Garmon v. IDOC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JESSE C. GARMON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:21-CV-27-MAB

)

DONALD DUNN, DAVID STOCK, )

JEFFREY DENNISON, JULIE TANNER, )

DEBORAH ZELASKO, )

DEBBIE MAGNUS, DAN LYNN, )

SUSAN WALKER, KENDRA SEIP, )

HARRY ALLARD, )

STEPHANIE WAGGONER, and )

VERA ROLLINS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Jesse Garmon filed this lawsuit in January 2021 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 seeking compensatory damages for his allegedly unlawful incarceration in the

Illinois Department of Corrections after the Prisoner Review Board revoked his

supervised release. This matter is currently before the Court on the motion for summary

judgment filed by all Defendants (Doc. 146). Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, the

previous Orders of the Court, and the relevant case law, the undersigned finds the

threshold issue of whether Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they are barred

by Heck v. Humphrey should be decided first, before addressing Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.

BACKGROUND1

In October 2012, Plaintiff was sentenced in Fulton County, Illinois to six years

imprisonment for aggravated domestic battery, to be followed by a four-year term of

Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) (Doc. 146-1). Then on August 18, 2015, the

Fulton County court reduced Plaintiff’s sentence to three years and six months, with four

years MSR (Doc. 41, p. 19).2 The IDOC recalculated Plaintiff’s sentence and changed his

out date to June 26, 2015 (Doc. 41, p. 20), which had already passed, meaning Plaintiff

was eligible for immediate release. Plaintiff was scheduled for immediate release on

August 21, 2015 (Id.), and was in fact released from Big Muddy River Correctional Center

that day (Doc. 146-2, para. 10). Plaintiff claims that the excess time he served left him with

a “floating sentence credit” of two months and nine days that could be credited against

any future sentence imposed for violating the supervised released

On October 8, 2015—less than two months after being released from prison—

Plaintiff was arrested, in Sangamon County, Illinois for domestic battery (Doc. 41, p. 22).

The following day, the IDOC issued a Parole Violation Report and a warrant for Plaintiff’s

arrest (Id.; Doc. 146-2, p. 2).3 After pleading guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct in

Sangamon County (see Doc. 41, pp. 43–44), Plaintiff was handed over to IDOC custody

1 The facts stated in this section are taken from the admissible evidence submitted by Defendants at

summary judgment, as well as the sworn allegations contained in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint

and the documents attached thereto.

2 Neither party provided any information as to why Plaintiff’s sentence was reduced.

3 While there is a distinction between the terms “parole” and “mandatory supervised release,” see People v.

Lee, 979 N.E.2d 992, 1000-01 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2012), those terms are used synonymously and

interchangeably throughout the record in this case to describe Plaintiff’s status.

on December 4, 2015, to await an appearance in front of the Prisoner Review Board

(“PRB”) on the supervised release violation (Doc. 146-2, para. 11).

It is undisputed that on March 2, 2016, the PRB found Plaintiff had violated his

supervised release as of October 8, 2015, by committing a criminal offense in Sangamon

County (Doc. 41, p. 9 (Second Am. Comp.); Doc. 146, p. 3 (Defs.’ MSJ); Doc. 146-2, p. 6

(PRB Order)). Plaintiff claims that he met with Donald Dunn, a member of the PRB, on

March 2, 2016, and that Mr. Dunn decided Plaintiff should be reinstated to supervised

release with some minimal modifications to the conditions (Doc. 41, 9–10). Plaintiff claims

that he even signed papers agreeing to the new conditions (Id.). However, it is undisputed

that the Order issued by the PRB revoked Plaintiff’s supervised release and required him

to serve the remainder of his four-year MSR term in prison (Doc. 41, p. 9 (Second Am.

Comp.); Doc. 146, p. 3 (Defs.’ MSJ); Doc. 146-2, p. 6 (PRB Order)).

In the days that followed his meeting with the PRB, Plaintiff began corresponding

with various counselors at Centralia, about Dunn’s reinstatement order; those

communications suggested that Plaintiff would be released to a halfway house (Doc. 41,

pp. 10, 14; see also id at p. 24). Plaintiff was also told that his discharge date, meaning “the

day that [the IDOC] will have to let you go whether you have a place or not,” was

September 19, 2016 (Doc. 41, p. 25). On March 8, 2016, he received a message that his

discharge date had changed and was actually September 14, 2017 (Doc. 41, pp. 10, 28; see

also id. at pp. 27). He was soon informed that his release date was recalculated yet again

to January 22, 2019, because he had been ordered to serve 85% of his sentence. (Doc. 41,

pp. 10, 29–31; see also Doc. 146-2, p. 2). He continued to ask Centralia officials why he was

still incarcerated and had not been released as ordered, as well as why his discharge date

kept changing (Doc. 41, pp. 10, 23, 33). At some point, he also started asking why he was

not receiving credit for the two months and nine days of excess time that he had served

on his original sentence, but his requests were repeatedly denied (Doc. 41, pp. 7, 11, 12;

see also id. at pp. 32, 60–68).

Plaintiff was transferred to Shawnee Correctional Center sometime in late May or

early June 2016 (see Doc. 41, pp. 67–72). He claims that he immediately began contacting

staff at Shawnee asking for his sentence to be properly calculated to reflect the two

months and nine days of credit that he thought he was entitled to, but again his requests

were refused (Doc. 41, pp. 12–13, 14; see also id. at pp. 34–37, 70–72). Plaintiff was

discharged on January 22, 2019, (Doc. 146-2, p. 3), which he claims was over two months

after the date that he should have been released.

In this lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, all of whom were officials at

Centralia or Shawnee, had no authority to keep him in prison after his PRB hearing

because Donald Dunn ordered that his supervised release be reinstated (Doc. 41, p. 15).

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants miscalculated his revocation sentence by

refusing to give him credit for excess time he served on his original sentence (Doc. 41, p.

15). Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on claims that Defendants’ refusal to release

Plaintiff from custody following the PRB hearing and/or miscalculating his revocation

sentence violated his federal and state due process rights and his Eighth Amendment

rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (Docs. 23, 62). He is seeking

monetary damages for his “unlawful incarceration” (Doc. 41, p. 16).

After all the Defendants appeared and filed their answers, this action was

reassigned to the undersigned in March 2023 upon the full consent of all parties (Doc.

128). Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s

claims on July 29, 2024, arguing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law

because there is no evidence that the Prisoner Review Board ever ordered Plaintiff to be

released from prison and reinstated on supervised release, like he contends, and because

his revocation sentence was properly calculated (Doc. 146, pp. 4–6). Plaintiff filed a

response in opposition on September 12, 2024, primarily arguing that he should have

received credit on his revocation sentence for the excess time he spent in custody on his

original sentence from June 26, 2015, to August 21, 2015 (Doc. 152). Defendants did not

file a reply brief.

DISCUSSION

A glaring threshold issue that the jumps out to Court from the facts of this case

and which it must address first, before considering the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, is whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey forecloses

Plaintiff from bringing this action under § 1983. Although neither party has raised this

point, this is an issue the Court can raise sua sponte.4 And in this instance, given the facts

of this case, the Court believes it is appropriate to do so.

The Supreme Court has made clear that “[c]hallenges to the validity of any

confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus . . .

4 A court is permitted to raise Heck sua sponte. See, e.g., Knowlin v. Thompson, 207 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2000)

(affirming sua sponte dismissal of claim as Heck barred).

.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500

(1973)). Accord Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Challenges to

conditions of confinement (such as pollution in the prison or deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs) fall under § 1983” while “[a]ttacks on the fact or duration of the

confinement come under § 2254.”) Precedent requires that “state prisoners use only

habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the [fact or]

duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier

release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the

unlawfulness of the State's custody.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (emphasis

in original). Accordingly, a state prisoner is barred from bringing a § 1983 action for

money damages where success on the claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of

his confinement or its duration unless and until the conviction or sentence at issue has

been invalidated in a federal habeas proceeding or other similar proceedings in state

court. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Accord Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82

(“[A] state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the

relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state

conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action

would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”) (emphasis

and alterations in original).

The Heck doctrine extends to challenges of parole revocations, Easterling v.

Siarnicki, 435 Fed. App’x. 524, 526 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,

81–82 (2005)), and applies even when a plaintiff has been released from custody and can

no longer utilize habeas proceedings to invalidate the revocation, see Savory v. Cannon,

947 F.3d 409, 419-28 (7th Cir. 2020).

Here, part of Plaintiff’s claim is that, as a result of Defendants’ alleged misconduct,

he was held in prison when he should have been reinstated to supervised release. The

other part of Plaintiff’s claim is that, as a result of Defendants’ alleged misconduct, he

was deprived of credit to which he was entitled for time already served. In other words,

Plaintiff’s claims are based on the premise that he was unlawfully held for too long in

prison on the supervised release revocation. He is challenging the legality of the fact or

duration of his physical custody, and success on the merits of his claims would

necessarily impugn the validity of his confinement. See Clemente v. Allen, 120 F.3d 703,

705 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding plaintiff’s civil rights suit challenging the BOP’s computation

of his sentence was Heck barred; success on his claim “would imply the invalidity of his

sentence because he is challenging the duration of his confinement.”); Easterling, 435 Fed.

App’x. at 526 (holding plaintiff’s civil rights suit alleging prison officials unlawfully

detained him rather than releasing him on supervision was Heck barred; success on his

claim “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his revoked supervised release”).

Plaintiff has not alleged, nor shown in the documents he submitted at summary

judgment or with his various complaints, that he previously succeeded in having the

revocation of his supervised release or the computation of the revocation sentence

declared invalid through state court proceedings or a federal habeas proceeding under §

2254 (see Doc. 1, Doc. 20, Doc. 41, Doc. 152). Consequently, it appears that Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by Heck and should be dismissed without prejudice. However, in an

abundance of caution and in the interest of fairness to Plaintiff, he will be given 30 days

to respond to this Order and demonstrate that the revocation of his supervised release or

the computation of the revocation sentence was, in fact, declared invalid, or in the

alternative, to explain why Heck does not apply in this instance.

CONCLUSION

` The Court declines to decide Defendants’ summary judgment motion in light of

the possibility that Plaintiff’s claims are Heck barred. The motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 146) is DENIED without prejudice to refiling, if appropriate.

Plaintiff shall have until September 26, 2025, to respond to this Order and explain

why his claims should not be dismissed as Heck barred. Defendants reply, if any, is due

30 days thereafter. Both parties’ briefs are limited to 10 pages. Plaintiff’s failure to file a

brief will be construed as an admission that has never challenged the lawfulness of his

confinement through the proper means and result in the summary dismissal of this

action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 27, 2025

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge