The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NATALIE BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 2572 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 13, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004931-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2025
Natalie Brown (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on May 13, 2024, in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. On
February 6, 2024, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, persons not
to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying
firearms on public streets in Philadelphia, possessing an instrument of crime
(“PIC”), terroristic threats, simple assault, recklessly endangering another
person (“REAP”), and criminal mischief. 1 On appeal, Appellant claims that this
verdict is against the weight of the evidence and that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Appellant a new trial. After careful review, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1); 6105; 6106; 6108; 907(a); 2706(a)(1); 2701(a);
2705; and 3304(a)(5), respectively.
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The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows:
Complainant, Ashley Bellamy, testified to an incident involving Appellant and
three other individuals. It began with an argument over how Appellant gained
unauthorized access to Bellamy’s home the previous week. Despite Appellant
wearing a bandana over her face, Bellamy was able to identify her as one of
the perpetrators. See Appellant’s Brief, 3/12/25, at 4. The argument escalated
when Appellant fired a single gunshot in Bellamy’s direction: “Bellamy testified
that she heard the gun make a ‘pop’ noise, saw an orange flash, and felt ‘a
hot wind go past [her] face’ with tiny particles hitting her face.” Trial Court
Opinion, 12/02/24, at 3 (citing N.T., 2/6/24, at 15-18). Appellant got into her
car and started to drive away. Bellamy got into her own car and followed
Appellant while on the phone with 911. Appellant then pulled over, got out of
her car, and fired four or five gunshots at Bellamy’s car. See id. at 4. Bellamy
positively identified Appellant as the shooter to investigators.
At trial, the Commonwealth played the 911 call and admitted it into
evidence. Bellamy is heard exclaiming that someone was shooting at her car.
When asked to clarify what she was describing, Bellamy testified that
Appellant shot at her four or five times. See id. at 4 (citing N.T., 2/6/24, at
19-21, 29-30; Exhibit C-10). The Commonwealth also presented surveillance
video that captured the shots being fired after Appellant pulled over her
vehicle and photos of damage to Bellamy’s vehicle, which she confirmed were
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from gunshots. See id. at 5, 7 n.10. The trial court found Bellamy’s testimony
to be credible and consistent with the physical evidence. See id. at 12.
The trial court convicted Appellant on all charges after a bench trial and
deferred sentencing pending a presentence investigation. On May 13, 2024,
the court sentenced Appellant to two to four years’ incarceration for persons
not to possess firearms and to eight years’ probation for the remaining
offenses. See id. at 2. On May 23, 2024, Appellant filed a post-sentence
motion challenging the weight of the evidence. The court denied the motion
on September 4, 2024. This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the court
complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), (b).
Appellant raises one question for our review:
Did the lower court err and abuse its discretion by denying
[Appellant’s] post-sentence motion for a new trial, as the verdict
was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock one’s
sense of justice, where the Commonwealth’s identification
evidence was inconsistent and unreliable?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
well settled. The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the
evidence: they are “free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Champney,
832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citation omitted). “Appellate review of a weight
claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth
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v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 341 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and emphasis
omitted). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder; nor
will we reweigh evidence. See Interest of D.J.K., 303 A.3d 499, 507 (Pa.
Super. 2023).2
The same standard is applied whether it is a bench trial or a jury trial.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d 257 (Pa. Super. 2016):
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 619 Pa. 423, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054–55
(2013) (quotation marks, quotations, and citations omitted). In
order for an appellant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of
the evidence, “the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and
uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.”
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (2003) (quotation
marks and quotations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d at 264–65 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Here, Appellant claims that she should have been awarded a new trial
because, “no credible evidence was presented that [Appellant] was the
individual who shot at Ms. Bellamy and her vehicle.” Post-Sentence Motion,
5/23/24, at 3. Specifically, Appellant questions Bellamy’s ability to identify the
shooter and considers Bellamy’s testimony “inconsistent and contradictory.”
Appellant’s Brief, 3/12/25, at 8-9. We do not find this argument persuasive.
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2 The same standard is applied whether it is a bench trial or a jury trial.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d 257 (Pa. Super. 2016) (
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The trial court weighed the evidence presented at the bench trial and
deemed Appellant’s claim to be without merit. The trial court found Bellamy’s
testimony to be credible, consistent, and corroborated by her 911 call,
damage to her vehicle, and surveillance footage. See Trial Court Opinion,
12/02/24, at 12. Additionally, Bellamy positively identified Appellant as the
shooter at every step in the investigation. See id. There is no indication that
the trial court abused its discretion in this case; rather, its findings were well
supported by the record. Accordingly, Appellant is due no relief and we affirm
the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/28/2025
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