The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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TIMOTHY A. JOHNSON,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, 24-CV-5107 (RPK) (JRC)
v.
STATE TROOPER DUCHARME #8724,
STATE TROOPER MOHAMED #7906,
and STATE TROOPER
SUPERINTENDENT COLONEL
PATRICK CALLAHAN,
Defendants.
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RACHEL P. KOVNER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey
state law in connection with his arrest on the New Jersey Turnpike. See Compl. (Dkt. #1).
Defendants move to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
over claims against defendants in their official capacities due to sovereign immunity and that venue
is improper. See Mot. to Dismiss 2–4, 9 (Dkt. #15). Plaintiff moves to transfer venue to the
District of New Jersey. See Mot. to Change Venue (Dkt. #24). As explained below, plaintiff’s
claims against defendants in their official capacities are dismissed. The rest of the case is
transferred to the District of New Jersey for consideration of defendants’ remaining dismissal
arguments and all further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the complaint and assumed true for the purpose of this
order. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 2, 2023, plaintiff was arrested by defendants Ducharme
and Muhammad* on the New Jersey Turnpike. Compl. 4. Plaintiff alleges that the arrest was
“without probable cause” because he “could never ha[ve] broken an[y] traffic law” given he “was
not driving the car.” Ibid. He further alleges that Ducharme and Muhammad denied him medical
treatment, and that defendant Callahan “failed to properly train[]” them. Ibid.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, which brings claims against all defendants for false arrest and
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, violation of plaintiff’s
right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and denial of medical treatment
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 2–3. The complaint also asserts
that defendants’ denial of medical treatment violated New Jersey state law. Id. at 3. Plaintiff states
that all defendants are sued in their official capacities, and that defendants Ducharme and
Muhammad are also sued in their individual capacities. See id. at 2–3. He seeks monetary
damages. Id. at 5.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint. They argue that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their official capacities because those
claims are barred by sovereign immunity. See Mot. to Dismiss 2–4. They also argue that the Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants, that venue is improper in this district, and that plaintiff
has failed to state a claim. See id. at 4–16. In the alternative, defendants request that the case be
transferred to the District of New Jersey. Reply 4 (Dkt. #21). Plaintiff opposes the motion to
dismiss, but concedes that venue is improper and asks that the case be transferred to the District
of New Jersey in the interest of justice under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). See Mot. to Change Venue.
* The caption on plaintiff’s complaint uses the surname “Mohamed,” see Compl. 1, but defendant’s filings use the
surname “Muhammad,” see Mot. to Dismiss 1, so the Court adopts that spelling here.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their official capacities are dismissed because they
are barred by sovereign immunity. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are transferred to the District of
New Jersey for consideration of the remainder of defendants’ motion and all further proceedings.
I. Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their official capacities are dismissed because they
are barred by sovereign immunity. Courts routinely dismiss claims as barred by sovereign
immunity before considering a motion to change venue. Some reason that sovereign immunity
disputes should be settled first because claims of sovereign immunity implicate a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, and “[w]ithout subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court is without power to effect
the relief plaintiffs seek, i.e., transfer of venue.” See Yun Chi v. Parajon, No. 20-CV-9042 (PAE),
2020 WL 6700584, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2020) (collecting cases). Other courts simply find
that it would not be in the interest of justice to transfer claims that are “doomed” on “significant
immunity grounds.” Dudla v. Jordan, No. 1:14-CV-889 (LEK) (RFT), 2015 WL 403079, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015); see, e.g., Salazar-Ruiz v. Cox, No. 24-4052 (DDC) (GEB), 2024 WL
5106684, at *12 (D. Kan. Dec. 13, 2024) (transfer was not in the interest of justice in part because
“sovereign immunity likely applies, which means plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits”);
Sanchez-Mercedes v. Bureau of Prisons, 453 F. Supp. 3d 404, 430 (D.D.C. 2020) (transfer was
not in the interest of justice because sovereign immunity presented an “obvious defect[]” in the
claims), aff’d, 2021 WL 2525679 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2021).
Plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their official capacity are barred by sovereign
immunity. Sovereign immunity extends to “actions for the recovery of money from the state”
against “state agents.” Leitner v. Westchester Cmty. Coll., 779 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15
(1890)). A lawsuit brought against officials of a government entity in their official capacities is
“in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107
(2d Cir. 2001). Because plaintiff’s claims for damages under Section 1983 and state law against
defendants in their official capacities are effectively “actions for the recovery of money from the
state,” Leitner, 779 F.3d at 134, sovereign immunity bars them. Moreover, “it is well established
that Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity in enacting [Section] 1983.” Sargent v.
Emons, 582 F. App’x 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 44 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against defendants in their official capacities are dismissed without
prejudice.
II. Remaining Claims
Plaintiff’s remaining claims are transferred to the District of New Jersey in the interest of
justice under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). If venue is improper, “[t]he district court . . . shall dismiss, or
if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). A court may transfer a case under Section 1406 even if it
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465–66
(1962); Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 435 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, the parties
agree that venue is improper in the Eastern District of New York and is proper in the District of
New Jersey as to plaintiff’s remaining claims, see Mot. to Dismiss 9; Reply 4; Mot. to Change
Venue, but they dispute whether transfer is in the interest of justice, see Opp’n to Mot. to Change
Venue 2 (Dkt. #25).
The “functional purpose of [S]ection 1406(a)” is to “remov[e] whatever obstacles may
impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies on their merits.” Bolar
v. Frank, 938 F.2d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466–67). Courts
therefore “enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to transfer a case in the interest of
justice.” Daniel, 428 F.3d at 435. Transfer may be required “in order that the plaintiff not be
penalized by . . . time-consuming and justice-defeating technicalities.” Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 467
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Transfer is not in the interest of justice, however, if the
case is a “sure loser.” Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 324 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted);
accord Daniel, 428 F.3d at 436. The Second Circuit also considers any prejudice transfer may
cause the defendant, Corke v. Sameiet M. S. Song of Norway, 572 F.2d 77, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1978),
and whether transfer “would reward plaintiffs for their lack of diligence in choosing a proper
forum,” Spar, Inc. v. Info. Res., Inc., 956 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1992).
Under these principles, it is in the interest of justice to transfer this case to the District of
New Jersey. Transfer is appropriate because “dismissal would require pro se [p]laintiff to incur
additional filing costs,” and because “re-filing . . . in the appropriate district would delay the
proceeding.” Gonsalves-Carvalhal v. Aurora Bank, FSB, No. 12-CV-2790 (MKB), 2014 WL
201502, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2014); see, e.g., Marshall v. Caudill, No. 23-CV-1998 (RA),
2023 WL 5101565, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023); Garland v. Carter, No. 22-CV-3462 (DG)
(CLP), 2022 WL 5110953, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2022); Nelson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
17-CV-4045 (LAP), 2019 WL 2514229, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2019). Moreover, “the Court
cannot conclude that there is no merit to any of [p]laintiff’s [remaining] claims” based on nothing
more than his pro se form complaint. Gonsalves-Carvalhal, 2014 WL 201502, at *7. “There is
no indication” that plaintiff filed in this forum “in bad faith,” Abalu v. Soc’y of Hum. Res. Mgmt.,
Jennifer McCollum, No. 24-CV-5917 (LJL), 2025 WL 1019199, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2025),
as he believed state law permitted him to file where he resides, see Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 4
(Dkt. #20). And defendants “will not be prejudiced by a transfer; in fact, they moved in the
alternative for a transfer.” Nelson, 2019 WL 2514229, at *11; see Abalu, 2025 WL 1019199, at
*15; Reply 4.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue to the District of New Jersey is granted
and the remainder of defendants’ motion to dismiss is deferred for consideration by that court. See
Brown v. New York, 947 F. Supp. 2d 317, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part, and plaintiff’s claims against defendants
in their official capacities are dismissed without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1). Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue to the District of New Jersey is also granted, and the
remainder of defendants’ motion is deferred for consideration by that court. The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to transfer this action to the District of New Jersey.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Rachel Kovner
RACHEL P. KOVNER
United States District Judge
Dated: August 28, 2025
Brooklyn, New York