Weber v. Fletcher

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

TYRONE WEBER CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0698

SECTION P

VS.

JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

BRANDY G. FLETCHER MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tyrone Weber, a prisoner at Riverbend Detention Center ("RDC") proceeding

pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately May 20, 2025, under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. He names Brandy G. Fletcher as Defendant.1 For reasons below, the Court

should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.

Background

Plaintiff claims that after he filed a grievance,2 Inmate Account Officer Brandy G.

Fletcher failed to ensure that he was reimbursed $71.00, which was deducted from his inmate

account at RDC to pay a fare for his bus ride home when he was released from incarceration

from a previous sentence on June 2, 2024.3 [doc. # 1, p. 3]. He adds that Fletcher’s actions (or

inaction) were unauthorized. [doc. # 9, p. 3]. He maintains that the Department of Corrections

should have paid for his bus fare, that he was not responsible for paying the fare, and that he

never agreed to pay the fare. Id. at 3, 4. He also alleges (i) Fletcher was negligent because she

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under

28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court.

2 [doc. # 1-2, p. 3].

3 Plaintiff was incarcerated again at an unknown date. [doc. # 1, p. 4].

did not provide him "any invoice/documentation" about the charge to his account and (ii)

Fletcher should not have investigated his grievance because his grievance was against her. Id. at

3. He suggests that, because he lacked the $71.00 from his account, he was unable to purchase

hygiene items, food, and writing materials with which to contact family. [doc. # 9, p. 2].

Plaintiff claims that Fletcher “did everything possible to prevent the exercising of [his]

right to petition, going as far as withholding legal documents as well as flagging incoming and

outgoing mail.” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. He appears to claim that after he filed this proceeding, Fletcher

intercepted his outgoing mailing and failed to mail it to the Court. [doc. # 9-1, pp. 1, 3]. The

mailing was a copy of this Court’s June 20, 2025 Memorandum Order granting Plaintiff in forma

pauperis status, on which he wrote that Fletcher misinterpreted the portion of the order

concerning the monthly withdrawal of funds from his account to pay the filing fee each time his

account exceeds $10.00. Id.

Plaintiff claims that because he complained about Fletcher to a warden, he suffered

retaliation and was moved from his “original housing Phase III” to “a protective environment in

Phase II[.]” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. The “transition made it even harder to contact [his] family and

obtain the resources [he] need[ed].” Id.

Plaintiff seeks $71.00 in reimbursement, as well as compensation for his pain and

suffering. [doc. # 1, p. 5].

Law and Analysis

1. Preliminary Screening

Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a

prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is

subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.4 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d

578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his

Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is

frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Id.

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies

somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

4 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any

facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations

of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary

program.”

Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of

the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.

In making this determination, the court must assume that all the plaintiff’s factual

allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the

same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not

satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614

F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677.

“[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to

make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53

(5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim

if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A.

(Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).

A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926

F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights

complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788

F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986).

“To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by

the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638

(5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a

“[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional

conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).

2. Parratt/Hudson Doctrine

As above, Plaintiff claims that Inmate Account Officer Brandy G. Fletcher failed to

ensure that he was reimbursed $71.00, which was deducted from his inmate account at RDC to

pay a fare for his bus ride home when he was released from incarceration. [doc. # 1, p. 3]. He

adds that Fletcher’s actions (or inaction) were unauthorized. [doc. # 9, p. 3]. He maintains that

the Department of Corrections should have paid for his bus fare, that he was not responsible for

paying the fare, and that he never agreed to pay the fare. Id. at 3, 4. He also alleges that Fletcher

was negligent because she did not provide him "any invoice/documentation" about the charge.

To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that Fletcher caused or is causing the deprivation of his

funds, the Parratt-Hudson doctrine forecloses his claims. A post-deprivation tort cause of action

in state law is, under the Parratt/Hudson5 doctrine, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due

process when a plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of his property, without due process of

law, by the negligent or intentional actions of a state officer that are “random and

unauthorized.”6 Sheppard v. Louisiana Bd. of Parole, 873 F.2d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1989)

(quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533-35). Louisiana law provides an adequate remedy for both

5 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in

part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

6 “The doctrine is meant to protect the state from liability for failing to provide predeprivation

process in situations where it cannot anticipate the need for such process (when actions are

random and unauthorized).” Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).

intentional and negligent deprivations of property. See Copsey v. Swearingen, 36 F.3d 1336,

1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994); Marshall v. Norwood, 741 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 and observing that “Louisiana law affords an opportunity to

redress intentional torts under the same section of the Code by which negligence is remedied.”);

Fuller v. XTO Energy, Inc., 989 So. 2d 298, 302 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing the tort of

conversion).7

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he was deprived of money by anyone acting under an

official policy, custom, or procedure; rather, he describes unauthorized action. See Allen v.

Fuselier, 273 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Parratt and concluding, “Allen's assertion that the

defendants improperly removed $75 from his inmate account is frivolous because the existence

of a postdeprivation tort cause of action in [Louisiana] law is sufficient to satisfy the

requirements of due process.”); Washington v. Collier, 747 F. App'x 221, 222 (5th Cir. 2018)

(“[A] state actor's unauthorized deprivation of an inmate’s prison account funds—be it negligent

or intentional—'does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is

available.’”) (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533); Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91 (5th Cir.

1996); Parker v. Davilla, 67 F. App'x 242 (5th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Howard, 224 F.3d 766 (5th

Cir. 2000).

7 See also Suria v. Wathen, 616 F. App’x 175 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming dismissal of a claim that

correctional officers lost an inmate’s personal property through gross negligence and dereliction

of duty, on grounds that “negligent conduct is not actionable under § 1983.”).

Plaintiff should, if he wishes, pursue relief under state law in state court because

Louisiana law provides adequate remedies for this alleged conduct. Accordingly, the Court

should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims.

3. Grievance Responses

To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that Fletcher failed to properly investigate his

grievances concerning his allegedly improperly deducted funds, he does not state a plausible

claim. Likewise, he does not raise a plausible claim with respect to his allegation that Fletcher

was conflicted and should not have investigated his grievance because his grievance was against

her.

A prisoner does “not have a constitutional right to have his grievances resolved in his

favor or to have his claims reviewed pursuant to a grievance process that is responsive to his

perceived injustices . . . .” Burgess v. Reddix, 609 F. App’x 211 (5th Cir. 2015); see Alexander v.

Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 2020 WL 826452, at *2 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2020) (affirming

dismissal of a claim that grievances were mishandled or improperly denied because “prisoners

have no due process rights in the inmate grievance process.”).

In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475 (1995), the Supreme Court left prisoners without

a federally-protected right to have grievances investigated and resolved. See Taylor v. Cockrell,

92 Fed. App’x. 77, 78 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that “claims that the defendants violated his

constitutional rights by failing to investigate his grievances fall short of establishing a federal

constitutional claim.”); Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[The plaintiff]

does not have a federally protected liberty interest in having . . . grievances resolved to his

satisfaction. . . . [A]ny alleged due process violation arising from the alleged failure to

investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.”). Here, accordingly, the Court should

dismiss these claims.

4. Access to Court

Plaintiff claims that Fletcher “did everything possible to prevent the exercising of [his]

right to petition, going as far as withholding legal documents as well as flagging incoming and

outgoing mail.” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. He appears to claim that after he filed this proceeding, Fletcher

failed to send his outgoing mailing to this Court, which was a copy of the Court’s June 20, 2025

Memorandum Order granting Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on which Plaintiff wrote that

Fletcher misinterpreted the part of the order concerning the monthly withdrawal of funds from

his account to pay the filing fee when funds in his account exceed $10.00. [doc. # 9-1, pp. 1, 3].

To succeed on a claimed denial of access to courts, a plaintiff must show that he lost an

actionable claim or was prevented from presenting such a claim because of the alleged denial.

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996); Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996)

(holding that to state a claim of denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

his position as a litigant was prejudiced as a direct result of the denial of access). “[T]he

complaint should state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a), just as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe

any remedy available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Christopher v.

Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417-18 (2002).

The “injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 353. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the lack of access prevented him from

filing or caused him to lose a case that attacks either his conviction or seeks “to vindicate ‘basic

constitutional rights’” in a civil rights action. Id. at 353-54 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 579 (1974)).

“Denial-of-access claims take one of two forms: forward-looking claims alleging ‘that

systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the

present time,’ and backward-looking claims alleging that an official action has ‘caused the loss

or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to sue, or the loss of an

opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.’” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 601 (5th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14).

“To maintain a backward-looking claim, a plaintiff must identify (1) a nonfrivolous

underlying claim; (2) an official act that frustrated the litigation of that claim; and (3) a remedy

that is not otherwise available in another suit that may yet be brought.” United States v. McRae,

702 F.3d 806, 830-31 (5th Cir. 2012); see Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413-14 ((“These cases do not

look forward to a class of future litigation, but backward to a time when specific litigation ended

poorly, or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently

unobtainable.”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim because he does not allege that he lost an

actionable claim or was prevented from presenting such a claim because the Court did not

receive (until now) his comments concerning the payment of his filing fee. The undersigned

recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s claims in the instant Report and Recommendation on grounds

other than the alleged failure of a prison official to deduct funds from Plaintiff’s account.

Plaintiff does not demonstrate that his position as a litigant is or was prejudiced as a direct result

of Fletcher’s alleged mail interference.

Likewise, Plaintiff does not sufficiently identify a non-frivolous, arguable claim that he

could not raise because of defendant’s actions, that he raised and lost, or for which he could not

obtain a remedy. He states that Fletcher interfered with his right to petition the Court; however,

he was able to initiate this proceeding by filing a complaint, and he was able to file an amended

pleading.

The Court should dismiss this claim.

5. Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff suggests that because he lacked the $71.00 from his account, he was unable to

purchase hygiene items, food, and writing materials with which to contact family. [doc. #s 1, p.

5; 9, p. 2].

“While the Constitution does not require that custodial inmates be housed in comfortable

prisons, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does require

that prisoners be afforded ‘humane conditions of confinement’ and prison officials are to ensure

that inmates receive adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care.” Herman v. Holiday, 238

F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). To establish

an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that a prison official was

deliberately indifferent to conditions that resulted in the “extreme deprivation[,]” Shannon v.

Vannoy, 682 F. App’x 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2017), of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.”8 Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 2008). To establish

deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the official knew of and disregarded an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must have been both aware of facts from the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must have drawn

8 The deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

This standard is not static: the inquiry is whether the conditions are contrary to “the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 102 (1976) (quotation marks and quoted source omitted).

the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

“Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in

combination when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing

effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or

exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue

blankets.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (internal quotation marks and quoted

source omitted).9 However, “Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the level

of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.”

Id. at 305.

Here, Plaintiff’s claim is impermissibly conclusory. He does not plausibly allege that he

endured an extreme deprivation of any life necessity and that he was exposed to a substantial risk

of serious harm. See Wingfield v. Garner, 2025 WL 1040649, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2025)

(finding that the plaintiff failed to state a conditions of confinement claim because he "failed to

plead what harm he experienced as a result [of the conditions] or what substantial risk of serious

harm" the conditions created). The Court should dismiss this threadbare claim.

6. Retaliation

Plaintiff claims that because he complained about Fletcher to a warden, he suffered

retaliation and was moved from his “original housing Phase III” to “a protective environment in

Phase II[.]” [doc. # 9, p. 2]. The “transition made it even harder to contact [his] family and

obtain the resources [he] need[ed].” Id.

9 “Such things as food, sleep, clothing, shelter, medical attention, reasonable safety, sleep, and

exercise have been recognized by courts as basic physical human needs subject to deprivation by

conditions of confinement.” Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654, 678 (M.D. La. 2007)

(citing cases).

Plaintiff, however, does not identify a responsible defendant. He references a warden, an

assistant warden, and a captain, but he does not address how they were personally involved.

Section 1983 provides in relevant part: “Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). If a person is not personally involved, then, a fortiori, he

cannot subject another to, or cause, a deprivation of constitutional rights. See Thompson v.

Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an essential element of a

civil rights cause of action.”).

Plaintiff does not sufficiently identify “any particular defendant’s personal involvement

in conduct that caused constitutional deprivation.” See Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr.

Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2017) (dismissing a claim that supervisory officials failed to

correctly house the plaintiff because despite the magistrate judge’s instruction to “state what

each defendant did[,]” the plaintiff did not identify a responsible defendant). The Court

disregards bare assertions of collective responsibility unsupported by concrete factual

allegations. See Martinez v. City of N. Richland Hills, 846 F. App’x 238, 243 (5th Cir. 2021);

Jones v. Hosemann, 812 F. App’x 235, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2020) (“It is not enough for a plaintiff to

simply allege that something unconstitutional happened to him. The plaintiff must plead that

each defendant individually engaged in actions that caused the unconstitutional harm.”).

Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this claim.

Recommendation

For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Tyrone Weber’s claims

that Defendant Fletcher deprived him of funds be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as legally

frivolous and for failing to state claims on which relief may be granted but otherwise

WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff's right to pursue relief under state law in state court for

the same alleged conduct.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's remaining claims be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as legally frivolous and for failing to state claims on which

relief may be granted.

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by

this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation

to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another

party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or

response to the district judge at the time of filing.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the

proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen

(14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the

legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See

Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).

In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 29" day of July, 2025.

Haft Cp Me Chesley

Kavita Dye Mc Chsky

United States Magistrate Judge

13