Restrepo v. New Phase Electrical Contractors, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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HUMBERTO RESTREPO,

Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

- against - 25-CV-0321 (PKC) (MMH)

NEW PHASE ELECTRICAL

CONTRACTORS, INC.,

Respondent.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Petitioner Humberto Restrepo (“Petitioner”), as Chairman of the Joint Industry Board of

the Electrical Industry (the “JIB”), filed his Petition in this district on January 1, 2025, seeking to

confirm an arbitration award rendered pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between

Local Union #3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the “Union”) and New

Phase Electrical Contractors, Inc. (“Respondent”). (Pet., Dkt. 1, at 1.) On April 23, 2025, after

Respondent failed to appear or otherwise defend this action, Petitioner requested that his Petition

be deemed as an unopposed motion for summary judgment. (Pet’r’s Ltr., Dkt. 11.) On

June 20, 2025, the Court granted Petitioner’s request and converted his Petition to a motion for

summary judgment (“Motion”). (See 6/20/2025 Dkt. Order.) For the reasons set forth below, the

Court now grants summary judgment in favor of Petitioner.

BACKGROUND1

I. The JIB and Employment Benefit Plans

The JIB is the administrator of various multiemployer employee benefit plans established

and maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Union, certain employer

associations, and independent or unaffiliated employers in the electrical and other related

industries, including Respondent. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 4, 16.) The JIB is the administrator and

fiduciary of applicable employee benefit plans (“ERISA Plans”) within the meaning of

§§ 3(16)(A)(i) and 3(21)(A) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)2,

codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)(A)(i) and 1002(21)(A).3 (Id. ¶ 5; see Finkel v. Firequench,

Inc., No. 23-CV-4868 (EK) (JAM), 2024 WL 320870, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2024), R&R

adopted as modified, No. 23-CV-4868 (EK) (JAM), 2024 WL 4249224 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2024);

29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (West).

1 The following facts are taken from the Petition and exhibits thereto and presumed true,

given Respondent’s failure to respond. Trs. of the Ne. Carpenters Health, Pension, Annuity,

Apprenticeship, & Lab.-Mgmt. Coop. Funds v. Countrywide Home Improvement, Inc.,

No. 17-CV-2570 (DRH) (ARL), 2017 WL 5690922, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2017).

2 These include the Pension, Hospitalization and Benefit Plan of the Electrical Industry,

the Dental Benefit Fund of the Electrical Industry, the Educational and Cultural Trust Fund of the

Electrical Industry, the Annuity Plan of the Electrical Industry, the Health Reimbursement

Account Plan of the Electrical Industry, the Deferred Salary Plan of the Electrical Industry (the

“DSP”), the Joint Apprenticeship and Training Program, and the National Electrical Benefit Plan.

(Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 5.) Each plan is an employee benefit plan within the meaning of § 3(3) of ERISA,

codified as 29 U.S.C. 1002(3), and a multi-employer plan within the meaning of § 3(37) of ERISA,

codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37). (Id. ¶ 7); see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (West).

3 Each of the ERISA Plans is also jointly administered by a board of trustees that is

comprised of labor and management representatives who share equal representation in the

administration of the ERISA Plans in accordance with Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management

Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 7.)

As administrator and fiduciary, the JIB undertakes several roles. First, it receives a weekly

remittance consisting of contributions to each of the ERISA Plans4 (“JIB Contributions”) directly

from each signatory employer and a Union assessment collected by the signatory employer from

each Union member employed (the “Union Assessment”).5 (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 6.) The JIB also retains

a third-party record-keeper and investment manager Empower, who receives employee-elective

contributions (“Employee Contributions”) and employer contributions (“Employer

Contributions”) (collectively, “DSP Contributions”) remitted by the signatory employers, allocates

these remittances to the relevant individual accounts, and enables individuals to then “direct the

investment of their DSP Contributions from among various investment alternatives selected by the

JIB in conjunction with Empower.” (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.) Finally, the JIB may collect employee loan

payments due to the Union, payments against loans made from benefits plans, and contributions

to fund the operations of the JIB via employee deductions from their paychecks. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.)

II. The Collective Bargaining Agreement

The Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the New York Electrical

Contractors’ Association, Inc. and the Association of Electrical Contractors, Inc. (collectively, the

“Associations”) covering the period of April 10, 2019 through April 13, 2022 (the “2019-2022

CBA”). (Id. ¶ 17.) The 2019-2022 CBA states that it “shall remain in effect until April 13, 2022

at 4:00 P.M., unless otherwise provided in this Agreement. It shall continue in effect from year to

year thereafter, provided, however, any party hereto may terminate this Agreement on

April 13, 2022, and any time thereafter by giving the other party at least ninety (90) days’ notice

in writing of modification or termination prior to April 13th of such year.” (Id. ¶ 19 (quoting

4 Except for the DSP. (Id. ¶ 6.)

5 The JIB acts as a mere collection agent with respect to the Union Assessment. (Id.)

Agreement and Working Rules, Dkt. 1-2, at 99).) On May 11, 2022, the Union and the

Associations extended the 2019-2022 CBA until April 9, 2025. (Id. ¶ 18; see Mem. of Agreement

(“MoA”), Dkt. 1-3, at 1 (setting new contracting term until April 9, 2025 (the “2022-2025 CBA,”

together with the 2019-2022 CBA, the “CBA”)).) On December 19, 2023, Respondent assented

to “be bound by all of the provisions of the [CBA] and working rules.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 16; Ltr. of

Assent, Dkt. 1-1). To date, neither the Union, the Associations, nor Respondent have provided the

required notice to terminate the CBA, which remains in effect upon all parties including

Respondent. (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 20–21.)

Under the CBA, Respondent is required to make the employee benefit plan payments

discussed supra, including to the ERISA Plans and the Non-ERISA Plans, “for all work within the

trade and geographical jurisdiction of the Union and to submit weekly payroll reports that provide

the name, gross wages, and hours worked for each worker employed by the company on whose

behalf [the relevant contributions] are made.” (Id. ¶ 22 (citing Agreement and Working Rules,

Dkt. 1-2, at 11–18).) If Respondent fails to remit contributions and has not submitted payroll

reports for such unpaid contributions, under the CBA’s Policy for the Collection of Delinquent

Contributions (the “Delinquency Policy”), the JIB may “use a prior week’s payroll report

submitted by the employer to calculate the amount of Contributions due from the employer.” (Pet.,

Dkt. 1, ¶ 27; Delinquency Policy, Dkt. 1-4, at 5.) The Delinquency Policy also holds that “interest

shall be calculated at the rate set forth in Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code.”

(Delinquency Policy, Dkt. 1-4, at 4.) Furthermore, Respondent “shall be liable for the remedies

under Section 502(g)(2) of ERISA, including liquidated damages of [20 percent], in the event of

entry of Judgment against [Respondent] in an action or proceeding to collect delinquent

contributions,” (Agreement and Working Rules, Dkt. 1-2, at 21), as well as “liquidated damages

and attorneys’ fees and costs if legal action is commenced,” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 29; Delinquency Policy,

Dkt. 1-4, at 4). Finally, under JIB’s Arbitration Procedures and Rules Governing Employer

Delinquency Disputes and Audits (“Arbitration Procedures”), an arbitrator shall have the

jurisdiction to determine any disputes between the “JIB against an Employer, related to the

Employer’s obligation to contribute to the [ERISA Plans], including but not limited to Audits,

Delinquencies, interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Arbitration

Procedures, Dkt. 1-5, at 2.)

III. The Arbitration

After Respondent failed to remit JIB Contributions for four payroll weeks in March 2024

and DSP Contributions for nine payroll weeks between January and March 2024, Petitioner

initiated arbitration before the designated arbitrator, Stephen F. O’Beirne, Esq. (Pet., Dkt. 1,

¶¶ 32–33.) Petitioner noticed said arbitration by mailing a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate with

Statement of Claims by electronic mail to Respondent. (Notice, Dkt. 1-6.) In its written

submission to the arbitration, Petitioner stated that Respondent owed: “(1) JIB Contributions for

payroll weeks ending March 6, 2024 through and including March 27, 2024 of $27,598.64; (2)

DSP Contributions for payroll weeks ending January 24, 2024 through and including

March 27, 2024 of $26,625.90; (3) total interest of $4,598.16; (4) liquidated damages of

$10,844.91; and (5) attorneys’ fees and costs of $2,550.00.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 35; see Arbitration

Mem. of Law, Dkt. 1-7, at 18–19.) Respondent failed to provide any submissions or otherwise

contest Petitioner’s claims. (Id. ¶ 36; Opinion and Award (“Award”), Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 6.)

On October 15, 2024, the arbitrator issued his award (the “Award”), finding “that

Respondent did violate the CBA” and ordering Respondent to pay the award of $72,217.61

consisting of: (1) Required Contributions in the total amount of $54,224.54, (2) interest of

$4,598.16, (3) liquidated damages of $10,844.91, (4) and legal fees and costs of $2,550.00.

(Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 7–8.) The arbitrator also found Respondent liable for Petitioner’s

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ECF 8.) To date, the Award has not been vacated or modified,

and no application for such relief is pending. (Pet., Dkt. 1, at ¶ 41.)

On January 17, 2025, Petitioner filed his Petition seeking confirmation of the Award in all

respects, including $72,217.61 pursuant to the Award; $2,398.20 in attorneys’ fees and costs

arising out of the Petition; and any other relief deemed just and proper. (Id. at 10.) On

April 23, 2025, after Respondent had failed to respond to the Petition, Petitioner requested that the

Petition be deemed an unopposed motion for summary judgment. (Pet’r’s Ltr., Dkt. 11.) On

June 20, 2025, the Court granted Petitioner’s request and converted the Petition to a Motion for

Summary Judgment. (6/20/2025 Dkt. Order.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“A federal court’s review of labor arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed and highly

deferential—indeed, among the most deferential in the law.” A&A Maint. Enter., Inc. v.

Ramnarain, 982 F.3d 864, 868 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting N.Y. City & Vicinity Dist. Council of United

Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Ass’n of Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Indus. of N.Y., Inc.,

826 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 2016)). Where an award is issued pursuant to a collective bargaining

agreement, the Supreme Court has instructed that “[a]s long as the arbitrator’s award draws its

essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely his own brand of industrial

justice, the award is legitimate.” Finkel v. Firequench, Inc., 2024 WL 320870, at *4 (quoting

United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)), R&R adopted

as modified, 2024 WL 4249224 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2024).

Because a petition to confirm a labor arbitration award is typically accompanied by a

record, “courts treat an unanswered petition to confirm an arbitration award ‘as an unopposed

motion for summary judgment.’” Countrywide Home Improvement, 2017 WL 5690922, at *2

(quoting D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2006)). “Although a

summary judgment standard is applied to arbitration confirmation proceedings” and the moving

party must show that it has “met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains

for trial,” Trs. of Ne. Carpenters Health, Pension, Annuity, Apprenticeship, & Lab. Mgmt. Coop.

Funds v. Upstate Interiors, LLC, No. 19-CV-326 (MKB), 2021 WL 2576938, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

June 23, 2021) (citation omitted), confirmation of a labor arbitration award is generally “a

summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment of the

court, and the court must grant the award unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected.”

D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 110 (internal quotations and citations omitted); Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C.

v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 (2008) (“[A] court ‘must’ confirm an arbitration award ‘unless’

it is vacated, modified, or corrected [under 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 or 11].” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9)). The

arbitrator’s rationale need not be explained, and the Court should confirm the award “if a ground

for the arbitrator’s decision can be inferred from the facts of the case.” D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d

at 110 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, only “a barely colorable justification

for the outcome reached” is necessary to confirm the award. Id. (internal quotations and citation

omitted). Accordingly, courts “play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an

arbitrator.” Tully Constr. Co. v. Canam Steel Corp., 684 F. App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary

order) (quoting Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 36).

DISCUSSION

I. Confirmation of the Award

Upon review of the uncontroverted evidence submitted with the Petition, the Court finds

that the record submitted by Petitioner presents no genuine issue of material fact and provides the

requisite “ground[s] for the arbitrator’s decision.” D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 110 (internal quotations

and citations omitted). First, it is clear from the record that Respondent “is bound to [the CBA]

between [the Union] and [the Associations] covering the period April 13, 2022 through

April 9, 2025.” (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 4–5; see Ltr. of Assent, Dkt. 1-1; MoA, Dkt. 1-3.)

Second, it is clear from the record that the CBA “requires employers to submit payroll reports and

benefit contributions to a variety of employee benefit plans administered by the JIB” and governed

by ERISA. (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 5; see Agreement and Working Rules, Dkt. 1-2, at 15–18,

23, 24–25.) Third, it is clear from the record that Respondent failed to meet certain obligations

under the CBA for the periods identified by Respondent. (Award, Dkt. 1-9, ECF 6–7; see

Breakdown of Benefits Owed, Dkt. 1-6, at ECF 25 (showing missed contributions); Payroll

Inquiry, Dkt. 1-7, at ECF 33 (showing missing payroll information).) Finally, it is clear from the

record that, under the Delinquency Policy and Arbitration Procedures, both incorporated into the

CBA by reference, the arbitrator had the authority to hear and decide the underlying dispute

between Petitioner and Respondent, (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 6; see Delinquency Policy, Dkt. 1-4,

at 1–2; Arbitration Procedures, Dkt. 1-5, at ECF 2), and that Respondents were provided notice of

the dispute, (Notice, Dkt. 1-6, at ECF 1). Therefore, the Court finds that the record presents no

genuine issue of material fact and that there is more than “colorable justification” for the Award,

D.H. Blair, 462 F.3d at 110 (internal quotations and citations omitted), which the Court confirms.

II. Prejudgment and Post-Judgment Interest

A. Prejudgment Interest

Under ERISA, “interest on unpaid contributions shall be determined by using the rate

provided under the plan, or, if none, the rate prescribed under section 6621 of Title 26.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 1132(g)(2). Here, the Delinquency Policy provides that interest on unpaid contributions “shall

be calculated at the rate set forth in Section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code.” (Delinquency

Policy, Dkt. 1-4, at 4.) The prejudgment rate under Section 6621 is the sum of the Federal short-

term rate plus three percentage points, to be compounded daily. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6621(a)(2),

6622(a). Petitioner does not request prejudgment interest as relief separate from the confirmation

of the Award, (see Pet., Dkt. 1, at 10), which includes interest on the delinquent contributions,

(Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 7). Accordingly, the Court confirms the Award as-is and declines to

award additional prejudgment interest. See Finkel, 2024 WL 320870 at *5 (recommending no

prejudgment interest separate and apart from the interest that is already included in the award);

Team Air Express, Inc. v. A. Heffco Techs., Inc., No. 06-CV-2742 (NG) (CLP), 2008 WL 4790464,

at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2008) (“[I]t is respectfully recommended that in the absence of a specific

request, plaintiff not be awarded prejudgment interest[.]”), R&R adopted, 2008 WL 4790460

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008).

B. Post-Judgment Interest

Post-judgment interest is “mandatory” in the Second Circuit and should be awarded at the

statutory rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso, 371

F.3d 96, 100–02 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Lewis v. Whelan, 99 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 1996)

(affirming award of post-judgment interest in a confirmation proceeding); Trs. of the N.Y. City

Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Golden Dev. & Constr. Corp., No. 17-CV-1051

(VSB) (JLC), 2017 WL 2876644, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2017) (“The award of post-judgment

interest is mandatory on awards in civil cases as of the date judgment is entered, including orders

that confirm arbitration awards.”) (internal citations omitted), R&R adopted, 2017 WL 3309737

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2017). Though not explicitly identified as such in the Petition, (see Pet., Dkt. 1,

at 10), Petitioner, in effect, seeks post-judgment because the Award includes interest “accru[ing]

on the principal amounts owed until paid in full,” (Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 8). Accordingly, the

Court grants post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the judgment to the date when the

judgment is satisfied, at the rate provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

III. Petitioner’s Attorneys’ Fees and Costs6

A. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner seeks a total of $1,878, reflecting 5.8 hours of work by its attorneys, Lillianna

Iorfino (“Iorfino”) and Maura Moosnick (“Moosnick”). (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 49.) Parties are entitled to

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in an action initiated to recover delinquent

contributions pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement under Section 502 of ERISA. 29

U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). “Although that entitlement does not necessarily extend to petitions to

confirm arbitration awards, courts tend to award fees when respondents refuse to abide by an

arbitrator’s decision without justification.” Finkel v. IDL Commc’n & Elec., Inc., No. 22-CV-5889

(NRM) (RML), 2023 WL 4565403, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 20, 2023) (internal quotations and

citation omitted), R&R adopted, 2023 WL 4564911 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2023); see Finkel v.

Millennium Fire Servs., LLC, No. 22-CV-6225 (RPK) (RML), 2023 WL 3620615, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Apr. 6, 2023) (awarding fees incurred in confirmation proceeding); Finkel v. JCF Elec., Inc.,

No. 21-CV-3161 (CBA) (RER), 2022 WL 3682834, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2022) (same).

To determine a reasonable attorney’s fee, courts must calculate a “lodestar figure” by

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate, yielding a

presumptively reasonable fee. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Millea v.

Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens

Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). Courts consider the community in

6 Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees and costs for the arbitration itself were included in the Award.

(Award, Dkt. 1-9, at ECF 7.)

which the district court sits and look to the prevailing rates for attorneys in that field with

comparable experience to determine what a reasonable client would pay. See Gesualdi v. Bestech

Transp., LLC, No. 14-CV-1110 (JS) (ARL), 2022 WL 866853, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2022)

(“The reasonableness of hourly rates is guided by the market rate prevailing in the community for

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”) (citation

modified); Rudler v. Houslanger & Assocs., PLLC, No. 18-CV-7068 (SFJ) (AYS), 2020

WL 473619, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2020) (following the Second Circuit’s “‘forum rule,’ which

‘generally requires use of the hourly rates employed in the district in which the reviewing court

sits in calculating the presumptively reasonable rate’” (quoting Trs. of NE Carpenters Health

Pension, Annuity, Apprenticeship, and Labor Mgmt. Coop. Funds v. Cali Enters., Inc.,

No. 18-CV-3556 (SFJ) (AYS), 2019 WL 2076784, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2019)). “[T]he

prevailing rates for attorneys in the E.D.N.Y. . . . are approximately $300-$450 per hour for

partners, $200-$300 per hour for senior associates, and $100-$200 per hour for junior associates.”

Rudler, 2020 WL 473619, at *2 (quoting Cleanup N. Brooklyn by Chantrtanapichate v. Brooklyn

Transfer LLC, 373 F. Supp. 3d 398, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 2019)).

1. Moosnick’s Fees

Moosnick is a partner at Virginia & Ambinder, LLP (“V&A”) with four years of practice

experience, and she has billed her time at $410 per hour. (See Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 46; Billing, Dkt. 1-10.)

Courts in this district have previously noted that Moosnick’s requested hourly rate is high

compared to her years of experience. See Finkel, 2024 WL 320870, at *7 (noting that “courts

typically award hourly rates of $200-$250 for attorneys with more years of experience than

[Moosnick]” and reducing her hourly rate to $200); IDL Commc’n & Elec., 2023 WL 4565403,

at *4 (finding Moosnick’s requested hourly rate high for a second-year associate and

recommending reducing this to $200 per hour); Millennium Fire Servs., 2023 WL 3620615, at *5

(same). While Moosnick is now a partner rather than an associate, the Court agrees that her

requested hourly rate does not reflect her years of experience, regardless of her current title. The

Court therefore reduces Moosnick’s hourly rate to $300 and otherwise finds the 0.8 hours billed

by Moosnick to be reasonable. (See Billing, Dkt. 1-10 (detailing total hours billed by Moosnick).)

The Court awards Moosnick $240 in fees.

2. Iorfino’s Fees

Iorfino is an associate at V&A with four years of practice experience, and she has billed

her time at $310 per hour. (See id. ¶ 45.) Iorfino appears to have only begun her ERISA practice

in November 2024. (See id.) Accordingly, the Court finds the requested hourly rate of $310 too

high. See, e.g., Finkel v. J&H Elec. Contracting, Inc., No. 22-CV-4293 (MKB), 2023

WL 3948752, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023) (reducing rate of $290 to $250 for associate who

graduated in 2016 and had three years of ERISA litigation experience); Ally Fin. Inc. v. Comfort

Auto Grp. NY LLC, No. 20-CV-1281 (MKB) (RLM), 2022 WL 3703955, at *18 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 26, 2022) (recommending $250 hourly rate for associate with seven years’ experience), R&R

adopted, 2022 WL 4813505 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2022); Trs. of Ne. Carpenters Health, Pension,

Annuity, Apprenticeship, & Lab. Mgmt. Cooperation Funds v. CEI Contractors, Inc.,

No. 18-CV-3467 (JFB) (GRB), 2019 WL 117603, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2019) (reducing the

hourly rate for associate who graduated four years prior from $265 to $200). The Court therefore

reduces Iorfino’s hourly rate to $200.

Regarding the 5 hours billed by Iorfino, the Court finds 5 hours to be high for a petition

and memorandum of law such as those submitted in this case. (See Billing, Dkt. 1-10 (detailing

total hours billed by Iorfino)); see, e.g., J&H Elec. Contracting, Inc., 2023 WL 3948752 at *6

(finding 2.5 hours billed to be reasonable); IDL Commc’n & Elec., 2023 WL 4565403, at *5

(finding 3.2 hours billed to be reasonable); Millenium Fire Servs., 2023 WL 3620615, at *5

(finding 4.1 hours billed to be reasonable). However, the additional time expended appears to

correspond with Iorfino’s relative lack of experience with ERISA complaints. The Court therefore

accepts Iorfino’s total billed time of 5 hours, and awards Iorfino $1,000 in fees.

3. Fees for Legal Assistants

Petitioner’s counsel also notes that “V&A will bill the legal assistants’ time at a rate of

$155 per hour for work performed in connection with this action.” (Id. ¶ 47.) However, the Court

sees no billing by or from any legal assistants, or at the hourly rate of $155. (See Billing,

Dkt. 1-10.) Therefore, it assumes there are no such fees to recover, and awards none.

B. Costs

Finally, Petitioner’s counsel requests “$520.20 in court filing fees and service charges upon

the filing of the instant petition.” (Pet., Dkt. 1, ¶ 50.) ERISA provides for the recovery of costs

associated with litigation commenced to recover unpaid fringe benefit contributions. See 29

U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). “[C]ourts routinely make awards for costs pursuant to ERISA in

confirmation proceedings.” Loc. 363, United Elec. Workers of Am., Int’l Union of Journeymen &

Allied Trades v. Laser Lite Elec., Inc., No. 17-CV-0267 (DLI) (SMG), 2017 WL 9939041, at *6

(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2017) (quoting Abondolo v. Jerry WWHS Co., 829 F. Supp. 2d 120, 130

(E.D.N.Y. 2011)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a

court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the

prevailing party.”). “The party requesting reimbursement of its costs, however, must provide the

court with adequate documentation not only showing costs were incurred, but that they were paid.”

Finkel v. KLK Elec., Inc., No. 19-CV-4945 (NG) (SJB), 2020 WL 3885739, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.

June 25, 2020) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Here, Petitioner’s counsel has failed to provide any documentation of the costs they seek

to recover. Without documentation to show that the costs claimed were in fact incurred and paid,

the Court cannot award such costs. However, the Court will award the filing fee of $405, because

the docket indicates that this fee was paid by Petitioner’s counsel. (See 1/17/2025 Dkt. Entry); see

also Shalto v. Bay of Bengal Kabob Corp., No. 12-CV-0920 (KAM) (VMS), 2013 WL 867420,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (holding that filing fees are recoverable without supporting

documentation if verified by the docket). Therefore, the Court awards Petitioner $405 in costs.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court confirms the Award in full and grants Petitioner’s

motion. The Court orders Respondent to pay the total Award amount of $72,217.61 as follows:

1) $27,598.64 in delinquent payroll contributions owed Petitioner and $1,109.25 in

interest on the same;

2) $3,408.88 in additional interest on the unpaid contributions owed Petitioner;

3) $10,844.91 in liquidated damages owed Petitioner;

4) $26,625.90 in delinquent payroll contributions owed Empower and $80.03 in interest

on the same; and

5) $2,550.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as part of the arbitration.

The Court also orders Respondent to pay Petitioner $1,645 in attorneys’ fees and costs

arising out of the Petition and post-judgment interest to be calculated by the Clerk of Court in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: August 28, 2025

Brooklyn, New York