Mabine v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

RONALD L. MABINE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 2:24-cv-02556-TLP-tmp

v. )

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS, DISMISSING COMPLAINT IN PART, AND

GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

In August 2024, Plaintiff Ronald L. Mabine, Bureau of Prisons register number 12562-

007, filed a pro se Complaint alleging claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),

28 U.S.C. § 261, et seq; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,

403 U.S. 388 (1971); the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706; and state

malpractice law. (ECF No. 1.) At the time of the Complaint, Mabine was incarcerated at the

Federal Correctional Institution in Memphis, Tennessee (“FCI Memphis”). (Id. at PageID 2.)

But in June 2025, Mabine informed the Court that he had been transferred to the Federal

Correctional Institution in Butner, North Carolina. (ECF No. 10.)

In January 2025, the Court ordered Mabine to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) or to

pay the civil filing fee. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff then moved for reconsideration because he had

paid the civil filing fee, which the docket now reflects. (ECF No. 8.) And so, the Court

GRANTS Mabine’s motion to reconsider (ECF No. 8) and VACATES the Order requiring

Plaintiff to pay the fee (ECF No. 7).

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint and for the reasons below, the Court

DISMISSES Mabine’s Complaint in part. But the Court GRANTS leave to amend other claims.

The Court also DENIES Mabine’s motion for service of process (ECF No. 6) without prejudice,

but Plaintiff may request this relief again after amending his Complaint.

BACKGROUND

Mabine alleges that he was diagnosed with Lupus in 1992 and has been taking

Prednisone, an oral steroid, to treat his condition since June 2015. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) He

claims that his Lupus “was successfully treated with Prednisone from 2015 through August

2023,” while he was housed at another federal prison. (Id.) But when he was transferred to

FCI Memphis in August 2023, Nurse A. Martz “discontinued dispensing” Mabine’s prescribed

amount of Prednisone. (Id.) Mabine alleges that Nurse Martz told him, “[I am] not giving you

all that Prednisone. That’s too much Prednisone.” (Id.)

Mabine also claims that in 2021, he was diagnosed with gastroesophageal reflux disease

(“GERD”), for which a doctor prescribed him Omeprazole, the generic medication for Prilosec,

for “long term use.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Martz “confiscated” his medication and

told him to “buy it on commissary.” (Id.) But according to Mabine, the prison commissary did

not sell Omeprazole and that the medication available in the commissary “is much weaker and

ineffective.” (Id.)

Based on this conduct, Mabine argues that he received “inadequate health care for his

Lupus and GERD” at FCI Memphis. (Id.) He also claims that he “suffered pain and physical

injury while his Lupus and GERD went untreated.” (Id.) And, according to the Complaint, he

has “permanent and disfiguring scars on his skin” because he did not receive “adequate health

care” at FCI Memphis. (Id.)

Mabine now sues the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”); Naveed Gill, a medical doctor with the

BOP; A. Martz, a nurse practitioner with the BOP1; “unknown” BOP employees; and the United

States of America (“United States”). (Id. at PageID 1, 3.) He alleges violations of the FTCA,

Eighth Amendment, APA, and state malpractice law. (Id. at PageID 5–6.) And he seeks

“compensatory damages, punitive damages, [and] nominal damages” of unspecified amounts.

(Id. at PageID 7.) Plaintiff also seeks “costs in this suit, and any other relief as may be just and

proper.”2 (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Courts must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of it, if

the complaint:

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).3

In assessing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, courts

apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as interpreted in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

1 Plaintiff sues Gill and Martz in their official and individual capacities. (Id. at PageID 3.)

2 Mabine also sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but such requests for relief are now moot.

The alleged denial of adequate medical care occurred while he was an inmate at FCI Memphis,

and Plaintiff is no longer confined at that facility. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th

Cir. 1996) (explaining that prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were rendered

moot because he was no longer confined at institution about which he complained); see also

Hower v. Damron, Civ. No. 0:20-53-WOB, 2021 WL 4449980, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2021),

aff’d, No. 21-5996, 2022 WL 16578864 (6th Cir. Aug. 31, 2022) (applying Kensu in a Bivens

action).

3 The Court screens Mabine’s pro se Complaint even though he has paid the full filing fee. See

In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (“District courts are

required to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners, regardless of whether the inmate paid the

full filing fee.”).

677–79 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007). Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). A complaint must contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Courts accept a complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations

as true and then determine whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”

Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). But

courts do not accept legal conclusions in a complaint, instead requiring them to “be supported by

factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Moreover, courts “liberally construe[]” pro se pleadings and hold them “to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin

v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). But pro se litigants are not exempt from the

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th

Cir. 1989); see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming

dismissal of pro se complaint for failing to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and

stating that “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his

pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

Rather than dismissing a complaint sua sponte under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for

failing to state a claim, district courts may allow prisoners to amend a complaint. Lucas v.

Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951

(6th Cir. 2013)). But courts should not grant leave to amend when a plaintiff cannot cure the

deficiency in the complaint. See Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir.

2001) (“If it is crystal clear that . . . amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte

dismissal may stand.”); see also Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We

agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be

salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to

the courts”).

Given these standards, the Court now reviews Plaintiff’s Complaint, dismisses claims

that fail as a matter of law, and grants leave to amend claims for which Mabine may be able to

assert facts that could state a claim to relief.

ANALYSIS

I. John Doe Defendants

Mabine sues “other agents, servants, and employees” of the United States, who allegedly

“committed the acts of negligence” against Mabine (“John Doe Defendants”). (ECF No. 1 at

PageID 3.) But Mabine fails to allege a cognizable claim against the John Doe Defendants.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 requires a plaintiff to “name all the parties” in a complaint.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Service of process cannot be made on an unidentified party, and filing a

complaint against an unknown defendant does not toll the statute of limitations. See Wiggins v.

Kimberly-Clark Corp., 641 F. App’x 545, 548–49 (6th Cir. 2016) (“The Sixth Circuit treats

naming a specific individual in place of a John Doe as joinder of a new party.” (citing Cox v.

Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996))). Before Mabine can proceed against the John Doe

Defendants, he must first identify the individuals and re-allege his claims against them.4

4 The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[s]ubstituting a named defendant for a ‘John Doe’ defendant

is considered a change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties.” Cox, 75 F.3d at 240. Thus,

Mabine must meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) “in order for the

amendment adding the named defendant to relate back to the filing of the original complaint.” Id.

And so, the Court GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND Mabine’s claims against the John

Doe Defendants. But the Court warns that failure to identify these Defendants will result in

dismissal for failure to state a claim to relief.

II. FTCA Claim

The FTCA provides a cause of action against the United States for personal injury or

property loss suffered because of the negligence of a federal government employee. 28 U.S.C. §

2679(b)(1); Flechsig v. United States, 991 F.2d 300, 303 (6th Cir. 1993)). The United States is

the only proper defendant for claims under the FTCA. Jones v. Johnson, 707 F. App’x 321, 331

(6th Cir. 2017) (citing § 2679(b)(1)). Mabine therefore cannot sue Gill, Martz, or the BOP under

the FTCA. And the Court DISMISSES Mabine’s FTCA claims against those individual

Defendants WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.

As to the United States, Tennessee law governs Mabine’s FTCA claim for inadequate

health care. Jackson, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 831, 831 n.6. And under Tennessee law, to show that

medical personnel is liable to him, Mabine must allege the following:

(1) The recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession

and the specialty thereof, if any, that the defendant practices in the

community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community at the

time the alleged injury or wrongful action occurred;

(2) That the defendant acted with less than or failed to act with ordinary and

reasonable care in accordance with such standard; and

(3) As a proximate result of the defendant’s negligent act or omission, the

plaintiff suffered injuries which would not otherwise have occurred.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a). Mabine’s allegations fail to establish all three elements.

Mabine generally claims that Gill and Martz “failed to exercise reasonable care and skill

commensurate with the standard of care,” but he does not allege what the standard of care is or

explain how he believes that Gill and Martz failed to comply with it. So Mabine has failed to

allege a valid basis to hold the United States liable at this time but, in the future, he might allege

facts to support this claim. The Court thus GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND the FTCA claim

against the United States.

III. Bivens Claim

Mabine next alleges that he was denied adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth

Amendment while confined at FCI Memphis. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6–7.) Because Mabine was

a federal inmate at the time of the alleged constitutional violation, the Court construes this claim

as arising under Bivens.

Bivens provides a right of action against federal employees who, acting under color of

federal law, violate an individual’s rights under the Constitution. 403 U.S. at 389. This includes

claims that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a federal inmate’s medical needs

under the Eighth Amendment. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017); see also Carlson

v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980).

A. Claims Against the BOP, the United States, and Official Capacity Claims

Against Gill and Martz

Bivens authorizes damage suits against individual federal officials, but Bivens does not

authorize such suits against the United States or its agencies. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,

534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001) (explaining that a prisoner “may not bring a Bivens claim against the

officer’s employer, the United States, or the BOP”). Nor does Bivens permit suits against

government employees in their official capacities because “the real party in interest in an

official-capacity suit is the entity represented and not the individual officeholder.” Himmelreich

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 11-3474, 2012 WL 13226685, at *1 (6th Cir. May 7, 2012)

(quoting Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78 (1987)); see Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (“With respect to

the alleged constitutional deprivation, [the plaintiff’s] only remedy lies against the individual.”).

That said, Mabine’s claims against the BOP, the United States, and Gill and Martz in their

official capacities fail to state a claim to relief as a matter of law. And so the Court DISMISSES

these claims WITH PREJUDICE.

B. Individual Capacity Claims

Mabine also sues Gill and Martz in their individual capacities. He claims that they were

deliberately indifferent to Mabine’s medical conditions and “refus[ed] to provide medically

necessary and adequate health care.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.)

“[T]o plausibly state a Bivens claim, ‘a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution’ in a

manner that can be vindicated under Bivens.” Himmelreich, 2012 WL 13226685, at *2 (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). A plaintiff asserting a Bivens claim must, as part of his prima facie case,

allege facts showing “that the individual defendant acted under color of federal authority and was

personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Mueller v.

Gallina, 137 F. App’x 847, 850 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1. Individual Capacity Claim Against Gill

Mabine’s pro se Complaint contains no factual allegations against Gill—much less any

claims about how Gill “was personally involved” in denying Plaintiff proper health care. See id.

(See ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) That said, the Complaint fails to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face” and is subject to dismissal. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. But rather than

dismiss right now, the Court GRANTS Mabine LEAVE TO AMEND his Bivens claim against

Gill in his individual capacity.

2. Individual Capacity Claim Against Martz

Mabine also alleges that Martz refused to dispense the prescribed amount of Prednisone

to treat Mabine’s Lupus because she believed it was “too much Prednisone.” (ECF No. 1 at

PageID 4.) Martz allegedly “confiscated” the Omeprazole prescribed to treat Mabine’s GERD

and told Plaintiff to buy a less effective medication from the commissary. (Id.) Mabine alleges

that he “suffered pain and physical injury while his Lupus and GERD went untreated.” (Id.)

With these allegations, Plaintiff tries to show deliberate indifference toward his serious

medical needs, thereby invoking the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). An Eighth Amendment claim of

deliberate indifference has both objective and subjective components. See Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005)

(recognizing that in Farmer, the Supreme Court “adopted a mixed objective and subjective

standard for ascertaining the existence of deliberate indifference in the context of the Eighth

Amendment”).

The objective component requires that a prisoner have a “sufficiently serious” medical

need. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834). “[A] medical need is objectively serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would readily

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. at 897 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). And the subjective component requires that jail officials acted with the requisite

intent—or, put another way, that the officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[D]eliberate

indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Id. at 835. That

said, the prison official must subjectively know of an excessive risk of harm to an inmate’s

health or safety and then disregard that risk. Id. at 837.

Mabine has failed to allege facts showing that Martz had a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind” and acted with “deliberate indifference” by altering Plaintiff’s prescribed treatment

regimen for Lupus and GERD. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. This is because Mabine has not

alleged facts from which to infer that Martz personally knew that changing Plaintiff’s treatment

regimen would create excessive risk to his health or that Martz disregarded that risk. See id. at

837. But Plaintiff may be able to do so. And so, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff LEAVE TO

AMEND his individual capacity claim against Martz.

IV. APA Claim

In the section of Mabine’s Complaint labeled “Claims,” Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’

“actions or omissions” that “caused [Mabine] to suffer legal wrongs [are] reviewable under the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.) The Court construes

Mabine’s claim as alleging that Defendants’ denial of adequate medical care violated the APA.

(See id.)

The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is

entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. But Mabine has not pleaded facts to suggest

that any agency decision has violated his federal rights, and this claim is subject to dismissal.

Even so, the Court GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND this cause of action because Plaintiff may

be able to assert facts supporting an APA claim.

V. State Law Malpractice Claim

Lastly, Mabine alleges a state-law claim for health care liability. (ECF No. 1 at PageID

5-6.) “If there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the default assumption [under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(a)] is that the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims.”

Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks, alteration, and citation omitted). But when “the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction,” it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

related state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Gamel v. Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951

(6th Cir. 2010). Because the Court has granted leave to amend, it does not yet know if it is

dismissing each of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. But the Court will decline

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s health care liability claim if it dismisses each of the

federal claims.

AMENDMENT UNDER THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

As noted above, the Court grants Mabine leave to amend some of his claims. He has 30

days to amend, and the amended pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. This includes, but is not limited to, satisfying Rule 8’s requirement for a short and

plain statement of the claims. Mabine must also allege plausibly that he is entitled to relief on

his claims. And he must sign the amended complaint.

An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and must be independently

complete without referring to or relying on the prior pleadings. In other words, the amended

complaint itself must allege enough facts to support each claim. All claims in an amended

complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. And Plaintiff must state

each claim for relief in a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued under that count.

The amended complaint also must attach any exhibits on which it relies and identify them by

number.

If Mabine fails to comply with Rule 8 and the Court’s instructions for pleading amended

claims within 30 days from the entry of this Order, the Court will dismiss the remaining claims

with prejudice and enter judgment for Defendants.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Mabine’s motion to reconsider (ECF No. 8)

and VACATES the Order requiring Plaintiff to pay the fee (ECF No. 7).

The Court also DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Mabine’s FTCA claims against Gill,

Martz, and the BOP for failure to state a claim to relief as a matter of law. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1). And the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Mabine’s Bivens claims

against the BOP, the United States, and Gill and Nurse Martz in their official capacities for

failure to state a claim to relief as a matter of law. See id.

But the Court GRANTS LEAVE TO AMEND (1) the FTCA claim against the United

States, (2) his Bivens claims against Gill and Martz in their individual capacities, (3) his APA

claim, and (4) his claims against the John Doe Defendants. See id. Mabine may amend his

complaint within 30 days of the date of this Order, under the guidelines set forth above. And

failure to do so will result in the Court dismissing these claims with prejudice for failure to state

a claim to relief, as explained in this Order.

Given that Plaintiff has not yet stated any claims to relief and has been granted leave to

amend, the Court does not decide whether it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Mabine’s health care liability claim,5 and it DENIES Mabine’s motion for service of process.

(ECF No. 6.)

The Court also ORDERS Mabine to notify the Court immediately, in writing, of any

change in address, or if he is transferred or released from BOP custody. If Mabine fails to

provide the Court with his current address or fails to follow any other requirements of this Order,

the Court may impose appropriate sanctions, up to dismissal of this action, without any other

notice or hearing by the Court.

SO ORDERED, this 29th day of August, 2025.

s/Thomas L. Parker

THOMAS L. PARKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5 The Court will decline supplemental jurisdiction if Plaintiff fails to amend or if his amended

complaint fails to state a federal claim.