Miles v. State of Maryland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ARNOLD MILES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-1415-ABA

STATE OF MARYLAND, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Arnold Miles (“Miles”), who is incarcerated at the Eastern Correctional

Institute in Westover, Maryland, was housed in a cell with Kevin Clark (“Clark”).

Plaintiff alleges that both he and Clark had requested that they be separated, based on a

combination of safety and religious reasons. In June 2021, Clark assaulted Miles,

resulting in Miles permanently losing his left eye. Plaintiff has sued Warden William

Bailey, Lieutenant James Reich, and Lieutenant Heather Griffiths (“Defendants”),

alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and several

Maryland laws, in connection with the assault.1 Defendants have filed a motion to

dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in

part.

1 The complaint incorrectly identifies this defendant as “Defendant Lieutenant Griffin,”

which Defendants later clarify should refer to Lieutenant Heather Griffiths. ECF No. 38-

1 at 1 n.1. The complaint also named as defendants the State of Maryland and Carolyn J.

Scruggs in her capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and

Correctional Services, but Plaintiff has since withdrawn his claims against them. ECF

No. 44.

I. BACKGROUND2

On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff and Kevin Clark became cellmates at Eastern

Correctional Institute (“ECI”). ECF No. 1 ¶ 18. Plaintiff “reported that he was concerned

for his safety as it relates to his cellmate Kevin Clark.” Id. ¶ 20. He alleges that, in

addition to that request, “the two men sent a joint request, signed by both men, to be

separated.” Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that the joint request was based on safety concerns.

See id. ¶ 20 (alleging that Plaintiff’s “independent[] report[]” was “also” based on a

“safety” concern). Plaintiff alleges that ECI was thus on notice of a risk to Plaintiff’s

safety from being housed in a cell with Clark, particularly because ECI allegedly “had

prior notice of Clark’s violent tendencies toward other inmates” and had investigated an

assault by Clark on his previous cellmate. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. As far as Plaintiff was aware, the

reason Clark wanted to be separated from Plaintiff was because of “their incompatibility

in religious preference” as Clark is Muslim and Plaintiff is Christian. Id. ¶ 21. But

accepting Plaintiff’s allegations, Plaintiff’s expressed concerns were about safety. Id. ¶

20. Lieutenant Griffin denied the separation requests. Id. ¶ 23.

About a month after Clark was moved into Plaintiff’s cell, on June 14, 2021, “at

approximately 4:00 a.m., Clark attacked Plaintiff in the cell as Plaintiff slept.” Id. ¶ 24.

Plaintiff suffered “significant facial injuries including the complete separation of his left

eye from his head.” Id. ¶ 25. After assaulting Plaintiff, Clark “attempted to get the

attention of officers by banging on the door of the cell.” Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff alleges that

officers initially ignored Clark and did not enter the cell “[m]ore than an hour later.” Id.

2 At the pleadings stage, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations

contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016).

¶ 28. Plaintiff was then taken to the prison medical unit, and then to Tidal Health Care,

and later “Shock Trauma” (presumably referring to the Shock Trauma Center at the

University of Maryland). Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges “there were no security rounds

conducted by the officers on duty during the time of the assault even though the

logbooks on the tier indicated they had been completed.” Id. ¶ 31.

Clark was charged in the Circuit Court for Somerset County (Case No. C-19-CR-

22-000133) with first- and second-degree assault of an inmate pursuant to Md. Code

Ann., Crim. Law § 3-210. Clark v. State, No. 1879, 2023 WL 7627762, at *1 (Md. Ct.

Spec. App. Nov. 15, 2023) (unpublished); see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 34. He was convicted

after a trial in December 2022, and sentenced to seven years “to be served consecutively

to any sentences he was already serving.” Clark, 2023 WL 7627762, at *2. The Appellate

Court of Maryland affirmed Clark’s conviction in November 2023. Id.

On May 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed this case against the State of Maryland, Carolyn J.

Scruggs in her capacity as Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and

Correctional Services, Warden William Bailey, Lieutenant James Reich, Lieutenant

Heather Griffiths, two John Doe officers, and all other unnamed officers who were on

duty at the time of the assault. In July 2024, the State of Maryland and Secretary

Scruggs filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them. ECF No. 23. Plaintiff

later filed a stipulation, withdrawing the claims he had asserted against those

defendants. ECF No. 44. The other Defendants, Warden Bailey, Lt. Reich, and Lt.

Griffiths (“Defendants”), filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against them. ECF

No. 38. Plaintiff responded to that motion, ECF No. 43, and Defendants replied. ECF

No. 51.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When a defendant asserts that, even

assuming the truth of the alleged facts, the complaint fails “to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted,” the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). At the pleadings stage, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” King, 825 F.3d at 212.

To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative relief” by containing “enough facts

to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Although a court reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion “must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff,” King, 825 F.3d at 212, bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to the

assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a plausible claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges six counts: (1) violation of the Eighth Amendment of

the U.S. Constitution by failing to protect and/or render aid3; (2) violation of Articles 24

and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights4; (3) violation of Articles 16 and 25 of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights; (4) negligence; (5) gross negligence; and (6) intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Warden

Bailey, Lt. Reich, or Lt. Griffiths should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and/or

on immunity grounds. ECF No. 38-1.

A. Counts 1 and 3: “Failure to Protect and/or Render Aid”

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to protect him from being attacked by

Clark, and then to aid him after he was attacked by Clark, and that those failures

violated the Eighth Amendment (Count 1) and Articles 16 and 25 of the Maryland

Declaration of Rights (Count 3).

“It is well settled that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the infliction

of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ reaches beyond a prisoner’s sentence to ‘the

treatment of a prisoner . . . in prison and the conditions under which he is confined.’”

Ford v. Hooks, 108 F.4th 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509

U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). That constitutional obligation includes “a duty . . . to protect

prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st

3 The complaint also refers to the Fourteenth Amendment in Count 1, but in his brief in

opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff relies solely on the Eighth Amendment,

and thus the Court will construe Count 1 as a § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation

of the Eighth Amendment. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff does not

address Count 2, or Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, on which

it is based. Accordingly, the Court deems Plaintiff to have abandoned Count 2.

4 Count 2 is asserted under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 50–54.

Cir. 1988)). After all, “[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the

penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Id. at 834

(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). But “it is not every injury

suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional

liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. Rather, “[s]uch injury

must be the product of prison officials’ deliberate indifference to the risk of injury.”

Ford, 108 F.4th at 230 (emphasis in original).

Two requirements must be met to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on an

alleged failure to protect. “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently

serious, [and second,] a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (cleaned up). To

satisfy the latter requirement, a plaintiff must allege that the prison official had a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” that is, one of “deliberate indifference to inmate

health or safety.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Ford, 108 F.4th at 230; Brown v. N.C. Dep’t

of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010). “Deliberate indifference is a very high

standard, and a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.” Ford, 108 F.4th at 230

(quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004)). A plaintiff

must show more than just that the prison official “should have recognized the risk and

the inadequacy of his response,” but rather that the prison official had a “culpable mens

rea” such that “the prison official subjectively ‘knew’ of the substantial risk of harm to a

prisoner and ‘consciously disregarded’ it.” Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 839). The

Maryland courts apply these same standards to prison failure-to-protect claims under

Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which, like the Eighth Amendment

provides, “[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted.” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 25; see

Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 656 (1995) (“[I]t is well settled in this State

that Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in para materia with the Eighth

Amendment.”).5

Here, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts in support of Counts 1 and 3 to survive

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Although his allegations regarding the notice

Defendants received about safety-related concerns with housing Miles and Clark

together are not particularly detailed, he has alleged that, on multiple occasions,

Defendants were notified that leaving him in a cell with Clark created a safety risk for

Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19–23, 32–33. Similarly, although it is not entirely clear from

Plaintiff’s allegations what involvement these particular Defendants (Warden Bailey, Lt.

Reich, and Lt. Griffiths) had in considering Plaintiff’s and Clark’s requests or in

responding to them, Plaintiff has alleged that these Defendants were among the “ECI

administrators” who “had prior notice of Clark’s violent tendencies toward other

inmates,” id. ¶ 32; that Lt. Reich and Lt. Griffith were correctional officers who “fail[ed]

to prevent the brutal attack against Plaintiff,” “cover[ed] up of their failure to protect

Plaintiff after [the] occurrence,” and “fail[ed] to render aid to Plaintiff despite the means

5 Plaintiff also invokes Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in Count 3.

Article 16 provides that “no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to

be made in any case, or at any time.” Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 16. It appears the

Maryland Supreme Court has not decided whether Article 16 should be interpreted in

pari materia with the Eighth Amendment, but the Appellate Court of Maryland has

assumed without deciding that it should be. See Torbit v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t,

231 Md. App. 573, 591 (2017); see also Carter v. State, 461 Md. 295, 308 (2018)

(explaining that Articles 16 and 25 “have usually been construed to provide the same

protection as the Eighth Amendment, although this Court has acknowledged that there

is some textual support for finding greater protection in the Maryland provisions”).

and duty to do so,” id. ¶ 37; and that Warden Bailey “had the capacity and authority to

make final decisions for the purpose of ECI policy, practice and conduct,” id. ¶ 7.

At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff will have to support those allegations

not only with evidence that separation requests were made, but that these particular

Defendants “subjectively ‘knew’ of the substantial risk of harm to a prisoner and

‘consciously disregarded’ it.” Ford, 108 F.4th at 230. In Ford, for example, the Fourth

Circuit held that correctional officers who were “aware of Ford’s complaints requesting

protective custody and the reasons for his fear of reprisal” but who “conclude[ed] that

they did not have enough information to carry out an appropriate allegation” (in part

because the plaintiff did not “g[i]ve names or even nicknames in response to the prison

officials’ investigatory efforts”) were entitled to summary judgment on a failure-to-

protect claim. 108 F.4th at 230–31. In contrast, the prisoner in that case was entitled to

proceed to trial on his Eighth Amendment claim against another correctional officer

who, “within earshot of other inmates on the unit, demand[ed] that Ford name the

individuals threatening him,” thereby creating a genuine dispute of fact about whether

that officer “knowingly exacerbated the dangers to Ford that officers had already

recognized.” Id. at 228, 231.

But the question for now is not whether there is evidence sufficient to rise to that

high standard, but whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts that, if true, would

subject Warden Bailey, Lt. Reich, and Lt. Griffiths to liability on Plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference claims. Although the allegations are thin as discussed above—and the Court

notes with respect to Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Bailey that “there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983,” Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782

(4th Cir. 2004)—the Court concludes Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim

and thus for Counts 1 and 3 to proceed to discovery.

That leaves Defendants’ assertions of immunity. With respect to Defendants’

assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity, see ECF No. 38-1 at 5–8, Plaintiff does not

dispute that such immunity applies insofar as he has sued Defendants in their official

capacities. Because Plaintiff has alleged sufficient involvement by these Defendants in

failing to prevent the assault as discussed above, the Court concludes that he has

sufficiently alleged claims against these Defendants in their personal capacities. See

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a

barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability’ on state officials under

§ 1983.”).

And with respect to qualified immunity, although dismissal of a complaint based

on qualified immunity “is appropriate when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the

existence of a meritorious defense,” Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir.

2011) (quoting Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178–181 (4th Cir. 1996)), here

Plaintiff has sufficient alleged that Defendants knew that putting him in a cell with Clark

put him at serious risk of physical danger, and that they consciously disregarded that

risk. And the legal standards under the Eighth Amendment based on threats among

prisoners are clearly established, as discussed above. Indeed, Defendants only offer a

single conclusory sentence in support of the argument that the complaint should be

dismissed at the pleadings stage based on qualified immunity. See ECF No. 38-1 at 12

(“[E]ven if Plaintiff had stated a plausible claim that the defendants violated a

constitutional right, they still would be entitled to qualified immunity.”). And the case

Defendants cite, Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 391 (4th Cir. 2013), is a summary

judgment case, not a dismissal at the pleadings stage. It may turn out that the

evidentiary record will show, for example, that these Defendants were not, in fact,

sufficiently put on notice of the risk that Clark would attack Miles to give rise to Eighth

Amendment liability or to overcome qualified immunity. But at the pleadings stage, the

Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom as true,

including with respect to qualified immunity. And when those facts are accepted as true,

they do not “clearly reveal[]” that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Cf.

Brockington, 637 F.3d at 506.

For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss counts 1 and 3 will be denied.

B. State-law tort claims

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are for negligence (count 4), gross negligence (count

5), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count 6). Defendants argue those

counts do not state claims on which relief can be granted, and that in any event they are

entitled to immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”).

To establish a negligence claim, Plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that “(1)

the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3)

the plaintiff sustained an injury or loss, and (4) the defendant’s breach of the duty was

the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.” Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v.

Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP, 451 Md. 600, 610 (2017) (citing 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v.

Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 430 Md. 197, 213 (2013)). Gross negligence is “an

intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences

as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of

the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.” Barbre v. Pope, 402

Md. 157, 187 (2007).

With respect to Defendants’ assertion of public officer immunity, “[s]tate

personnel” sued in the performance of their public duties are entitled to immunity

under the MTCA. Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-101 through 12-110. Section 12-105 of

the MTCA provides that State personnel have “immunity from liability” as provided

under § 5-522(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That section, in turn,

provides that State personnel “are immune from suit in courts of the State and from

liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the public duties

of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence, and for which the

State or its units have waived immunity[.]” Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522(b). This statutory

immunity extends not only to simple negligence claims, but also to “non-malicious

intentional torts and constitutional torts.” Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 255 (2004).

Here, for the same reasons that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts in support

of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims (Counts 1 and 3), discussed above, the factual

allegations are sufficient to state a claim for gross negligence. See § III.B, supra. Thus

the motion to dismiss Count 5 will be denied. But because public officer immunity

requires, at minimum, gross negligence, Count 4, for negligence, will be dismissed

based on the immunity conferred by § 5-522(b).

That leaves Count 6, Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. That claim requires Plaintiff to allege certain elements about the conduct of

Defendants: “(1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be

extreme and outrageous, (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful

conduct and the emotional distress; [and] (4) the emotional distress must be severe.”

Oliver v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs., 350 F. Supp. 3d 340, 354 (D. Md.

2018) (quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566 (1977)). Plaintiff argues that this

count states a claim on which relief can be granted because “Defendants knowingly

placed Plaintiff in harm’s way by refusing to separate him from Kevin Clark, despite

documented risks and repeated separation requests.” ECF No. 43-1 at 17. But Maryland

courts have recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress claims only in limited

circumstances. See Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 734 (1992) (“We have upheld claims

for intentional infliction of emotional distress only three times and only in cases which

involved truly egregious acts.”). None of the cases Plaintiff cites persuades this Court

that the Maryland courts would expand the tort to include the type of claim at issue in

this case. The closest Plaintiff comes is citing Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,

303 Md. 182 (1985). But there, the allegations were that the defendant had engaged in

conduct the “purpose” of which was “to harass the Plaintiff into . . . committing suicide.”

Id. at 198–99. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count 6 will be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1. The motion to dismiss filed by the State of Maryland and Secretary

Scruggs (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED in light of Plaintiff’s withdrawal of the claims

against those defendants, ECF No. 44. Accordingly, the Clerk shall TERMINATE the

State of Maryland and Secretary Scruggs as defendants on the docket.

2. The motion to dismiss filed by the other defendants (ECF No. 38) is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Counts 4 and 6 are DISMISSED; the

motion to dismiss is denied as to the remaining counts.

/s/

Date: August 28, 2025 __________________

Adam B. Abelson

United States District Judge