Apalone Inc. v. Schutt Sports LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

APALONE INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 21-cv-3186

)

SCHUTT SPORTS LLC and )

CERTOR SPORTS LLC )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.

On December 20, 2024, Plaintiff Apalone Inc. and Defendants

Schutt Sports LLC and Certor Sports LLC appeared before this

Court for a claim construction hearing. See 12/20/24 Minute

Entry. The parties presented arguments as to the proper

construction of two disputed claim terms in claim 27 of U.S. Patent

No. 8,938,817 (“the ’817 Patent”): “attachment mechanism” and

“second shell.” See id.; see also d/e 52, 53.

The Court considers each term’s proper construction in turn

and construes “second shell” using ordinary claim construction

rules to mean the outermost layer of the external helmet cushioning

system that has a top, a side, a front, and a rear. This Court also

construes “attachment mechanism” as a means-plus-function term

subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) with a function of coupling the second

shell to the first shell in a manner that may be removable, and

structures listed in the specification consisting of screws, chin-

strap snaps and face mask mounts.

I. BACKGROUND

Dr. Steven T. Baldi is the founder and owner of Apalone, Inc.

(“Plaintiff”) and the inventor of the ’817 Patent. Defendant Schutt

and Defendant Certor both manufacture football protective helmets

(collectively, “Defendants”). Defendant Certor manufactures the F7

football helmets at issue in this case and owns Defendant Schutt’s

assets.

On August 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed its Complaint alleging

infringement of the ’817 Patent, as well as U.S. Patent 10,617,167

(“the ‘167 patent”). d/e 1. On October 21, 2021, Defendants filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’817

Patent that challenged only the claim term “attachment

mechanism.” d/e 17. On November 15, 2021, Defendants filed a

petition for inter partes review with the United States Patent and

Trademark Office challenging the validity of the ‘167 patent’s

claims, including those asserted in this litigation. See d/e 22 at pp.

2-3, d/e 22-1. The parties then jointly requested the Court stay the

litigation pending the outcomes of Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment challenging the ’817 Patent and inter partes review

petition challenging the ‘167 patent. d/e 22.

On August 15, 2022, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board issued

a judgment cancelling all challenged ‘167 patent claims, including

those asserted in this case. See d/e 29, p. 1; d/e 29-1. The ‘167

patent is therefore no longer at issue in this case. See d/e 33.

Infringement of claim 27 of the ’817 Patent remains at issue.

Claim 27 of the ’817 Patent states:

I claim: … 27. An external cushioning system for a helmet

comprising: a first shell having an outer surface; a second

shell outward of said outer surface of said first shell; an

absorptive layer disposed between the outer surface of the

first shell and the second shell; an attachment

mechanism to couple the second shell to the first shell;

and wherein the second shell outward of said first shell

by an offset distance, said offset distance being less than

around one-half inch.

’817 Patent col. 12 ll. 39-50 (emphasis added).

On January 3, 2024, this Court entered an Opinion and Order

denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. d/e 36. This

Court found that triable issues of fact exist concerning infringement

of claim 27 of the ’817 Patent and that a reasonable jury could find

that the “attachment mechanism” limitation is present in the F7

Accused Products. Id. at p. 8.

On July 24, 2024, the parties filed a Joint Claim Construction

Statement disputing the meanings of two terms in claim 27 of the

’817 Patent:

1. Whether the term “shell” should be given its plain and

ordinary meaning (as proposed by Apalone) or construed

to mean “a rigid, semi-rigid or flexible material that covers

the top, side, front, and rear of a person’s head” (as

proposed by Defendants); and

2. Whether the term “attachment mechanism” is subject

to Section 112(f)—Apalone proposes that it is; Defendants

propose that it is not.

d/e 47, p. 2. The parties’ briefings later specified the first contested

term, “shell,” to instead be “second shell.” d/e 52, p. 6; d/e 53, p. 7.

On August 7, 2024, Plaintiff filed its Claim Construction Brief and

on August 21, 2024, Defendants filed their Claim Construction

Memorandum. d/e 52, d/e 53. On November 15, 2024, Defendants

filed a Motion to Request a Claim Construction Hearing. d/e 56.

On December 20, 2024, the parties appeared before this Court

for a claim construction hearing and presented arguments as to the

proper construction of “attachment mechanism” and “second shell”

in claim 27 of the ’817 Patent. See December 20, 2024, Minute

Entry; see also d/e 52, 53.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a question of law that “falls ‘exclusively

within the province of the court,’ not that of the jury.” Teva Pharms.

USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 325 (2015) (quoting

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)).

“[T]he district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent

(the patent claims and specifications, along with the patent’s

prosecution history), [so] the judge’s determination will amount

solely to a determination of law.” Teva, 574 U.S. at 331.

Claim terms “are generally given their ordinary and customary

meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when

read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.”

Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). “There are only two exceptions to this

general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as

his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full

scope of a claim term either in the specification or during

prosecution.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365 (citing Vitronics Corp. v.

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

It is “entirely appropriate for a court, when conducting claim

construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance

as to the meaning of the claims.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d

1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This Court “must interpret the claims

in light of the specification, yet avoid impermissibly importing

limitations from the specification. That balance turns on how the

specification characterizes the claimed invention.” Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l

Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal

citations omitted).

Additionally, certain claim terms require special construction.

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), “[a]n element in a claim for a

combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a

specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts

in support thereof.” Id. (emphasis added). Such claims “shall be

construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts

described in the specification and equivalents thereof.” Id. Claims

subject to § 112(f) are therefore often known as means-plus-

function claims.

As outlined in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339

(Fed. Cir. 2015), to determine whether § 112(f) applies to a claim

term, Federal Circuit “precedent has long recognized the importance

of the presence or absence of the word ‘means.’” Id. at 1348. “[T]he

use of the word ‘means’ in a claim element creates a rebuttable

presumption that § 112[(f)] applies,” and “the failure to use the word

‘means’ also creates a rebuttable presumption … that § 112[(f)] does

not apply.” Id. However, “the essential inquiry is not merely the

presence or absence of the word ‘means’ but whether the words of

the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to

have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). Notably,

Generic terms such as “mechanism,” “element,” “device,”

and other nonce words that reflect nothing more than

verbal constructs may be used in a claim in a manner that

is tantamount to using the word “means” because they

“typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure”

and therefore may invoke § 112[(f)].

Id. at 1350 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

If a claim term is subject to § 112(f), “[c]onstruing a means-

plus-function claim term is a two-step process. The court must first

identify the claimed function. Then, the court must determine what

structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the

claimed function.” Id. at 1351 (internal citations omitted).

III. CONSTRUCTION OF “SECOND SHELL”

A. The Court Now Construes the Claim Term “Second Shell.”

Plaintiff argues that “second shell” is within the subset of

terms that “mean what they say, and do not need further

definition.” d/e 52, p. 7. Plaintiff argues that courts are not

required to specifically construe every claim term, that Defendants

failed to argue that “second shell” required specific construction in

their Motion for Summary Judgment filings, and that this Court

repeatedly used “second shell” in its prior Opinion and Order

without further defining the term. Id. at pp. 7-8.

Defendants argue, on the other hand, that this Court must

construe “second shell” because the term “does not have a singular,

clear lay meaning, as evidenced by the eleven different dictionary

definitions that stretch across highly varied subject-matter[s].” d/e

53, p. 23. Further, Defendants argue, “second shell” is used

“according to a special meaning (not a lay meaning nor a

universally understood meaning in the art)” as “the patentee

provided a definition to guide [a person of ordinary skill in the

relevant art of protective helmet design and manufacturing] in

understanding the term.” Id. at p. 24.

When “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood

by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay

judges,” claim construction “involves little more than the

application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood

words” and “general purpose dictionaries may be helpful.” Phillips

v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal

citations omitted).

This Court agrees with Defendants that there is no generic

meaning to the word “shell,” either for a person of ordinary skill in

the art (here, of sports helmet design) or in general, as

demonstrated by the over one dozen definitions for the term,

stretching across nearly as many subjects, found in the dictionary.

See Shell, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shell (August 28,

2025). Therefore, this Court now construes the term “second shell.”

B. Defendants’ Proposed “Second Shell” Definition Does Not

Read Out Any Embodiments Disclosed in the ’817 Patent

Specification as Plaintiff Claims.

Defendants argue that “second shell” should be construed to

mean “a rigid, semi-rigid or flexible material that covers the top,

side, front and rear of a person’s head.” d/e 53, p. 18. In support,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff defined “second shell” as such in the

’817 Patent specification and that every embodiment of Plaintiff’s

external helmet cushioning system in the ’817 Patent satisfies that

definition. Id. at pp. 19-23.

Defendants cite to the ’817 Patent specification language,

which states that “[a]s shown in FIG. 1, the present external helmet

cushioning system 10 includes a [second] shell 12, an absorptive

layer 14, and at least one attachment member 16 to couple the

system to an existing helmet 100.” ’817 Patent col. 3 ll. 8-11. The

’817 Patent specification goes on to state, “[t]he shell 12 has a top

20, a side 22, a front 24, and a rear 26. Throughout the entire

disclosure, the shell 12 may be a flexible material, a semi-rigid

material, or a rigid material.” Id. at ll. 30-33.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants’ proposed definition for several

reasons. d/e 52, pp. 8-12. First, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’

proposed definition “reads out embodiments disclosed in the ’817

Patent specification.” Id. at p. 5.

The “Field of the Invention” section of the ’817 Patent

specification states that the “external helmet cushioning system

that can be applied over any existing helmet or incorporated into a

newly manufactured helmet; in particular, helmets for high-impact

sports such as football, hockey, lacrosse, snow sports, or any other

sport that uses a helmet.” ’817 Patent col. 1 ll. 14-18. The “Detailed

Description” section of the ’817 Patent specification states that “the

shell 12 of the present external helmet cushioning system 10’ may

be molded or otherwise manufactured into a shape that fits any

currently manufactured helmet 100.” Id. at col. 4 ll. 30-33.

Therefore, Plaintiff argues, “the claimed invention of the ’817 Patent

could be reasonably implemented on helmets that lack a top, sides,

a front, or a back.” d/e 52, p. 9.

This Court must look “to whether the specification refers to a

limitation only as a part of less than all possible embodiments or

whether the specification read as a whole suggests that the very

character of the invention requires the limitation be a part of every

embodiment.” Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361,

1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “[W]here the specification makes clear at

various points that the claimed invention is narrower than the

claim language might imply, it is entirely permissible and proper to

limit the claims.” Id. (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced

Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).

The ’817 Patent references four specific embodiments of the

external helmet cushioning system: three embodiments depicted in

seven figures and described in the specification, and one

embodiment only described in the specification. ’817 Patent col. 2 ll.

43-59; col. 7 ll. 1-2. Figure 1 and Figure 2 each depict a different

embodiment of the invention and are labeled as having a top, a

side, a front, and a rear. Id. at Drawing Sheets 1-2; col. 2 ll. 43-48.

Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 all depict differently

angled views of the same embodiment depicted in Figure 2. Id. at

Drawing Sheets 3-5, col. 2 ll. 49-59. The ’817 Patent refers only to

the embodiment in Figure 5 and Figure 6 (and thus Figure 2) as a

“preferred embodiment of the present external helmet cushioning

system.” Id. at col. 5 ll. 11-15.

Figure 7 depicts “an alternative embodiment of the external

helmet conditioning system” and is not labeled as having a top, a

side, a front, or a rear. Id. at Drawing Sheet 6; col. 2 ll. 57-59.

However, Figure 7 is “cut along the same line as” Figure 5—which is

not labeled as having a top, a side, a front, and a rear but depicts

the same embodiment as does Figure 2, which is labeled as having

a top, a side, a front, and a rear. Id., see also Drawing Sheet 5.

Lastly, the ’817 Patent specification states that “[i]n an alternative

embodiment not shown, the rigid shell may be comprised of two

parts, an upper part and a lower part.” Id. at col. 7 ll. 1-2. However,

the ’817 Patent specification does not state that the second shell

being comprised of two parts precludes the second shell from

having a top, a side, a front, and a rear. Therefore, the ’817 Patent

does not conclusively depict or describe an embodiment—preferred

or otherwise—of the invention with a second shell that lacks a top,

a side, a front, or a rear.

Plaintiff cites Defendants’ 2966 helmet shell as lacking a back

and argues that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would

recognize that if a second shell was molded or otherwise

manufactured into a shape that fit [the] 2966 helmet shells, the

second shell would not have a back.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff

reasons, Defendants’ proposed “construction would improperly

exclude a preferred embodiment of the ’817 Patent implemented on

a ‘currently manufactured helmet.’” Id.

“[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the

meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in

the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the

effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp.,

415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, Plaintiff does not

establish that Defendants’ 2966 helmet, or any other potentially

backless helmet, was a “currently manufactured helmet,” especially

“for [a] high-impact sport[],” at the time of the ’817 Patent’s

publication. ’817 Patent col. 2 ll. 43-59.

C. Defendants’ “Second Shell” Definition Improperly Reads

the Word “Cover” Into the ’817 Patent.

Plaintiff also raises several arguments as to why a definition

for “second shell” should not require coverage of the wearer’s head:

that the “second shell” in the ’817 Patent Figure 5 embodiment

“covers only a portion of the [wearer]’s head, contradicting the

definition proposed by” Defendants; that Defendants “attempt[] to

improperly import limitations from the specification” by defining the

shell “to cover the [] top, side, front, and rear of a [wearer]’s head;”

and that Defendants’ use of the term “shell plate” in their own

patent indicates that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would

certainly recognize that a helmet shell is not required to surround a

wearer’s head.” d/e 52, pp. 6-9.

“When a patentee acts as his own lexicographer in redefining

the meaning of particular claim terms away from their ordinary

meaning, he must clearly express that intent in the written

description.” Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d

1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The ’817 Patent only uses the word or

derivatives of “cover” twice in the context of the second shell. The

’817 Patent specification states that Figure 2 “illustrates one

embodiment of the external helmet cushioning system 10’ installed

over an existing helmet 100. The outer shell 12 of the external

helmet cushioning system 10’ is shown substantially covering the

entire existing helmet 100.” ’817 Patent col. 4 ll. 28-30 (emphasis

added). The ’817 Patent specification later states,

In another embodiment, if a forehead cushion 32 is

incorporated into a semi-rigid shell 12, it may have a cover

44 that is fabric (shown in FIG. 7) if the shell is more-rigid,

or forehead cushion 32 may be covered by the semi-rigid

shell (shown in FIG. 5) as the semi-rigid shell may provide

sufficient flexure to displace and utilized [sic] the full

capacity of the forehead cushion 32.

Id. at col. 6 ll. 15-22 (emphasis added).

“[T]his court will not at any time import limitations from the

specification into the claims.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Lab’ys,

512 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

Therefore, this Court will not read these limitations found in two

embodiments in the specification—the second shell substantially

covering the entire existing helmet and the second shell covering an

optional forehead cushion—into the claim term “second shell.”

Defendants argue in support of their definition that “each

portion of the second ‘shell’ (i.e., the ‘top,’ ‘side,’ [‘]front,’ and ‘rear’)

[is] positioned over the corresponding part of the wearer’s head” and

“refer[s] to orientations relative to the wearer’s head.” d/e 53, pp.

14-15. Defendants are correct. Nonetheless, that positioning and

orientation of the second shell’s top, side, front, and rear does not

require that the second shell cover the top, side, front, and rear,

respectively, of the wearer’s head.

Defendants further argue that “[e]very second ‘shell 12’ shown

or described in the patent has” a top, a side, a front, and a rear.’”

Id. at p. 21. Defendants are correct—as described earlier, the ’817

Patent does not conclusively depict an embodiment, preferred or

otherwise, of the invention with a shell that lacks a top, a side, a

front, or a rear. However, that does not require that the second shell

cover the top, side, front, and rear of the wearer’s head.

D. The Court Construes “Second Shell” to Mean the

Outermost Layer of the External Helmet Cushioning

System that has a Top, a Side, a Front, and a Rear.

Since neither party’s proposed definition aligns with the ’817

Patent, this Court turns to “the written description for guidance as

to the meaning of the claims.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d

1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “[W]here the specification makes clear

at various points that the claimed invention is narrower than the

claim language might imply, it is entirely permissible and proper to

limit the claims.” Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361,

1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The ’817 Patent specification states, “[t]he shell 12 has a top

20, a side 22, a front 24, and a rear 26. Throughout the entire

disclosure, the shell 12 may be a flexible material, a semi-rigid

material, or a rigid material.” ’817 Patent col. 3 ll. 30-33. Plaintiff

does not offer an example of a first helmet shell lacking a top, a

side, a front, or a rear manufactured at the time “of the effective

filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415

F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The ’817 Patent does not

conclusively depict an embodiment, preferred or otherwise, of the

invention with a second shell lacking a top, a side, a front, or a rear.

The ’817 Patent uses the term “shell 12” forty-eight times, all

in the “Detailed Description” of the specification. See generally ’817

Patent. The first four uses of “shell 12” appear in the first full

paragraph of column 3:

As shown in FIG. 1, the present external helmet

cushioning system 10 includes a shell 12, an absorptive

layer 14, and at least one attachment member 16 to couple

the system to an existing helmet 100. The attachment

mechanisms 16 may removeably [sic] couple the system to

the helmet 100. As shown, the shell 12 is the outermost

layer and the absorptive layer 14 is generally disposed

between the shell 12 and the outer surface 102 of existing

helmet 100… The shell 12 has a top 20, a side 22, a front

24, 30 and a rear 26.

’817 Patent col. 3 ll. 8-15, 30 (emphasis added).

In the ’817 Patent’s subsequent forty-four uses of “shell 12,”

the term is limited in some way: language indicating possibility,

such as the word “may,” accompanies the term; the term is

explicitly used to depict a specific figure drawing or embodiment of

the invention; and/or the shell in question is specified as made

from a particular material, whether “flexible,” “semi-rigid” or “rigid.”

See ’817 Patent col. 3 ll. 32, 34, 36, 39, 41, 44, 46, 49, 52, 54, 56,

63, 65, 67; col. 4 ll. 1, 3, 4, 6, 13, 28, 30, 47, 53, 55, 58, 64; col. 5

ll. 14, 62, 65; col. 6 ll. 3, 4-5, 16, 18, 24, 30, 37, 41, 42, 44, 46, 61;

col. 7 l. 24; col. 8 ll. 4, 35.

Also instructive is the Plaintiff’s use of differing versions of the

claim term “external helmet cushioning system” throughout the

specification. Plaintiff adds an apostrophe and uses “external

helmet cushioning system 10’ ” to reference a specific embodiment

of the external helmet cushioning system as depicted in one of the

patent’s figures. For example, the third full paragraph in column 4

of the ’817 Patent begins, “FIG. 2 illustrates one embodiment of the

external helmet cushioning system 10’ installed over an existing

helmet 100.” ’817 Patent col. 4 ll. 26-27.

Conversely, Plaintiff drops the apostrophe and uses “external

helmet cushioning system 10” to reference the system generally. For

example, the first full paragraph of column 3 of the ’817 Patent

listed earlier references Figure 1—not by listing the components of

the external helmet cushioning system shown in that particular

figure, but by listing the components of the external helmet

cushioning system overall, including but not exclusively as depicted

in Figure 1:

As shown in FIG. 1, the present external helmet

cushioning system 10 includes a shell 12, an absorptive

layer 14, and at least one attachment member 16 to couple

the system to an existing helmet 100.

’817 Patent col. 3 ll. 8-11. Therefore, the “shell 12” as described in

that paragraph is presumably the “shell 12” of the invention at

large, including but not limited to the shell depicted in Figure 1.

Those different uses of “shell” and “external helmet cushioning

system” throughout the ’817 Patent inform their unique use in the

first full paragraph of column 3 of the patent. There, Plaintiff “sets

out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer” as to the term

“second shell”: “the outermost layer” of the external helmet

cushioning system that “has a top[], a side[], a front[], and a rear[].”

See Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365

(Fed. Cir. 2012); ’817 Patent col. 3 ll. 8-15, 30-31.

The Court notes that it must look “to whether the specification

refers to a limitation only as a part of less than all possible

embodiments or whether the specification read as a whole suggests

that the very character of the invention requires the limitation be a

part of every embodiment.” Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342

F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “[W]here the specification makes

clear at various points that the claimed invention is narrower than

the claim language might imply, it is entirely permissible and

proper to limit the claims.” Id. (citing SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v.

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345 (Fed. Cir.

2001)).

As discussed earlier, the ’817 Patent does not conclusively

depict or describe an embodiment—preferred or otherwise—of the

invention with a second shell that lacks a top, a side, a front, or a

rear. Also, all seven figures in the ’817 Patent show the “shell 12” as

the outermost layer of the external helmet cushioning system. See

id. at Drawing Sheets 1-6. This aligns with the specification’s “Field

of the Invention” section asserting that the invention “can be

applied over any existing helmet.” ’817 Patent col. 1 l. 15. As such,

“the specification read as a whole suggests that the very character

of the invention requires the limitation be a part of every

embodiment” with regard to the second shell being the outermost

layer with a top, a side, a front, or a rear. Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade

Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Therefore, this Court follows the lead of the Plaintiff acting as

his own lexicographer and construes “second shell” to mean the

outermost layer of the external helmet cushioning system that has

a top, a side, a front, and a rear.

IV. CONSTRUCTION OF “ATTACHMENT MECHANISM”

A. The Court Now Construes the Claim Term “Attachment

Mechanism.”

Plaintiff argues that Defendants conceded that this Court

should construe “attachment mechanism” as a means-plus-

function claim term subject to § 112(f). d/e 52, p. 4. Plaintiff cites

Defendants’ assertion in their Motion for Summary Judgment that

“[t]he Court should construe the term ‘attachment mechanism’…as

a ‘means[-]plus[-]function’ term under § 112(f).” Id.; see also d/e 17,

p. 30. Plaintiff also cites this Court’s language in its prior Opinion

and Order that “[t]he parties agree that the term ‘attachment

mechanism’ is a means-plus-function claim limitation under 35

U.S.C. § 112(f).” d/e 52, p. 4; d/e 36, p. 8.

Plaintiff asserts that further construction of “attachment

mechanism” is unnecessary because this Court properly construed

the term as a means-plus-function term under § 112(f) in this

Court’s last Opinion and Order. See d/e 52, p. 5. This Court’s last

Opinion and Order noted that “attachment mechanism” consisted of

“chin-strap snaps/screws and face mask mounts,” “includ[ing]

screw heads adapted to receive a Phillips style screw bit,” that

“removably coupl[e] the second shell to the first shell.” d/e 36, pp.

8-10. That Opinion and Order also noted, “[t]he parties agree…that

the two disclosed means of the ‘attachment mechanism’ in the ’817

Patent are (1) chin-strap snaps/screws and (2) face-mask mounts

and their equivalents.” Id. at p. 8.

While Plaintiff’s citations are correct, in the interest of clarity

and completion, the Court now construes the claim term

“attachment mechanism.”

B. Defendants’ Arguments That “Attachment Mechanism”

Should Be Subject to Ordinary Claim Construction Rules

Are Not Compelling.

Defendants raise several arguments as to why “attachment

mechanism” should be subject to ordinary claim construction rules.

d/e 53, p. 10. First, Defendants argue that claim 27 does not use

means-plus-function language and is, thus, presumed to be subject

to ordinary claim construction rules under Williamson v. Citrix

Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015). d/e 53, p. 11.

However, as discussed earlier, Williamson also states that

“mechanism” is in a class of words that “may be used in a claim in

a manner that is tantamount to using the word ‘means’ because

they typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure and

therefore may invoke § 112[(f)].” Williamson at 792 F.3d at 1350

(internal citations omitted).

Further, the cases Defendants cite in support do not cover

both parts of the term “attachment mechanism.” See d/e 53, p. 11.

Additionally, all but one of the cases Defendants cite are from a

fellow district court, all but one of which are located outside of this

Court’s circuit and none of which bind this Court. Id., see also Al-

Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, 174 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A]n

attaching portion . . . supplie[d] structural, not functional, terms”

and “precluded” treatment as a “means-plus-function” claim

limitation); UV Partners, Inc. v. Proximity Sys., Inc., No. 20-CV-

4210, 2022 WL 2757837, at *11 (S.D. Tex. July 14, 2022)

(“attachment device” connotes sufficient structure; Section 112(f)

does not apply); Nanology Alpha LLC v. WITec Wissenschaftliche

Instrumente und Technologie GmbH, No. 6:16-CV-00445-RWS,

2017 WL 5905272, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2017) (“movement

mechanism” connotes sufficient structure; Section 112(f) does not

apply); Blackbird Tech LLC v. ELB Elecs., No. 15-CV-56 (RGA),

2016 WL 7451622, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 28, 2016), vacated on other

grounds, 895 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“fastening mechanism”

connotes sufficient structure; Section 112(f) does not apply); Uni-

Sys, LLC v. United States Tennis Ass’n Nat’l Tennis Ctr. Inc., No.

17-CV-147(KAM)(CLP), 2020 WL 3960841, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. July 13,

2020) (“retention mechanism” connotes sufficient structure; Section

112(f) does not apply); Bonutti Rsch., Inc. v. Lantz Med., Inc., No.

114CV00609SEBMJD, 2016 WL 247752, at *16 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 21,

2016) (“bending mechanism” connotes sufficient structure; Section

112(f) does not apply).

Next, Defendants argue that the ’817 Patent specification

identifies examples supporting the structural scope of “attachment

mechanism”— “screws (item 16), chin-strap snaps (item 104), and

face-mask mounts (item 106)”—and “does not specially define

‘attachment mechanism’ or disavow coverage of any structures that

would fall within the scope of that term.” d/e 53, p. 12. Defendants

cite in support Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303, 1316–

17 (Fed. Cir. 2005), which quotes the United States Patent and

Trademark Office rule that patent application claims “must conform

to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification”

and that claim terms “must find clear support or antecedent basis

in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims

may be ascertainable by reference to the description.” Id. (quoting

37 C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1)).

The Federal Circuit has held that “even if the claim element

specifies a function, if it also recites sufficient structure or material

for performing that function, § 112[(f)] does not apply.” Rodime PLC

v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

However, Defendants’ cited examples of “attachment mechanism”

are in the ’817 Patent specification, not in any of the patent’s

claims. See ’817 Patent, col. 4 ll. 33-44. “It is the claims, not the

written description, which define the scope of the patent right,”

such that a “court may not import limitations from the written

description into the claims.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1346 (citing

Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998))

(emphasis in original). Therefore, the ’817 Patent specification

containing examples of the “attachment mechanism” structure,

without defining or delineating exclusions from “attachment

mechanism,” does not preclude § 112(f) from applying to

“attachment mechanism.”

Plaintiff’s patent specification may not “specially define

‘attachment mechanism’ or disavow coverage of any structures that

would fall within the scope of that term.” d/e 53, p. 12. But that

does not run afoul of the United States Patent and Trademark

Office rule that claims “must conform to the invention as set forth

in the remainder of the specification” and that “the terms and

phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent

basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the

claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description.” 37

C.F.R. § 1.75(d)(1). “Attachment mechanism” in claim 27 of the ’817

Patent conforms to Plaintiff’s patented invention as set forth in

Defendants’ referenced specification terms “screws (item 16), chin-

strap snaps (item 104), and face-mask mounts (item 106).” d/e 53,

p. 12. “Attachment mechanism,” as used in claim 27, has clear

support in the description’s “screws (item 16), chin-strap snaps

(item 104), and face-mask mounts (item 106)” such that the

meaning of “attachment mechanism” is ascertainable by reference

to the description. See ’817 Patent, col. 4 ll. 33-44.

Next, Defendants argue that “attachment mechanism” should

be construed using ordinary claim interpretation rules because

Plaintiff did not dispute construing “attachment mechanism” during

the prosecution of the application that led to the ’817 Patent before

the Patent Office. d/e 53, p. 12. However, Defendants then admit

that they did not dispute Plaintiff’s asserted construction of

“attachment mechanism” as a means-plus-function term in their

Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at pp. 16-18; see also d/e 17, p.

30. Since both parties have changed course as to their prior

definitions, Defendants’ final statements negate each other.

C. This Court Construes “Attachment Mechanism” as a

Means-Plus-Function Term Subject to § 112(f).

Neither party references any Federal Circuit Court of Appeals

cases directly assessing whether a patent claim term of “attachment

mechanism” is subject to means-plus-function construction.

However, the Court has reviewed three Federal Circuit cases that

shed light on this inquiry.

In Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277

(Fed. Cir. 2002), the Federal Circuit described a patent claim’s

“means for affixing” direct light reflectors to a stem as an

“attachment mechanism.” Id. at p. 1282 (emphasis added). The

Federal Circuit then noted that “[t]he district court does not appear

to have treated this [affixing means] claim language as a means-

plus-function limitation according to 35 U.S.C. § 112[(f)]. The

parties have not appealed this aspect of the district court’s claim

construction.” Id. at 1283 n. 1. Thus, the Federal Circuit seemed to

view “attachment mechanism” as plausibly subject to claim

construction as a means-plus-function term—and to view its

decision not to subject that claim to § 112(f) as warranting an

explanation of the underlying procedural reasons.

In Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580,

(Fed. Cir. 1996), the Federal Circuit considered the claim term

“detent mechanism.” Id. at 1583. That the claim term was “defined

in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element

containing that term into a ‘means for performing a specified

function,’” the Federal Circuit held, as “[m]any devices take their

names from the functions they perform.” Id. In that vein, “the noun

‘detent’ denotes a type of device with a generally understood

meaning in the mechanical arts, even though the definitions are

expressed in functional terms.” Id.

Subsequently, in Massachusetts Institute of Technology and

Electronics for Imaging, Inc. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344

(Fed. Cir. 2006), the Federal Circuit considered the term “colorant

selection mechanism” in the wake of its decision in Greenberg:

In contrast [to the term “detent”], the term “colorant

selection,” which modifies “mechanism” here, is not

defined in the specification and has no dictionary

definition, and there is no suggestion that it has a

generally understood meaning in the art. We therefore

agree with the district court that “colorant selection

mechanism” does not connote sufficient structure to a

person of ordinary skill in the art to avoid [§] 112[(f)]

treatment.

Id. at 1354.

Taking all of the parties’ arguments and applicable caselaw

into consideration, this Court construes “attachment mechanism”

as a means-plus-function term under § 112(f). Pursuant to

Williamson, the use of the term “mechanism” in claim 27 “is

tantamount to using the word “means,” as it does “not connote

sufficiently definite structure…and therefore invoke[s]” § 112(f).

Williamson at 792 F.3d at 1350 (internal citations omitted). In other

words, use of the word “mechanism” is akin to “use of the word

‘means’ in [claim 27, and] creates a rebuttable presumption that

§ 112[(f)] applies.” Id. at 1348. Defendants’ arguments do not rebut

that presumption.

The nature of the word “attachment” also supports the term

“attachment mechanism” falling under § 112(f). The dictionary

definitions of the noun “attachment” are quite broad: “a seizure by

legal process,” “the state of being personally attached,” “a device

attached to a machine or implement,” “the physical connection by

which one thing is attached to another,” “the process of physically

attaching,” and “a separate document or file that is included and

sent with an electronic message (such as an email or text

message).” Attachment, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-

Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/attachment (August 28, 2025).

The two definitions that refer to a physical object—“a device

attached to a machine or implement” and “the physical connection

by which one thing is attached to another”—are most relevant to

this inquiry. Id. But those two definitions define the “attachment”

object’s orientation relative to other objects—either affixed to

another object or connected between two other objects—and do not

define the “attachment” object itself. Unlike the term “detent,” there

is no indication that the term “attachment” denotes “a type of device

with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical arts.”

Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583.

Since “the term ‘[attachment],’ which modifies ‘mechanism’

here, is not defined in the specification,” has no applicable

dictionary definition, “and there is no suggestion that it has a

generally understood meaning in the art,” the Court finds that

“‘[attachment] mechanism’ does not connote sufficient structure to

a person of ordinary skill in the art to avoid [§] 112[(f)] treatment.”

Abacus Software, 462 F.3d at 1354. Therefore, this Court construes

“attachment mechanism” as a means-plus-function claim limitation

subject to § 112(f).

This Court “must [next] identify the claimed function” of the

term “attachment mechanism.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. As

stated in the ’817 Patent, the function of the “attachment

mechanism” is to “couple the second shell to the first shell” in a

manner that may be “removabl[e].” ’817 Patent col. 12 ll. 46-47, col.

3 ll. 11-12. Then, this Court “must determine what structure, if

any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed

function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351. Pursuant to the ’817

Patent, the structures disclosed in the specification corresponding

to the claimed function are screws as in the embodiments depicted

in Figures 1 and 2, as well as “chin-strap snaps” and “face mask

mounts” as in the embodiment depicted in Figure 2. See ’817

Patent, Drawing Sheets 1-2, col. 4 ll. 33-4.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court construes “second shell”

using ordinary claim construction rules to mean the outermost

layer of the external helmet cushioning system that has a top, a

side, a front, and a rear. Additionally, this Court construes

“attachment mechanism” as a means-plus-function term subject to

§ 112(f) with a function of coupling the second shell to the first shell

in a manner that may be removable, and structures listed in the

specification consisting of screws, chin-strap snaps and face mask

mounts.

ENTERED: August 29, 2025.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE