Curtin-Wilding v. Trustees of Boston University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-10432-RGS

LYDIA CURTIN-WILDING,

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

v.

TRUSTEES OF BOSTON UNIVERSITY

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS, MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT, AND MOTION TO

CERTIFY QUESTIONS OF LAW

August 27, 2025

STEARNS, D.J.

Before the court is defendant Trustees of Boston University’s (BU)

motion for judgment on the pleadings, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), as well as

plaintiff Lydia Curtin-Wilding’s motions to amend the Complaint, Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and to certify certain questions of law to the Massachusetts

Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), Mass. S.J.C. Rule 1:03. For the following

reasons, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is allowed. The motions

to amend the Complaint and certify questions of law to the SJC are denied.

BACKGROUND

The court assumes familiarity with the facts of the case. Since August

of 2015, BU, a private, nonprofit research institution of higher education

with campuses in Boston, employed Curtin-Wilding as a salaried Lecturer.

Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶ 13. BU paid Curtin-Wilding on a monthly basis on or

about the last business day of each month. Id. ¶¶ 15, 18. She claims that BU’s

policy resulted in the wages that she and the putative class members earned

in the first half of the month from February 18, 2022, until August 1, 2023,

being paid approximately nine days late, in violation of the Massachusetts

Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 (Wage Act). Id. ¶¶ 18, 23. Curtin-

Wilding filed this putative class action on February 21, 2025. See Dkt. # 1.

On May 23, 2025, this court denied BU’s motion to dismiss the Complaint.

See Dkt. # 34. On June 6, 2025, BU filed its Answer. See Dkt. # 38.

On July 4, 2025, Massachusetts Governor Maura Healey signed a

budget bill into law, which included Section 113 of Chapter 9 of the Acts and

Resolves of 2025 (Section 113). Section 113 provides immunity to nonprofit

institutions of higher education and nonprofit organizations that comprise a

health care delivery system from Wage Act lawsuits targeting the employers’

monthly payment of wages to employees. See 2025 Mass. Acts. ch. 9, § 113.1

1 On April 16, 2025, the Joint Committee on Labor and Workforce

Development held a hearing on two bills, Bill S.1369 and Bill H.2164, which

were the precursors of Section 113. See Daggett v. Comm’n on Gov’t Ethics

& Election Pracs., 205 F.3d 445, 456 n.9 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the

court may take judicial notice of legislative facts). At the hearing, Rob

McCarron, the President of the Association of Independent Colleges and

Universities in Massachusetts, testified that the proposed legislation would

Following the passage of Section 113, on July 25, 2025, BU filed a

motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. # 39. Three days later, on

July 28, 2025, Curtin-Wilding filed a motion to amend the Complaint. See

Dkt. # 41. On August 1, 2025, she filed a motion to certify a question of law

to the SJC. See Dkt. # 48. On August 19, 2025, Curtin-Wilding filed another

motion to certify additional questions of law to the SJC. See Dkt. # 56.

Before the court are the pertinent motions, which the court will discuss in

turn.

DISCUSSION

1. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Rule 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings at

any time “[a]fter the pleadings are closed,” as long as the motion does not

delay the trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion differs from a Rule

12(b)(6) motion in that it implicates the pleadings as a whole. “In the

correct “unintended consequences” of the Wage Act, manifesting in the filing

of multiple class action lawsuits against universities in Massachusetts. See

Higher Educ. Hearing (Constitutional Amendment/Higher Education:

Hearing on S.1369, H.2164 Before the Joint Comm. on Lab. & Workforce

Dev., 194th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2025) (statement of Rob McCarron) (Dkt. # 50-

2)) at 2:23. On May 29, 2025, the bills were also discussed at a supplemental

budget hearing. The Senate proposed amendments to the legislation and

appointed a joint conference committee to reconcile the differences. On

June 30, 2025, the House and Senate accepted the conference committee

reports and enacted the budget legislation.

archetypical case, the fate of such a motion will depend upon whether the

pleadings, taken as a whole, reveal any potential dispute about one or more

of the material facts.” Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Reder, 355 F.3d 35, 38

(1st Cir. 2004). “Because [a Rule 12(c)] motion calls for an assessment of the

merits of the case at an embryonic stage, the court must view the facts

contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and

draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. . . .” Perez-Acevedo v. Rivero-

Cubano, 520 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008), quoting R.G. Fin. Corp. v. Vergara-

Nunez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006).

BU argues that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate because

Section 113 provides statutory immunity to BU based on a plain reading of

the legislation. See Dkt. # 40 at 6. Curtin-Wilding concedes that Section 113

“grants immunity only to ‘nonprofit institutions,’” see Dkt. # 42-1 at 2, but

challenges the constitutionality of Section 113, claiming that it: (a) is an

unreasonable and inequitable retroactive statute under the United States

and Massachusetts Constitutions, see Dkt. # 50 at 9; (b) is an impermissible

selective exemption to standing laws in violation of Article X of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, see Dkt. # 50 at 6; and (c) violates the

remedies clause of Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, see

Dkt. # 50 at 20.

The Wage Act requires that:

Every person having employees in his service shall pay weekly or

bi-weekly each such employee the wages earned by him to within

six days of the termination of the pay period during which the

wages were earned if employed for five or six days in a calendar

week, or to within seven days of the termination of the pay period

during which the wages were earned if such employee is

employed seven days in a calendar week.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. However, Section 113 provides that:

Nonprofit institutions of higher education and nonprofit

organizations that comprise a health care delivery system shall

be immune from liability with regard to any claim or cause of

action seeking a legal or equitable remedy or other relief

commenced between July 1, 2024 and September 30, 2028,

inclusive, that alleges that the institution’s or organization’s

payment of wages on a monthly basis or pursuant to any written

policy, schedule, or agreement presented or made available to an

employee concerning payment for work performed over an

academic term violated section 148 of chapter 149 of the General

Laws; provided, however, that earned wages shall have been paid

in full within 6 days of the termination of a pay period occurring:

(i) on a monthly basis; or (ii) pursuant to any written policy,

schedule or agreement presented to an employee concerning

payment for work performed over a specific period or an

academic term.

2025 Mass. Acts. ch. 9, § 113. The court agrees with the parties that the plain

language of Section 113 immunizes BU from liability for Curtin-Wilding’s

Wage Act claim that BU paid her on a monthly basis. See Summit Inv. and

Development Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 610 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that

words in a statute are to be given their plain meaning unless a literal

interpretation leads to an absurd result). Curtin-Wilding’s claim, which was

filed on February 21, 2025, squarely falls within the applicable statutory

period.2

A. Retroactive Application of Law

“The legal analysis of whether retroactive statutes violate the Due

Process Clause of the United States Constitution is that also followed as to

the Massachusetts Constitution.” Dutra v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 96 F.4th 15,

19-20 (1st Cir. 2024), citing Nantucket Conservation Found., Inc. v. Russell

Mgmt., Inc., 380 Mass. 212, 214 (1980); see Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Comm’r of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 194 (1978) (“[W]e perceive no need for

separate analysis of [plaintiffs’] various contentions under the impairment-

of-contracts clause and under the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the United

States Constitution and cognate State constitutional provisions.”).

“Retroactive legislation must satisfy the due process test: ‘a legitimate

legislative purpose furthered by rational means.’” Dutra, 96 F.4th at 20,

quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992). “A

2 Curtin-Wilding argues that BU must amend its Answer to include its

unpled affirmative defense of immunity under Section 113 before moving for

judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. # 50 at 3. BU contends that Section 113

is not an affirmative defense. See Dkt. # 55 at 2. “When an affirmative

defense is ‘definitively ascertainable from the complaint and other allowable

sources’ and the facts are “suffic[ient] to establish the affirmative defense

with certitude,’” a court may grant a Rule 12(c) motion. Taylor v. Milford

Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 3d 8, 13 (D. Mass. 2024), quoting Gray v.

Evercore Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F.3d 320, 324 (1st Cir. 2008).

legislative enactment carries with it a presumption of constitutionality, and

the challenging party must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that

there are no conceivable grounds which could support its validity.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Only those statutes which,

on a balancing of opposing considerations, are deemed to be unreasonable,

are held to be unconstitutional.” Id.

In evaluating the reasonableness of a retroactive statute, the court

weighs three factors:

(1) the nature of the public interest which explicitly or may have

motivated the Legislature to enact the retroactive statute; (2) the

nature of the rights affected retroactively and the reasonableness

of any reliance expectations on those rights; and (3) the extent or

scope of the statutory effect or impact, including whether the

statute is appropriate and narrowly tailored.

Id.

As to the first factor, the court finds Section 113 serves the public

interest by addressing “the devastating financial impact” of these Wage Act

claims to Massachusetts institutions of higher education. See Higher Educ.

Hearing at 3:14-23. McCarron, President of the Association of Independent

Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts, testified before the Joint

Committee on Labor and Workforce about the bill, which would become

Section 113. He referenced this lawsuit and others like it:

[The lawsuits] place[] hundreds of millions of dollars and even

billions of dollars at issue. It is very important to note that all of

the employees of the institutions that have been targeted by these

class action lawsuits received their full pay and on a regularly

scheduled basis. There are no allegations that any employee was

paid less than what they were owed, and there are no allegations

that any employee was paid later than the established pay

structure. Again, the intent of the Mass Wage Act is to go after

those unscrupulous employers and there is no allegation of any

of that in these cases. And the financial harm to the institutions

is entirely disproportionate to the damages suffered by the

affected employees, and the resulting harm to the institutions

would dramatically affect their ability to serve students and

employees.

Higher Educ. Hearing at 4:2-20. At the conclusion of McCarron’s testimony,

Representative McCurty stated:

Look, we and the legislature, we try to do the best we can but we

don’t get it right all the time and occasionally there’s an

unintended consequence. One of the beauties of the work that we

do is have an opportunity to go back and, you know, address

these matters. So, its really important that you are here.

Id. at 6:12-18. The “Legislature is well aware that Massachusetts is home to

a number of colleges and universities, and they are vital to the state’s

economy.” Dutra, 96 F.4th at 22. Private, nonprofit colleges in the

Commonwealth “educate 290,000 students and employ nearly 100,000

people . . . and represent a $71 billion impact for the state each year.” See

Higher Educ. Hearing at 2:14-17. And “[e]ven if the statute

disproportionately benefits private actors, that does not mean it was enacted

contrary to public interest.” Rodrigues v. Coll., 710 F. Supp. 3d 95, 100 (D.

Mass. 2024).

As to the second factor, the court finds that Section 113 is based upon

“reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose

justifying its adoption.” U.S. Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,

22 (1977), citing Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 445-447

(1908). Although Curtin-Wilding alleges that had she known the Legislature

was “prepared to deny her, but no other category of employee, protection

under the Wage Act, she certainly would not have undertaken the time,

expense, and personal and professional risk to vindicate her rights,” see Dkt.

# 50 at 17, she does not persuasively show that she would have acted

differently, other than forego the filing of her lawsuit, had she known Section

113 would be enacted. See Dupont v. Chief of Police of Pepperell, 57 Mass.

App. Ct. 690, 694 (2003) (holding that parties challenging the

reasonableness of a retroactive statute “must show that they acted in

reasonable reliance upon the previous state of law” and “would not have

acted differently had [they] known [the statute at issue] would be enacted”).

There are no allegations that Curtin-Wilding, a BU employee since 2015,

otherwise contested her monthly payment of wages. Nor are there any

allegations that BU paid Curtin-Wilding less than what she was owed or later

than the established monthly pay structure.

Lastly, under the third factor, the court determines that the “extent of

the impact is not excessive.” See Dutra, 96 F.4th at 25 (courts “weigh the

‘duration of the burden imposed by the retroactive statute’ and ‘whether the

scope of the statute is narrowly drawn to treat the problem perceived by the

legislature’”), quoting Sliney v. Previte, 473 Mass. 283, 294 (2015). The

statute will affect a relatively small number of cases and is narrowly drawn

to address a public policy concern determined by the Legislature to be

detrimental to the welfare of the Commonwealth. See Parello v. McKinney,

46 Mass. App. Ct. 785, 792 (1999) (holding that the scope of a statute was not

excessive because the statute affected a relatively small number of pending

cases), citing Leibovich v. Antonellis, 410 Mass. 568, 579 (1991). In this

claim, immunity is “confined to suits that commenced within the specified

time frame” between July 1, 2024 and September 30, 2028. See 2025 Mass.

Acts. ch. 9, § 113; Dutra, 96 F.4th at 24. The legislation only affects those

suits in which a technical violation of the Wage Act occurred – Section 113

does not provide immunity to higher education institutions that have not

paid in full employees’ wages “within 6 days of the termination of a pay

period occurring: (i) on a monthly basis; or (ii) or pursuant to any written

policy, schedule or agreement presented to an employee.” See 2025 Mass.

Acts. ch. 9, § 113. Accordingly, the court finds that a balancing of all three

factors weighs in favor of retroactive application of Section 113 to this case.

B. Article X of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights

Curtin-Wilding contends that Section 113 violates Article X of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because it is a “special legislation” that

is designed to insulate a handful of employers, including Harvard University,

Amherst College, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Curry College, and Mass

General Brigham (all of whom face pending Wage Act lawsuits). See Dkt. #

50 at 6.

Article X of the Massachusetts Constitution provides that “[e]ach

individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of

h[er]s life, liberty and property, according to standing laws.” Mass. Const.

pt. 1., art. X. It thereby “prohibits the enactment of special legislation that

singles out any person for special privileges or advantages at the expense of

the rights of another.” Kienzler v. Dalkin Shield Claimants Tr., 426 Mass.

87, 89 (1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Courts have

defined “special legislation” as “legislation addressed to a particular

situation, that does not establish a rule of future conduct with any substantial

degree of generality, and may provide ad hoc benefits of some kind for an

individual or a number of them.” Id. at 89 n.2.

Section 113 applies equally to all “[n]onprofit institutions of higher

education” – it does not benefit an individual in the way Article X prohibited.

2025 Mass. Acts. ch. 9, § 113; see Donahue v. City of Boston, 264 F. Supp. 2d

74, 83 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that a statute at issue was not a “special

legislation” that violated the Constitution of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts because it applied equally to all applicants to the Boston

Police and Fire Departments who took the civil service exam after the

statute’s enactment). And as Curtin-Wilding concedes, Section 113 does not

mention by name the six university employers facing Wage Act violation

claims. See Dkt. # 50 at 7.

C. Article XI of the Declaration of Rights

Lastly, Curtin-Wilding contends that Section 113 violates the remedies

clause of Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because it

strips her of all remedies for her untimely pay. See Dkt. # 50 at 20.

Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantees that:

Every subject of the commonwealth ought to find a certain

remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs

which [s]he may receive in h[er] person, property, or character.

[S]he ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being

obliged to purchase it; completely, and without any denial;

promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.

Graizzaro v. Graizzaro, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 911, 912 (1994), citing Mass.

Const. pt. 1., art. XI. However, the retroactive application of Section 113 to

Curtin-Wilding’s claim in this case is a reasonable exercise of the

Legislature’s authority. Moreover, Article XI’s guarantee of “‘a certain

remedy . . . for all injuries . . . which [one] may receive’ has never been

construed to grant to any person ‘a vested interest in any rule of law entitling

[such person] to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit.’”

Decker v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 389 Mass. 35, 44 (1983) (alteration in

original), quoting New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917).3

2. Motion to Certify Questions of Law to the SJC

Curtin-Wilding asks this court to certify the following questions of law

to the SJC:

(1) Would the retroactive application of the immunities

provided by Section 113 of Chapter 9 of the Acts of 2025

violate the due process rights under the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights of the Plaintiff and putative class

members who were employees at BU paid monthly in

violation of the Wage Act who have pending claims for

penalty damages arising out of violations of the Wage Act

occurring prior to the enactment of Section 113?

3 The Massachusetts Constitution expressly permits the legislature to

alter or repeal statutes. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 14 (1971)

(“[C]hanges in prior law are necessary in any ordered society, and to argue

that art. 11 prohibits alterations of common law rights as such, especially in

the face of the specific provision to the contrary in art. 6, flies in the face of

all reason and precedent.”).

(2) Does Section 113 constitute an impermissible selective

exemption to Massachusetts standing laws in violation of

Article X of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights?

(3) Does Section 113 violate the Article XI of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights insofar as it extinguishes all legal and

equitable remedies available to Plaintiff and the putative

class under the Massachusetts Wage Act based on monthly

pay violations?

Dkt. # 56 at 4-5.

The SJC permits federal courts to certify questions of Massachusetts

law “which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying

court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling

precedent in the decisions of [the SJC].” Mass. S.J.C. Rule 1:03; see also

Nicholls v. Veolia Water Cont. Operations USA, Inc., 144 F.4th 354, 358 (1st

Cir. 2025). Certification is necessary only “when ‘the course [the] state

court[] would take is [not] reasonably clear.’” Easthampton Sav. Bank v.

City of Springfield, 736 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2013) (alterations in original).

Here, the SJC has “clearly articulated the method by which

Massachusetts statutes are to be interpreted.” Nicholls, 144 F.4th at 358,

citing MacLaurin v. City of Holyoke, 475 Mass. 231 (2016). Because the

state court and First Circuit have provided the framework to analyze the

constitutionality of the retroactive application of a statute and alleged

violations of Article X and Article XI of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights, certification of the questions of law are not warranted.4

3. Motion to Amend the Complaint

Curtin-Wilding seeks leave to file an Amended Complaint to: (a) add

BU President Melissa L. Gilliam and BU Treasurer Nicole K. Tirella as named

defendants; (b) add a cause of action for unjust enrichment under

Massachusetts common law; (c) amend the late payment allegations; and (d)

add 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) as a basis for this court’s jurisdiction. See Dkt. # 42

at 1.

A party seeking to amend a complaint more than 21 days after “service

of a responsive pleading or . . . motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f)” must seek

leave of court to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). When deciding a motion to

amend, the court’s task is to determine whether “justice . . . requires” that

leave to amend be granted. Id. A motion to amend may be denied where the

exercise is futile. Hatch v. Dep’t for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 274 F.3d

12, 19 (1st Cir. 2001). Futility means that the complaint, as amended, would

4 The court additionally notes that Curtin-Wilding filed this suit, solely

raising a state-law claim under the Massachusetts Wage Act, in federal court.

A party “who chooses the federal courts in diversity actions is in a peculiarly

poor position to seek certification . . . .” Ken’s Foods, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins.

Co., 36 F.4th 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2022), quoting Cantwell v. Univ. of Mass., 551

F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir. 1977).

fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Glassman v.

Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir. 1996). When leave to

amend is sought before discovery is complete and neither party has moved

for summary judgment, the district court, in reviewing for futility, applies

“the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”

Id.

A. BU’s President and Treasurer

First, Curtin-Wilding seeks to add BU’s President Gilliam and

Treasurer Tirella as defendants to her Wage Act claim and argues that

Section 113 “grants immunity only to ‘nonprofit institutions’ (not

individuals).” See Dkt. # 42-1 at 2.

The court “will not adopt a literal construction of a statute if the

consequences of such construction are absurd or unreasonable.” Att’y Gen.

v. Sch. Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 (1982); see Wild v. Constantini,

415 Mass. 663, 668 (1993) (“Reason and common sense are not to be

abandoned in the interpretive process, as it is to be supposed that the

Legislature intended to act in accordance with them.”). When such is the

case, “[t]he legislative intention in enacting the statute must be ascertained,

‘not alone from the literal meaning of its words, but from a view of the whole

system of which it is but a part . . .’” Killam v. March, 316 Mass. 646, 650

(1944). No reasonable legislative purpose of Section 113 would be served by

immunizing BU, an institution of higher education, yet holding its President

and Treasurer5 liable for purported violations of the Wage Act. To interpret

Section 113 in that way “would produce a result at odds with the intent of the

statute” and defy common sense. Cook v. Patient Edu, LLC, 465 Mass. 548,

554 (2013).6

5 Gilliam and Tirella were not BU officers serving at the time of Curtin-

Wilding’s claim, which spans from February 18, 2022, until August 1, 2023

– Tirella was named BU’s Treasurer in January of 2024, while Gilliam

became BU’s President on July 1, 2024. See Dkts. # 51-1 at 3; 51-2 at 4;

DeMego v. Nisonson, 2017 WL 3090212, at *2 (Mass. Super. May 25, 2017)

(“Nothing in the Wage Act or in appellate decisions construing the statute

indicates that someone newly hired as the president of the company becomes

personally liable on their first day on the job for all wages that were allegedly

earned but not paid before that time.”).

6 The Wage Act provides that:

The president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or

agents having the management of such corporation shall be

deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation

within the meaning of this section.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. Massachusetts courts have interpreted this

provision to mean that “a president and treasurer of a corporation are ‘jointly

and severally liable with the corporation for the payment of unpaid wages.’”

Ellicott v. Am. Cap. Energy, Inc., 2017 WL 1294437, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 3,

2017), aff’d, 906 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2018), citing Bisson v. Ptech, Inc., 2004

WL 2434638, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 19, 2004); see also Perrin v.

Collaborative Eng’rs, Inc., 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1121, 1121 n.2 (2013)

(interpreting Wage Act as “defining class of individuals subject to joint and

several liability with corporation” to include “the president and treasurer of

a corporation”). Where no viable claim exists against the corporate

B. Unjust Enrichment Claim

The court finds that adding a cause of action for unjust enrichment is

futile. A fundamental prerequisite to any unjust enrichment finding is that

the enrichment be “unjust.” See Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 622,

625 (2017) (“The plaintiff must establish ‘not only that the defendant

received a benefit, but also that such a benefit was unjust.’”), quoting Metro.

Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 464 Mass. 623, 644 (2013). There are no facts to

suggest that Curtin-Wilding had a reasonable expectation that she would be

paid other than on a monthly basis nor, as the court previously stated, does

she allege that BU failed to pay her in accordance with that monthly schedule

or for less than the amount she was owed. See FAC ¶ 32. Even assuming BU

enjoyed some small incidental benefit in the few days of retention of Curtin-

Wilding’s wages, it is not what a court sitting in equity would deem an affront

to “the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience.”

Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 539 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Del. 1988).

C. Late Payment Allegations

In her original Complaint, Curtin-Wilding alleged that BU had a

practice of paying her “wages on or about the last business day of each

defendant, it follows that there can be no joint and several liability

chargeable to its offense.

month, even though Plaintiff and Class members did not choose or elect at

their own option to be paid monthly. . .” Compl. ¶ 26. Without any additional

factual allegations or explanation, Curtin-Wilding seeks to amend her

Complaint to allege that she was paid at intervals “less frequently” than

monthly. See Dkt. # 42-2 (proposed Amended Complaint) at 7. The court

need not credit such a conclusory, unsubstantiated allegation. See SEC v.

Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Because it is a futile exercise, the court will deny Curtin-Wilding’s

motion to amend the Complaint.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, BU’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

is ALLOWED. Curtin-Wilding’s motion to amend the Complaint is DENIED.

Curtin-Wilding’s motion to certify the questions of law to the SJC is also

DENIED. The Clerk will enter judgment for BU and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Richard G. Stearns

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE