MAHER v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

LAWRENCE E. MAHER,

Petitioner,

Civil No. 19-cv-9060 (RMB)

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OPINION

et al.

Respondent.

BUMB, CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Lawrence E. Maher (“Plaintiff”), alleges that while incarcerated at FCI

Fort Dix, he was subjected to deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs,

inadequate living conditions, and negligent medical care. (Second Am. Compl., Dkt.

No. 79.) He asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment, the New Jersey

Constitution, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–

2680.

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons explained below,

the Court grants the Motion.

Accordingly, all claims are dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Administrative Claim under the

FTCA, seeking $10,000 in damages for alleged inadequate medical care following the

discovery of a pulmonary nodule in October 2016 at FCI Fort Dix. (First Am. Compl.,

Dkt. No. 1-5 at 55—56.) The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) investigation revealed that

Plaintiff had a preexisting history of severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

(“COPD”) and prior prostate cancer treatment. (Id. at 57—58.) Medical records reflect

his ongoing monitoring in the Chronic Care Clinic, multiple imaging studies, and

consultations with a contract pulmonologist, who recommended follow-up imaging

and conservative medical management. (Id. at 29—43; 53.) Plaintiff underwent a CT-

guided biopsy in June 2018. (Id. at 8.) The BOP concluded that there was no evidence

of negligence and denied the claim, noting that surgery was not indicated, and that

Plaintiff had not suffered a compensable loss. (Id. at 57—58.) Plaintiff was advised of

his right to file suit in federal court within six months. (Id.)

Plaintiff also filed a regional administrative appeal requesting nutritional

supplements, which was rejected for both procedural and substantive reasons. (Id. at

60.) The administrative appeal was denied, finding no medical evidence of

malnourishment or need for dietary supplementation. (Id. at 64.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 28, 2019, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action under the

FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680, seeking $3.2 million in damages for alleged

medical negligence. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-2 at 1—2.) He alleged that BOP

medical staff failed to timely treat lung nodules despite his cancer history, and that this

omission contributed to the worsening of his condition, significant weight loss,

recurrent infections, and other complications. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1—

2.) He further alleges that prison officials disregarded environmental hazards,

including mold at FCI Fort Dix, and that medical staff responded dismissively to his

concerns following a collapsed lung. (Id. at 2.) As relief, Plaintiff sought monetary

damages and injunctive relief in the form of transfer to a federal medical facility or

placement in the Compassionate Release Program. (Id.)

After several periods of inactivity and multiple dismissals for failure to prosecute

or serve, the Court reopened the matter and directed the U.S. Marshals to effect

service. (See Dkt. Nos. 2–31.) On January 20, 2023, Respondents filed an Answer

denying most of Plaintiff’s allegations, proceeding only that Plaintiff received certain

medical treatments while incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, and that he filed and was

subsequently denied an administrative tort claim. (Answer, Dkt. No. 34 at 3—7.)

Defendants raised numerous affirmative defenses, including failure to state a claim,

lack of jurisdiction, untimeliness, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and

failure to provide a required Affidavit of Merit under New Jersey law. Defendants

deny liability for punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, or a jury trial, and request dismissal

of the complaint with prejudice. (Id. at 7—10.)

On May 15, 2023, Plaintiff moved for appointment of pro bono counsel

(Motion, Dkt. No. 42), which was granted on July 24, 2023 (Motion, Dkt. No. 47).1

1 The Court wishes to express its appreciation to pro bono counsel for their

commendable assistance in this matter.

On May 17, 2024, following several extensions, Plaintiff submitted the

operative Second Amended Complaint. (Second Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 79.) That

pleading alleges that while incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, Defendants exhibited

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, failed to provide constitutionally adequate living conditions, and

committed negligence and medical malpractice actionable under the FTCA. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts that after being diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2014 and

receiving radiation treatments, he was transferred to FCI Fort Dix in 2015, where

Defendants were aware of his medical history. (Id. at 3—4.) Beginning in 2015,

imaging revealed a pulmonary nodule that grew over time. (Id. at 4.) Despite repeated

recommendations from outside physicians for a biopsy or removal, Defendants

allegedly delayed or denied necessary treatment for years, even as additional nodules

developed, symptoms worsened, and evidence of metastasis emerged. (Id. at 4—5.)

Plaintiff further contends that his medical care was repeatedly delayed or canceled due

to Defendants’ negligence and retaliatory conduct, including failures to secure

diagnostic testing, ensure compliance with pre-operative protocols, or provide

appropriate medications. (Id. at 6—8.) He also alleges that he was subjected to

prolonged solitary confinement under conditions that exacerbated his pulmonary

symptoms, including lack of ventilation, inadequate medical care, and exposure to

mold in his housing unit. (Id. at 9—11.)

According to Plaintiff, these delays and conditions resulted in the worsening of

his health, significant weight loss, repeated hospitalizations, and long-term respiratory

complications. (Id. at 6—9.) He alleges that only after his compassionate release in

September 2020 did he receive appropriate surgical intervention, which significantly

improved his condition. (Id. at 10.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts four

counts: (I) Eighth Amendment violations under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (U.S.N.Y., 1971); (II) violations of the New

Jersey Constitution asserted through the FTCA against the United States; and (III—

IV) medical malpractice and negligence under the FTCA. He seeks compensatory,

punitive, and consequential damages, emotional distress damages, attorneys’ fees,

costs, and other relief deemed appropriate. (Id. at 10—14.)

On January 2, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.2 (Motion, Dkt. No.

93.) First, the motion urges dismissal of all Bivens claims (Count I) against the

individual BOP employees, contending that Plaintiff’s claims present a “new context”

beyond the narrow circumstances in which the Supreme Court has recognized Bivens

remedies, and that special factors counsel against extending such liability. (Id. at 15—

17.) They further argue that even if a Bivens remedy were available, dismissal is

warranted because the individual defendants are protected by qualified immunity and

the claims are independently barred by the statute of limitations. (Id. at 28—29.)

Second, the motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the New Jersey

Constitution (Count II) on jurisdictional grounds since the United States has not

2 It is unclear why Defendant’s say the motion to dismiss is “[partial],” see Motion,

Dkt. No. 93 at 37, when the Motion addresses all of the claims. If this Court has

misconstrued the Motion, the parties shall address the Court via Local Civil Rule

7.1(i).

waived sovereign immunity. (Id. at 34—35.) They note that Plaintiff has also indicated

an intent to withdraw this count without prejudice, further supporting dismissal. (Id.

at 34; Dkt. No. 91.)

Third, the motion argues that Plaintiff’s FTCA claims (Counts III and IV) fail.

(Id. at 35—36.) While acknowledging that Plaintiff filed an administrative tort claim

in 2018, Defendants argue that his Second Amended Complaint relies on factual

allegations outside the scope of that claim. (Id. at 36.) To the extent the FTCA counts

rest on unexhausted theories, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must

dismiss those claims. (Id. at 36—38.)

On August 18, 2025, Defendants supplemented their motion with the Third

Circuit’s recent precedential decision in Muniz v. United States, No. 24-1028, 2025 WL

2328350 (3d Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), which they contend is dispositive of Plaintiff’s Bivens

claims. (Letter, Dkt. No. 100.) Citing Muniz, Defendants argue that the BOP

Administrative Remedy Program (“ARP”) creates an alternative remedial structure,

that is, a “new context” from Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.14 (1980) and constitutes a

“special factor” precluding extension of a Bivens remedy for alleged deficiencies in

prison medical care. (Id. at 1.) Because Plaintiff had access to the ARP and does not

allege interference with that process, Defendants maintain that Muniz forecloses his

Bivens claims arising from medical treatment while incarcerated. (Id. at 1—2.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

1. Federal Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may adjudicate cases only

where federal question jurisdiction exists, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or diversity jurisdiction

applies, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

2. Eighth Amendment and Bivens Claims

Claims under the Eighth Amendment are actionable via Bivens against

individual federal officers in their personal capacities and require a showing of

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

105–06 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–37 (1994). Deliberate

indifference encompasses conduct that is more than mere negligence, requiring the

defendant to have actual knowledge of, and disregard for, an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety. See, e.g., Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67—69 (3d Cir. 1993);

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).

Courts distinguish between mere disagreements over medical judgment or treatment

and actionable constitutional violations.

3. Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

FTCA claims permit suit against the United States for the negligent or wrongful

acts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, but the United

States is liable only as a private person would be under state law, and certain remedies,

including punitive damages and attorneys’ fees, are statutorily barred, 28 U.S.C. §§

1346(b), 2671–80. FTCA claims require the timely presentation of an administrative

claim and exhaustion of remedies. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

Establishing liability under the FTCA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate duty, breach,

proximate causation, and actual damages. See Roma v. United States, 344 F.3d 352, 362

(3d Cir. 2003).

4. State Constitutional Claims

State constitutional claims are actionable under supplemental jurisdiction, 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a), when part of the same case or controversy as federal claims. Courts

may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if federal claims are dismissed, 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Substantively, claims under the New Jersey Constitution mirror common law duties

and constitutional principles, requiring proof of actionable misconduct and proximate

harm. See S.P. v. Newark Police Dep’t, 428 N.J. Super. 210, 230 (App. Div. 2012).

5. Remedies Available

Recoverable remedies differ depending on the claim. FTCA claims exclude

punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and certain speculative or consequential damages,

28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2678. Eighth Amendment claims may support compensatory

damages, but a plaintiff must show that defendants’ conduct directly caused harm. See

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012) (to recover for an Eighth Amendment

violation, a prisoner must show deliberate indifference and that such indifference

caused actual injury.) Equitable relief may be unavailable if the plaintiff is no longer

subject to the challenged conditions. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.

1993) (prisoner’s release mooted claims for injunctive relief because he was no longer

subject to challenged prison conditions.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Claims Under Bivens

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs while incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, including delayed or denied

treatment for pulmonary nodules, repeated cancellation of care, and exposure to

substandard housing conditions. (Second Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 79 at 4—11.) Under

the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a defendant knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06. Mere disagreement with medical judgment, inadvertent

delay, or negligence is insufficient.

The complaint, however, attaches evidence that Plaintiff received ongoing

medical care from April 2015 through 2018, including Chronic Care Clinic

monitoring, multiple imaging studies, medication management, specialist

consultations, and a CT-guided biopsy. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-5 at 1—43, 53.)

For example, after a pulmonologist identified a 4 mm pulmonary nodule in October

2016, Plaintiff was evaluated, prescribed medication, and scheduled for follow-up

imaging. (Id. at 33.) Subsequent scans showed growth of the nodule, with follow-up

CT and PET scans in 2018, and surgical intervention was not indicated at that time.

(Id. at 7, 13—27.) Although Plaintiff disagrees with the pace and scope of his

treatment, “disagreement with a doctor’s professional judgment does not state a

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir.

1990).

Moreover, under the Third Circuit’s recent decision in Muniz, the availability of

the BOP’s ARP constitutes a “special factor” foreclosing the extension of a Bivens

remedy for alleged deficiencies in prison medical care beyond the narrow context of

Carlson. Here, Plaintiff filed administrative claims and a regional appeal regarding his

care, evidencing access to the BOP’s ARP. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-5 at 55—

56, 60.) He does not allege interference with that process. (Id.) Accordingly, in light of

Muniz, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims must be dismissed.

B. Claims Under the New Jersey Constitution

Plaintiff next alleges violations of the New Jersey Constitution, contending that

Defendants failed to provide adequate medical care and subjected him to substandard

living conditions. (Second Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 79 at 9—11.) He has since indicated

his intent to withdraw this claim without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 91.)

Even absent withdrawal, the claim cannot proceed. The United States has not

waived sovereign immunity for alleged violations of state constitutions, and federal

courts lack original jurisdiction over such claims against the United States. See F.D.I.C.

v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (sovereign immunity bars constitutional tort claims

against the United States absent waiver); see also Robinson v. United States, 849 F. Supp.

799, 801 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims arising solely

under a state constitution). The Third Circuit has similarly recognized that state

constitutional claims cannot be shoehorned into the FTCA absent a specific statutory

waiver. See CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s New Jersey constitutional claims are dismissed.

C. Claims Under the Federal Tort Claims Act – Claim III and IV

Plaintiff also asserts claims for negligence and medical malpractice under the

FTCA (Counts III and IV). He alleges that Defendants’ delay in treating his

pulmonary nodules, failure to provide adequate pre-operative care, and exposure to

environmental hazards such as mold caused his deteriorating health. (Second Am.

Compl., Dkt. No. 79 at 4–11.)

To establish medical malpractice or negligence under the FTCA, a plaintiff

must demonstrate: (1) the existence of a duty owed by the federal employee or agent;

(2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate causation linking the breach to the plaintiff’s

injury; and (4) actual damages. See Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008).

Claims are evaluated under the law of the state where the alleged act occurred—in this

case, New Jersey law. A claimant must comply with procedural prerequisites,

including filing an administrative tort claim with the relevant agency prior to

commencing suit, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111–

12 (1993).

Here, the record demonstrates that Plaintiff exhausted one administrative tort

claim in 2018, limited to allegations of inadequate medical care following discovery of

a pulmonary nodule and environmental exposure to mold. (First Am. Compl., Dkt.

No. 1-5 at 55—58, 60.) However, his Second Amended Complaint advances broader

allegations—such as retaliatory cancellation of appointments, and solitary

confinement conditions—that were never presented in the 2018 claim. (Second Am.

Compl., Dkt. No. 79 at 6–11.) Because administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional

prerequisite, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any FTCA theory not

fairly encompassed within the 2018 claim. See White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d

453, 457 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, those portions of the FTCA claims are

dismissed.

Even as to the exhausted claim, Plaintiff fails to allege causation or compensable

damages under New Jersey law. The medical records all reflect that his pulmonary

nodules were repeatedly evaluated, monitored by imaging, and reviewed by

specialists. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-5 at 1—43, 53.) The BOP reasonably

followed the pulmonologist’s recommendations for conservative management until

biopsy was clinically indicated in 2018. (Id. at 28, 32—40.) A plaintiff cannot establish

negligence merely by disagreeing with the chosen course of treatment. See Schueler v.

Strelinger, 43 N.J. 330, 344 (1964).

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegation that his condition improved only after

surgical intervention post-release does not demonstrate that earlier surgery was

medically required, or that the delay proximately caused compensable injury. See

Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 409 (2014). The BOP’s denial of his administrative

claim emphasized that surgery was not medically indicated at the time, a conclusion

supported by contemporaneous medical records. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 1-5 at

57–58.)

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages, consequential damages, and attorneys’ fees.

(Second Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 79 at 13–14.) These forms of relief are largely barred

under the FTCA. Punitive damages are explicitly excluded by statute (28 U.S.C. §

2674), and attorneys’ fees are not recoverable absent specific statutory authorization

(28 U.S.C. § 2678). Consequential or speculative damages, including weight loss,

hospitalizations, or future medical costs, are generally not recoverable unless they

constitute direct, reasonably foreseeable losses. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,

146 (1950); see also Polzo, 196 N.J. at 584. Here, Plaintiff’s claims for consequential

damages are not supported by the record and therefore cannot be shown to constitute

direct, foreseeable losses. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 57—59, 64; Second Am.

Compl., Dkt. No 79 at 6—9.)

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s FTCA claims must be dismissed.

D. Equitable Relief

Plaintiff also seeks equitable relief, including transfer to a federal medical facility

and placement in the Compassionate Release Program. (First Am. Compl., Dkt. No.

1-3 at 2.) These claims are moot. Plaintiff was granted compassionate release in

September 2020, after which he underwent successful surgical intervention. (Second

Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 79 at 9—10.) Because he is no longer incarcerated, he is not

subject to the challenged conditions at FCI Fort Dix, and his claims for injunctive or

declaratory relief are dismissed as moot. See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206–

07 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege actionable

Eighth Amendment violations, FTCA claims, or state constitutional claims..

Accordingly, all claims must be dismissed.

An appropriate order follows.

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge

Dated: August 27, 2025