcotics Unit. (See Officer Gardner Dep. at 30:2-31:3).

Defendants did not find any contraband on Beatty’s person as a result of this strip

search. (Doc. 25 ¶ 44).

Lopez was later charged in a three-count information of aggravated assault,

simple assault, and harassment in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County.

(Doc. 25-7 at ECF 4). The government filed an amended information charging her

with harassment and disorderly conduct. (Id. at ECF 5). During the bench trial, the

court found “Officer Gardner’s testimony to be credible” and found Lopez guilty of

both offenses. (Doc. 25-12). Beatty was never charged with a criminal offense. (Doc.

25 ¶ 46).

Beatty sued Officer Gardner and Detective Irvin, raising the same seven

claims in his complaint against both defendants. (Doc. 1 at 5-9). Four arise under 42

U.S.C. § 1983: (1) unreasonable arrest, (2) unreasonable stop, (3) unreasonable

search, and (4) First Amendment retaliation. (Id. at 5-7). The remaining are

Pennsylvania state law tort claims: (1) false arrest/false imprisonment, (2) battery,

and (3) assault. (Id. at 8-9). Discovery has completed, and both defendants have

moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 22, 26). These motions are fully briefed and

are ripe for disposition. (Docs. 23, 30, 32, 34, 36, 40).

II. Legal Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary

judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is material if resolution of it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law” and genuine “if the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Mall

Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622, 631 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When considering a

motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (citing

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). The court’s duty is not “to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242-43.

There are “two closely related methods for a movant to succeed at summary

judgment.” Mall Chevrolet, 99 F.4th at 630. “First, under the standard approach, the

moving party may produce material facts, established as genuinely undisputed, that

entitle it to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). “Second,

under the Celotex approach, a moving party may instead demonstrate that the

nonmoving party has not made ‘a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

The nonmoving party can defeat a motion for summary judgment by

producing evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 256. The nonmoving party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his

pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id. The party “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 252. Moreover, if the nonmovant’s version of disputed facts is “blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

III. Discussion

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. First, they contend

Lopez’s state conviction stemming from the parties’ encounter bars judgment

against them in Beatty’s civil case under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). On

the merits, defendants maintain they had probable cause to stop, search, and arrest

Beatty, which negates his constitutional and state law tort claims. In the alternative,

they contend qualified immunity shields them from judgment on the constitutional

claims, and the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”)

immunizes them on the state law claims.

A. The Heck Doctrine Does Not Apply

As a threshold matter, defendants claim Heck precludes all of Beatty’s

claims. (Doc. 23 at 2 n.1; Doc. 30 at 19-21). Since Lopez was convicted of criminal

offenses stemming from the Turkey Hill incident and because the judge in those

proceedings found Officer Gardner’s testimony regarding observing marijuana to

be credible, defendants contend that allowing the jury to make an adverse

credibility determination would upset Lopez’s state court conviction. Id. Not so.

Heck concerned a state prisoner challenging the constitutionality of his

conviction in a Section 1983 action. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478. The prisoner alleged,

among other things, law enforcement had “knowingly destroyed evidence which

was exculpatory in nature and could have proved [petitioner’s] innocence[.]” Id. at

479 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court held where “a

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at

487. Conversely, if “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action

should be allowed to proceed[.]” Id. (emphasis in original).

Beatty’s claims are not barred by Heck. He was not charged with, let alone

convicted of, any offense stemming from the Turkey Hill incident. (Doc. 25 ¶ 36).

And so, the state court judge made no findings regarding Officer Gardner’s

credibility with respect to Beatty. Heck stands for the proposition that persons

cannot bring civil rights actions which would invalidate their criminal convictions,

not convictions of others. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (prohibiting civil rights claim which

would invalidate “any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff”)

(emphasis added). Perhaps Lopez would be precluded from bringing claims against

Officer Gardner and Detective Irvin under Heck, but Beatty is not.

B. Probable Cause Existed, So Beatty’s Constitutional Claims Fail

Section 1983 prohibits state and local officials, acting under color of law, from

depriving persons “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Supreme Court has observed,

this statute “creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for

deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.

808, 816 (1985). Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to establish a claim under Section 1983

“must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of

the United States [and] that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person

acting under color of state law.” Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993).

Beatty’s constitutional claims—unreasonable arrest, unreasonable stop,

unreasonable search, and First Amendment retaliation—all hinge on whether

defendants had probable cause or reasonable suspicion. As discussed below, the

totality of the circumstances demonstrates beyond dispute that they did with

respect to the arrest, stop, and two of the search claims, so these claims do not

survive summary judgment, nor does the retaliation claim relating to these

underlying claims. While the third search—Beatty’s strip search—was not clearly

supported by reasonable suspicion, qualified immunity shields defendants from

judgment on this claim and the resultant retaliation claim. Thus, none of these

claims survive summary judgment.

1. Unreasonable Arrest

A plaintiff asserting an unreasonable arrest claim “must establish ‘(1) that

there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.’”

Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting James v. City of

Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012)). Such a claim “will necessarily fail if

probable cause existed for any one of the crimes charged against the arrestee[.]”

Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477 (3d Cir. 2016).

“Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person committed

the crime at issue.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (quotation

marks and citation omitted). Law enforcement have probable cause to arrest an

individual “when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s

knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe

that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”

Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). This determination

requires officers to “consider plainly exculpatory evidence in addition to

inculpatory evidence . . . ‘even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing by

itself) suggests that probable cause exists.’” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200 (quoting

Wilson, 212 F.3d at 790).

Courts evaluating probable cause at the summary judgment stage “must

assess probable cause based upon the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ available to the

arresting officer and view those circumstances in the light most favorable to” the

plaintiff. Id. (citing Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467-68). This requires comparing “whether

the plainly exculpatory evidence available to the arresting officer” carries more

weight than the probable cause that otherwise exists. Id. Because an assessment of

probable cause is “necessarily fact-intensive,” the factfinder at trial, rather than a

judge at summary judgment, typically resolves this question. Dempsey, 834 F.3d at

468; see also Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998) (remarking

“the question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury.”).

But summary judgment is appropriate where “a reasonable jury could not find a

lack of probable cause” for the plaintiff’s arrest. Id.

The parties dispute only whether probable cause existed for Beatty’s arrest,

not whether such arrest occurred. (Doc. 25 ¶ 30; Doc. 27 ¶ 25ii; Doc. 31 ¶ 25). Beatty

was never charged with committing any crimes. (Doc. 25 ¶ 46). Officer Gardner and

Detective Irvin contend, however, that Officer Gardner’s detection of a marijuana

joint and flakes in the vehicle, coupled with the fact that the surrounding area was

known for drug activity, established probable cause. (Docs. 23 at 7-9; 30 at 7-8).

Beatty disputes both that he drove in a high narcotics trafficking area and that

there was marijuana in the vehicle. (Doc. 31 ¶¶ 7, 16).

The record demonstrates defendants had probable cause to arrest Beatty.

While footage from his body-worn camera is inconclusive, Officer Gardner provided

uncontroverted testimony that he saw a marijuana roach and marijuana flakes in

the vehicle. (Officer Gardner Dep. at 13:18-14:21). It is irrelevant that Beatty claims

there was nothing illegal in the vehicle since he was not present and has offered no

evidence whatsoever to counter Officer Gardner’s eyewitness account. In fact,

Officer Gardner’s observations were bolstered by Lopez’s later admission that there

was a marijuana roach in the car. (Gardner 1 at 0:04:24-0:04:37).

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, the marijuana was medicinal in

nature, it is illegal to possess medical marijuana in Pennsylvania in “dry leaf or

plant form.” 35 P.S. § 10231.303(b)(3); id. § 10231.304(b)(1) (“It is unlawful to . . .

[s]moke medical marijuana.”). Therefore, viewing the record in the light most

favorable to Beatty, the totality of the circumstances makes evident there was a

“fair probability” marijuana was in the vehicle. Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200; Wilson,

212 F.3d at 789. And because there was, defendants had probable cause to arrest

Beatty. Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483.

2. Unreasonable Stop

Beatty claims defendants unreasonably stopped him “in the complete

absence of reasonable suspicion to believe that he was engaged in criminal conduct

or was armed and dangerous.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 40). Defendants maintain they had

reasonable suspicion to stop Beatty for the same reasons they had probable cause to

arrest him: among other things, Officer Gardner’s observation of a marijuana joint

and flakes in the vehicle, the fact that the surrounding area was known for drug

activity, and Beatty’s “not making eye contact and appearing unusually vigilant.”

(Docs. 23 at 7-9; 30 at 7-8).

Unreasonable stops offend the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jackson,

120 F.4th 1210, 1218 (3d Cir. 2024); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). An officer may

conduct a stop after obtaining a warrant, or he may conduct a brief, investigatory

stop absent a warrant if he has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal

activity. Jackson, 120 F.4th at 1218; Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). The

reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop is less than probable cause but

requires an officer “to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized

suspicion or hunch’ of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24 (quoting

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).

The legality of Terry stop is a two-part inquiry. Jackson, 120 F.4th at 1218. At

step one, courts consider if the stop was “justified at its inception—that is, whether

the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion at the outset.” United States v.

Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 452 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Next, courts must determine “whether the manner in which the stop was

conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place.” Id. at 451, 452 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

Since they had probable cause to arrest Beatty, defendants necessarily bore a

reasonable suspicion to stop him inside the Turkey Hill. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-

24. Beatty challenges the justification for this stop; he disputes whether he was

driving in a high-crime area, avoiding eye contact with the officers, and the

presence of marijuana in the vehicle. (Doc. 31 ¶¶ 6, 7, 16). True, merely driving in a

high crime area alone does not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[I]t was not merely respondent’s presence in an area

of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his

unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.”). But, as noted above, Officer Gardner

believed he saw marijuana in the vehicle and the forms of the marijuana—a joint

and marijuana flakes—are prohibited by Pennsylvania law. (Officer Gardner Dep.

at 13:18-14:21); 35 P.S. § 10231.303(b)(3); id. § 10231.304(b)(1). Therefore, as Officer

Gardner bore a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the

stop, defendants did not violate Beatty’s Fourth Amendment rights in effectuating

it.

3. Unreasonable Search

Beatty alleges Officer Gardner and Detective Irvin unreasonably searched

him three times: (1) inside the Turkey Hill store; (2) on the hood of the vehicle; and

(3) during the strip search conducted at the police station. (Doc. 1 ¶ 43).

Just like unreasonable stops, unreasonable searches violate the Fourth

Amendment. United States v. Williams, 898 F.3d 323, 329 (3d Cir. 2018); Horton v.

California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). Courts assessing the reasonableness of a search

“have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests

against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Maryland v. Buie, 494

U.S. 325, 331 (1990). For example, a search incident to arrest is permissible “when,

under all the circumstances, there remains a reasonable possibility that the arrestee

could access a weapon or destructible evidence in the container or area being

searched.” United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2010).

As to the first search inside the Turkey Hill store, Beatty maintains he did not

consent to a search, but that is “blatantly contradicted by the record.” Scott, 550

U.S. at 380. Bodycam footage depicts Beatty stating “Do you want to search me? Go

ahead.” (Officer Gardner 1 at 0:00:54-0:00:56). His consent thus negates this

unreasonable search claim. Williams, 898 F.3d at 329; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (noting the validity of “a search that is conducted pursuant

to consent.”); Florida. v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (assessing consent to a

search under an objective reasonableness standard). Therefore, defendants are

granted summary judgment as to this first unreasonable search claim.

The second search, on the hood of the vehicle after Beatty was arrested, also

was permissible. It is axiomatic “that a search incident to a warrantless arrest is

valid if the arrest itself is valid.” United States v. Brown, 33 F. App’x 606, 608 (3d

Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Kithcart, 134 F.3d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 1998)); see also

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (“The constitutional validity of the search . . .

must depend on the constitutional validity of the . . . arrest.”). Beatty’s arrest was

lawful as it was supported by probable cause, and thus the search incident to his

arrest also was lawful.

Conversely, Beatty’s strip search at the police station was arguably unlawful.

“Undergoing such an inspection is undoubtedly humiliating and deeply offensive.”

Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 341

(2012) (Alito, J., concurring); see also Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir.

1994) (“[O]ne of the clearest forms of degradation in Western Society is to strip a

person of his clothes. The right to be free from strip searches and degrading body

inspections is thus basic to the concept of privacy.”). Precisely due to its

invasiveness, a strip search must be supported by “reasonable suspicion of

concealment of weapons or contraband.” United States v. Parker, 458 F. Supp. 3d

260, 265 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (observing that neither the Supreme Court nor the Third

Circuit have not directly addressed non-institutional strip searches and collecting

cases from courts which have established this standard). “Reasonable suspicion

could arise from the offense of arrest itself or from the particularized facts and

circumstances known to the arresting officer.” Id.

The record does not clearly demonstrate defendants bore such reasonable

suspicion. For one, they already searched Beatty twice—once inside the Turkey Hill

and another incident to his arrest—before they strip-searched him, neither of which

uncovered weapons or contraband. (Officer Gardner 1 at 0:00:38-0:00:50); (Id. at

0:03:40-0:04:00); (Detective Irvin Dep. at 19:16-17). Second, by this point, defendants

were aware both that the vehicle was owned by Lopez and that Lopez admitted the

marijuana in the vehicle was hers as well. (Doc. 25 ¶¶ 1-2); (Gardner 1 at 0:04:24-

0:04:37). Defendants merely support their decision to strip search Beatty with their

past experience, rather than “particularized facts and circumstances” to Beatty

which would bear a reasonable suspicion that he, rather than Lopez, had illicit

materials on his person. Parker, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 265.

But while defendants may have violated Beatty’s rights by subjecting him to

a strip search, they are insulated from judgment by qualified immunity. This

doctrine shields officers from Section 1983 liability unless they violate a right that

was clearly established at the time the events transpired. Urda v. Sokso, No. 24-

1804, __ F.4th __, 2025 WL 2046175, at *1 (3d Cir. July 22, 2025). Qualified immunity

“protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79

(2017)).

Beatty does not cite to caselaw clearly establishing that law enforcement, in

the non-institutional setting, may not strip search an individual without reasonable

suspicion of weapons and contraband. That is unsurprising, as this court previously

observed neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit directly addressed the

constitutional standards governing non-institutional strip searches. Parker, 458 F.

Supp. 3d at 265. Because this right was not clearly established when defendants

conducted the strip search, they are shielded from judgment for doing so by

qualified immunity and will be granted summary judgment on this claim.

4. First Amendment Retaliation

Beatty’s final constitutional claim is for First Amendment retaliation. He

alleges defendants “retaliated against him for engaging in . . . protected activity by

following him, harassing him, holding him against his will, laying hands on him

multiple times, handcuffing, detaining, arresting, and searching him three separate

times all in the complete absence of probable cause and reasonable suspicion.”

(Doc. 1 ¶ 46). The protected speech, according to Beatty, was his refusal to provide

defendants with his identification and his instruction to Lopez to withdraw her

consent to search the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18).

The government generally may not retaliate against a person for engaging in

constitutionally protected speech. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) (citing

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). A person whose First Amendment

rights are violated in such fashion may seek judicial relief. Id. But to do so, the

“plaintiff must establish a ‘causal connection’ between the government defendant's

‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff's ‘subsequent injury.’” Id. (quoting Hartman,

547 U.S. at 259). The animus must be the but-for cause of the First Amendment

violation. Id.

This analysis turns on whether probable cause existed for the plaintiff’s

arrest. Id. at 404. If it did, “a retaliatory arrest claim fails.” Id. As noted above,

defendants had probable cause to arrest Beatty. Therefore, this claim cannot

survive summary judgment. Id. Nor can Beatty demonstrate a causal connection

between his stop, search in the Turkey Hill, and search incident to his arrest with

purported retaliatory animus because those actions also were lawful. Therefore, his

First Amendment retaliation claim on these grounds fail, too.

Conversely, whether defendants’ decision to strip-search Beatty was lawful is

not clearly supported by the record. But even assuming it was not, and that Beatty

could demonstrate a causal connection between his speech and his strip search, his

retaliation claim still would be barred by qualified immunity. Put simply, if binding

caselaw does not clearly establish the constitutional standard for engaging in a non-

institutional strip search, then caselaw also does not clearly establish the right to be

free from retaliation relating to such a strip search. Therefore, the court will grant

summary judgment to defendants on this claim.

C. The Court Declines To Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over

Beatty’s State Law Claims

In addition to his federal constitutional claims, Beatty also alleges false

arrest, assault, and battery claims under state law. Having granted defendants

summary judgment on all federal claims, this court has the discretion to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Beatty’s state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The

court will decline to exercise its discretion to resolve these claims because doing so

is not unfair to the parties and does not unduly hinder judicial economy. Hedges v.

Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“where the claim over which the district

court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must

decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial

economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative

justification for doing so.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Borough of West Mifflin

v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Reiner v. Northumberland

Cnty., 734 F. Supp. 3d 379, 390 (M.D. Pa. 2024) (declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction where all federal claims had been dismissed); Vorobyev v. Wolfe, 638 F.

Supp. 3d 410, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2022) (same). Therefore, Beatty’s state law claims will be

dismissed without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Beatty’s claims. (Docs. 22,

26). The court will grant these motions as they relate to Beatty’s federal

constitutional claims. The court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Beatty’s state law claims and will dismiss these claims without prejudice. An

appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ KELI M. NEARY

Keli M. Neary

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: August 29, 2025