Holladay v. Gestamp Alabama, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

GLORIA HOLLADAY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.: 2:21-cv-01712-AMM

)

GESTAMP ALABAMA, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

This matter is before the court on a motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and

expenses filed by plaintiff Gloria Holladay. Doc. 216. For the reasons explained

below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from an employment dispute between plaintiff Gloria

Holladay and defendant Gestamp Alabama, LLC. See Doc. 17. Gestamp

“manufactures automotive parts and components at its production facilities in

McCalla, Alabama.” Doc. 100 ¶ 1; Doc. 110 at ¶ 1. Ms. Holladay began working for

the Materials Department of Gestamp as a Materials Handler in 2003 and became a

salaried Materials Analyst in 2015. See Doc. 100 ¶ 6; Doc. 107-1 ¶ 4; Doc. 110 ¶ 6.

On September 3, 2020, Ms. Holladay was fired. Doc. 107-1 ¶ 66. She filed a charge

of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and was

issued a Notice of Right to sue. See Doc. 17-1; Doc. 17-2.

On September 26, 2022, Ms. Holladay filed an amended complaint and

alleged that “Gestamp hired younger employees in their twenties and thirties as

Materials Analysts, and paid these younger Materials Analysts more money than

[Ms.] Holladay performing the same job duties.” Doc. 17 ¶ 50. Additionally, Ms.

Holladay alleged that “Gestamp intentionally subjected [Ms.] Holladay to adverse

terms and conditions of employment because of her age to set up [Ms.] Holladay for

failure and termination.” Id. ¶ 56. Moreover, Ms. Holladay alleged that Gestamp’s

Plant Manager “promoted male employees over females and paid males higher

wages.” Id. ¶ 64. Ms. Holladay also alleged that Gestamp “terminat[ed] . . . [Ms.]

Holladay . . . in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination.” Id. ¶ 87. Ms.

Holladay further alleged that “Gestamp . . . willfully violated [the Equal Pay Act] by

paying wages to [Ms.] Holladay at rates less than the rates paid to employees of the

opposite sex in the same establishment for equal work on jobs, the performance of

which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are performed under

similar working conditions.” Id. ¶ 128. Finally, Ms. Holladay alleged that “Gestamp

. . . falsely claimed . . . that [Ms.] Holladay had been terminated for misconduct,

resulting in the denial of unemployment compensation benefits.” Id. ¶ 153.

Ms. Holladay pleaded six counts. See id. ¶¶ 46–154. Count One asserted age

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discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and the Alabama Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (“AADEA”), Ala. Code § 25-1-20 et seq. Doc. 17 ¶¶ 46–59. Count

Two asserted sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Doc. 17 ¶¶ 60–78. Count Three asserted

retaliation under the ADEA and AADEA. Id. ¶¶ 79–90. Count Four asserted

retaliation under Title VII. Id. ¶¶ 91–102. Count Five asserted violation of the Equal

Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Doc. 17 ¶¶ 103–29. Count Six

asserted retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201

et seq. Doc. 17 ¶¶ 130–54.

During the course of litigation, Ms. Holladay filed several motions and

requested several extensions, some of which were denied by this court. See, e.g.,

Doc. 50 at 12 (denying motion to compel and finding that Ms. Holladay failed to

“establish a prima facie case of abuse of Rule 33(d)”); Doc. 62 at 4 (denying motion

to extend discovery deadlines and finding that “Ms. Holladay has not established the

requisite good cause to modify the court’s scheduling order a fourth time”).

Eventually, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Doc. 93; Doc.

101.

On March 20, 2024, this court denied Ms. Holladay’s motion for partial

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summary judgment and entered summary judgment in Gestamp’s favor on five of

Ms. Holladay’s six counts. See Doc. 135. Litigation proceeded towards trial on the

single count that remained—the EPA claim. See Doc. 135; Doc. 141. On October 9,

2024, Gestamp made a Rule 68 offer of judgment to Ms. Holladay for $102,699.50,

which exceeded all damages that were alleged against Gestamp in Ms. Holladay’s

itemized damages statement. See Doc. 191; Doc. 205-1. Ms. Holladay rejected the

offer of judgment. See Doc. 210. On the eve of trial, the parties filed a joint motion

for a consent judgment wherein Gestamp agreed to pay Ms. Holladay $102,699.50.

See Doc. 211. The court entered the proposed consent judgment. See Doc. 212. In

the proposed consent judgment, the parties agreed to a process whereby Ms.

Holladay could seek a fee award. See Doc. 211-1 at 1; Doc. 212 at 1–2.

This matter is now before the court on a motion for attorney’s fees, costs, and

expenses in which Ms. Holladay seeks $829,559.70 in attorney’s fees, $19,481.55

in costs, and $9,891.52 in expenses. See Doc. 216-1. Gestamp filed a response. Doc.

223. Ms. Holladay filed a reply. Doc. 228. Gestamp then filed a sur-reply without

leave of court.1 Doc. 230. Ms. Holladay filed a motion to strike the sur-reply because

it was filed without leave of court. Doc. 231. Gestamp followed with a motion for

1 The court’s initial order specifies that “[s]ur-replies are not permitted without leave of court.”

Doc. 6 at 9.

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leave to file a sur-reply. Doc. 233. The court did not separately rely on the arguments

made in Gestamp’s sur-reply to render this decision. Accordingly, Ms. Holladay’s

motion to strike, Doc. 231, and Gestamp’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply, Doc.

233, are DENIED AS MOOT.

The court has conducted a careful, itemized review of Ms. Holladay’s fee

petition and its supporting documents.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The EPA is a subsection of the FLSA that prohibits employers from engaging

in sex discrimination when paying wages to their employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

Employers who violate the EPA “shall be liable to the employee . . . affected in the

amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation . . .

and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

Additionally, “[t]he court . . . shall . . . allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid

by the defendant, and costs of the action.” Id.

“A reasonable attorney’s fee . . . is calculated ‘by multiplying the number of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Caplan

v. All Am. Auto Collision, Inc., 36 F.4th 1083, 1089 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Blum

v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). “The sum of this calculation is often called

the lodestar.” Id. (cleaned up). Nevertheless, determining “a reasonable fee [under

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the FLSA] is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . .” Kreager v. Solomon

& Flanagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit “has

indicated that, at least in the FLSA context, there are some cases where a reasonable

fee award is zero.” Batista v. S. Fla. Woman’s Health Assocs., 844 F. App’x 146,

152 (11th Cir. 2021).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,

experience, and reputation.” Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,

1299 (11th Cir. 1988). “The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory

evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates.” Id. “[A]

movant may meet his burden by producing either direct evidence of rates charged

under similar circumstances or opinion evidence of reasonable rates.” Duckworth v.

Whisenant, 97 F.3d 1393, 1396 (11th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). But this requires more

than just “the affidavit of the attorney performing the work.” Norman, 836 F.2d at

1299.

Ms. Holladay requests the following hourly rates for her counsel: $575.00 for

Alicia Haynes, $550.00 for Cynthia Wilkinson, $610.00 for Charles Guerrier, and

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$510.00 for Kenneth Haynes. See Doc. 216-2. Ms. Holladay provided declarations

from six attorneys in support of her requested rates. Doc. 216-23; Doc. 216-24; Doc.

215-25; Doc. 216-26; Doc. 216-27; Doc. 216-28. All six testified to the

reasonableness of the requested rates. See Doc. 216-23; Doc. 216-24; Doc. 215-25;

Doc. 216-26; Doc. 216-27; Doc. 216-28.

Heather Leonard, an employment and civil rights attorney and mediator who

has practiced in Alabama since 1998, stated that her “current hourly rate for

mediation services is $550” and that her last “fee award [in which Ms. Wilkinson

was co-counsel was] based on a rate of $550 an hour.” Doc. 216-23 ¶¶ 1–2, 4, 10.

Allen D. Arnold, a lawyer who has “engaged in civil litigation law practice

since 2004” and focused his practice on “federal employment claims” declared that

the hourly rates requested in this case “are reasonable and well within the range of

appropriate hourly charges given [the] experience [of the attorneys]” and his belief

that some of the attorneys involved are “the very best plaintiff’s employment law

trial attorneys in the State of Alabama, and some of the best trial attorneys in the

country.” Doc. 216-24 ¶¶ 10, 20. Additionally, Mr. Arnold declared that his

“opinions are formed by examining other employment law verdicts in trial courts

around the country” and his research of “supporting fee affidavits of plaintiff’s and

defendant’s attorneys in other civil matters.” Id. ¶ 20.

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Candis A. McGowen, a law partner who has specialized in labor and

employment law and civil rights since 1988, declared that she has “received awards

for attorneys’ fees in previous cases that have ranged from $250.00 to $550.00 per

hour.” Doc. 216-25 ¶¶ 3–4, 6. Additionally, Ms. McGowen declared that “[t]he

current hourly rate for an attorney with 20-25 years of experience exceeds $500 per

hour[,]” while “[t]he current hourly rate for an attorney with over 30 years of

experience in the labor and employment field exceeds $550 an hour[,]” leading Ms.

McGowen to conclude that “[t]he hourly rates requested by [the attorneys in this

case] are commensurate with the prevailing range of rates charged by attorneys in

similar circumstances and with comparable skill and responsibility in similar areas

of litigation . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 10–11.

Additionally, Ms. Holladay identified a decision from the Northern District of

Alabama in which the court held that rates within the range requested by Ms.

Holladay are reasonable. See Briggins v. Elwood TRI, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1280,

1294–95 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (adopting the findings of the magistrate judge that an

hourly rate ranging from $525 to $625 is reasonable in the light of the attorney’s

expertise and years of experience).

Finally, the attorneys of record in this case declared that they each have

experience in the field of employment law for over thirty years. See Doc. 216-26 ¶¶

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3, 5–9; Doc. 216-27 ¶¶ 3–4; Doc. 216-28 ¶¶ 3, 5.

Gestamp argues that the requested rates are unreasonable, alleging that “[Ms.]

Holladay has produced insufficient evidence that [these rates] are in line with

prevailing market rates[.]” Doc. 223 at 22. Gestamp points to Mr. Arnold’s

declaration in which he “alleges he has recently earned $325-$425 in similar cases,”

a rate significantly lower than the rates sought by Ms. Holladay. See id.; Doc. 216-

1. Additionally, Gestamp identifies a decision from the Northern District of Alabama

“finding that $375 per hour is consistent with the average hourly rate in Birmingham

for . . . employment law cases.” Doc. 223 at 22 (cleaned up). Finally, Gestamp argues

that Ms. Holladay’s purported rates are “disingenuous” considering her counsel’s

arguments in recent cases that a “reasonable [hourly] rate for labor and employment

partners at Burr Forman with over fifteen years of experience” is $175. Id. at 22–23.

Ms. Holladay’s requested rates are reasonable. Ms. Holladay provided six

affidavits in which attorneys testified that the requested rates are reasonable. See

Doc. 216-23; Doc. 216-24; Doc. 216-25; Doc. 216-26; Doc. 216-27; Doc. 216-28.

Three of these attorneys have performed work in this case, so their declarations will

be afforded less weight. See Doc. 216-26; Doc. 216-27; Doc. 216-28; Norman, 836

F.2d at 1299. Still, three uninterested attorneys testified to the reasonableness of the

requested rates. Gestamp’s argument that one affiant personally sought a lower rate

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in another case does not disturb the court’s reasonableness finding. Without more,

the court cannot know if or why that attorney sought a lower rate in that case.

Moreover, the decision cited by Gestamp in which $375 was determined a

reasonable rate pertained to an attorney with less than ten years of experience, which

is significantly lesser than the thirty or more years of experience that Ms. Holladay’s

counsel has. See Harris v. Reneau, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-00849-MHH, 2021 WL

3270495, at *7 (N.D. Ala. July 30, 2021) (finding that $375 was a reasonable hourly

rate for an attorney who had been in practice for only eight years). Finally, Ms.

Holladay’s counsel’s unreasonable arguments in another case do not undermine the

evidence of reasonableness in this case.

Ms. Holladay requests an hourly rate ranging from $100 to $145 for the

paralegals and law clerks that contributed to this case. See Doc. 216-1 at 1. She

identifies a decision from the Northern District of Alabama that found similar rates

to be reasonable. See, e.g., Virciglio v. Work Train Staffing LLC, No. 2:12-CV-

03738-AKK, 2018 WL 11424658, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2018) (observing that

“the top end hourly rate for skilled paralegal assistance in Birmingham was $150”

and citing decisions finding reasonable awards of $125 and $145). Gestamp did not

object to the law clerk and paralegal rates requested by Ms. Holladay. Accordingly,

the court finds the requested rates reasonable.

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B. Reasonable Hours

“The next step in the computation of the lodestar is the ascertainment of

reasonable hours.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. “[E]xcessive, redundant or otherwise

unnecessary hours should be excluded from the amount claimed” to encourage fee

applicants to exercise billing judgment. See id. (cleaned up). “[T]he measure of

reasonable hours is determined by the profession’s judgment of the time that may be

conscionably billed and not the least time in which it might theoretically have been

done.” Id. at 1306. “[A] fee applicant is not entitled to compensation at an attorney’s

rate simply because an attorney undertook tasks which were mundane, clerical or

which did not require the full exercise of an attorney’s education and judgment.” Id.

“The court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert on the question [of reasonable

fees] and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable

and proper fees . . . .” Id. at 1303 (cleaned up).

Ms. Holladay “seeks compensation for 2227.96 hours of work” on the EPA

claim. Doc. 216 at 12. She excluded 171.99 hours, as a “billing judgment” and

195.60 hours as “time wholly devoted to unsuccessful claims.” Id. at 7 (cleaned up).

Ms. Holladay argues that this figure is reasonable because her attorneys “achieved

an exceptional result on her behalf” because she “will receive as much or more than

she could have received had she prevailed at trial, without having to confront the

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risk of losing, or potential consequences of Gestamp’s offer of judgment.” Id. at 22.

Ms. Holladay argues that “[r]esults such as this do not justify a reduction in the

lodestar.” Id.

Gestamp argues that this figure is unreasonable for several reasons. First,

Gestamp argues that it fails to account for “[t]he limited extent of [Ms.] Holladay’s

success in relation to all claims pursued[,]” and that it seeks “excessive and

unnecessary fees” for “time spent on drafting meritless motions,” “time spent on the

fee petition,” and “time spent on [Ms.] Holladay’s unsuccessful Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment.” Doc. 223 at 7–10. Next, Gestamp argues that “there is no

reasonable basis [to include fees for] nine depositions (along with associated

preparation) in relation to recovery for a single-plaintiff EPA wage claim—

particularly after [Ms.] Holladay argued at the pre-trial stage of litigation that [two

deponents] should be excluded as witnesses.” Id. at 9. Additionally, Gestamp argues

that Ms. Holladay included hours committed to clerical tasks, inappropriately

included hours expended by attorneys who did not appear in this case, and engaged

in impermissible block billing. See id. at 12–16. Finally, Gestamp argues that the

116 hours expended on composing this “unreasonable fee petition” should be

excluded. Id. at 16 (cleaned up).

The court cannot find that the expenditure of 2227.96 hours on an EPA claim

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is reasonable. At a forty-hour per week pace, that amount reflects more than fifty

full weeks of a law partner’s undivided attention. Further, the fees that result from

that alleged expenditure of time, $829,559.70, exceed the negotiated recovery,

$102,699.50, by an extreme multiple. The 367.59 hours that Ms. Holladay’s counsel

voluntarily redlined, see Doc. 216 at 7, do little to cure the problem. These factors

and several others counsel in favor of a reduction:

1. Meritless Motions

Ms. Holladay includes fees for hours expended on several unsuccessful

motions. First, the entries include hours for work expended on a motion to compel,

Doc. 29, and a renewed motion to compel, Doc. 34, both of which were denied. See

Doc. 216-5 at 18–19, 25, 30; Doc. 50. The motion lacked merit because the court

found that Ms. Holladay’s assertion that her counsel should not have to comb

through documents to find relevant information was “insufficient to establish a

prima facie case of abuse of Rule 33(d).” Doc. 50 at 12. The motion was also

unnecessary because the court found that “Gestamp [had] already produced the

information responsive to [Ms. Holladay’s] request.” Id. at 14.

Second, the entries include hours for work expended on a motion to extend

the discovery deadline, after numerous successive extensions had been granted. See

Doc. 216-5 at 46. The request was denied because the court found that “Ms. Holladay

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has not established the requisite good cause to modify the court’s scheduling order

a fourth time.” Doc. 62 at 4.

Third, the entries include hours for work expended issuing subpoenas that

were quashed for lack of necessity and untimeliness. See Doc. 85; Doc. 216-5 at 50,

56–57. The court noted that “Ms. Holladay appears to have already received the

information she seeks from [the entity].” Doc. 85 at 18. The court explained that

“[s]he cannot request the same information . . . merely because she is displeased with

the information Gestamp provided.” Id. Moreover, the court found that “Ms.

Holladay [had] not complied with the court’s instructions” and should not be

rewarded for her untimely subpoenas. Id. at 20.

Fourth, the entries include hours for work expended filing unsuccessful

motions to exclude declarations for eight witnesses. See Doc. 216-5 at 78–80. These

motions were also denied because “the court reject[ed] Ms. Holladay’s objections”

and found that she had “not met [the] standard for striking sham affidavits.” Doc.

135 at 3–4.

The court does not exclude the hours expended on these motions merely

because they were unsuccessful. It excludes these hours because, in the light of the

reasons for their failure, the court cannot find time spent preparing them was

reasonable.

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2. Clerical Tasks By Non-Attorney Staff

Ms. Holladay includes fees for hours expended by non-attorney law clerks

and paralegals. See Doc. 216-1. Controlling precedent directs that “paralegal time is

recoverable as part of a prevailing party’s award for attorney’s fees and expenses but

only to the extent that the paralegal performs work traditionally done by an

attorney.” Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (cleaned up); see also

Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) (observing that “purely clerical

or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who

performs them”).

Gestamp argues that “[a] review of the time entries reveals many are plainly

clerical and secretarial and thus non-recoverable[.]” Doc. 223 at 14. Ms. Holladay

argues that “[t]he time entries identified by [Gestamp] are not clerical tasks but relate

to litigation work[.]” Doc. 228 at 34.

The entries include a number of obviously purely clerical tasks: “[i]ndexed,

scanned and bound defendant’s deposition exhibits 1-34[,]” “[p]rinted all documents

referenced in the motions in limine and objections[,]” “[c]onverted documents

received . . . into one PDF file,” “[d]eveloped a comprehensive trial notebook which

includes all exhibits for defendant and plaintiff for Holladay witnesses[,]”

“[d]ownload marked exhibits with labels and reload in Trial Pad program.” Doc.

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216-5 at 24, 44, 118, 132. These are not tasks “traditionally done by an attorney.”

Jean, 863 F.2d at 778 (cleaned up). Their dollar value is not enhanced just because

a paralegal or law clerk did them. Accordingly, Ms. Holladay’s inclusion of these

hours at a law clerk or paralegal rate is unreasonable.

3. Excessive Fees-On-Fees

Ms. Holladay includes 113.60 hours expended on drafting this fee petition.

See Doc. 216-2 at 2. “[C]ourts . . . have allowed parties to recover the cost of

establishing their right to, and the amount of attorney’s fees—the right to fees-on-

fees.” Norelus v. Denny’s, Inc., 628 F.3d 1270, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010). But “[a]

request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Moreover, an award of fees should not result

in a windfall to the attorney. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002).

Ms. Holladay argues that “[p]reparing a fee petition is not a simple clerical

matter” and that the petition as well as the “numerous spreadsheets” accompanying

it “require[] a substantial amount of attorney time.” Doc. 216 at 12. Gestamp argues

that “[r]esearch should not be required for the preparation of the fee petition[]” and

that the “time entries should have already been prepared.” Doc. 223 at 17.

The record indicates that Ms. Holladay’s counsel expended time on some

reasonable and necessary tasks including excising excessive hours, dividing the

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entries into five phases to reflect the progression of litigation, soliciting affidavits,

and drafting this fee petition. See Doc. 216-2; Doc. 216-5. But spending 113.60

hours on these tasks is unreasonable, especially considering that a majority of the

exhibits accompanying Ms. Holladay’s fee petition consist of time entries. See Doc.

216-1; Doc. 216-2; Doc. 216-3; Doc. 216-4; Doc. 216-5; Doc. 216-6; Doc. 216-7;

Doc. 216-8; Doc. 216-9. Those materials should have been prepared during the

course of litigation, not solely for this fee petition. Accordingly, Ms. Holladay’s

inclusion of all 113.60 hours is unreasonable.

4. Block Billing

Gestamp argues that Ms. Holladay’s counsel engaged in impermissible block

billing. See Doc. 223 at 15. “Block billing is defined as billing multiple unrelated

tasks in one billing entry, such that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to calculate

with any precision the number of hours an attorney devoted to a particular task.”

Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th 1254, 1279 n.46 (11th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). District

courts making reasonableness determinations regularly approve reductions in block-

billed hours. See, e.g., Kearney v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 1369,

1377–78 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Lil’ Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson, No. 06-20079-CIV,

2008 WL 2688117, at *11–12 (S.D. Fla. July 1, 2008).

Gestamp identifies several entries in the record that list multiple tasks,

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including for instance: (1) “Analyzed prior briefing on Motion to Compel and Mr.

Frazier’s meet-and-confer notes, continued drafting/revising Reply Brief, prepared

exhibits and filed all with Court[,]” (2) “Reviewed the Court’s Revised Scheduling

Order, Doc. 144 and identified all documents for the attorneys trial notebook. Started

work on exhibits for trial and those used by Plaintiff in depositions on pay and

promotion. Identified witnesses used by Defendant at summary judgment that it

relied on pay and promotion decisions and created a chart of key points for this

testimony for each witness[,]” (3) “Revise several subpoenas with request for

documents and several notices of depositions and the requests for production.” Doc.

216-5 at 33, 38, 94; see also Doc. 223 at 15–16. Ms. Holladay argues that her counsel

did not engage in block billing and that Gestamp’s “objections are due to be

overruled.” Doc. 228 at 33.

Gestamp is correct that the entries listed above are emblematic of block

billing. The lack of clarity in and indivisibility of these entries makes it “difficult, if

not impossible, to calculate with any precision the number of hours an attorney

devoted to a particular task.” Johnston, 36 F.4th at 1287 (cleaned up).

Each of the factors discussed above establishes that the hours purportedly

expended by Ms. Holladay’s counsel are unreasonably high and serves as an

independent basis to apply a fee reduction. “[W]here a fee application is voluminous

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and a district court finds that the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the

court has two choices: (1) it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or (2) it may

reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Caplan, 36 F.4th at 1094

(cleaned up).

Ms. Holladay’s fee petition, which contains 1,816 combined entries, is

voluminous. See Doc. 216-5. And the block billing problem makes it impracticable

for the court to apply an hour-by-hour reduction or disaggregate reasonable entries

from unreasonable entries. See id. Applying an across-the-board cut to the volume

of hours would be likewise infeasible. Ms. Holladay’s counsel includes 1,816 entries

from four attorneys and twelve law clerks and/or paralegals, most of whom bill at

different hourly rates. See Doc. 216-1. Apportioning reduced hours between sixteen

individuals at eight different rates in a manner that appropriately represents the work

reasonably expended by each individual is not achievable. Therefore, the court will

turn to the limited nature of Ms. Holladay’s success and apply a reduction

accordingly.

C. Limited Overall Success

Ms. Holladay argues that her overall success was “exceptional.” Doc. 216 at

22. “[B]ecause [Ms. Holladay] prevailed on the merits of her EPA claim and

achieved excellent results,” she asserts that “her counsel is entitled to an award that

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includes all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result.” Id.

Gestamp argues that Ms. Holladay’s overall success is limited. See Doc. 223

at 6. Gestamp asserts that “[s]he did not prevail on her age discrimination in

discipline claim, age discrimination in pay, age discrimination in termination, sex

discrimination in discipline, sex discrimination in pay, sex discrimination in

termination, retaliation under the ADEA and AADEA, retaliation under Title VII,

or retaliation under the FLSA.” Id. Gestamp argues that “[Ms.] Holladay may not

recover on any fees or expenses expended on the unsuccessful claims . . . .” Id.

Under binding precedent, overall success may impact an award of fees. The

court must consider the extent of “discrete and unsuccessful claims” brought by the

fee applicant. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. “If the claims on which the plaintiff did

not prevail and the claims on which he did prevail were distinctly different claims

based on different facts and legal theories, the court cannot award any fee for

services on the unsuccessful claims.” Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570,

1578 (11th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). “[I]f the unsuccessful and the successful claims

involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, the court must

compare the plaintiff’s overall relief with the number of hours reasonably expended

on the litigation.” Id. (cleaned up).

“[R]eduction is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in

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comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. In

Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., the plaintiff’s fee agreement provided for

counsel to receive as a fee one-third of the total judgment. 815 F.2d 1407, 1423 (11th

Cir. 1987). The district court calculated the plaintiff’s lodestar at $118,545, but

reduced it by half based on the limited success of the litigation and small damage

recovery. See id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit explained that “[w]hile . . . a small

damage award alone does not justify reducing a fee award[,]” “[i]t is well established

that the result obtained from a lawsuit—the degree of success—is a relevant

consideration in reducing or enhancing a [lodestar].” Id. at 1424. The Circuit held

that “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in applying a negative multiplier

. . . .” Id.

District courts regularly follow this rule. See, e.g., James v. Wash Depot

Holdings, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding “that the

lodestar should be reduced by 50%” based on “the Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to

adequately segregate time spent on successful and unsuccessful claims, Plaintiff’s

billing for clerical work at senior attorney and partner rates, and the limited success

achieved by the Plaintiff.”); Goss v. Killian Oaks House of Learning, 248 F. Supp.

2d 1162, 1168 (denying attorney’s fees where counsel “leveraged a small sum as a

stepping-stone to a disproportionately large award of attorney’s fees”); Jimenez v.

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Borman, No. 16-24055-CIV, 2017 WL 5508382, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2017)

(finding “that a 75% reduction is warranted because the number of hours billed is

unreasonable and excessive”).

Ms. Holladay prevailed on only one of her six claims. See Doc. 135; Doc. 212.

Some of the unsuccessful and successful claims involve a common core of facts—

whether Ms. Holladay was discriminated against based on age and/or gender. See

Doc. 17. Accordingly, the court must compare Ms. Holladay’s overall relief with the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. See Popham, 820 F.2d at

1578.

Ms. Holladay received a favorable judgment on her EPA claim—the consent

judgment provided recovery for every item of damages that she sought. See Doc.

205-1; Doc. 212. But this success was quite limited when compared to the overall

litigation: Ms. Holladay’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied and

summary judgment was entered in Gestamp’s favor on five of Ms. Holladay’s six

counts. See Doc. 135.

Ms. Holladay asserts that “time devoted wholly to [Ms. Holladay’s]

unsuccessful claims that were dismissed at summary judgment” has been excluded.

Doc. 216 at 12. But the record calls that assertion into question and suggests that

many of Ms. Holladay’s counsel’s entries encompass a great deal of work that was

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done in furtherance of the unsuccessful claims, and in any event precludes the court

from disaggregating the entries to estimate the time spent on the EPA claim. For

example, 1,038 included entries are dated before this court’s summary judgment

order, (which disposed of all but the EPA claim), and these 1,038 entries do not

distinguish between work done for the EPA claim and work done for the five

unsuccessful claims. See Doc. 216-5 at 1–87. Additionally, multiple entries are

dedicated to conducting eleven depositions, and those depositions were not taken

solely in furtherance of the single EPA claim. See id. at 11–85. But Ms. Holladay’s

counsel fails to make the necessary distinctions. As such, it is impossible for the

court to disaggregate the entries to isolate the work on the EPA claim.

And even if Ms. Holladay’s success were not limited to one-sixth of the claims

she asserted, an $829,559.70 fee is wholly unreasonable for a single EPA claim

worth less (even on full recovery) than one-eighth of that sum. Accordingly, the

court applies a negative multiplier (a fractional reduction) to the requested

$829,559.70 to represent the limited success attained by Ms. Holladay and assess a

reasonable fee.

Gestamp asserts that this fraction should be one-tenth, arguing that the six

counts of violations asserted by Ms. Holladay contain ten subclaims. See Doc. 223

at 20. This court declines to dissect Ms. Holladay’s claims to this level of granularity,

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and instead recognizes that six claims were brought against Gestamp, where one

attained success. See Doc. 17; Doc. 135; Doc. 212. The court thus applies a five-

sixths reduction to account for (1) its comparison of Ms. Holladay’s overall relief to

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation of her EPA claim, and (2)

the court’s finding that the lodestar is due to be substantially reduced as a result of

numerous unrecoverable categories. See supra at 11–24. This reduction brings the

fee award down from the $829,559.70 requested to $138,259.95.

D. Expenses and Costs

In addition to fees, Ms. Holladay argues that she is entitled to $9,891.52 in

expenses and $19,481.55 in costs associated with the EPA claim upon which she

prevailed. See Doc. 216-1. Gestamp argues that many of the expenses are not

recoverable and that the costs are excessive. See Doc. 223 at 20–21.

Under the FLSA, the prevailing party is entitled not only to reasonable

attorney’s fees, but also to “costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Under

controlling precedent, these costs are limited to those enumerated by 28 U.S.C. §

1920, which include the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts

necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making

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copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily

obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

(6) Compensation of court appointed experts,

compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses,

and costs of special interpretation services under section

1828 of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 1920 (cleaned up); see also Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567,

1575 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting that “nothing in the legislative history associated

with Section 216(b)’s passage suggests that Congress intended the term ‘costs of the

action’ to differ from those costs as now enumerated in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920”).

The Eleventh Circuit has held that “costs such as general copying,

computerized legal research, postage, courthouse parking fees and expert witness

fees . . . are clearly nonrecoverable” under Section 1920. Duckworth, 97 F.3d at

1399; see also Gary Brown & Assocs. v. Ashdon, Inc., 268 F. App’x 837, 846 (11th

Cir. 2008) (holding that “mediation expenses, meals, courier/postage, Lexis-Nexis

research, air fare, and lodging are not included under § 1920”).

All fifty entries in Ms. Holladay’s itemized expense submission are not

permitted by Section 1920 or controlling precedent. See Doc. 216-22. One entry is

for mediation, nine entries are for meals, ten entries are for postage, and most other

entries are for online research and pacer charges. See id. Finally, two entries are for

general copies and prints. See id. Although printing and making copies is allowed

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by Section 1920, it must be “necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. §§

1920(2), (4). Ms. Holladay’s generic entries do not make clear that such necessity

existed. See Doc. 216-22. Accordingly, this court declines to award the requested

$9,891.52 in expenses.

Next, Ms. Holladay submitted a bill of costs totaling $19,481.55. See Doc.

215. This bill includes electronic transcripts totaling $15,521.29; twenty-five entries

for trial subpoenas, witness fees, and mileage totaling $2,367.86; $402.00 for Fees

of the Clerk; and $1,190.40 for photocopies of documents “necessarily obtained for

use at trial.” Id. Ms. Holladay detailed the necessity of these copies—for the court,

for plaintiff’s counsel, for use at the witness stand, for use with the court’s electronic

document presenter, and for the jury. See id. at 6–10.

Gestamp argues that Ms. Holladay’s costs should be proportionally reduced

to reflect her limited overall success. See Doc. 223 at 21. Ms. Holladay argues that

a proportional reduction is unwarranted but withdraws from her bill the following

costs: (1) Martinrea’s subpoena expenses; (2) Bocar’s subpoena expenses; (3)

Jessica Tarwater’s deposition, witness fee, and mileage; (4) Dave Murrell’s witness

fee and mileage; (5) Sonya Green’s witness fee and mileage; and (6) Craig Lane’s

witness fee and mileage. See Doc. 229 at 5. These withdrawals total $837.54. See

Doc. 215 at 3–5.

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Ms. Holladay’s costs are reasonable. The depositions, trial subpoenas, witness

and mileage fees, clerk fees, as well as other miscellaneous fees laid out in the bill

of costs reflect expenditures made at least in part in furtherance of her EPA claim

and have been appropriately explained. Moreover, Ms. Holladay’s willingness to

withdraw some costs bolsters their reasonableness. Accordingly, the court awards

the requested costs, subtracting the withdrawn amounts.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Ms. Holladay’s motion for attorney’s fees

and costs, Doc. 216, is GRANTED IN PART such that Ms. Holladay is awarded

$138,259.95 in fees and $18,644.01 in costs. The defendant, Gestamp, is

ORDERED to pay Ms. Holladay $138,259.95 in fees and $18,644.01 in costs.

DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of August, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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