Duman v. Wigand

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-61151-STRAUSS

JAMES BARTOLO DUMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHRISTOPHER WIGAND,

Defendant.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS MATTER was assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant

to Administrative Order 2025-11. However, because I find that dismissal of this case is warranted,

and because I do not presently have authority to issue a dispositive order, I am issuing a Report

and Recommendation. I have separately entered an order directing the Clerk to randomly reassign

this case to a District Judge of this Court. For the following reasons, I respectfully

RECOMMEND that this action be DISMISSED and that all pending motions be denied as moot.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant on June 9, 2025, [DE 1], and subsequently

moved to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE 3]. The Complaint identifies Defendant as a Broward

County Circuit Court Judge. [DE 1] at 1. Plaintiff alleges Defendant, while presiding over

Plaintiff’s case in Florida state court regarding a child custody dispute, incorrectly entered an

injunction against him. See [DE 1] at 2–4. Plaintiff requests that the Court “get involved [and]

see the errors.” Id. at 2.

Because Plaintiff has moved to proceed in forma pauperis, the screening provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, if a court determines that the case is frivolous

or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, then the court “shall dismiss the case at

any time.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and conclusions”; a “formulaic

recitation of the cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must

be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings

and hold them to “less stringent standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Bilal v. Geo Care,

LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency

does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The reasons

why depend, in part, on whether Plaintiff is suing Defendant in his official or individual capacity.

It is not entirely clear in what capacity Plaintiff seeks to sue Defendant, a Broward County Circuit

Court Judge. The Complaint does not specify if Plaintiff is seeking to sue Defendant in his official

capacity as a Broward County Circuit Court Judge or in his individual capacity. Regardless,

Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed. To the extent he sues Defendant in his official capacity,

his claims are barred by sovereign immunity and the fact that Defendant is not a “person” under

42. U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent he sues Defendant in his individual capacity, his claims are barred

by judicial immunity and the text of § 1983. And, regardless, his claims are barred by the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine.

When the complaint does not “clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their

official capacity, or both[,] ‘[t]he course of proceedings’ in such cases typically will indicate the

nature of the liability sought to be imposed.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)

(quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469 (1985)). Here, Plaintiff appears to be suing Defendant

in his official capacity because the relief Plaintiff seeks is for the Court to “get involved” and “see

the errors” in his state child-custody case. [DE 1] at 2. In other words, as discussed further below,

Plaintiff seeks to have this Court correct what he sees as errors by the state court and somehow

compel the state court to grant or enforce the “original order” giving him custody of his children.

See id. He does not profess to seek monetary damages against Defendant personally. Id. Under

these circumstances, Plaintiff appears to sue Defendant in his official capacity. See Graham, 473

U.S. at 165 (explaining that “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions he takes under color of state law[,]” whereas “[o]fficial-capacity

suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of

which an officer is an agent”) (internal citations omitted); see also Shean v. Garcia, No. 3:20-cv-

750-MMH-PDB, 2021 WL 2403936, * 4–5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2021), report and recommendation

adopted, 2021 WL 1811772 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2021).

If Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant in his official capacity, Plaintiff’s claims are

barred by sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment bars “suits against a state initiated by

that state’s own citizens.” Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir.

1999). This immunity extends to state agencies and other arms of the state. Cassady v. Hall, 892

F.3d 1150, 1153 (11th Cir. 2018). Although “a state can consent to suit in federal court . . . .[,]

Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity with regard to § 1983 actions.” Cichowski v. Totten,

No. 24-10195, 2024 WL 2182487, at *2 (11th Cir. May 15, 2024) (citation omitted). Nor has

Congress abrogated “the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 suits.” Id.

A Florida state-court judge in his official capacity is an arm of the State of Florida. See

Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 213 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding Florida state-court judge is an

arm “of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore enjoy immunity from liability

on [Plaintiff’s] § 1983 claims, both legal and equitable”); Kaimowitz v. The Fla. Bar, 996 F.2d

1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The Eleventh Amendment prohibits actions against state courts and

state bars.”); Coker v. Warren, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2023) (“In Florida, the state

court system, and therefore a state court judge acting in his official capacity, are considered arms

of the State of Florida.”).

There is an exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity when a plaintiff brings

a suit seeking “prospective equitable relief to end ongoing and continuing violations of federal

law.” Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1336. This is known as the Ex parte Young doctrine. But

the doctrine does not include or permit judgments against state officers that declare that the state

officers violated federal law in the past or permit a plaintiff to adjudicate the legality of past

conduct. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).

That is what Plaintiff seeks to do here. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff’s and his

children’s right to due process. [DE 1] at 4. The allegations within the Complaint are that

Defendant entered an order enforcing an out of state order granting Plaintiff custody of his

children. Id. at 2–3. Then two weeks later, Defendant entered another injunction – this time

unfavorable to Plaintiff – which resulted in Plaintiff losing custody of his children. Id. at 2–4.1

Plaintiff alleges that this second injunction was wrong. Id. at 3–4. In other words, Plaintiff is

alleging that Defendant’s action in the past violated Plaintiff’s due process. Therefore, Plaintiff is

not seeking prospective equitable relief to end ongoing and continuing violations of federal law,

and the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply here. See Higdon v. Tusan, 746 F. App’x 805,

809–10 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding claims against state judges seeking entry of an order overturning

state-court orders or declaring that the state court violated federal law in the past were barred by

Eleventh Amendment).

Additionally, a plaintiff cannot use a § 1983 claim as a device to review a state court

judgment. Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We reject, from the outset, the

use of § 1983 as a device for collateral review of state court judgments.”). And “neither a State

nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Michigan

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Clark v. Clark, 984 F.2d 272, 273 (8th Cir.

1993) (“Courts are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”); Ippolito v. State of

Fla., 824 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (“[I]t is important to note that a state court is not

a ‘person’ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Consequently, if Plaintiff is bringing a §

1983 suit against Defendant in his official capacity as a Broward County Circuit Judge then

dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 is warranted. See Shean, 2021 WL 2403936, at *5.

Even if Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant in his individual capacity (and seeking

money damages), Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. It is well-

established that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for acts taken in

1 Plaintiff uses the term “D.V. Injunction” in his facts and makes references to safety. Id. at 3.

The Court presumes Plaintiff is referring to a domestic violence injunction, but this is purely

speculation as Plaintiff’s facts are not clear as to what occurred.

their judicial capacity unless they act in the absence of all jurisdiction. See Bolin v. Story, 225

F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages

for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity[.]”). “A judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear

absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (quoting Bradley

v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)). Plaintiff’s allegations all pertain to Defendant exercising his

duties as a Broward County Circuit Court Judge. Plaintiff’s generalized dissatisfaction with

Defendant’s order regarding child custody will not serve to circumvent the doctrine of judicial

immunity. Thus, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Defendant acted in the “clear absence of all

jurisdiction,” and the doctrine of judicial immunity applies. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57.

Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff believes he is seeking injunctive relief against

Defendant, the plain text of § 1983 bars his suit. The statute states that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding a violation of a

declaratory decree or the availability of declaratory relief.2

2 Moreover, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a §1983 claim for a federal due process violation.

“[A] § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1)

a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3)

Finally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant. Under this

doctrine, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a state court order.”

Thurman v. Jud. Correction Servs., Inc., 760 F. App’x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2019). The Rooker-

Feldman doctrine applies to cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In such cases, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 vests authority to review a state court’s judgment solely with the

Supreme Court. Id. at 291–92.

It is true that Rooker-Feldman does not strip a district court of subject matter jurisdiction

over a claim “simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously

litigated in state court.” Id. at 293. But, Rooker-Feldman does not prioritize form over substance;

rather, it bars all appeals of state court judgments, brought in federal district court, regardless of

how a plaintiff labels his complaint. Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2021); see

also May v. Morgan Cnty. Georgia, 878 F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A] state court loser

cannot avoid Rooker-Feldman’s bar by cleverly cloaking her pleadings in the cloth of a different

claim.”).

When reviewing if Rooker-Feldman applies, “[t]he question isn’t whether the whole

complaint seems to challenge a previous state court judgment, but whether resolution of each

constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).

Even if Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts showing that the state court proceedings deprived him

of due process, Plaintiff has failed to show that the state did not make available a means to remedy

the deprivation. See Laskar v. Peterson, 771 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014); Carcamo v. Miami-

Dade County, 375 F.3d 1104, 1105 (11th Cir. 2004). If Plaintiff is seeking a modification or

reversal of a domestic violence injunction, a Florida appellate court can provide the necessary

relief to remedy any deprivation. See Chizh v. Chizh, 199 So. 3d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).

individual claim requires review and rejection of a state court judgment.” Behr, 8 F.4th at 1213.

In this case, Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against Defendant and asks this Court to “get involved,”

and wants his “original order granted in [Florida].” [DE 1] at 2. Thus, to resolve Plaintiff’s § 1983

claim, this Court would have to review and reject Defendant’s prior order regarding Plaintiff’s

custody of his children. Rooker-Feldman prohibits such a review.

Therefore, I respectfully RECOMMEND that this action be DISMISSED without

prejudice and that all pending motions be denied as moot.3

The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with this Court.4

Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by a District

Judge of this Court of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on

appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds

3 “Our cases make clear that ‘a [pro se] plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the

complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice’—at least, that is, where ‘a

more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.’” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927

F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289,

1291 (11th Cir. 2018)) (alteration in original).

4 As set forth in Rule 4(b) of the of the Magistrate Judge Rules of this Court’s Local Rules:

Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, recommendations

or report under subsections 1(d), (e), and (f) of these rules, supra, within fourteen

(14) days after being served with a copy thereof, or within such other time as may

be allowed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. Such party shall file with the

Clerk of the Court, and serve on all parties, written objections which shall

specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or

report to which objection is made, the specific basis for such objections, and

supporting legal authority. . . . A District Judge shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,

the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.

of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

DONE AND SUBMITTED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 28h day of July 2025.

ared M. Strauss

United States Magistrate Judge