State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel Buchanan, In Re: McAdoo Bonding Company, Surety

08/27/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 11, 2025 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NATHANIEL BUCHANAN, IN RE: McADOO

BONDING COMPANY, SURETY

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Rutherford County

No. F-80648 James A. Turner, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2024-00474-CCA-R3-CO

___________________________________

A defendant was charged with one count of first-degree murder and one count of unlawful

possession of a firearm. He was granted bail upon the posting of a $100,000 bond by a

bonding company. In the wake of the defendant’s successive failures to appear, the trial

court ordered the bond forfeited. The defendant was apprehended several weeks after the

bonding company paid the forfeiture, and the bonding company sought a refund. The trial

court denied the refund, and the bonding company moved the trial court to set aside its

order denying the refund. The trial court also denied the motion to set aside, and this appeal

followed. We affirm the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JEFFREY USMAN, SP.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN, P.J., and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., joined.

Joel H. Moseley, Jr., Murfreesboro, Tennessee (in trial court and on appeal), and John

Mitchell, Murfreesboro, Tennessee (in trial court), for the appellant, McAdoo Bonding

Company.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; William C. Lundy, Assistant Attorney

General; Jennings H. Jones, District Attorney General; and Matthew Westmoreland,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I.

In May 2018, Nathaniel Buchanan (Defendant) was charged with one count of first-

degree murder and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a

felony.1 The trial court set the bond at $100,000 and ordered Defendant to wear a GPS

monitoring device. McAdoo Bonding Company (McAdoo) issued the bond in July 2018,

and it was filed with the trial court in August 2018.

In April 2021, the trial court entered an order authorizing the removal of the GPS

tracking device as a condition of Defendant’s bond. On December 10, 2021, the State filed

a motion to revoke bail or increase the bond based on new criminal arrests and charges

filed after the monitor removal. Defendant’s counsel also moved to withdraw. The trial

court heard these motions on January 13, 2022, but Defendant failed to appear. The trial

court promptly granted the State’s motion, ordering that a capias warrant be issued for

Defendant and that he be held without bond.

On January 14, 2022, a “Forfeiture and Capias Order” was filed. It provides, in

pertinent part, as follows:

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the Court that the State of

Tennessee have and recover of the defendant, Nathaniel Buchanan and

principal, and the said McAdoo Bonding as surety, the sum of $100,000.00

dollars, and all the costs of this cause.

IT IS ORDERED that a Scire Facias be issued against the defendant

and his/her surety and the defendant be notified by certified mail, making

known to him/her these proceedings requiring him/her to appear instanter,

and show cause, if any, why this judgment should not be made final. The

surety, McAdoo Bonding shall be [sic] one hundred eight [sic] (180) days

from this date to surrender the defendant or this forfeiture as to said surety

will be made final.

The order also provides on a separate line, “STATUS OF FORFEITURE HEARING SET

FOR: 7/15/22.” It was mailed to both Defendant and McAdoo on January 18, 2022.

On January 18, 2022, a scire facias was issued, providing as follows:

1

Defendant was subsequently indicted for one count of first-degree murder and one count of

unlawfully possessing a firearm.

-2-

To Any Lawful Officer of Rutherford County:

You are hereby commanded to make known to McAdoo Bonding Company

– Kristy McAdoo, that a conditional forfeiture was rendered by the Judge of

the Rutherford County Circuit Court in and for said County against them, as

bondsman for $100,000.00. If Nathaniel Lamont Buchanan has not appeared

within 180 days from date of issue, the forfeiture will be made final, with the

conditional hearing set for 7/15/2022.

This document was mailed to McAdoo on January 18, 2022.

On July 13, 2022, two days before the scheduled hearing, McAdoo filed with the

trial court a Petition for Extension. McAdoo averred that it was searching for Defendant

and requested “additional time on this forfeiture.” A hearing on this request was scheduled

for August 26, 2022, and that same day the trial court entered an order granting the Petition

for Extension, extending the date of the conditional hearing by 180 days, so that it fell on

Wednesday, January 11, 2023.

On December 16, 2022, McAdoo filed a second Petition for Extension, which the

trial court scheduled for hearing on January 4, 2023. McAdoo requested a ninety-day

extension and, by an order entered on January 4, 2023, the trial court granted an extension

to May 31, 2023.

McAdoo filed a third request for an extension of time on May 24, 2023. In response

to this request, the trial court entered an order extending the date of the conditional hearing

to June 30, 2023, and stating that no more extensions would be granted. This final request

for an extension and the court’s grant of the extension are referenced in the court’s

subsequent orders but are not included in the record before us, and the record does not

reflect what, if anything, occurred before the trial court on June 30, 2023.

On July 6, 2023, the trial court issued an order of final forfeiture2 providing as

follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the Court that on 07/06/23, a

Conditional Forfeiture was made on the bond of the above-named defendant

and his sureties. The amount of the Bond(s) was $100,000.00 issued on

07/26/18. Scire Facias having been duly issued and duly returned into Court

showing proper notice to the Sureties of the Defendant’s Bond, and they have

2

This order was filed on July 7, 2023.

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failed to bring the Body of the Defendant before the Court within the 180-

day period as they are bound to do, nor has the process duly issued for the

arrest of the Defendant been executed.

It is therefore the orders of this Court pursuant to T.C.A. 40-11-139

that the Conditional Forfeiture made in this case against the Defendant and

his Sureties, be and is hereby made final this date. Due notice of this

Forfeiture will be made by mailing a certified copy of this order to all

concerned.

It is therefore ordered by the Court that all the costs of this case be

deducted and applied, and the balance of said amount to be paid to Rutherford

County, Tennessee on the Clerk’s proper agency reports. Final Forfeiture

Due Date: 08/05/23.

McAdoo did not appeal this order within thirty days, and the record reflects that

McAdoo paid the forfeiture in full on August 8, 2023. Defendant was eventually located

and apprehended at his girlfriend’s residence on October 18, 2023, more than two months

after the forfeiture was paid. That same day, McAdoo filed a motion requesting that the

forfeiture be refunded (the Refund Motion). As grounds for relief, McAdoo detailed the

efforts it took to locate Defendant and asserted that Defendant was apprehended based on

information that it provided to law enforcement.

As legal authority for its request, McAdoo relied on Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-11-204. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[T]he judges of the general sessions, circuit, criminal and supreme courts

may receive, hear and determine the petition of any person who claims relief

is merited on any recognizances forfeited, and so lessen or absolutely remit

the same, less a clerk’s commission . . . of the original paid final forfeiture

or one thousand dollars ($1,000), whichever is less, and do all and everything

therein as they shall deem just and right, and consistent with the welfare of

the state, as well as the person praying for relief. This power shall extend to

the relief of those against whom final judgment has been entered whether or

not the judgment has been paid, as well as to the relief of those against whom

proceedings are in progress.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-204(a)(1) (effective July 9, 2012, to June 30, 2025).3

3

This statute was amended in 2025. See 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 395 § 1 (effective July 1, 2025).

-4-

On December 7, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the Refund Motion

(the Order Denying Refund). As grounds for its decision to deny McAdoo’s request for a

refund, the trial court set forth in the Order Denying Refund the following:

After careful review of the record as a whole, the proof presented at

the hearing of this petition, and applicable law, the Court finds that McAdoo

Bonding Company has failed to prove it is entitled to relief from the

forfeiture. McAdoo voluntarily entered a contract that burdened themselves

with the responsibility of ensuring the defendant’s presence on his designated

court dates. When it failed to do so, it was generously afforded three

extensions to locate the Defendant to no avail. Meanwhile, the Defendant,

charged with this state’s most serious violent crime, was unaccounted for

from January 13, 2022 to October 18, 2023 (1 year, 9 months and 5 days).

The Defendant was not located in another state or country, nor was there

proof that he ever left the jurisdiction. Rather he was subsequently found

within the city of his residence, the city of his arrest, the city where McAdoo

maintains its primary office, and at an address 6 miles from the courthouse.

McAdoo argues that its efforts to continue trying to locate the

Defendant should be rewarded by the granting of its petition to the tune of

$100,000.00, less the clerk’s fee. Counsel argues that by granting this

request, the Court would show to the local bonding industry the value in

continuing to search for a defendant past the date of final forfeiture. The

Court views the scenario differently. The Court finds that granting the

petition would equate to eliminating any risk that a bail bonding company

voluntarily assumes. This assumption of risk followed McAdoo receiving a

payment of 10% of the bail amount. There is inherent risk in all business

ventures, especially the bail bonding business. The relief the Court offered

in this case was already granted in the multiple final forfeiture extensions.

The Court further finds that McAdoo is precluded from relief under

local rules for untimely apprehension. The Court finds that the defendant

was apprehended approximately seventy-four (74) days after the forfeiture

became final. Therefore, the defendant’s apprehension was untimely for

relief pursuant to Local Rule 16.04(F).4

4

Rule 16.04(F) Local Rules of Practice, 16th Judicial District, provides that, “[u]pon a forfeiture

becoming final and timely paid, the bonding entity may apply for the return of bond proceeds if the

defendant is incarcerated within Tennessee within thirty (30) days of the forfeiture becoming final.”

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On January 8, 2024, McAdoo filed with the trial court a motion “pursuant to Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-11-204 and Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure” to set

aside the Order Denying Refund (the Motion to Set Aside). As grounds, McAdoo claimed

(1) that its rights to procedural due process had been violated because there was never a

hearing on the final forfeiture and (2) that the trial court erred in relying on Local Rule

16.04(F).

On February 28, 2024, the trial court filed a written order denying the Motion to Set

Aside (the Order Denying Motion to Set Aside). Initially, the trial court stated that, in

addition to addressing the motion as a Rule 59.04 motion, it was also evaluating the motion

under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 “because McAdoo essentially claims that

the final forfeiture entered on July 6, 2023 is void” due to the alleged failure of the trial

court to hold a final forfeiture hearing.5 Relying on the plain language of Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-11-1396 and this court’s decision in Danny Blankenship Bonding Co.

5

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 provides,

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party’s

legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) fraud (whether heretofore

denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse

party; (3) the judgment is void; (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged,

or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is

no longer equitable that a judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

6

In July 2023, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-139 provided as follows:

(a) If the defendant whose release is secured under § 40-11-122 does not comply with the

conditions of the bail bond, the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the

bail to be forfeited. Notice of the order of forfeiture shall be immediately sent by regular

mail by the clerk of the court to the defendant at the defendant’s last known address. The

defendant’s surety will be served with scire facias upon the forfeiture entered and a capias

shall be issued for the defendant. When the defendant, who failed to appear pursuant to

conditions of a bail bond, is arrested on a capias, the surety on the defendant’s forfeited

bond is released.

(b) After the expiration of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date surety is served

with scire facias or scire facias is returned to the clerk unserved or undelivered, the court

may enter judgment for the state against the defendant and the defendant’s sureties for the

amount of the bail and costs of the proceedings.

(c) No execution shall issue upon a final forfeit, nor shall proceedings be taken for its

enforcement until the expiration of thirty (30) days after its entry.

-6-

v. State, No. W2015-00614-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 409663 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3,

2016), the trial court concluded that it had no obligation to conduct a hearing prior to

entering the final forfeiture judgment. The trial court stated:

In the case at bar, McAdoo was never denied a hearing. McAdoo was

given notice of the conditional forfeiture through the scire facias. The Court

conducted multiple hearings on McAdoo’s motions seeking an extension to

locate and surrender the defendant prior to final forfeiture. In each and every

hearing the Court allowed McAdoo to present any evidence it saw fit to

introduce. However, the defendant was ultimately not located in time. An

order of final forfeiture was accordingly entered by the Court. The final

forfeiture was . . . then paid without protest.

Following the Defendant’s apprehension, McAdoo petitioned for

exoneration. A hearing was held on that petition, and the request was denied.

Now, McAdoo asserts, for the first time, after multiple evidentiary hearings,

orders, extensions and payment of the forfeiture, that this Court failed to give

them a hearing prior to final forfeiture.

In applying Danny Blankenship and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-139,

this Court denies McAdoo’s motion as to this ground.

The trial court also rejected McAdoo’s argument that Local Rule 16.04(F) limited its

discretion in determining relief, noting that Local Rule 1.017 permits a trial judge to

suspend any of the local rules when justice requires.

McAdoo appealed. On appeal before this court, McAdoo maintains that its rights

to procedural due process were violated when the trial court entered the final forfeiture

order on July 6, 2023, without a hearing. McAdoo argues that “it is entitled to a refund

(d) If a court issues a bench warrant due to a defendant’s failure to appear on a felony or

on a Class A or Class B misdemeanor that is violent or sexual in nature as determined by

the court, or if a defendant is charged with a failure to appear, then the defendant shall be

placed on any available state or federal list or database as a fugitive from justice, without

limitation, within ten (10) days of the defendant’s failure to appear. A surety is not liable

for any undertaking if the defendant has not been placed on such a database within the time

required by law.

(e) The surety is only responsible for costs in accordance with § 40-11-201.

7

Rule 1.01 Local Rules of Practice, 16th Judicial District, provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny

of these Rules may be suspended or varied in exceptional cases where the Judge determines justice so

requires.”

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where the trial court failed to follow the lawful procedure” and further asks this Court to

“issue a corrective mandate” as to “the trial court’s behavior.”

II.

We begin with a brief explication of the bail bonding process. As recognized by the

Tennessee Supreme Court,

[t]he bail bond itself is a contract between the government on the one side

and the criminal defendant and his surety on the other, whereby the surety

assumes custody of the defendant and guarantees to the State either the

appearance of the defendant in court or the payment of the full amount of the

bail set by the court.

In re Rader Bonding Co., Inc., 592 S.W.3d 852, 859 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting In re Sanford

& Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., 96 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002)). Thus, if a criminal

defendant under bond fails to appear in court as ordered, the company that issued the bond

may be called upon to pay the full amount of the bond into court as a forfeiture. The

process by which a bonding company may be ordered to pay a forfeiture is controlled by

state statute. See id. (citing 9 David L. Raybin, Tennessee Practice: Criminal Practice &

Procedure § 4:33 (2018)).

Accordingly,

where . . . a defendant fails to appear in court in accordance with the bail

bond agreement, the trial court may enter a conditional judgment of forfeiture

against the defendant and the defendant’s sureties. [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-

11-201. The court must then also issue a scire facias notifying the defendant

and his sureties to show cause why the conditional judgment of forfeiture

should not become final. [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-11-202. After 180 days,

if the surety has not satisfied the court that it is entitled to relief, “the court

may enter [a final] judgment [of forfeiture] for the state against the defendant

and [his] sureties.” [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 40-11-139(b) (2018 & Supp. 2019).

Id. The purpose of the writ of scire facias “is to give the parties to the bond ‘a plain and

simple notice of the default and forfeiture, and the time when the sureties are to appear and

show cause why judgment final should not be entered against them.’” Goldsby v. State, 19

S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tenn. 1929) (quoting State v. Frankgos, 85 S.W. 79, 80 (Tenn. 1905)).

Thus, in addition to notifying the surety that a forfeiture is pending, the writ of scire facias

serves “to set a date for a hearing on final forfeiture.” Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.

-8-

Blackwell, 653 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-11-

202, 40-11-139).

III.

The procedural history of this case demonstrates that, in accordance with the

applicable statutes, the trial court issued a writ of scire facias and set the hearing date for

July 15, 2022. On three separate occasions, McAdoo requested this hearing date to be

extended. The trial court granted McAdoo’s request for relief on each occasion. The Order

Denying Refund indicates that, after the third request for an extension of the hearing date,

the trial court reset the hearing date to June 30, 2023, and stated that no further extensions

of time would be granted.

The record contains no indication of what, if anything, occurred on June 30, 2023.

Indeed, the record is silent as to any further activities until July 7, 2023, at which point the

trial court entered its order declaring the conditional forfeiture to be final and the final

forfeiture to be paid on August 5, 2023. On August 8, 2023, McAdoo paid the forfeiture.

Months later, after Defendant was finally apprehended in the latter part of October

2023, McAdoo reappeared in court requesting to be refunded the forfeiture. McAdoo

raised no issue with respect to the proceedings in the trial court up to that date. Rather,

McAdoo simply asked that it be refunded its forfeiture because Defendant had finally been

taken into custody. It was not until the trial court denied this request for relief that McAdoo

asserted that its procedural due process rights had been violated because, according to

McAdoo, the trial court had “failed” to conduct a final forfeiture hearing.

Our first task is to determine what, exactly, is properly before this court. McAdoo’s

Notice of Appeal was filed on March 29, 2024. It provides as follows:

Comes McAdoo Bonding Company (“Surety”) pursuant to Rules 3

and 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure (TRAP), and hereby

gives notice of its appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals from the judgment

rendered in the above case on the 28th day of February, 2024, by the

Honorable James A. Turner, Judge of Circuit Court for Rutherford County,

Tennessee, which judgment denied the Surety’s Motion for a refund and the

subsequent motion to set aside the denial, as well as the initial final forfeit

judgment.

Thus, McAdoo is essentially attempting to appeal three distinct judgments: (1) the

judgment of final forfeiture, entered on July 7, 2023 (the Final Forfeiture Order); (2) the

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Order Denying Refund; and (3) the Order Denying Motion to Set Aside. We begin by

considering our ability to consider each of these three judgments.

A. The Final Forfeiture Order

McAdoo paid the forfeiture in full on August 8, 2023. The record contains no

indication that McAdoo paid the forfeiture under any form of protest. McAdoo remained

silent about the forfeiture for more than ninety days after the trial court entered the Final

Forfeiture Order. Not until October 18, 2023, after Defendant was apprehended, did

McAdoo seek any form of redress. Even then, it raised no issue with respect to the validity

of the Final Forfeiture Order or the process by which it was obtained. It was not until

January 8, 2024, six months after the Final Forfeiture Order was entered, that McAdoo first

claimed that the judgment was invalid because it was entered without a final forfeiture

hearing and therefore in violation of its procedural due process rights.

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 mandates that, for appeals as of right, the

notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the appellate court “within 30 days after the

date of entry of the judgment appealed from.” Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a). For “all criminal

cases the ‘notice of appeal’ document is not jurisdictional and the timely filing of such

document may be waived in the interest of justice.” Id. However, “[t]he notice of appeal

requirement is jurisdictional and mandatory in all civil cases. If the notice of appeal is not

filed as required by Rule 4, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to hear the issues

raised on the defective appeal.” Hutcheson v. Barth, 178 S.W.3d 731, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2005) (footnotes omitted). Despite bail bond forfeitures being appealed to the Tennessee

Court of Criminal Appeals,8 this court has previously and repeatedly recognized that bail

bond forfeitures are civil matters and governed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

See, e.g., In re Gary’s Bonding Co., No. M2018-00459-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5617940,

at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2018) (indicating that “[a] bail bond forfeiture is a civil

action, and the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the trial court proceedings”);

In re Guy James Bonding, No. M2003-01033-CCA-R3CD, 2004 WL 1402562, at *1 n.3

(Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2004) (noting that “[t]he bail bond forfeiture process is a civil

one governed by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure”); see also Indem. Ins. Co. of N.

Am., 653 S.W.2d at 264-65 (stating regarding bail bond forfeitures that “[t]his process is

a civil one but it is, nevertheless, appealed from the trial court to the Court of Criminal

Appeals . . .[and that] [t]he Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure apply to bail bond

forfeitures just as they would in any other civil action.” (citations omitted)). Tennessee

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) sets forth four types of motions under which “the time

for appeal . . . shall run from entry of the order denying” the motion. These include a

8

In re Gary’s Bonding Co., No. M2018-00459-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 5617940, at *1 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Columbia Bonding Co. v. State, 476 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Tenn. 1972)).

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motion under Rule 50.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment in

accordance with a motion for directed verdict, a motion to amend or make additional

findings of fact under Rule 52.02, a motion for new trial under Rule 59.07, and a motion

to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59.04. Tenn. R. App. 4(b). The rules governing

each of these types of motions indicate that they must be filed within 30 days of the entry

of judgment. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50.02 (setting the timeframe for filing a motion as “[w]ithin

30 days after the entry of judgment”); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 (setting the timeframe for

filing a motion as “not later than 30 days after entry of judgment”); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.02

(“A motion for new trial and all other motions permitted under this rule shall be filed and

served within 30 days after judgment has been entered in accordance with Rule 58.”). As

noted above, neither a notice of appeal nor another time-extending motion was filed within

30 days after the Final Forfeiture Order was entered.

This court has previously considered the effect of untimely efforts to challenge final

forfeiture judgments and concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. For

example, in In re Gary’s Bonding Co., the trial court entered a final forfeiture order on

May 22, 2017. 2018 WL 5617940, at *1. The bonding company did not promptly file a

notice of appeal. Id. On January 17, 2018, the bonding company filed a motion to set aside

the final forfeiture. Id. The trial court denied this motion, and the bonding company then

filed a notice of appeal, seeking relief from the forfeiture. Id. This court held as follows:

Here, the trial court entered its order of final forfeiture on May 22, 2017. The

appellant, however, did not file a notice of appeal until March 12, 2018.

While the appellant filed a motion to set aside the final forfeiture on January

17, 2018, that motion was not filed within 30 days of the final forfeiture order

and, therefore, did not toll the 30-day requirement for filing a notice of appeal

[as to the final forfeiture order]. Accordingly, we conclude the appellant’s

notice of appeal was untimely filed, thereby barring this Court’s jurisdiction.

Id. Accordingly, this court dismissed the appeal. Id. at *2; see also, e.g., State v. Michael

N. Allen, No. E2004-00292-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2108232, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Sept. 22, 2004) (“Since the appellant did not appeal the forfeiture judgment before it

became final or file one of the motions that would have extended the time for appeal, we

are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred in entering the final

forfeiture against the appellant.” (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 4(b), (c))); In re Gary’s Bonding

Co., No. M2011-00430-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 4529645, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept.

30, 2011) (holding that an untimely filed notice of appeal from the denial of a petition for

exoneration deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal).

- 11 -

In summary, McAdoo filed neither a timely notice of appeal nor an appropriate

timely motion that could extend the time for filing an appeal. Therefore, we are without

jurisdiction to consider McAdoo’s attempted appeal from the judgment of final forfeiture.

B. The Order Denying Refund

The Order Denying Refund was entered on December 7, 2023, a Saturday.

Accordingly, as to this judgment, McAdoo had until Monday, January 8, 2024, to timely

file either a notice of appeal or a motion that would toll the time for filing a notice of appeal.

On January 8, 2024, McAdoo timely filed its Motion to Set Aside Order Denying Refund

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. After the trial court denied the

Motion to Set Aside, McAdoo timely filed its notice of appeal. Accordingly, McAdoo’s

notice of appeal preserved this court’s jurisdiction to consider both the Order Denying

Refund and the subsequent Order Denying Motion to Set Aside. Because the filing of a

timely 59.04 motion tolls the time for filing a motion to appeal as to the underlying

judgment, the trial court’s denial of McAdoo’s timely filed 59.04 motion enabled McAdoo

to appeal both the underlying judgment and the order denying the motion to alter or amend.

See, e.g., Burris v. Burris, 512 S.W.3d 239, 254 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (“Because

Mother filed a timely Rule 59.04 motion and filed her notice of appeal within thirty days

of the trial court’s denial of that motion, she was entitled to appeal both the underlying

judgment and the denial of her post-trial motion.”).

However, while we have jurisdiction to consider McAdoo’s challenge to the Order

Denying Refund, we do not have a complete record. The Order Denying Refund recites

that an evidentiary hearing was held on the Motion for Refund, yet a transcript of that

hearing is not before us.

Pursuant to its appeal, McAdoo had a duty to transmit to this court a record that

conveys “a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those

issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). In the absence of a complete

record, this court may consider itself precluded from considering the issue, see, e.g., State

v. Roberts, 755 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), or may simply presume that the

trial court’s ruling was supported by the evidence, see, e.g., State v. Bibbs, 806 S.W.2d

786, 790 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Smith v. State, 584 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1979) & Vermilye v. State, 584 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979)).

Although we lack a transcript of the hearing, the trial court made findings of fact

and expressly found credible the witness who testified on behalf of McAdoo. The trial

court recited the efforts undertaken by McAdoo to find Defendant, including its

communications with the United States Marshals Office, the Tennessee Bureau of

Investigation, the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Office, the Office of the District Attorney,

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and the Murfreesboro Police Department. The trial court also credited McAdoo’s use of

bounty hunters and its posting of a reward for information about Defendant’s whereabouts.

The trial court noted that McAdoo’s efforts continued even after it had paid the forfeiture.

However, the court also noted that Defendant was ultimately at large for over a year and a

half and was apprehended less than six miles from the courthouse, in close proximity to

McAdoo’s headquarters. The trial court’s delineation of the relevant facts enables us to

undertake a review of the Order Denying Refund on the merits.

Initially, we emphasize that McAdoo bore the burden of establishing that it was

entitled to relief. In re Rader Bonding Co., Inc., 592 S.W.3d at 860 (citing In re Paul’s

Bonding Co., 62 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)). We review the trial court’s

decision on McAdoo’s request for relief from its forfeiture for an abuse of discretion. See

id. at 858 (citing Goldsby, 19 S.W.2d at 242). We may conclude that the trial court abused

its discretion only if it applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical conclusion,

based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or used reasoning that

caused an injustice to McAdoo. Id.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has expressly stated that “trial courts ordinarily

should not grant relief from forfeiture simply because a defendant fails to appear and a

surety makes ordinary, good faith – but unsuccessful – efforts to locate the defendant . . . .

Indeed the defendant’s nonappearance is the very risk a surety assumes in the contract.”

Id. at 858 n.7 (citing In re Sanford & Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., 96 S.W.3d at 202)).

Additionally, this court has observed that “[b]ecause the surety has entered into an

agreement to assure the presence of the defendant thereby assuming calculated risk in the

ordinary course of business, it can rarely be said that the trial court has abused its discretion

by enforcing the terms when there has been a breach of the contract.” State v. Elijah D.

Truitt, No. M2005-01226-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2738876, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept.

21, 2006); see also, e.g., State v. Sergio Lara, No. M2020-00263-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL

2701797, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2021) (affirming denial of surety’s petition to

be released from its bond on basis that defendant fled the jurisdiction, noting that “a

bondsman must evaluate the inherent risk of flight before writing the bond and be diligent

‘in keeping tabs on the defendant after the bond is written’” (quoting In re Sanford & Sons

Bail Co., Inc., 96 S.W.3d at 202)).

We have recited above the trial court’s stated reasons for denying McAdoo’s request

for a refund. In light of the facts before us and the foregoing authority, we see no abuse of

discretion by the trial court in reaching its conclusion. We hold that McAdoo is not entitled

to relief on this basis.9

9

After concluding that McAdoo was not entitled to a refund of the forfeiture on the merits, the trial

court in its Order Denying Refund stated the following:

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C. The Order Denying Motion to Set Aside

As set forth above, we have jurisdiction to consider the Order Denying Motion to

Set Aside. The record on appeal is also complete insofar as we have the written motion, a

transcript of the hearing on the motion, and the trial court’s written order denying relief.

Accordingly, we are in a position to consider McAdoo’s appeal from the Order Denying

Motion to Set Aside.

Somewhat confusingly, McAdoo expressly indicated it was filing under Rule 59.04

of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure but, nevertheless, labeled its motion as a motion

to set aside, rather than a motion to alter or amend. As noted above, the trial court analyzed

the motion both as a Rule 59.04 motion and a Rule 60.02 motion. On appeal before this

court, McAdoo characterizes its motion as a motion to alter or amend. “Rule 59.04 allows

The Court further finds that McAdoo is precluded from relief under local rules for

untimely apprehension. The Court finds that the defendant was apprehended

approximately seventy-four (74) days after the forfeiture became final. Therefore, the

defendant’s apprehension was untimely for relief pursuant to Local Rule 16.04(F).

As set forth above, Rule 16.04(F) Local Rules of Practice, 16th Judicial District, provides that, “[u]pon a

forfeiture becoming final and timely paid, the bonding entity may apply for the return of bond proceeds if

the defendant is incarcerated within Tennessee within thirty (30) days of the forfeiture becoming final.”

McAdoo argued in its Motion to Set Aside that this rule impermissibly limits a trial court’s wide discretion

to refund forfeitures pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-204(a).

In its Order Denying Motion to Set Aside, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:

The Court notes that the text of this local rule does not state what the outcome of

a petition for exoneration will be if it is filed after the 30-day time period. Additionally,

Local Rule 1.01 states that any of the local rules may be suspended where a judge finds

that justice so requires. Candidly, even if McAdoo is correct in stating that Local Rule

16.04(F) limits the Court’s discretion, the order denying exoneration clearly sets out the

factual and legal basis for the Court’s decision beyond the citation to Local Rule 16.04(F).

As such, this ground for relief substantially lacks merit. The Court finds that the local rule

does not limit its exercise of discretion . . . . The Court denies McAdoo’s motion as to this

ground.

McAdoo does not address the trial court’s determination of this issue in its brief before this court.

Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); Trezevant v. Trezevant, 696 S.W.3d 527,

530 (Tenn. 2024) (recognizing that an issue may be considered waived “when the brief fails to include an

argument satisfying the requirements of [Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure] 27(a)(7)” (quoting Hodge

v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012))). The trial courts of the Sixteenth Judicial District may wish

to consider the possible conflict between Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-204(a) and Local Rule

16.04(F) and make any changes they deem necessary.

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a party to seek relief from a judgment within thirty days after being entered; conversely,

Rule 60.02 affords a party a means to seek relief from a final, non-appealable judgment.”

Ferguson v. Brown, 291 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). Where “the judgment

was not yet a final, non-appealable judgment . . . Rule 59.04 is the applicable rule.” Id.;

see also In re Lyric N., No. E2021-00578-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 3010501, at *7 (Tenn.

Ct. App. July 29, 2022) (construing a motion to set aside that did not indicate what

procedural rule it was filed under as a Rule 59.04 motion because it was filed while the

decree was still appealable). Though inartful, we accept McAdoo’s labeling of its motion

as a Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend, and we consider it as such.

We will reverse a trial court’s ruling on a motion to alter or amend “only for an

abuse of discretion.” Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003) (citing Harris

v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2000)). As set forth above, a trial court abuses its

discretion only if it “applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical conclusion,

bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning

that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” In re Rader Bonding Co., Inc., 592

S.W.3d at 858 (quoting State v. Jones, 568 S.W.3d 101, 127-28 (Tenn. 2019)).

In its motion, McAdoo claimed, for the first time in these proceedings, that the Final

Forfeiture Order was infirm because it had been entered without the trial court having first

conducted an actual hearing. That is, McAdoo began claiming six months after the fact

that it had suffered a procedural due process violation. In rejecting McAdoo’s claim, the

trial court considered the text of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-13910 and a

decision from this court indicating that a bonding company must only be provided with the

opportunity to be heard before a final forfeiture is ordered. See Danny Blankenship

Bonding Co., 2016 WL 409663, at *3 (holding that bonding company was not entitled to

relief on basis that there was no hearing prior to entry of the final forfeiture because the

court had provided the bonding company with “the opportunity to be heard”); see also In

re Sanford & Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., 96 S.W.3d at 204 (“Generally speaking, a trial court

must afford a surety an opportunity to establish its suitability for relief . . . .”).

The trial court stated,

In the case at bar, McAdoo was never denied a hearing. McAdoo was

given notice of the conditional forfeiture through the scire facias. The Court

conducted multiple hearings on McAdoo’s motions seeking an extension to

locate and surrender the defendant prior to final forfeiture. In each and every

hearing the Court allowed McAdoo to present any evidence it saw fit to

10

See footnote six, supra, for the text of this statute.

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introduce. However, the defendant was ultimately not located in time. An

order of final forfeiture was accordingly entered by the Court. The final

forfeiture was . . . then paid without protest.

Emphasizing that McAdoo was asserting an issue regarding the final forfeiture hearing “for

the first time,” the trial court denied relief “as to this ground.”

At oral argument, counsel for McAdoo asserted that the trial court erred in denying

its motion because, for sui generis reasons, the Final Forfeiture Order should be set aside

to correct a clear error of law or to prevent injustice. See Vaccarella v. Vaccarella, 49

S.W.3d 307, 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). We disagree.

Motions to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure

59.04 “‘may be granted (1) when the controlling law changes before a judgment becomes

final, (2) when previously unavailable evidence becomes available, or (3) when, for sui

generis reasons, a judgment should be amended to correct a clear error of law or to prevent

injustice.’” Id. However, a Rule 59.04 motion should not be used to alter or amend a

judgment “if it seeks to raise new, previously untried legal theories” or “to present new,

previously unasserted legal arguments.” Bradley v. McLeod, 984 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1998); see also, e.g., Lawrence A. Pivnick, 2 Tenn. Cir. Ct. Prac. § 28:4 (2025)

(observing that Rule 59.04 motions “should not be used to raise or present new, previously

untried or unasserted theories or legal arguments”); In re M.L.D., 182 S.W.3d 890, 895

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that “[a] Rule 59 motion should not be used to raise or

present new, previously untried or unasserted theories or legal arguments”). Rather, “[t]he

judgment of a court should not ‘be lightly changed, altered, amended or set aside, but only

done upon very clear, convincing, cogent evidence that a true injustice has been done to

the complaining party and that the complaining party is in no wise responsible, or termed

in another way, negligent in protecting that party’s interest.’” Polster v. Polster, No.

M2020-01150-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 4167927, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2021)

(quoting Myers v. Myers, 891 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)).

The first time that McAdoo raised its due process objection was in its Rule 59.04

motion, asserting a due process objection that could have been raised much earlier in

seeking relief. McAdoo could have responded to the trial court’s January 2022 show cause

order by requesting a hearing. McAdoo does not assert that it sought and was denied such

a hearing in response to the trial court’s show cause order as to which it failed to take

action.11 McAdoo could have filed an appropriate motion immediately following the

11

“Parties have the responsibility to see to it that the record contains the evidence necessary to

support their arguments on appeal.” Levine v. March, 266 S.W.3d 426, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). “More

particularly, the burden falls on the party asserting error: ‘it is incumbent upon the appellant to provide a

record that is adequate for a meaningful review.’” Riddle v. Miclaus, No. M2024-01335-COA-R3-CV,

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original final forfeiture order, objecting to the entry of this order in the absence of a hearing.

McAdoo could have presented its due process argument in its petition for a refund as

further support for obtaining a refund. McAdoo raised a new legal basis, a new theory, for

why it should obtain a refund for the first time in its motion to alter or amend. McAdoo

has provided absolutely no explanation for failing to raise this argument earlier. Such

failure is not cured by labeling in a conclusory manner the hearing issue “sui generis.”

Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying McAdoo’s motion to alter or amend on the basis of a new argument that McAdoo

could have previously raised.

IV.

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

s/ Jeffrey Usman

JEFFREY USMAN, JUDGE

2025 WL 1166481, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2025) (quoting Tanner v. Whiteco, L.P., 337 S.W.3d

792, 796 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010)). McAdoo has also failed to ensure that the record contains the critical

third extension order. The absence of this order has further complicated considering McAdoo’s argument

on appeal.

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