Fodor v. The Honorable Judge Jennifer Harlacher-Sibum

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LOUISE FODOR,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-00647

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

THE HONORABLE JUDGE JENNIFER

HARLACHER-SIBUM, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Presently before the Court is the June 3, 2025, report and recommendation of

Magistrate Judge William I. Arbuckle (“the Report”) (Doc. 12), recommending the Court

dismiss Plaintiff Louise Fodor’s (“Fodor”) pro se amended complaint without granting leave

to amend because her claims against Defendants the Judicial Conduct Board of Pennsylvania,

the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania (collectively, the “Pennsylvania Defendants”) are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and because her claims against Defendant Judge Jennifer Harlacher-Sibum

(“Judge Harlacher-Sibum”) are barred by the Younger Abstention Doctrine. (Doc. 12, at 7-

14). The Report also recommends the Court deny Fodor’s motion to expedite proceedings

(Doc. 3) as moot. (Doc. 12, at 15). The Report informed Fodor that she had 14 days to file an

objection. (Doc. 12, at 17). On July 2, 2025, Fodor filed a “Notice of Appeal” but called the

Court the next day to inform the Court that her “Notice of Appeal” should have been filed as

an objection to the Report. (Doc. 13). Although Fodor mislabeled this objection and filed it

after the 14-day deadline to file an objection had passed, under the liberal pleading standards

for pro se plaintiffs, the Court will consider Fodor’s objection. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (stating “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’”) (citing Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Wright v. Curcillo, No. 1:21-CV-00481, 2022 WL

20033342, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2022) (considering a pro se plaintiff's late-filed objection

to a report and recommendation). Based on the Court's review of Fodor’s objection along

with the Report, Fodor’s objection (Doc. 13) is OVERULED, and the Report (Doc. 12) will

be ADOPTED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“A district court may ‘designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition’ of certain matters pending before the court.” Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Within fourteen

days of being served a Report and Recommendation, “any party may serve and file written

objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party timely files objections, the district court is to conduct a de

novo review of the challenged portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings unless the objection

is “not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Cir.1984); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on

the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Rahman v.

Gartley, No. CV 3:23-363, 2024 WL 555894, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (citing United v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

Il. DISCUSSION

Since the Report correctly states the procedural and factual background of this case, it

will not be repeated in its entirety here. (Doc. 12). However, the necessary background for the

purpose of the instant Order is as follows. Fodor initiated this pro se action by filing a

complaint on April 10, 2025. (Doc. 1). On April 10, 2025, Fodor filed a motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis which Judge Arbuckle granted on April 28, 2025. (Doc. 2, Doc. 6).

Also on April 10, 2025, Fodor filed a motion to expedite proceedings. (Doc. 3). Fodor filed

the operative amended complaint on May 28, 2025. (Doc. 11). The amended complaint

alleges that Judge Harlacher-Sibum violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution by issuing various allegedly biased rulings in a state child custody

proceeding. (Doc. 11). The amended complaint also alleges that the Pennsylvania Defendants

violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to investigate Judge Harlacher-

Sibum’s alleged bias after Fodor filed various complaints. (Doc. 11, at 11). Judge Arbuckle

screened the amended complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and

recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed as to the Pennsylvania Defendants

because Fodor’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc. 12, at 7-8). Judge

Arbuckle next recommended that Fodor’s claims against Judge Harlacher-Sibum be

dismissed under the Younger Abstention Doctrine. (Doc. 12, at 9-14). Judge Arbuckle

explained that under the Younger Abstention Doctrine, absent clear bad faith or extraordinary

circumstances, courts should abstain from issuing injunctive or declaratory relief which

interferes with state child custody proceedings that are 1) judicial in nature, 2) implicate an

important state interest, and 3) afford adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. (Doc. 12,

at 9-14). Judge Arbuckle determined that the Younger Abstention Doctrine applied to Fodor’s

child custody proceedings and recommended dismissal on that basis. (Doc. 12, at 9-14). Judge

Arbuckle further recommended that Fodor be denied leave to amend because amendment

would be futile due to Fodor’s claims being barred by both the Eleventh Amendment and the

Younger Abstention Doctrine. (Doc. 12, at 14-15). Finally, Judge Arbuckle recommended that

Fodor’s motion to expedite proceedings be denied as moot. (Doc. 12, at 16). Fodor’s objection

asserts that the Report was flawed because she was not afforded a hearing and because Judge

Jennifer Harlacher-Sibum and the Pennsylvania Defendants violated her rights under the First

and Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 13, at 2). This objection does not respond to Judge

Arbuckle’s findings.

After reviewing the relevant filings, the Court finds no error in Judge Arbuckle’s

conclusion that Fodor’s amended complaint should be dismissed. (Doc. 12). The Court finds

Judge Arbuckle’s analysis to be well-reasoned and supported by the applicable law. (Doc. 12).

Courts in this Circuit have held that even though pro se pleadings must be liberally construed,

“courts should not assume the role of advocate and dismissal is proper where claims are

supported only by vague and conclusory allegations.” Coley v. Beard, No. CIVA 3:05CV2290,

2006 WL 1670253, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2006). Courts overrule objections when they lack

legal foundation and are “more commentary than recognizable substantive objection.” Coley,

2006 WL 1670253, at *4 (overruling pro se objections that are vague and unintelligible and

stating “[p]laintiff's filings are more in the nature of a fishing expedition where he would have

the [c]ourt accept as factual allegations what are more accurately characterized as bald

assertions or legal conclusions and assume the role of advocate in fashioning a legal theory

4

for him.”); see also Booker v. Shannon, No. CIV.A. 00-CV-2055, 2003 WL 22872039 (E.D. Pa.

Dec. 2, 2003) (overruling objections where they are “vague” and without facts to establish

legitimacy of legal conclusions). Further, a magistrate judge is not required “to hold a hearing

prior to issuing a report and recommendation.” McArdle v. Verizon Comme'ns Inc., 567 F. App'x

116, 118 (3d Cir. 2014). Fodor’s objection is more a commentary than a substantial objection

and Judge Arbuckle was not required to hold a hearing prior to issuing the Report. (Doc. 13).

Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Arbuckle’s conclusion that Fodor’s amended

complaint should be dismissed. (Doc. 12).

I. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court again finds no clear error in the Report recommending that leave to amend

be denied. (Doc. 12, at 14-15). The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is

vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative

amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State

Hosp, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Granting leave to amend would be futile here because

Fodor’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the Younger Abstention Doctrine.

See Jones v. Delaware Health, 709 F. App'x 163, 164 (3d Cir. 2018) (nonprecedential) (finding

amendment futile where claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Williams v.

Butler, No. CV 24-1425-GBW, 2025 WL 1755286, at *2 (D. Del. June 25, 2025) (finding

amendment futile where claims are barred by the Younger Abstention Doctrine). As such, the

Court adopts with the Report’s recommendation to deny leave to amend.' (Doc. 12, at 14-

' Because the Court adopts the Report’s recommendation to dismiss the amended

complaint without leave to amend, the Court also adopts the Report’s recommendation to

deny Fodor’s motion to expedite proceedings (Doc. 3) as moot. (Doc. 12, at 15)

15). However, the Court also adopts the Report’s recommendation that Fodor’s claims “be

dismissed without prejudice to [Fodor]’s ability to raise the substance of her claims in an

appropriate forum.” (Doc. 12, at 15).

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court agrees with the Report’s sound reasoning and discerns no error of law.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Report (Doc. 12) is ADOPTED IN

ITS ENTIRETY as the opinion of the Court. As Fodor is denied leave to amend, the Clerk

of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

Dated: August 28, 2025 | Karoline Mehalchich

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge