Olea v. Riva Solutions Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JOHNNY OLEA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-23-00498-PRW

)

RIVA SOLUTIONS, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 40) filed by

Defendant RIVA Solutions, Inc.; Plaintiff Johnny Olea’s Response (Dkt. 53); and RIVA’s

Reply (Dkt. 62). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the Motion (Dkt. 40).

Background

This case arises from the allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory termination of an

employee based on his disability. The following facts are undisputed. RIVA is a

government contractor who provides mail delivery and distribution services to the Federal

Aviation Administration at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City.

The FAA required RIVA to sort and catalog all incoming mail and to scan deliverables

with barcodes into the FAA’s Package Tracking System. Olea worked at the site for RIVA

as a Driver/Courier. In this role, he was responsible for sorting and delivering mail. Olea

has suffered from hydrocephalus since he was a child.

From September 2021 to March 2022, Olea (1) was banned from the “CAMI

Building”—“one of RIVA’s largest delivery stops on the contract” for allegedly engaging

in inappropriate interactions with a female employee working at that building; (2) arrived

to work tardy on at least one occasion; and (3) (according to RIVA)1 failed to sync his

handheld scanning device (iPad) for twenty-three days, risking the loss of over 2,000

packages.

Around the same time—from December 2021 through March 2022—Olea

experienced worsening pain in his groin and abdomen. The pain caused him to move slower

and take longer to complete his mail routes. Olea testifies that he informed his immediate

supervisors, Michael Lindsay and Robert Stavinoha, of the pain and opined that he thought

he needed medical care.2 In mid-March, he notified his supervisors as well as a Human

Resources employee that he had a hernia and needed surgery and medical leave and that

he would have lifting restrictions for several weeks following the surgery.

On April 8, 2022, RIVA terminated Olea’s employment, citing his ban from the

CAMI building, tardiness, and device-related failures. Olea argues that these reasons are

pretextual, and that he was fired because of his disability and in retaliation for requesting

accommodations for his disability. Consequently, Olea sued RIVA on June 6, 2023,

alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination

1 Olea disputes this, testifying that “to [his] knowledge,” he synched his iPad every day.

Dep. of Johnny Olea (Dkt. 53-6), at 51. Regardless, RIVA contends that this is the primary

reason that he was terminated. See RIVA Termination Letter (Dkt. 40-20).

2 Dep. of Johnny Olea (Dkt. 53-7), at 20–24, 49–52.

Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act. (Dkt. 1). RIVA now moves for summary

judgment.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”3 A

genuine issue exists if “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury

to return a verdict for that party.”4 Evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly

probative” will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.5 A fact is material if it “might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”6

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.7 Once the movant has met his initial burden,

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.”8 Courts may only consider admissible evidence in reviewing

summary judgment, but the evidence need not be submitted “in a form that would be

admissible at trial.”9 Rather, the proponent must show that the evidence is capable of

3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

4 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (citation omitted).

5 Id. at 249–50 (citation omitted).

6 Id. at 248.

7 Trainor v. Apollo Metal Specialties, Inc., 318 F.3d 976, 979 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted).

8 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

9 Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Trevizo v. Adams, 455 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2006)).

presentation in an admissible form.10 Courts must view all facts and reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.11

Analysis

I. The Court denies Olea leave to file a sur-reply.

As a preliminary matter, Olea moves for leave to file a sur-reply. (Dkt. 63). He

argues that RIVA raises several new arguments in its reply brief. While parties generally

may not raise issues for the first time in a reply brief, such matters are properly considered

when they are responsive to arguments raised in the response brief.12 The Court finds that

each “new argument” that Olea identifies is responsive to matters that he brought into play

in his Response brief. The Court therefore DENIES the motion for leave to file a sur-reply.

II. Summary judgment is appropriate.

The Court first notes that Olea did not respond to RIVA’s arguments for summary

judgment as to (1) his failure-to-accommodate claims under the ADA and Oklahoma Anti-

Discrimination Act or (2) his FMLA claim. “Courts routinely deem an issue ‘waived’ when

a party fails to respond to a movant’s substantive argument.”13 Accordingly, Olea has

conceded these arguments, and the Court finds that summary judgment as to these claims

is appropriate. This leaves only his discrimination and retaliation claims.

10 Id. (citations omitted).

11 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

12 In re Gold Res. Corp. Sec. Litig., 776 F.3d 1103, 1119 (10th Cir. 2015).

13 Northcutt v. Fulton, No. CIV-20-885-R, 2020 WL 7380967, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 15,

2020) (collecting cases); see also Cigar Box, LLC v. Hous. Specialty Ins. Co., 685 F. Supp.

3d 1269, 1279 (W.D. Okla. 2023) (collecting cases).

A. The McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework applies.

The ADA prohibits both employment discrimination and discriminatory retaliation

against qualified disabled employees, and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act forbids

the same.14 The Oklahoma ADA’s protections “are ‘co-extensive with the protections

provided by federal law under the ADA.’”15 Therefore, if Olea’s ADA claims fail, his

Oklahoma ADA discrimination claims fail as well.16 Accordingly, the Court analyzes these

claims together.

Because Olea has not presented direct evidence of discrimination and relies instead

on indirect and circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework applies to both claims.17 First, Olea must establish prima facie cases of

discrimination and retaliation. The burden then shifts to RIVA to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, which shifts the burden back to Olea to show

that Riva’s justification is pretextual.18 Because the Court concludes that Olea’s claims fail

14 See George v. Cmty. Health Centers Inc., No. CV 21-00464-PRW, 2022 WL 697787, at

*3, 7 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 2022).

15 Hamilton v. Okla. City Univ., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1206 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (quoting

McCully v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1246–47 (N.D. Okla. 2010)).

16 Id.; see also Cline v. Clinical Perfusion Sys., Inc., 92 F.4th 926, 931 (10th Cir. 2024)

(collecting cases); George, 2022 WL 697787, at *7 (citing Tilghman v. Kirby, 662 F. App’x

598, 603 (10th Cir. 2016)).

17 See Kierl-Allen v. Salvation Army Ark./Okla. Div., 2021 WL 4495909, at *3 (W.D. Okla.

Sept. 30, 2021) (collecting cases) (involving circumstantial evidence of disability

discrimination); Herrman v. Salt Lake City Corp., 21 F.4th 666, 679 (10th Cir. 2021)

(involving circumstantial evidence of retaliation).

18 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (10th Cir. 1973).

at steps two and three, it assumes (without deciding) that he made a prima facie showing

of each claim.

B. RIVA articulated a legitimate reason for the termination.

The defendant’s burden at the second step is “exceedingly light.”19 It need only

provide facially legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for the termination.20 This

burden “is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.”21

Here, RIVA produced ample evidence that Olea’s ban from the CAMI Building, tardiness,

and failure to synch his device for 23 consecutive days, are the reasons that he was fired.22

RIVA has therefore articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination.

Thus, Olea must show that these reasons are pretextual.

C. Olea has failed to show pretext.

To survive summary judgment, Olea “must present evidence to establish there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether [RIVA’s] articulated reason for the adverse

employment action was pretextual.”23 A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by showing that

“the proffered reason is factually false, or that discrimination was a primary factor in the

employer’s decision.”24

19 DePaula v. Easter Seals El Mirador, 859 F.3d 957, 970 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation

omitted).

20 Id. (citation omitted).

21 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

22 See Resp. (Dkt. 40), at 26.

23 DePaula, 859 F.3d at 970.

24 Id.

Olea doesn’t claim that anyone with the authority to terminate him did so for

pretextual reasons. Instead, he argues that the decision was made because of the

discriminatory and retaliatory animus of Olea’s supervisors, Lindsay and Stavinoha (who

were not authorized to terminate his employment).25 Olea therefore relies on a “cat’s paw”

theory of liability, “which allows a plaintiff to establish pretext even without evidence that

the ‘actual decisionmaker’ possessed an unlawful motive.”26 An employer is liable under

this theory “if a subordinate to the decisionmaker performs an act motivated by

discriminatory [or retaliatory] animus that is intended by the subordinate to cause an

adverse employment action, and that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment

action.”27 Proximate cause is established where a plaintiff shows that the final

decisionmaker fires an employee based on “uncritical reliance” on facts provided by a

biased subordinate.28 A plaintiff must show that the subordinate’s involvement surpassed

“mere influence or input in the decision making process.”29 Instead, he must show a fact

issue exists as to “whether the biased subordinate’s discriminatory reports,

recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse employment action.”30

25 Olea does not dispute that Lindsay and Stavinoha lacked the authority to terminate him.

Resp. (Dkt. 53), at 1.

26 Singh v. Cordle, 936 F.3d 1022, 1038 (10th Cir. 2019).

27 Id. (cleaned up and emphasis removed).

28 Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t, 733 F.3d 1283, 1294 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation

marks and brackets omitted).

29 E.E.O.C. v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

30 Id.

Assuming without deciding that Lindsay and Stavinoha acted with discriminatory

or retaliatory intent, Olea has failed to show a triable issue as to whether their conduct

proximately caused his termination. The portions of the record on which Olea relies show

no more than “inputs” and “influence” on the decision-making process.31 Viewed in the

light most favorable to Olea, it merely evidences that his supervisors’ report of the iPad

incident travelled up the chain of command. But Olea has not shown that this report

substituted the decision-making process of those with actual firing authority.

Olea argues that “[e]ven an investigation . . . would not break the causal chain

between Stavinoha and Lindsay’s animus and the termination decision.”32 But it is “well-

established in the Tenth Circuit “that an employer can ‘break the causal chain’ between the

biased subordinate’s unlawful actions and the adverse employment action by

31 See Resp. (Dkt. 53), at 23, 1, 7 (citing Def.’s Resp. to Int. No. 3 (Dkt. 53-1), at 3 (Jennifer

Bonner, RIVA’s Senior Vice President for Client Delivery, initially requested Olea’s

termination “based upon information received from” Stavinoha and Lindsay. Following

that request, Bobby Frazitta (then Vice President of Human Resources and FSO) and

Deborah Campbell (Senior Human Resources Business Partner) “reviewed [Olea’s]

performance and discussed his continued employment.” Ultimately, CEO Naveen

Krishnamurthy and COO Neelu Modali decided “to terminate [Olea’s] employment[] after

consult[ing] with RIVA’s People & Culture Department.”); Jennifer Bonner’s Tr. (Dkt. 53-

2), at 108–109 (“I base[d] my opinion [regarding Olea’s termination] on . . . the chain of it

coming up to me[,]” so Olea’s termination “was caused at least in part” by information

provided by Stavinoha and Lindsay.); Neelu Modali’s Tr. (Dkt. 53-3), at 90 (The

description of the iPad synching issue would have come either from Stavinoha or

Lindsay.); Krishnamurthy’s Tr. (Dkt. 53-4), at 78–79 (Krishnamurthy received the

information regarding the iPad issue from Bonner.), 95–96 (Lindsay told Krishnamurthy

that Olea had performance issues and was insubordinate)).

32 Resp. (Dkt. 53), at 30.

independently investigating the allegations against the employee.”*’ Indeed, “simply

asking an employee for his or her version of events may defeat the inference that an

employment decision was discriminatory, as such an inquiry demonstrates that ‘the

employer has taken care not to rely exclusively on the say-so of the biased subordinate.’”**

Here, Olea’s own journal entries reflect that Human Resources called him to hear his

account of the iPad incident.*> Although not “conclusive,”** taken with Olea’s failure to

show a genuine issue of material fact as to causation, the Court finds that summary

judgment is warranted on his remaining claims.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion (Dkt. 40) and shall enter judgment

contemporaneously.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of August 2025.

PATRICK R. WYRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corp., 803 F.3d 510, 516 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Young v.

Dillon Cos., Inc., 468 F.3d 1243, 1253 (10th Cir.2006)).

Td. at 516-17 (quoting BCI Coca—Cola, 450 F.3d at 488).

>° Johnny Olea Notes (Dkt. 40-19).

°° Iweha v. Kansas, 121 F.4th 1208, 1229 (10th Cir. 2024).