HACKWORTH v. PACCAR INC.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RODERICK HACKWORTH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24CV883

)

PACCAR INC. and PACCAR, INC. )

d/b/a PETERBILT MOTORS COMPANY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned Magistrate Judge for

review of Plaintiff’s Stipulation (Docket Entry 19) and Defendants’

Letter Response (Docket Entry 20), which raise the issue of this

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. (See Docket Entry dated Jan.

8, 2025 (referring said filings to undersigned Magistrate Judge).)

Because the record does not establish the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction in this Court, as of the date of removal of

this action from state court (see Docket Entry 1 (Notice of

Removal)), the Court should remand this action, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that

the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case

shall be remanded.”).

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants in North

Carolina state court. (See Docket Entry 4 (Complaint).) The

Complaint (A) asserts claims (arising from a single-vehicle crash)

against Defendants for negligent design/manufacture, failure to

warn, and breach of implied warranties (see id. at 2-8), and (B)

requests “actual damages in . . . an amount in excess of

$25,000.00” (id. at 8), “punitive damages” (id.), as well as

“interest, costs, and attorney fees as provided by law” (id. at 9).

Defendants removed this action to this Court “pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1332, 1441, and 1446” (Docket Entry 1 at 1), alleging

specifically that “(a) there is diversity of citizenship between

Plaintiff and Defendant[s'] and (b) the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000” (id. at 3). After Defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss (Docket Entry 7), Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint

(Docket Entry 14), with the same relief demands as the Complaint

(see id. at 12). Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Docket Entry 15), to which Plaintiff

did not timely respond (see Docket Entry 18 (Letter from Clerk);

see _ also Docket Entry 21 at 1 (“regquest[ing] from the Court a

finding of excusable neglect .. . for the failure to timely submit

a [r]lesponse in [o]pposition to Defendant[s’] Motion to Dismiss

[Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint]”)).

' According to the Notice of Removal, “Defendant PACCAR [Inc.]

has been and is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of

business in the State of Washington” (Docket Entry 1 at 4) and the

other Defendant named in the Complaint “is an unincorporated

division of [Defendant] PACCAR [Inc.]” (id.), such that “the only

proper defendant is [Defendant] PACCAR [Inc.]” (id.). This

Recommendation will refer to Defendants collectively, including by

altering all quotations from the parties’ filings accordingly.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the Stipulation, via which

“Plaintiff stipulates that he is not seeking, does not assert, will

not seek, and will not accept damages that exceed $75,000,

including attorneys’ fees, but exclusive of interest and costs.”

(Docket Entry 19 at 1.) Defendants thereafter filed their Letter

Response, “submit[ting] that [the S]tipulation does not deprive

this Court of jurisdiction” (Docket Entry 20 at 2).

DISCUSSION

“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant may remove ‘any

civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts

of the United States have original jurisdiction.’” Decker v. USAA

Cas. Ins. Co., 683 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490 (M.D.N.C. 2023) (Schroeder,

C.J.) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). As documented in the

Introduction, “[h]ere, [Defendants] removed th[is] action by

asserting the [C]ourt’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Id. “Diversity jurisdiction requires a showing

that the matter in controversy is between citizens of different

states and exceeds the sum of $75,000.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a)). “The party seeking removal bears the burden of proving

[diversity] jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

at 491 (citing Zoroastrian Ctr. & Darb-E-Mehr of Metro. Wash., D.C.

v. Rustam Guiv Found. of N.Y., 822 F.3d 739, 748 (4th Cir. 2016));

see also, e.g., Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968)

(“The burden is on the party asserting the jurisdiction of the

3

court to show that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist.”). Hence,

“[D]efendant[s], as the part[ies] asserting federal jurisdiction,

[must] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

controversy has been satisfied.” Allen v. Dance, No. 3:09CV192,

2009 WL 2855716, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 2009) (unpublished) ;

accord, e.g., Hamilton v. Arcan Cap., LLC, No. 1:18CV356, 2019 WL

1322535, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2019) (unpublished) (Biggs, J.);

Pruett v. HCR Manorcare Med. Servs. of Fla., LLC, No. 5:13CV3790,

2013 WL 2389493, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. May 30, 2013) (unpublished);

Lawson v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 639, 641 (M.D.N.C.

2003) (Osteen, Sr., J.).

Importantly, “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction cannot be

conferred by the parties, nor can a defect in subject-matter

jurisdiction be waived by the parties.” Brickwood Contractors,

Inc. v. Datanet Eng’g, Inc., 369 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2004).

“Accordingly, questions of subject-matter jurisdiction may be

raised at any point during the proceedings and may (or, more

precisely, must) be raised sua sponte by the [C]lourt.” Id.

(italics omitted); see also, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.

77, 94 (2010) (emphasizing federal courts’ “independent obligation

to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists”); Allen,

2009 WL 2855716, at *1 (“The requirements for federal jurisdiction

are absolute; the parties may not waive a jurisdictional defect,

and . . . the [c]lourt, upon noticing a potential defect, ‘must

raise the matter on its own.’” (quoting Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr. v.

Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998))). “[Blecause the lack of

subject matter jurisdiction may be noticed by th[is C]ourt sua

sponte . . ., the [C]ourt may enter a remand order sua sponte.”

Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th

Cir. 2008) (italics omitted); see also Doe #1 v. Blair, 819 F.3d

64, 66-67 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[A] district court may remand a case

sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time and

such an order is not reviewable.” (internal citations and italics

omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447 & (d)}).

For purposes of assessing whether a removing defendant has

established diversity jurisdiction (or conversely whether the Court

must remand a case for lack of such jurisdiction), “[t]he amount in

controversy is typically determined by ‘the status of the case as

[disclosed] by the plaintiff’s complaint.’” Lawson, 286 F. Supp.

2d at 641 (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303

U.S. 283, 291 (1938)); accord, e.g., Blettner v. Masick, No.

1:15¢V474, 2015 WL 7575924, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2015)

(unpublished) (Schroeder, J.); see also Francis v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 709 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2013) (“If diversity of

citizenship . . . provides the grounds for removal, then ‘the sum

demanded in good faith in the initial pleading shall be deemed to

be the amount in controversy.’” (internal ellipsis omitted)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (2))). However, under North Carolina

law, for cases filed in Superior Court, “[i]n all negligence

actions, and in all claims for punitive damages in any civil

action, . . . the pleading shall not state the demand for monetary

relief, but shall state that the relief demanded is for damages

incurred or to be incurred in excess of twenty-five thousand

dollars ($25,000).” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(2) (emphasis

added); see also Gwyn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 44,

45-46 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (Bullock, C.J.) (“In North Carolina, however,

a plaintiff is forbidden in some cases to claim a specific amount

greater than [the Superior Court threshold] in damages.”).

In this action (as the Introduction documents), “Plaintiff

claim[ed] negligence and punitive damages under North Carolina law,

and [the C]omplaint[’s demand] for an unspecified amount of damages

[thus wa]s appropriate.” Kirklen v. Buffalo Wild Wing Int’l, Inc.,

No. 3:18CV468, 2019 WL 1649984, at *1 n.1 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 17, 2019)

(unpublished).2 Moreover, “[b]ecause pleading rules . . .

2 “Even if the [North Carolina pleading] rule [wa]s so

construed [to have permitted Plaintiff to plead specific damages

for some of his claims], the burden is now on Defendant[s] to

establish the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Lawson, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 642 n.1. “Defendant[s]

cannot shift the burden of proof on this issue by finding fault

with Plaintiff’s form of pleading.” Id. Nor does Plaintiff’s

assertion of three claims make the amount in controversy more than

$75,000 (i.e., more than $25,000 for each claim), because, “[u]nder

North Carolina law, a plaintiff may not recover on more than one

theory for the same course of conduct,” Blettner, 2015 WL 7575924,

at *2 (internal ellipsis and quotation marks omitted), and “[the

C]omplaint merely articulates three different theories of recovery

for the same tortious conduct,” id. (See Docket Entry 4 at 2-8.)

6

prohibit[ed P]Jlaintiff[] from initially pleading an exact [damages]

amount .. ., a determination of the amount in controversy from the

face of the [C]omplaint is not possible.” Lawson, 286 F. Supp. 2d

at 641; accord, e.g., Allen, 2009 WL 2855716, at *2. “The question

for this [C]ourt [then becomes how to] determin[e] the amount in

controversy for jurisdictional purposes [given that] it is not

apparent from the [face of the C]omplaint.” Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at

46. In answer to that question, a long line of decisions from

judges of this Court “have determined the amount [in] controversy

by considering all evidence bearing on the issue.” Lawson, 286

F. Supp. 2d at 641 (citing Dash v. FirstPlus Home Loan Owner Tr.

1996-2, 248 F. Supp. 2d 489, 498 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (Beaty, J.), and

Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at 46); see also, e.g., Decker, 683 F. Supp. 3d

at 493 (“When a plaintiff’s complaint does not specify damages, a

court may consider ‘any evidence of the amount in controversy.’”

(quoting Lunsford v. Cemex, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 652, 658

(M.D.N.C. 2010) (Schroeder, J.))).

“The rationale for considering evidence besides the Complaint

of the amount in controversy is that jurisdiction is not

determinate until the amount is made clear.” Doughton v. Ray, No.

1:02cV864, 2002 WL 31812918, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 13, 2002)

(unpublished) (Osteen, Sr., J.); see also Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at 46

(“If the complaint does not specify the money damages sought,

jurisdiction remains indeterminate while the court considers any

other information.”). In other words, because “the [C]omplaint

does not specify the amount of money damages sought, the [C]ourt

must look to other evidence to determine if [ D]lefendant[s] can

satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard for federal

jurisdiction.” Doughton, 2002 WL 31812918, at *2. “That is,

[Defendants] ‘“must provide enough facts to allow [the C]Jourt to

determine - not speculate - that it is more likely than not” that

the case belongs in federal court.’” Decker, 683 F. Supp. 3d at

491 (quoting Cannon v. AutoMoney, Inc., No. 1:19CV877, 2020 WL

3105183, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 12, 2020) (unpublished) (Peake, M.J.),

recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 3104352 (M.D.N.C. June 11, 2020)

(unpublished) (Eagles, J.), in turn quoting Scott v. Cricket

Comme’ns, LLC, 865 F.3d 189, 197 (4th Cir. 2017)); see also Cargo

Logistics Servs., Corp. v. Xtra Lease, LLC, No. 3:12CV832, 2013 WL

1798344, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 29, 2013) (unpublished) (“[T]he

defendant must produce some competent proof that the amount [in]

controversy requirement is satisfied.”); Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at 46

(concluding that the removing defendant failed to meet its

“evidentiary burden” where its proffer of amount in controversy

“[wa]s based on speculation, not fact”).

“Such evidence [as to the amount in controversy] can include

post-removal stipulations by the plaintiff regarding the amount in

controversy.” Decker, 683 F. Supp. 3d at 493. As then-Chief Judge

Schroeder recently explained:

[A] plaintiff cannot deprive the district court of

jurisdiction by reducing his claim via post-removal

stipulation. However, when a court faces ‘indeterminate

claims,’ it may ‘consider a stipulation filed by the

plaintiff that the amount in controversy is below the

threshold [diversity jurisdiction] amount.’ Under such

circumstances, a post-removal stipulation is not an

attempt to divest a federal court of jurisdiction, but

rather an effort to clarify whether federal jurisdiction

existed when the action was removed.

Id. (internal brackets and citations omitted) (citing St. Paul

Mercury, 303 U.S. at 292, and then quoting Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at

46); see also, _e.g., Kellar v. Ist Cap. Fin. of S.C., No.

1:20CV402, 2021 WL 7185503, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2021)

(unpublished) (Tilley, S.J.) (“[W]here ‘uncertainty still remains

about the amount in controversy after [an] examination of the

complaint,’ the court may consider a ‘post-removal stipulation of

damages’ to resolve the uncertainty.” (quoting Burdick v. Teal, No.

1:02CV727, 2003 WL 1937118, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 22, 2003)

(unpublished) (Osteen, Sr., J.))); Cargo Logistics, 2013 WL

1798344, at *3 (“When faced with an unspecified claim for damages,

several courts have held that a post-removal stipulation by the

plaintiff that the claim does not exceed the minimum federal

jurisdiction amount is appropriate for consideration.” (citing

Griffin v. Holmes, 843 F. Supp. 81, 88 (E.D.N.C. 1993))); Lawson,

286 F. Supp. 2d at 642 (“[S]tipulation has been used in certain

cases where the amount in controversy is ‘indeterminate.’” (citing

Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at 46, and Griffin, 843 F. Supp. at 88));

Doughton, 2002 WL 31812918, at *2 (“When faced with an unspecified

claim of damages, several courts, including this one, have held

that a post-removal stipulation by the plaintiff that the claim

does not exceed the minimum federal jurisdictional amount is

appropriate for the court’s consideration.” (citing Asociacion

Nacional de Pescadores a Pequena Escala o Artesanales de Colombia

v. Dow Quimica de Colombia S.A., 988 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 1993),

Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at 46, and Griffin, 843 F. Supp. at 88)).

The record in this case contains just such a stipulation,

i.e., “Plaintiff stipulate[d] that he is not seeking, does not

assert, will not seek, and will not accept damages that exceed

$75,000, including attorneys’ fees, but exclusive of interest and

costs.” (Docket Entry 19 at 1 (emphasis added).) “Because the

[C]ourt cannot determine the amount in controversy from the face of

the [C]omplaint, the [C]ourt [should] consider Plaintiff[’s]

stipulation that the value of [his] claim[s] does not exceed

$75,000 . . . .” Doughton, 2002 WL 31812918, at *2; see also

Lawson, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 642 (“Considering that the amount in

controversy is indeterminate from the face of the complaint, the

court will acknowledge [the p]laintiff’s stipulation.”); Gwyn, 955

F. Supp. at 47 (“Because the court cannot determine the amount in

controversy from the face of the complaint, it will consider [the

p]laintiff’s stipulation that the value of the claim does not

exceed [the diversity threshold].”). Indeed, Judge Tilley has

10

deemed definitive diction of the sort used in Plaintiff’s

Stipulation, i.e., “affirmative language that [he] will not accept

over $75,000,” Kellar, 2021 WL 7185503, at *2 (emphasis in

original), “sufficient to defeat federal jurisdiction,” id.

Defendants have urged the Court to conclude otherwise by

arguing (in the Letter Response) as follows:

[T]he amount in controversy is established at the time

the case is removed to federal court. And ‘post-removal

limits or waivers on damages cannot defeat jurisdiction.’

Here, Plaintiff had ample opportunities (both in the

prior lawsuit and in this one) to clarify the amount in

controversy by responding to Defendant[s’] multiple

requests or to timely seek remand. Only after being

confronted with the prospect of dismissal did Plaintiff

seek to limit the amount of damages to under $75,000.

This transparent attempt to avoid a ruling on the pending

[M]otion to [D]ismiss [Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint]

should not be permitted.

(Docket Entry 20 at 2 (internal citations omitted) (citing Griffin,

843 F. Supp. at 87, and then quoting Brown v. Brown, No. 3:23CV230,

2023 WL 6367669, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 2023) (unpublished));

see also id. at 1 (“Prior to removal (on October 9, 2024), counsel

for Defendant[s] sent a letter to Plaintiff’s counsel requesting

that Plaintiff stipulate to never recovering damages in excess of

$75,000. Plaintiff did not agree, and Defendant removed the case

and filed [the M]otion to [D]ismiss . . . . Plaintiff did not move

to remand. Instead, Plaintiff filed [the] Amended Complaint . . .

and Defendant [] filed [the M]otion to [D]ismiss [Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint].” (internal citation omitted) (citing Docket

Entry 1 at 6)), 1 n.1 (“not[ing (A)] that a lawsuit arising out of

11

the same alleged incident was originally commenced by Plaintiff

against [Defendants] on August 22, 2022 and timely removed to this

Court (Case No. 1:22-cv—-00809),” and (B) that, “[p]rior to removing

that case, [Defendants] also served a letter requesting that

Plaintiff stipulate to never recovering damages in excess of

$75,000, but Plaintiff would not agree to do so then either”).)?

Those arguments against the Court’s consideration of the

Stipulation fall short for several reasons. For starters, the two

decisions Defendants cited/quoted, Griffin and Brown, do not

support their position; to the contrary, those two decisions

reinforce the propriety of reliance on the Stipulation. The former

decision does recognize the general rule that courts faced with

diversity-based removals should assess the amount in controversy at

“the time of removal,” Griffin, 843 F. Supp. at 87 (internal

quotation marks omitted), as well as the “corollary of thl[at]

rule[, i.e.,] that the plaintiff in such an action may not defeat

diversity jurisdiction by filing a post-removal amendment of the

complaint which reduces the amount of damages requested by the

complaint below the amount in controversy reguired by [Section]

1332(a),” id. (emphasis added). Griffin, however, goes on to

discuss North Carolina’s limitation on a plaintiff’s ability to

> The prior, related case referenced by Defendants ended when

Plaintiff “voluntarily dismissed[ it] without prejudice,” Notice of

Voluntary Dismissal, Hackworth v. PACCAR Inc., No. 1:22CV809,

Docket Entry 24 at 1 (M.D.N.C. July 21, 2023), ™“[plursuant to

[Rule] 41(a) (1) (A) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” id.

12

delineate in a complaint “the amount of compensatory and punitive

damages sought,” id., and, upon review of pertinent authority,

including Saint Paul Mercury and Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores,

see id. at 87-88,* “agree[s] with the decisions characterizing a

post-removal amount-in-controversy stipulation [in that context] as

a clarification permitted by Saint Paul [Mercury], not an amendment

forbidden by Saint Paul [Mercury],” id. at 88 (emphasis added).

“Applying th[at] principle ..., the [Griffin C]lourt [] accept[ed]

the plaintiff’s stipulation that the total amount of compensatory

and punitive damages sought by his complaint [wa]s less than [the

diversity threshold].” Id. (emphasis added). “Accordingly, the

[Griffin C]jourt f£flound] that it lackled] subject matter

jurisdiction; the parties [we]re completely diverse, but the amount

in controversy [wa]s insufficient.” Id. (emphasis added).

The other decision cited by Defendants similarly acknowledges

that, due to North Carolina’s restrictions on “pleading an exact

amount of claimed damages, .. . a determination of the amount in

controversy may not be possible from the face of the complaint.”

Brown, 2023 WL 6367669, at *4. It thereafter draws the same line

“In particular, Griffin quotes this language from the Fifth

Circuit: ‘“‘Although . . .a plaintiff may not defeat removal by

subsequently changing his damage request, in this case the

affidavits clarify a petition that previously left the

jurisdictional question ambiguous. Under those circumstances, the

court is still examining the jurisdictional facts as of the time

the case [wa]s removed ... .’” Griffin, 843 F. Supp. at 88

(internal ellipsis omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting

Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores, 988 F.2d at 565).

13

as Griffin (and previously discussed decisions from judges of this

Court, e.g., Decker, Kellar, Lawson, Doughton, and Gwyn): a

plaintiff may not “decreas[e] the amount in controversy after a

complaint . . . has been removed when the amount in controversy is

plainly stated in the complaint,” id. at *5 (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks omitted), but, “where the initial

complaint does not specify an amount in controversy, a post-removal

stipulation limiting damages may be considered as a clarification

of an ambiguous complaint,” id. (emphasis added) .°

Any delay by Plaintiff in stipulating that the damages (plus

any recoverable attorneys’ fees) demanded in this action do not

exceed $75,000 likewise lacks sufficient evidentiary force to

warrant a finding that Defendants have met their burden of

establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount-in-

controversy requirement, particularly given the record material

showing (A) that, as far back as December 11, 2024, Plaintiff

° The complaint in Brown sought “damages in an amount .. .

greater than $25,000 and treble damages,” Brown, 2023 WL 6367669,

at *5 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in

original}, such that “the amount in controversy exceed[ed] $75,000

on the basis of [the] complaint,” id. As a result, “[t]hough [a]

stipulation [about damages could] be considered to clarify an

ambiguous complaint, it [wa]s not necessary [t]here,” id., because

“the plain reading of the [c]lomplaint ma[de] clear the amount in

controversy requirement [wa]s met,” id. (emphasis added). In this

case, by contrast, neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint

makes any such demand for treble damages. (See Docket Entry 4 at

8-9; Docket Entry 14 at 12.) That material distinction means that

the Brown Court’s ruling refraining from remanding that case does

not provide a basis for this Court to follow that course here.

14

“consent [ed] to stipulating an amount in controversy not to exceed

$74,999.99” (Docket Entry 21-3 at 1) and (B) that, “[d]espite [his

c]ounsel’s best efforts, [they] were unable to obtain [his] consent

until [that date], as he [wals an active member of the United

States Army” (Docket Entry 21 at 1 (citing Docket Entry 21-2 at

1)).° Defendants’ focus on Plaintiff’s failure to file a motion to

remand also misses the mark, as inaction by Plaintiff cannot fill

a jurisdictional void, see, e.g., Brickwood Contractors, 369 F.3d

at 390 (“Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the

parties, nor can a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction be waived

by the parties.”), and “questions of subject-matter jurisdiction

. . May (or, more precisely, must) be raised sua sponte by the

Court,” id. (emphasis added) (italics omitted).’

With the arguments in the Letter Response thus dispatched,

only Defendants’ contentions regarding diversity jurisdiction in

the Notice of Removal remain for the Court’s consideration. See

° Notably, neither the Notice of Removal nor the Letter

Response offer (or even refer to) any evidence of any affirmative

“refusal [by Plaintiff] to stipulate that h[is] damages fall below

the jurisdictional threshold,” Blettner, 2015 WL 7575924, at *1.

(See Docket Entry 1 at 1-8; Docket Entry 20 at 1-2.) In addition,

those filings do not contend that Defendants ever took advantage of

the option under North Carolina law, to “request of [Plaintiff] a

written statement of the monetary relief sought,” N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 1A-1, Rule 8(a) (2), which would have compelled him to, “within 30

days after such service, provide such statement,” id. (See Docket

Entry 1 at 1-8; Docket Entry 20 at 1-2.)

’ Furthermore, the record reflects that, on December 11, 2024,

Plaintiff asked Defendants to “consent to a [mJotion to [r]emand.”

(Docket Entry 21-3 at 1.)

15

generally Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores, 988 F.2d at 565 (“[I]t

has frequently been held that when faced with a complaint for

unspecified damages a court may look to the removal notice or

petition in deciding whether the requisite amount is in controversy

. . . .”). The Notice of Removal, in fact, does assert that “the

amount in controversy has been met in this case” (Docket Entry 1

at 7), but the Court should conclude that said “allegation of

jurisdiction in this case carries little weight,” Asociacion

Nacional de Pescadores, 988 F.2d at 566.

As an initial matter, “[r]emoval petitions or other

submissions by the defendant are more likely to be persuasive in

cases where the crucial facts supporting jurisdiction are known to

the defendant, especially suits for injunctive or declaratory

relief.” Id.; see also Auto Money N. LLC v. Walters, 737 F. Supp.

3d 330, 342 (D.S.C. 2024) (quoting Francis, 709 F.3d at 367, for

proposition that, “‘[i]n actions seeking declaratory or injunctive

relief, . . . the amount in controversy is measured by the value of

the object of the litigation,’” which includes “the cost to the

defendant”). Here, Plaintiff has not requested declaratory or

injunctive relief. (See Docket Entry 4 at 8-9; Docket Entry 14 at

12.) The Notice of Removal’s proffer as to the amount in

controversy therefore does not rest on “crucial facts . . . known

to [ D]efendant[s],” Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores, 988 F.2d at

566, about costs it would incur from “injunctive or declaratory

16

relief,” id. Rather, the Notice of Removal points to the absence

(at the point of its filing) of a stipulation by Plaintiff “to

never recover damages in excess of $75,000” (Docket Entry 1 at 6),

along with one reported decision “involving the[ same] causes of

action and similar injuries [which] ha[d_ an] amount [] in

controversy exceeding $75,000” (id. (citing Sexton by and through

Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1991))) and

three “jury verdicts [for more than $75,000 in cases with] similar

claims” (id. at 6 n.2 (citing two verdicts rendered in North

Carolina Superior Courts and one verdict rendered in this Court)).

Plaintiff (as documented above) now has stipulated that he

will not accept an amount of damages and recoverable attorneys’

fees greater than $75,000, thereby leaving Defendants’ damages

proffer dependent entirely on the four comparison cases listed in

the Notice of Removal. When gauging the amount in controversy,

“[t]he possible damages recoverable may be shown by the amounts

awarded in other similar cases.” Green v. Metal Sales Mfg. Corp.,

394 F. Supp. 2d 864, 867 (S.D. W. Va. 2005); accord, e.g., Kirklen,

2019 WL 1649984, at *2. The decision tendered by Defendants for

that purpose concerned a “jury verdict in favor of [the plaintiff]

in the amount of $1,551,381,” Sexton, 926 F.2d at 332 - arising

from a motorcycle crash in which the plaintiff “sustained a closed-

head injury and brain damage causing quadriparesis,” id.; see also

Smith v. Colvin, 208 F. Supp. 3d 931, 935 (N.D. Ind. 2016)

17

(describing “quadriparesis” as “muscle weakness affecting all four

limbs”) – based on claims, inter alia, of “negligence[] and breach

of warranty, alleging that the helmet [manufactured by the

defendant and worn by the plaintiff] was defectively designed and

that the warning given on the helmet was inadequate,” id. The

Notice of Removal describes the other cited verdicts as “$1.3

million to [a] plaintiff who brought negligent manufacturing claims

pertaining to a vehicle’s cruise control after sustaining a left

leg amputation, fractured vertebra, and a fractured pelvis” (Docket

Entry 1 at 6 n.2), “$159,750 to [a] plaintiff who brought claims

for a defective product . . . [the failure of which caused him to]

sustain[] a skull fracture” (id.), and “$218,000 to [a] plaintiff

who brought claims for negligent manufacturing and failure to warn

when [the] plaintiff sustained spinal injuries” (id.). Although

similarities exist between the causes of action asserted in those

cases and in this case, “Defendant[s] ha[ve] not, however, provided

any evidence to suggest that the injuries in the instant case are

similar to those in the cases cited,” Cargo Logistics, 2013 WL

1798344, at *2 (emphasis added); see also Kirklen, 2019 WL 1649984,

at *2 (deeming the defendant’s damages argument “speculative” for

failing to “explain how [the] cited cases [we]re factually similar

to the case at hand”). (See Docket Entry 1 at 6 & n.2.)8

8 The Complaint does allege that Plaintiff suffered “a serious

head injury” (Docket Entry 4 at 4), as well as “facial and spinal

(continued...)

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“Because these cases have not been shown to be factually

similar to the case at bar, the Court cannot say based upon these

verdicts alone that it is more likely than not that the amount in

controversy in the present case is greater than the jurisdictional

limit.” Allen, 2009 WL 2855716, at *4; see also Kirklen, 2019 WL

1649984, at *2 (“[The d]Jefendant has provided only conjecture as to

why the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. This speculation is

insufficient to overcome [the d]efendant’s burden of proof.”)}. Put

another way, “Defendant[s ] have neither rebutted Plaintiffl[’s

Stipulation] nor produced any evidence to show that Plaintiff[’s ]

claim exceeds $75,000.” Doughton, 2002 WL 31812918, at *2.

“Should there remain any doubt as to whether the amount in

controversy requirement has been met, the [C]Jourt must strictly

construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of

remanding the case to state court.” Decker, 683 F. Supp. 3d at 493

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mulcahey v. Columbia

Organic Chems. Co, Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Because

removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, we

must strictly construe removal jurisdiction. If federal

®(...continued)

fractures” (id.) “and multiple lacerations and contusions to his

hip . . . and [his] extremities” (id.}), but does not allege brain

damage, quadriparesis, amputation of a limb, pelvis fracture, or

skull fracture (see id.). Moreover, the record establishes that

Plaintiff’s injuries have not prevented him from engaging in

physically and mentally demanding employment as an active duty

soldier. (See Docket Entry 21-2 at 1.)

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jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.” (internal

citation omitted)); Pruett, 2013 WL 2389493, at *3 (“Removal by its

nature infringes upon state sovereignty. Therefore, the [c]lourt

must ‘resolve all doubts about the propriety of removal in favor of

retained state [court] jurisdiction.’” (quoting Hartley v. CSX

Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999))).

“Considering the evidence before it, and mindful of the fact

that . . . [the C]Jourt[ should] remand where federal jurisdiction

is doubtful, the Court [should] conclude[] that Defendant[s] ha[ve]

failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the

amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000.” Pippins v.

AutoMoney, Inc., No. 1:20CV65, 2020 WL 1692366, at *4 (M.D.N.C.

Apr. 7, 2020) (unpublished) (Biggs, J.) (internal citation

omitted). As a result, “it appears that th[is C]ourt lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, [and thus the Court should order that] the

case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).?

° “An order remanding the case may require payment of just

costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as

a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “However, ‘absent

unusual circumstances, courts may award attorneys’ fees under

§ 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively

reasonable basis for seeking removal.’” Decker, 683 F. Supp. 3d at

493-94 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Cap.

Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)). Given the (above-discussed)

significance of Plaintiff’s post-removal stipulation to the

determination of the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the

Court should not find that Defendants “lacked an objectively

reasonable basis for . . . [seeking] removal,” id. at 494; see

also, e.g., Gwyn, 955 F. Supp. at 47 (declining to “award costs or

attorney’s fees” where “there [wa]s no evidence that removal was

done in bad faith or without a reasonable basis”).

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CONCLUSION

The record does not establish that, as of the date of removal,

subject matter jurisdiction existed in this Court.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that this action be remanded to

the North Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court

Division, Durham, North Carolina, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

August 28, 2025

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