DANIELS v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

SHAWN DANIELS, )

) Civil Action No.:

) 2:24-CV-01730-CCW-CBB

Plaintiff, )

) Christy Criswell Wiegand

vs. )

United States District Judge

)

ALLEGHENY COUNTY, C.O. )

PARKER, C.O. DONATO, ) Christopher B. Brown

) United States Magistrate Judge

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS ECF No. 5

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Recommendation

This civil action was removed to this Court from the Court of Common Pleas

of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania on December 20, 2024. Plaintiff Shawn Daniels,

was a pretrial detainee in the custody of Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”), and alleges

that Defendants Allegheny County (the “County”), Corrections Officer Parker (“C/O

Parker”) and Corrections Officer Donato (“C/O Donato”) violated his civil rights

when he was physically and sexually assaulted by two other inmates while in ACJ’s

custody. ECF No. 1-2. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1331.

Presently pending before the Court is a motion by the County to dismiss

Daniels’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipal liability claim for failure to state a claim under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 5. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for

consideration. ECF Nos. 6, 10.

For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court

deny the County’s motion to dismiss.

II. Report

a. Background

According to the Complaint, Daniels was a pretrial detainee at ACJ awaiting

trial for DUI charges. ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 1, 10. Despite having no violent criminal

history, he was housed on a maximum-security pod with violent detainees,

including his two assailants, Keyjuan King and Kesean Proctor. Id. at ¶ 10. King

had previously been convicted of robbery and firearm charges, was previously held

in ACJ, and was awaiting trial on weapons and unlawful restraint/false

imprisonment charges. Id. at ¶ 11. Proctor had been convicted of possessing a

weapon at ACJ in 2022 and was awaiting trial on firearms charges. Id. at ¶ 12.

On June 5, 2024 at approximately 6:00 P.M., Daniels returned to his cell

after he attended a Christian mass service on his pod. Id. at ¶ 13. At approximately

6:15 P.M., King and/or Proctor motioned for C/Os Parker and/or Donato, who were

the correction officers on the pod at the time, to open Daniels’ cell door. Id. at ¶¶ 13-

14. Despite ACJ policy precluding corrections officers from allowing inmates to

access other inmates’ cells, and despite knowing that neither King nor Proctor were

Daniels’ cellmate, C/Os Donato and/or Parker opened Daniels’ cell door allowing

King and Proctor to enter. Id.

Upon entering Daniels’ cell, King and Proctor placed a towel on the cell

window and began assaulting Daniels with a homemade shank made from a nail

attached to a spork. Id. at ¶ 15. Despite ACJ policy precluding inmates from

obstructing cell windows and requiring corrections officers to immediately

investigate and/or intervene in such situations, C/Os Donato and Parker took no

action to investigate or intervene. Id.

It is alleged that over a 39-minute period, King and Proctor bound Daniels’

hands and legs, stabbed him 37 times, sexually assaulted him, and repeatedly

punched and kicked him. Id. at ¶ 16. While doing so, King and Proctor attempted to

extort money from Daniels. At the end of the 39-minute assault, King and Proctor

called Daniels’ daughter from Daniels’ jail tablet and demanded she send them

thousands of dollars. Id. at ¶ 17. Daniels’ daughter suspected something was wrong

and asked to speak to her father. Id. at ¶ 18. In response, King and Proctor

continued to beat Daniels and instructed him to tell his daughter to send the

money, which he did. Id. at ¶ 18-19. The call cut off and King and Proctor

attempted to call Daniels’ daughter back several more times. Id.

During the 39-minute attack, C/Os Parker and Donato should have

completed several cell checks on the pod, should have walked past Daniels’ cell at

least three times, and should have seen the towel covering the cell window in

violation of ACJ policy. Id. at ¶ 25. Despite this, it is alleged they took none of these

actions and failed to intervene. Id. . At approximately 6:54 P.M., King and Proctor

left Daniels’ cell, “leaving Daniels to die.” Id. at ¶ 26. When this occurred, it is

further alleged C/Os Parker and Donato still did nothing to intervene or check on

Daniels. Id.

It was only after Daniels’ daughter told her mother, Nilda Daniels, about the

suspected attack that Nilda called the ACJ at approximately 7:00 p.m. Id. at ¶¶ 20-

21. When she did, she spoke to Officer Remini and advised him that she believed

Daniels was being murdered in his cell. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. Officer Remini told Nilda

he would contact the officers on the pod, have them check on Daniels, and thereafter

contacted C/Os Parker and/or Donato to advise them Daniels was being assaulted

and requested they immediately check his cell. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. C/Os Parker and

Donato allegedly continued to do nothing to check on Daniels despite having actual

knowledge of the assault. Id. at ¶ 24.

It is alleged that Daniels remained in his cell for another 30 minutes until

Sergeant Maust and C/O Gilland responded. Id. at ¶ 27. When they did, Daniels

was transported to a hospital where he remained for a week to be treated for life-

threatening injuries. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.

C/Os Parker and Donato were disciplined in connection with the attack for

their failure to intervene. Id. at ¶ 30. King and Proctor were charged with a litany

of felonies in connection with the attack, including aggravated indecent assault. Id.

at ¶ 31.

Daniels claims his assault was not an isolated incident at the ACJ and

suggests two similar assaults occurred around the same time he was assaulted. Id.

at ¶ 32. The same month Daniels was assaulted, another inmate, M.M., was

assaulted in his cell under similar circumstances to Daniels in June 2024. Id. at ¶

33. M.M. was confined for non-violent offenses and was housed on the same pod as

Daniels with violent offenders, including M.M.’s assailants. Id. at ¶ 34. M.M. was

in his cell with the door locked, when another inmate motioned to the corrections

officer on the pod to unlock M.M.’s door. Id. at ¶ 35. The corrections officer opened

the door, three inmates rushed into the cell and held a shank to M.M.’s throat. Id.

at ¶¶ 35-36. When inside they sexually assaulted M.M. for several minutes while

attempting to extort him for money or property. Id. at ¶¶ 35-37. The corrections

officer would have witnessed the inmates rush into the cell, but refused to

intervene. Id. at ¶ 37. As with Daniels, M.M.’s assailants were charged with

numerous felonies related to the assault. Id. at ¶ 38. Daniels also claims, without

specifics, that another inmate, M.G., was assaulted in his cell under circumstances

similar to both Daniels and M.M. Id. at ¶ 39.

In the Complaint, Daniels asserts two causes of action: (1) a Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

C/Os Parker and Donato (Count I); and (2) a municipal liability claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against the County for its failure to train and failure to properly

classify inmates (Count II). Id. ¶¶ 40- 53. Defendants move to dismiss the

municipal liability claim against the County only. ECF No. 6.

b. Standard of Review: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Failure to State a

Claim

A motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the

complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The applicable

inquiry under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well settled. Rule 12(b)(6) works in

conjunction with Rule 8, which requires that a claim for relief contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and a complaint can be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A defendant has the burden

of showing that a complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United

States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding modified by Simon v. United

States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003)).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“Though ‘detailed factual allegations’ are not required, a complaint must do more

than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action.’” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241

(3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead

facts sufficient to show that [his] claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v.

City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).

To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court

must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a

claim for relief; (2) peel away allegations that are no more than conclusions and

thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) look for well-pled factual

allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give

rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012)

abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197,

204 (3d Cir. 2024). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must be dismissed if it merely alleges

entitlement to relief without supporting facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d

203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).

With that standard in mind, the Court turns to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss.

c. Discussion

Daniels asserts a section 1983 municipal liability claim against the County in

two respects: First, for its failure to train corrections officers to intervene in

inmate-on-inmate assaults; and second for its failure to have a policy that properly

classifies inmates and results in non-violent detainees being housed on a maximum-

security pod with violent offenders. ECF No. 10 at 2-5. The County argues Daniels

has failed to identify a policy or custom of ACJ that violates his constitutional rights

with respect to its failure to train or its failure to properly classify inmates. ECF

No. 6 at 4-6.

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal

court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). Section

1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution

and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3

(1979).

In Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the

Supreme Court of the United States held that “when execution of a government's

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury,” the government as

an entity is responsible. Id. at 694. The facts alleged must plausibly show that the

municipality was the moving force of a constitutional violation. Id.

Thus, to plead municipal liability under Monell, Daniels must allege (1) he

possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the County had a

policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom ‘amount[ed] to deliberate indifference’ to

that constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the ‘moving force behind

the constitutional violation.’” Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962, 974 (3d

Cir. 2015) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 410 (1997)). The policy or custom can either be a formal policy, where a

“decisionmaker with final authority ‘issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict,”

Williams v. Ponik, 822 F. App'x 108, 112 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon,

915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)), or an “informally adopted” custom. Beck v. City of

Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). Daniels

must show a “direct causal link” between the policy and/or custom and his

“constitutional deprivation.” Kramer v. City of New Kensington, No. CIV.A. 13-606,

2015 WL 5672640, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2015) (quoting Jiminez v. All Am.

Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2007)). “‘Failure to’ claims – failure

to train, failure to discipline, or . . . failure to supervise – are generally considered a

subcategory of policy or practice liability.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d

307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S.

822 (2015).

i. Failure to Train

The County argues that Daniels failure to train claim should be dismissed as

it “does not identify a specific training that the County failed to provide or that any

such training exists that would reduce the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.”. ECF

No. 6 at 5.

A municipality’s “decision not to train certain employees about their legal

duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official government

policy for purposes of [section] 1983. A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation

of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (cleaned up). For a failure to train claim under

section 1983 against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege either a “pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” id. at 62 (“pattern” based

section 1983 failure to train claim), or if no pattern is alleged, “the need for more or

different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the

violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said

to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (“single-incident” based section 1983 failure to train claim).

To state a claim for either a pattern or a single-incident based section 1983 failure

to train claim, the plaintiff must allege “that the deficiency in training actually

caused” the constitutional violation. Harris, 489 U.S. at 379.

Daniels’ allegations more than adequately state a failure to train as the

direct cause or moving force behind his injuries arising from the failure to protect

him from inmate violence. He alleges that his assault was the direct result of the

County’s failure to train corrections officers on inmate safety and prevention of, and

intervention in, inmate-on-inmate assaults. ECF No. 1-2 at ¶ 49. He further

adequately alleges that the need for training was so obvious given the pattern of

violations from the two identical attacks that occurred in the same month as

Daniels was attacked. Id. at ¶¶ 33-39. See Board of County Com'rs of Bryan County,

Okl., 520 U.S. at 407 (“If a program does not prevent constitutional violations,

municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is

called for. Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or should

know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the

conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate

indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.”). Given this, Daniels has

sufficiently alleged enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery

may reveal evidence to support his failure to train claim against the County.

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended the Court deny Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Daniels’ failure to train claim against the County.

ii. Failure to Properly Classify

The County next argues Daniels’ claim that it failed to properly classify

inmates is “conclusory” and does not “set forth any specific basis for such a claim

other than that inmate-on-inmate assaults have occurred” and “fail[s] to plead how

‘proper’ classification would have prevented such an assault.” ECF No. 6 at 6.

At the pleading stage, Daniels has adequately alleged a County policy or

practice of housing pretrial detainees with no history of violence on a maximum-

security pod with violent offenders in violation of his constitutional right to be free

from inmate violence. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (prison

officials have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

other prisoners); Hightower v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 21-4075-KSM, 2022 WL

1121418, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2022) (inmate stated a Monell claim by identifying

prison practices to house inmates with a history of violence or severe mental health

illness in cells with other inmates); Williams v. Delaware Cnty. Bd. of Prison

Inspectors, No. CV 17-4348, 2018 WL 4558190, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2018)

(same and addressing pretrial detainees). Daniels alleges he was a non-violent

detainee, was housed on the maximum-security pod with his assailants who were

violent offenders, one of whom had been previously convicted of possessing a

weapon at ACJ in 2022, the County knew the assailants were dangerous, and this

policy created the opportunity for Daniels to be attacked. ECF No. 10 at 4-5. At this

stage, Daniels has sufficiently alleged enough facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery may reveal evidence to support a finding the County had

an unconstitutional housing policy or practice with respect to non-violent detainees.

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended the Court deny Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Daniels’ failure to properly classify claim against the County.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Court deny

the County’s motion to dismiss.

Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,

and the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties have until August 11, 2025 to

object to this report and recommendation. Unless otherwise ordered by the District

Judge, responses to objections are due fourteen days after the service of the

objections. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights.

Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).

DATED this 28th day of July, 2025.

Respectfully submitted:

s/Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand

United States District Judge

via CM/ECF electronic filing

Counsel of record

via CM/ECF electronic filing