The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
HELEN M. PETRUCCI,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 6:24-cv-728-JRK
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER2
I. Status
Helen M. Petrucci (“Plaintiff”) is appealing the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration’s (“SSA(’s)”) final decision denying her claim for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Plaintiff’s alleged inability to work is the
result of trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety attacks, a hearing
impairment, issues with her lower back and neck, and neuropathy in both arms.
Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 9; “Tr.” or “administrative
1 Frank Bisignano was recently confirmed as the Commissioner of Social
Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Bisignano should be
substituted as Defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by
reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2 The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge. See Order Regarding Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction in Social
Security Appeals (Doc. No. 117), Case No. 3:21-mc-1-TJC (outlining procedures for consent
and Defendant’s generalized consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in social security
appeals cases); consent by Plaintiff indicated in docket language for Complaint (Doc. No. 1).
transcript”), filed June 18, 2024, at 92, 109, 248.3 Plaintiff protectively filed an
application for DIB on February 6, 2018, alleging a disability onset date of
March 15, 2013.4 Tr. at 222-27. Later, the alleged onset date was amended to
August 31, 2016. Tr. at 365-70; see Tr. at 1094. The application was denied
initially, Tr. at 91-106, 107, 130, 131-33, and upon reconsideration, Tr. at 108-
28, 129, 141-46, 147.
On July 22, 2019, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing,
during which she heard testimony from Plaintiff, who was represented by
counsel, and a vocational expert (“VE”). See Tr. at 42-82. On November 12, 2019,
the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled through September 30,
2018, the date Plaintiff was last insured for DIB (the “DLI”). See Tr. at 24-34.
Thereafter, Plaintiff sought review of the decision by the Appeals Council
and submitted additional medical evidence and a brief authored by her counsel.
See Tr. at 2, 5-6 (Appeals Council exhibit list and orders), 13-19, 83-90 (medical
evidence), 211-13 (request for review), 375-79 (brief). On November 23, 2020,
the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, Tr. at 1-4, thereby
making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On January
3 Adjudicative documents and medical evidence are sometimes duplicated in the
administrative transcript. Citations herein are to only one appearance of each document—not
duplicates.
4 Although actually completed on February 7, 2018, see Tr. at 222, the protective
filing date for the DIB application is listed elsewhere in the administrative transcript as
February 6, 2018, see, e.g., Tr. at 92, 109.
20, 2021, Plaintiff commenced an action in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
by timely filing a Complaint, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final
decision. Tr. at 1147-49. Thereafter, on unopposed motion by Defendant, Tr. at
1157-59, the Court on December 30, 2021 entered an Order reversing and
remanding the matter for further administrative proceedings, 1160-61 (Report
and Recommendation), 1162-63 (Order), 1164 (Judgment).
On remand, the Appeals Council on July 13, 2022 entered an Order
remanding the case to an ALJ for further proceedings. Tr. at 1168-70. On
November 7, 2022, the ALJ held a hearing,5 during which she heard testimony
from Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a VE. See Tr. at 1071-1101.
On April 19, 2023, the ALJ issued a Decision finding Plaintiff not disabled
through the DLI. See Tr. at 1046-61.
Thereafter, Plaintiff sought review of the Decision by the Appeals Council
and submitted additional medical evidence and a brief authored by her counsel.
See Tr. at 1030-31, 1034-35 (Appeals Council exhibit list and orders), 1103-20
(medical evidence), 1300-01 (request for exceptions), 1354-60 (brief). On
February 28, 2024, the Appeals Council declined to assume jurisdiction, Tr. at
1030-33, making the ALJ’s Decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On
April 19, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by
5 The hearing was held via telephone with Plaintiff’s consent. Tr. at 1073-74,
1293-94.
timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1), seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision.
On appeal, Plaintiff challenges “[w]hether the ALJ provided an adequate
analysis of the supportability and consistency factors when evaluating the
persuasiveness of the medical opinions of record and assessing Plaintiff’s
residual functional capacity” (“RFC”). Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff
(Doc. No. 16; “Pl.’s Mem.”), filed July 31, 2024, at 17. On October 7, 2024,
Defendant filed a Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner’s Decision
(Doc. No. 22; “Def.’s Mem.”) addressing the issue. Then, on October 21, 2024,
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Reply (Doc. No. 24; “Reply”) was filed. After
a thorough review of the entire record and consideration of the parties’
respective arguments, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner’s final
decision is due to be affirmed.
II. The ALJ’s Decision
When determining whether an individual is disabled,6 an ALJ must
follow the five-step sequential inquiry set forth in the Code of Federal
Regulations (“Regulations”), determining as appropriate whether the claimant
6 “Disability” is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A).
(1) is currently employed or engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a
severe impairment; (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals one listed in the Regulations; (4) can perform past
relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to perform any work in the national
economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Simon v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 7
F.4th 1094, 1101-02 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted); Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004). The claimant bears the burden of
persuasion through step four, and at step five, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
Here, the ALJ followed the five-step inquiry. See Tr. at 1049-61. At step
one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “did not engage in substantial gainful
activity during the period from her amended alleged onset date of August 31,
2016, through her [DLI] of September 30, 2018.” Tr. at 1049 (emphasis and
citation omitted). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff through the DLI
“had the following severe impairments: posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
depressive disorder, hearing loss, and degenerative disc disease.” Tr. at 1049
(emphasis and citation omitted). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
through the DLI “did not have an impairment or combination of impairments
that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 [C.F.R.] Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. at 1050 (emphasis and citation
omitted).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following RFC through the
DLI:
[Plaintiff could] perform light work as defined in 20 CFR [§]
404.1567(b) except she was never able to climb ladders, ropes or
scaffolds. She was able to frequently climb stairs and ramps, stoop,
kneel, crouch and crawl. She was not limited with balancing. She
could work at jobs where there is a moderate to low noise
environment. She was able to understand and remember simple
and some detailed instructions. She was able to perform simple
tasks at jobs where she had no interaction with the public,
occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers and where
there were no hourly quota production requirements. She would be
able to adapt to routine changes at the workplace.
Tr. at 1052 (emphasis omitted).
At step four, the ALJ relied on the VE’s hearing testimony and found that
Plaintiff through the DLI “was unable to perform any past relevant work” as an
“avionics technician” and an “aeronautic designer engineer.” Tr. at 1059 (some
emphasis omitted). The ALJ then proceeded to the fifth and final step of the
sequential inquiry. After considering Plaintiff’s age (“54 years old . . . on the
[DLI]”), education (“at least a high school education”), work experience, and
RFC, the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony and found through the DLI that
“there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy
that [Plaintiff] could have performed,” such as “electronics worker,” “plastics
assembler,” and “inspector and hand packer,” Tr. at 1059-60 (some emphasis
and citation omitted). The ALJ concluded Plaintiff “was not under a
disability . . . at any time from August 31, 2016, the alleged onset date, through
September 30, 2018, the [DLI].” Tr. at 1061 (emphasis and citation omitted).
III. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision as to disability
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given
to the ALJ’s conclusions of law, findings of fact “are conclusive if . . . supported
by ‘substantial evidence.’” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.
2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Substantial
evidence is something ‘more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.’” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial
evidence standard is met when there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also Biestek v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019); Samuels v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 959
F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). It is not for this Court to
reweigh the evidence; rather, the entire record is reviewed to determine
whether “the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence.” Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted). The decision reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is
supported by substantial evidence—even if the evidence preponderates against
the Commissioner’s findings. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,
1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
IV. Discussion
Focusing exclusively on her mental impairments, Plaintiff argues the
ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinion evidence, particularly opinions from
non-examining state-agency psychologists James Brown, Ph.D. and Theodore
Weber, Psy.D., treating psychiatrist Mira Sachdev, M.D., and treating
psychologist Scott Fairchild, Psy.D. Pl.’s Mem. at 17-33; Reply at 1-7.
Responding, Defendant contends the ALJ properly assessed the various
opinions and provided rationale supported by substantial evidence. Def.’s Mem.
at 6-18.
Dr. Brown reviewed available evidence in the administrative transcript
dated through February 2018 and authored an opinion on May 24, 2018
indicating Plaintiff was “anxious” but “her mental status examinations are
otherwise unremarkable.” Tr. at 97, 96-99, 102-03. According to Dr. Brown,
Plaintiff had “understanding and memory limitations,” “sustained
concentration and persistence limitations,” “social interaction limitations,” and
“ability to adapt limitations” but that Plaintiff’s “ADLs” (activities of daily
living) affected the consistency of Plaintiff’s statements about her symptom-
related limitations. Tr. at 99 (some capitalization omitted). Dr. Brown stated
Plaintiff had moderate limitations in various mental functional areas but no
more than that. Tr. at 102-03.
Dr. Weber reviewed available evidence dated through July 2018 and
authored an opinion on August 29, 2018. Tr. at 115-17, 124-25. Overall, he
concurred with Dr. Brown’s opinion, noting that since that opinion had been
authored, Plaintiff had been “more active.” Tr. at 125.
On April 19, 2019, Dr. Sachdev authored an opinion in which she stated,
among other things, that Plaintiff was “seriously limited” or unable to meet
competitive standards” in most mental abilities about which she was asked. Tr.
at 804-06 (some capitalization omitted). Asked to explain, she wrote “see
medical record.” Tr. at 805. According to Dr. Sachdev, Plaintiff could be
expected to be absent from work more than four days per month as a result of
her symptoms. Tr. at 805. Later, on January 24, 2020, Dr. Sachdev wrote a
letter in which she indicated Plaintiff had been a patient in the mental health
clinic since 2011 and in her care since October 2014; stated that Plaintiff’s
trauma symptoms are triggered by certain types of work (small rooms with one
exit; workstations not against a wall); indicated Plaintiff cannot work
productively if she does not feel safe and cannot maintain concentration for
more than an hour or remember detailed instructions or consistently follow a
schedule or maintain a normal workday; and stated Plaintiff has “striking”
interpersonal impairments that could manifest in triggers from atypical
coworker interactions and results in her inability to interact appropriately with
the general public. Tr. at 1810.
Dr. Fairchild first treated Plaintiff in December 2019, and he authored a
comprehensive mental health evaluation on January 28, 2020 for the division
of disability determinations in which he opined Plaintiff suffered from
“overwhelming emotional symptoms in response to her PTSD[,] anxiety and
depression.” Tr. at 1816, 1811-16. On December 30, 2019, Dr. Fairchild also
filled out the medical opinion form regarding mental abilities to do work and
opined Plaintiff is “seriously limited,” “unable to meet competitive standards,”
or has “no useful ability to function” in almost every mental abilities category.
Tr. at 1807-09 (some capitalization omitted). According to Dr. Fairchild,
Plaintiff would have “extreme difficulty in working anywhere, particularly
around males.” Tr. at 1808. Plaintiff could be expected to miss more than four
days of work per month. Tr. at 1808. Dr. Fairchild reaffirmed this opinion on
October 6, 2022. Tr. at 1817.
The SSA revised the rules regarding the evaluation of medical evidence
for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See Revisions to Rules Regarding
the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5844 (January 18,
2017); see also 82 Fed. Reg. 15,132 (March 27, 2017) (amending and correcting
the final Rules published at 82 Fed. Reg. 5,844). Under the new rules and
Regulations, “A medical opinion is a statement from a medical source about
what [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] impairment(s) and whether
[the claimant] ha[s] one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions
in the following abilities:” 1) the “ability to perform physical demands of work
activities”; 2) the “ability to perform mental demands of work activities”; 3) the
“ability to perform other demands of work, such as seeing, hearing, or using
other senses”; and 4) the “ability to adapt to environmental conditions.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2), 416.913(a)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining
“[a]cceptable medical sources”). Particularly regarding the mental demands of
work activities, “medical opinions are about” matters “such as understanding;
remembering; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; carrying out
instructions; or responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work
pressures in a work setting.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2), 416.913(a)(2).
An ALJ need not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a).7 “Because section 404.1520c falls within the scope
of the Commissioner’s authority and was not arbitrary and capricious, it
abrogates [the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s] prior
7 Plaintiff filed her application after the effective date of sections 404.1520c and
416.920c, so the undersigned applies the revised rules and Regulations.
precedents applying the treating-physician rule.” Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
Comm’r, 38 F.4th 892, 896 (11th Cir. 2022).
The following factors are relevant in an ALJ’s consideration of a medical
opinion or a prior administrative medical finding: (1) “[s]upportability”; (2)
“[c]onsistency”; (3) “[r]elationship with the claimant”; (4) “[s]pecialization”; and
(5) other factors, such as “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity
with the other evidence in the claim or an understanding of [the SSA’s]
disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c). Supportability and consistency are the most
important factors, and the ALJ must explain how these factors were considered.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). Generally, the ALJ is not required
to explain how he or she evaluated the remaining factors. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). However, if the ALJ “find[s] that two or more
medical opinions . . . about the same issue are both equally well-
supported . . . and consistent with the record . . . but are not exactly the same,
[the ALJ must] articulate how [he or she] considered the other most persuasive
factors . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).8
8 When a medical source provides multiple opinions, the ALJ is also not required
to articulate how he or she evaluated each medical opinion individually. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(b)(1), 416.920c(b)(1). Instead, the ALJ must “articulate how [he or she]
considered the medical opinions . . . from that medical source together in a single analysis
using the factors listed [above], as appropriate.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(1), 416.920c(b)(1).
Here, the ALJ found “persuasive” the opinions of Dr. Brown and Dr.
Weber and found “not persuasive” the opinions of Dr. Sachdev and Dr.
Fairchild. Tr. at 1055-57. Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s rationale for making
these findings is inadequate and unsupported. Pl.’s Mem. at 17-33. The
undersigned disagrees.
In addressing the persuasiveness of Dr. Brown and Dr. Weber’s opinions
in the context of the overall evidence, the ALJ wrote:
Dr. Brown and Dr. Weber’s opinions are persuasive
because they are specialists in the field of mental
health who are well acquainted with the assessment of
functionality as it pertains to the disability provisions
of the Social Security Act and Regulations. Their
opinions are also consistent with the progress notes and
supported by the objective medical evidence. The
undersigned however finds that [Plaintiff] could have
no interaction with the public after considering
[Plaintiff’s] history of PTSD. Specifically, [Plaintiff]
testified that her PTSD is triggered by anything out of
the ordinary like someone walking through the door
suddenly, noises at night, knocks on the door, and
conversations where she is put on the spot. She also
testified that she does not like to be around crowds
because she startles easily. On mental status
examinations, [Plaintiff] displayed an anxious mood,
restricted affect, fleeting attention, and impaired
insight and judgement, but she denied suicidal and
homicidal ideations and her appearance, eye contact,
speech, psychomotor level, memory, thought process,
and behavior were within normal limits (Exhibits 1F,
3F, 5F, 6F, and 10F). Further, the record documents
some improvement with treatment. For example, on
February 6, 2018, [Plaintiff] reported that she has been
in a good mood and in a good place the last few weeks
(Exhibit 1F/20). On May 8, 2018, [Plaintiff] reported
her mood has been “good” overall, she started
volunteering by giving tours at a museum and has been
enjoying that, and she just presented some middle
school-aged kids with awards (Exhibit 3F/13).
Additionally, [Plaintiff’s] treating provider indic[a]ted
on May 29, 2018 and September 27, 2018 that she
continued to show improvement in mood and daily
functioning (Exhibits 5F/69 and 6F/30).
Tr. at 1055-56. Next, regarding the persuasiveness of Dr. Fairchild’s opinions
as they relate to the rest of the evidence, the ALJ wrote:
Dr. Fairchild’s opinions (Exhibits 21F, 23F, and 24F)
are not persuasive because at the time he provided his
December 30, 2019 opinions (Exhibits 21F and 23F), he
had no prior treatment history with [Plaintiff] (Exhibit
23F/1). Additionally, his opinions are inconsistent with
the treatment records and not supported by the
objective medical evidence. For example, although
there were some findings of an anxious mood, restricted
affect, fleeting attention, and impaired insight and
judgement, [Plaintiff] denied suicidal and homicidal
ideations and her appearance, eye contact, speech,
psychomotor level, memory, thought process, and
behavior were within normal limits (Exhibits 1F, 3F,
5F, 6F, and 10F). In addition, [Plaintiff] has not
required repeated hospitalizations or emergency room
treatment for symptoms related to a mental disorder
during the period at issue. Further, the record
documents some improvement with treatment.
Tr. at 1056. The ALJ then repeated examples of treatment improvement she
had earlier provided when addressing Dr. Brown and Dr. Weber’s opinions. Tr.
at 1056-57. Finally, the ALJ addressed the persuasiveness of Dr. Sachdev’s
opinions in relation to the other evidence and found:
Although Dr. Sachev is [Plaintiff’s] treating
psychiatrist at the Viera VA Outpatient Clinic, her
opinions (Exhibits 7F and 22F) are not persuasive
because they are inconsistent with her own progress
notes and not supported by [Plaintiff’s] activities of
daily living. Specifically, on mental status
examinations, [Plaintiff] displayed an anxious mood,
restricted affect, fleeting attention, and impaired
insight and judgement, but she denied suicidal and
homicidal ideations and her appearance, eye contact,
speech, psychomotor level, memory, thought process,
and behavior were within normal limits (Exhibits 1F,
3F, 5F, 6F, and 10F). In addition, she bathed and
dressed independently, did laundry, cleaned the house,
vacuumed, ironed, prepared meals, drove a vehicle,
shopped, and attended church (Exhibits 12E and 14E).
She also gave tours at a museum and presented middle
school-aged kids with awards (Exhibit 3F/13). Further,
[Plaintiff] had been re-elected to the AIAA as secretary,
she was taking religious/Bible classes online, and was
looking for a job (Exhibits 5F/75 and 6F/71). [Plaintiff]
also did not require repeated hospitalizations or
emergency room treatment due to a mental impairment
prior to the date last insured.
Tr. at 1057.
The ALJ’s findings reflect adequate consideration of the required factors
and are supported by substantial evidence. During the relevant time period, Dr.
Sachdev prescribed Atomoxetine and Adderall for attention and concentration
concerns and Clonadine at bedtime for sleeping and ADHD. See, e.g., Tr. at 412-
17 (December 28, 2017 prescription notes and “stable mental status”), 674 (May
29, 2018 prescription notes). After Plaintiff’s homelessness issue had been
resolved, Plaintiff’s mental health notes (Dr. Sachdev’s included) indicate an
improvement in symptoms and good insight. See, e.g., Tr. at 644-46 (July 19,
2018 social worker note indicating Plaintiff was volunteering in various
positions, taking online religious courses, and looking for a job despite being
labeled “unemployable”), 672-77 (Dr. Sachdev’s May 29, 2018 note indicating
Plaintiff was looking for a job but did “not expect this to happen,” was working
with the Veterans council, and had mild anxiety with either normal or poor
concentration and otherwise benign findings), 565-66 (May 8, 2018 social
worker note indicating Plaintiff was volunteering at a museum and was doing
other community events; attention was “fleeting” but “redirectable”), 399-400
(February 8, 2018 note from social worker indicating Plaintiff appeared with a
service dog, had applied to volunteer at a museum, had fair impulse control and
euthymic mood but otherwise benign findings), 407-09 (January 9, 2018 note
from social worker stating Plaintiff’s concentration improved with increased
Adderall); see also Tr. at 915-20 (Dr. Sachev’s April 19, 2019 note (after the DLI
of September 30, 2018) indicating relatively benign symptoms and stable
mental status); but see Tr. at 655-59 (June 2018 aggravation of PTSD symptoms
after inappropriate encounters with a handyman in her apartment complex and
letter/recommendation by Dr. Sachdev that she move out). The ALJ also
accurately summarized Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. Tr. at 1055-57; see
Tr. at 313-20, 338-44. As to Dr. Fairchild, the ALJ accurately noted he had just
began treating Plaintiff when he authored his opinions. Tr. at 1056; see Tr. at
1811.
This is not a case of an ALJ’s failure to account for a fluctuation in
symptoms or a failure to identify genuine inconsistency between a treating
physician’s opinion and her notes, as Plaintiff contends. See Pl.’s Mem. at 24
(citing Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1260-64, 1267-68 (11th Cir.
2019)). Nor is it an ALJ’s failure, as Plaintiff argues, to take into account “the
fundamental differences between the relaxed, controlled setting of a medical
clinic and the more stressful environment of a workplace.” Pl.’s Mem. at 28
(quoting Simon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 7 F.4th 1094, 1107 (11th Cir. 2021)).
Rather, the ALJ’s Decision reflects consideration of the evidence on the whole
and specifically cites evidence both within and outside of the treatment notes
that is contradictory to the work-preclusive opinions of Dr. Fairchild and Dr.
Sachdev.
Plaintiff also contends the ALJ should not have relied on the opinions of
Dr. Brown and Dr. Weber because they did not review all of the evidence (they
could not have based upon the timing of their opinions). See Pl.’s Mem. at 22.
The relevant time period under consideration by the ALJ, however, only
extended months after these opinions were authored, during which time
Plaintiff showed even more improvement in her mental symptoms. Moreover,
although finding “persuasive” the opinions of Dr. Brown and Dr. Weber, the
ALJ actually added more restrictions to Plaintiff's RFC (no interaction with the
public) after finding credible Plaintiffs allegations in this regard. Tr. at 1052,
1055. The ALJ did not err in regard to her partial reliance on Dr. Brown and
Dr. Weber.
V. Conclusion
The ALJ’s Decision is supported by substantial evidence. Based on the
foregoing, it is
ORDERED:
1. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(¢), AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final
decision.
2. The Clerk is further directed to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on August 27, 2025.
ama. K. KAS
JAMES R. KLINDT
United States Magistrate Judge
kaw
Copies:
Counsel of Record
-18 -