Dudley v. Boise State University

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHELSEY DUDLEY, No. 24-3233

D.C. No.

Plaintiff - Appellant,

1:22-cv-00495-

v.

DCN

BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY;

TONY ROARK, in his official and OPINION

individual capacity; MANDY

NELSON, in her official and

individual capacity; KATE LAW, in

her official and individual capacity;

JOELLE POWERS, in her official

and individual capacity; JOHN

BUCKWALTER, in his official and

individual capacity; CHRISTOPHER

HYER, in his official and individual

capacity; ROGER MUNGER, in his

official and individual capacity;

GUNNAR WHISLER, in his official

and individual capacity; KELSIE

ZAK, in her official and individual

capacity; EMMA FORD, in her

official and individual capacity;

MIKE DIXON, in his official and

individual capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.

2 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 4, 2025

Portland, Oregon

Filed August 27, 2025

Before: Jay S. Bybee and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit

Judges, and Xavier Rodriguez, District Judge. *

Opinion by Judge Bybee

SUMMARY **

Due Process

The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the

district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to state a

claim Chelsey Dudley’s lawsuit alleging violations of her

Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due

process rights arising from Boise State University’s

revocation of her bachelor’s degree after the Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare informed the university

*

The Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 3

that Dudley used a state database to view a third party’s

confidential information without permission.

Addressing Dudley’s procedural due process claim, the

panel held that Dudley has a property interest in her degree

that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and may not

be rescinded without due process. The panel reversed the

district court’s dismissal of Dudley’s procedural due process

claim insofar as she alleged that defendants denied her

sufficient time to present her defense and did not allow her

to cross-examine university-affiliated witnesses at her

conduct hearing, and remanded for further proceedings.

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of

Dudley’s substantive due process claim. First, the

university’s decision to revoke Dudley’s degree and report

that revocation, while procedurally infirm, was not

substantively arbitrary and lacking a rational basis. Second,

Dudley failed to allege that she is unable to pursue a career

in the broader social work profession without a license or

degree, or that she cannot pursue a social work education

elsewhere.

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment granting

qualified immunity to defendants as to Dudley’s claims for

monetary relief because it was not clearly established that

Dudley had a property interest in her college degree or any

entitlement to certain procedural protections.

Finally, the panel dismissed, as moot, Dudley’s appeal

of the district court’s denial of an extension of a temporary

restraining order issued in 2022.

4 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

COUNSEL

Jeremiah Hudson (argued), Fisher & Hudson PLLC, Boise,

Idaho, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael E. Kelly (argued) and Shannon M. Graham, Kelly

Law PLLC, Boise, Idaho, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Boise State University revoked Chelsey “Brooke”

Dudley’s bachelor’s degree in social work after the Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW), which hosted

Dudley for an internship, informed the university that

Dudley used a state database to view a third party’s

confidential information without permission. Dudley sued

the university, several students, several administrators and

employees, and an IDHW employee (hereinafter, “BSU”),

for violating her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and

substantive due process rights. Dudley sought preliminary

and permanent injunctive relief and money damages.

The district court dismissed Dudley’s suit for failure to

state a claim. As to Dudley’s procedural due process claim,

the district court concluded that she lacked a property

interest in her degree, and that—even if she possessed such

an interest—BSU gave her adequate process. With respect

to Dudley’s substantive due process claim, the district court

concluded that Dudley failed to plausibly allege that she was

unable to pursue a career in social work.

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 5

We reverse in part and affirm in part. We hold that

Dudley’s BSU-issued college degree is a property interest

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that BSU failed

to afford Dudley adequate process before depriving her of

that interest. However, because it was not clearly established

that Dudley had a property interest in her college degree or

any entitlement to certain procedural protections, we hold

that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Dudley’s substantive due process claim seeking monetary

damages. Finally, we dismiss Dudley’s appeal of the district

court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dudley appeals the district court’s dismissal of her suit

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Ordinarily, we would take the

facts from Dudley’s complaint, accept them as true, construe

them in the light most favorable to her, and stop there. See

GP Vincent II v. Estate of Beard, 68 F.4th 508, 514 (9th Cir.

2023). In this case, however, Dudley requested a temporary

restraining order when she filed her complaint, and the

parties submitted additional evidence to the district court in

support of or opposition to that temporary restraining order.

Where helpful, we have drawn some facts below from that

record. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th

Cir. 2003) (describing how we may treat certain documents

“as part of the complaint, and thus may assume that [their]

contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6)”).

A. The Facts

Dudley graduated from BSU in May 2022 with a

bachelor’s degree in social work. As part of her required

coursework, she completed an internship between January

6 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

and April 2022 with the Idaho Department of Health and

Welfare (IDHW). BSU referred to the internship as “Social

Work Field Practicum II” and coded it as SOCWRK 481 on

her transcript. Dudley graduated from BSU in May 2022,

and, in July 2022, she passed the Social Work Licensing

Exam administered by the State Board of Social Work

Examiners in the Idaho Department of Occupational

Learning. In late August 2022, she was licensed as a social

worker in the State of Idaho.

On November 2, 2022, Defendant Tony Roark, BSU’s

Interim Dean for the College of Health Sciences and Social

Work, sent Dudley a letter notifying her that BSU had

received information from IDHW “establishing beyond

doubt that [she] accessed confidential client information

within IDHW’s database, information in files [she] had no

authorization to view and in which [she] had no legitimate

business interest.” Specifically, Dudley is alleged to have

accessed the records of the father of her child and the records

of the biological mother of his other child. Roark also

advised Dudley that BSU would retroactively change her

passing grade for SOCWRK 481 to a failing grade. And

because Dudley failed SOCWRK 481, she did not meet the

requirements for graduation, rendering her transcript

“invalid.” Roark told her that she could appeal the decision

to change her grade. He also told her that the matter had

been referred to the Office of the Dean of Students for

additional discipline. The next day, Mandy Nelson, BSU’s

Registrar, sent Dudley a letter stating her “degree has been

rescinded.” Nelson informed Dudley that her diploma was

“no longer valid and should be destroyed.”

Kate Law, BSU’s Assistant Dean of Students, sent

Dudley a letter on November 10, with the subject line

“Notification of Formal Conduct Hearing.” Law stated that

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 7

“it has been alleged that you have violated the Student Code

of Conduct during Spring 2022” and cited “Section 4/AC[,]

Violation of University Policy and/or Law.” Law recited that

Dudley’s alleged accessing of confidential files had been

“documented by IDHW’s IT department” and that the breach

violated “the School of Social Work’s field requirements, the

[National Association of Social Workers] Code of Ethics, the

Student Professional Conduct and Professional Standards,

and IDHW’s expectations for employees and interns . . . .”

Law indicated that Dudley would be subject to disciplinary

procedures outlined in University Policy #2020, Student

Code of Conduct Section 6.2.c, and she offered to meet with

Dudley “to discuss the Student Code of Conduct process and

[Dudley’s] rights and responsibilities” under the policy. Law

scheduled a “conduct hearing” for December 12 to “review

the[] charges.”

On December 7, Dudley sued BSU, several BSU

administrators and employees; the members of the Student

Conduct Board; Mike Dixon, IDHW’s chief of the Child

Welfare Office; and ten unnamed employees of BSU or

IDHW in the District of Idaho. Dudley sought injunctive

relief, monetary damages, and a temporary restraining order

(TRO) to prevent BSU from holding her conduct hearing on

December 12. She also asked the court to order BSU to

reinstate her degree.

The district court granted Dudley’s TRO request, in part

and ex parte, on December 9. The district court enjoined the

BSU Defendants from holding the conduct hearing, but it

declined to require them to implement any specific

procedural safeguards or reinstate Dudley’s degree. BSU

accordingly “vacated” the scheduled conduct hearing. When

the district court declined to extend the TRO, which expired

8 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

on December 23, 2022, Law sent Dudley a letter that reset

her conduct hearing for February 17, 2023.

BSU held Dudley’s conduct hearing before a five-

member Student Board of Conduct. There were no live

witnesses. BSU was represented by an employee from the

Dean of Students’ Office (DSO), who was denominated the

“Complainant,” and who presented written statements from

Dixon, Law, and Raymond Mullenax, BSU’s Director of

Field Education, that described Dudley’s alleged

misconduct. Dudley testified on her own behalf. She

admitted that, while at IDHW, “she had likely clicked on

hyperlinks of caregivers in her own” file within the IDHW

database. Dudley claimed that she accessed her file because

she was “in a unique position to . . . see how a common type

of interaction was reported by a social worker with the

perspective of the person who was interacting with the social

worker.” Dudley also testified that her IDHW supervisor

referenced database records related to the supervisor’s

family members and instructed her to look at closed files to

learn how to draft reports. Dudley complained of the time

constraints placed upon her at the hearing and the fact that

she was not permitted to cross-examine any witness who

provided a written statement.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Complainant asked

the Board to revoke Dudley’s degree and expel her from

BSU. Dudley alleges that Law remained with the Board

while they deliberated.

Law subsequently notified Dudley that the Student

Board of Conduct decided to revoke her degree and expel

her because it determined that it was “more likely than not”

that she violated the ethical and professional standards and

expectations established in BSU’s Professional Conduct and

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 9

Professional Standards, IDHW’s expectations for employees

and interns, and “state/federal privacy laws.” Law stated

that the “start date” for both sanctions was March 15, 2023.

Dudley unsuccessfully appealed the Board’s decision.

B. Procedural History

As we noted above, Dudley filed her suit in federal court

in December 2022 in an effort to prevent BSU from

conducting a hearing. The district court issued a TRO

forbidding BSU from proceeding with a hearing, and BSU

vacated the hearing in response. After holding a hearing, the

district court declined to extend the TRO, which lapsed on

December 23. BSU proceeded with the February 2023

hearing and issued its decision as we described above. In

July 2023, Dudley filed an amended complaint in district

court, alleging that Defendants violated the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking monetary

and injunctive relief. BSU moved to dismiss the complaint.

The district court dismissed Dudley’s complaint. See

Dudley v. Boise State Univ., 732 F. Supp. 3d 1270 (D. Idaho

2024). The district court ruled that Dudley had no property

interest in her SOCWRK 481 grade, her degree in social

work, her BSU diploma, or the process by which BSU

deprived her of those interests. Id. at 1279–83. The court

observed that “[t]his holding effectively ends this case.

Because there is no property interest at stake, there can be no

due process violation.” Id. at 1283. In the interest of judicial

efficiency, and alternatively, the district court held that the

Student Conduct Hearing afforded Dudley due process. Id.

at 1285–87. The court further held that Dudley did not state

a claim that Defendants deprived her of her substantive due

process liberty interest in pursuing her chosen profession,

social work. Id. at 1284. Finally, the court held that even if

10 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

Dudley had stated a cause of action under the Fourteenth

Amendment, Defendants would be entitled to qualified

immunity for any damages in their individual capacities. Id.

at 1287–89. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s dismissal of Dudley’s suit

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Barker v. Riverside

Cnty. Off. of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009). We

accept Dudley’s allegations as true and draw inferences from

them in the light most favorable to her. Id.

Although “[g]enerally, the scope of review on a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim is limited to the contents

of the complaint,” we “may consider evidence on which the

complaint ‘necessarily relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to

the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s

claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy

attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d

445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Here, because

Dudley’s First Amended Complaint refers to documents

which she attached to her motion for a preliminary

injunction, those documents are “central” to her case, and

neither party disputes those documents’ authenticity, we

review those documents alongside Dudley’s First Amended

Complaint. See id.

III. DISCUSSION

Dudley has presented four issues on appeal. First,

Dudley claims that she has property interests in various

facets of her BSU education and that BSU’s recission of

those interests, first without process or notice, and then after

a “conduct hearing,” violated the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Second, she claims that BSU

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 11

violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

right to pursue an occupation in social work. Third, she

argues that the district court erred when it held that, even if

BSU violated her due process rights, the individual

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from her

request for monetary damages because her rights were not

clearly established. Fourth, she argues that the court erred

when it denied her preliminary injunctive relief. We discuss

each of these issues below.

A. Procedural Due Process

We first consider whether Dudley plausibly alleged that

Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment procedural

due process rights. The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . .

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “To obtain

relief on a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must

establish the existence of ‘(1) a liberty or property interest

protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the

interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.’”

Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008)

(alteration in original) (quoting Portman v. County of Santa

Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)). Because BSU

does not dispute that it has taken various actions against

Dudley that would constitute a deprivation if she had a

property right, we must consider whether Dudley had any

property interests in various aspects of her BSU education,

and if so, whether BSU provided her with sufficient notice

and process before depriving her of those interests. The

district court held for BSU on both questions. Dudley, 732

F. Supp. 3d at 1279–83, 1285–87. We reverse on both.

12 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

1. Dudley’s property interests in her BSU education

“When [the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life,

liberty, or property is] implicated, the right to some kind of

prior hearing is paramount.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls.

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972) (footnote omitted).

Although the Due Process Clause imposes “process”

requirements, it does not supply the meaning of “property.”

Property interests are instead “defined by existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent source such

as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain

benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those

benefits.” Id. at 577.

After the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking decisions in

Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the term

“property” in the Due Process Clause can no longer be

“limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, ‘property’

denotes a broad range of interests.” Perry, 408 U.S. at 601

(citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). As we have explained, “[d]ue

process protects property interests ‘well beyond actual

ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.’” Redd v.

Guerrero, 84 F.4th 874, 893 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Roth,

408 U.S. at 571–72). Following Roth, Sindermann, and the

Court’s recognition of the “new property,” courts have

identified property interests in “utility service, public

education, welfare benefits, driver’s licenses, nursing care, a

cause of action, and a type of immigration petition.” Redd,

84 F.4th at 893 (citations omitted); see Goldberg v. Kelley,

397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits

are a form of property as “a matter of statutory entitlement

for persons qualified to receive them” and citing, inter alia,

Charles Alan Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733

(1964)); see also Johnson v. Ryan, 55 F.4th 1167, 1191–92

(9th Cir. 2022) (describing the “‘new property’ revolution”

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 13

that “began with Goldberg” and was “developed” in Roth

and Sindermann).

“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must

‘have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it,’ not just ‘an

abstract need or desire for it.’” K.W. ex rel. D.W. v.

Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Roth,

408 U.S. at 577). We look to “the language of the statute and

the extent to which the entitlement is couched in mandatory

terms” to determine whether state law gives rise to a

protected property interest. Redd, 84 F.4th at 893 (citing

Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Dudley asserts that the Due Process Clause protects four

discrete property interests: her SOCWRK 481 grade, BSU’s

disciplinary process, her bachelor’s degree awarded in May

2022, and her future reenrollment at BSU.

We can set two of these interests aside quickly. First, we

need not decide whether Dudley has a property interest in

her SOCWRK 481 grade because we think that, in this case,

that question is subsumed by her claim to a property right in

her degree, which we discuss in greater detail below.

Second, BSU’s disciplinary process cannot be Dudley’s

property for due process purposes. 1 Concluding otherwise

would place the cart before the horse: “[T]he mere fact . . .

[of] a careful procedural structure . . . [does not] indicate[]

the existence of a protected liberty interest.” Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983); see also Olim v.

Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983) (“Process is not an

end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a

1

Dudley relies on ISBOE Policy III.B.2.iii.3, which provides: “In

matters of disciplinary action, students have the right to due process and

to be held accountable using academic standards and institutional

procedures.”

14 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate

claim of entitlement.”). A state may provide process to

address its interests without imbuing those affected by the

process with substantive rights in the process itself. In such

cases, it may be “unfair for the [state] not to follow its own

procedures . . . but it [is] not unconstitutional.” Charleston

v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 774 (7th

Cir. 2013).

That leaves Dudley with two potentially viable property

interests: (a) her BSU degree and (b) her future reenrollment

at BSU. We consider whether Dudley has “a legitimate

claim of entitlement” to each one. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.

a. Dudley’s bachelor’s degree

Although Dudley contends that certain regulations

governing the conferral of her degree provide her with a

contract-based property interest in her diploma, we need not

reach this argument. 2 Dudley has not sued BSU for failing

to confer a degree that she earned; nor has BSU refused to

confer anything. Dudley instead challenges BSU’s

revocation of a degree that it already conferred to her.

Regardless of whether BSU and Dudley had an

enforceable contract for a degree, she had “a legitimate claim

of entitlement to it” under Idaho law. See id. Idaho’s law

does provide Dudley with a property interest in her degree.

The Idaho Constitution and Idaho statutes authorize the

Idaho State Board of Education (ISBOE) to promulgate

educational regulations. See Idaho Const. art. IX, § 2

2

See, e.g., The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that “it is by now well-

settled that the principal relationship between a college and its students

is contractual.” Wickstrom v. N. Idaho Coll., 725 P.2d 155, 157 (Idaho

1986).

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 15

(vesting the ISBOE with certain powers); Idaho Code § 33-

2811 (granting the ISBOE the authority to “confer such

degrees and grant such diplomas as are usual in universities,

or as they shall deem appropriate”). And the ISBOE

promulgated a regulation that gives college graduates like

Dudley a property interest in their degrees. See ISBOE

Governing Policies and Procedures § III.E.1 (stating that

“[c]ompletion of the program of instruction results in . . .

conferring of a degree upon the student by the faculty and

the Chief Executive Officer”). Because ISBOE policy

§ III.E.1. is couched in “mandatory language” that “leaves

no discretion” for BSU to deny conferral of a degree upon

“completion of the program of instruction,” Idaho law

created a property interest in Dudley’s degree. See Redd, 84

F.4th at 893.

Moreover, it is not difficult to see how, for a recipient, a

college degree “resembles more traditional conceptions of

property,” because it has an “ascertainable monetary value,”

one that can be measured in tuition payments. See Redd, 84

F.4th at 893–94 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Crook v.

Baker, 813 F.2d 88, 94 (6th Cir. 1987) (assuming that a

university “degree constituted an important property

interest”). But a college degree opens additional

opportunities to its recipient that cannot be reduced to the

bursar’s account. College and university degrees are

frequently prerequisites for employment opportunities and

admission to graduate school, professional programs, or, as

relevant here, professional licensing. See Goss v. Lopez, 419

U.S. 565, 575 & n.7 (1975) (observing that school discipline

may “interfere with later opportunities for higher education

and employment”); see also Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of

Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82 n.1 (1978) (noting that a

medical student’s dismissal would make it difficult for her to

16 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

get into another medical school). To obtain a social work

license in Idaho, an applicant must pass an examination and

have, at least, “a baccalaureate degree in social work from a

college or university approved by the board.” Idaho Code

§ 54-3206(3). Here, Dudley alleges that, three months after

graduating from BSU, she passed the Social Work Licensing

Exam and was licensed as a social worker in the State of

Idaho. 3

BSU conferred a diploma to Dudley in a public

ceremony. The diploma itself is physical property, suitable

for framing. And BSU has effectively demanded it back.

The diploma was important enough that, when BSU first

decided that Dudley had violated various terms of her

internship, university rules, and national ethical rules for

social workers, it advised her that “the diploma you received

for your BA is no longer valid and should be destroyed.”

While Dudley’s diploma, like the title to a car, has relatively

little intrinsic value, it has substantial extrinsic value as near-

conclusive evidence of a bundle of legal rights. The

diploma’s real value is not in its sheepskin, but in what it

represents: the rights and responsibilities pertaining to a

Bachelor of Arts degree from BSU.

In sum, Dudley’s diploma, and the degree it represents,

have real value. Therefore, we hold that Dudley’s degree is

a property interest that BSU may not rescind without due

process.

3

In November 2022, the Board of Social Work Examiners within the

Idaho Division of Occupational and Professional Licenses sent Dudley a

letter requesting further information regard BSU’s retraction of her

degree. The Board’s inquiry is on hold pending resolution of this case.

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 17

b. Re-enrollment

Dudley also maintains that she has a property interest in

her future enrollment at BSU. Having concluded that she

has a property interest in her degree, it is both premature and

unnecessary for us to consider her interest in re-enrollment.

As we will discuss, if the allegations in Dudley’s complaint

are true, BSU must hold a new hearing that affords Dudley

greater process. If, at the end of those proceedings, BSU

decides not to revoke Dudley’s degree, re-enrollment will

not be an issue. If it instead revokes her degree after a

constitutionally-adequate hearing, even assuming Dudley

has a property interest in re-enrollment, BSU will have

afforded her a constitutionally-adequate hearing before

depriving her of that interest. The accusations underlying

Dudley’s degree revocation and her expulsion are the same,

and there is no reason to believe that a hearing that suffices

as to the former would be unconstitutional as to the latter.

Indeed, BSU reached its revocation and expulsion decisions

following the same hearing, and Dudley does not argue that

more process is necessary for one decision versus another.

Thus, we need not decide whether Dudley has a property

interest in re-enrollment.

2. The process due

Having decided that Dudley has a property interest in her

BSU degree, we next consider whether BSU provided her

with sufficient procedural safeguards when it revoked that

degree. Dudley claims that BSU violated her due process

rights by depriving her of her degree twice: first without any

notice or hearing in November 2022, and then again, in

March 2023, after a “conduct hearing.” To determine what

process is due before BSU may deprive Dudley of her

degree, we balance three factors: (a) Dudley’s interest in

18 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

retaining her degree; (b) BSU’s interest in revoking her

degree; and (c) the risk that, given the process provided,

BSU erroneously deprived Dudley of her interest and the

probable value and burdens of additional safeguards. See

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

a. Dudley’s interest in retaining her degree

For reasons that we have largely detailed above, it is

obvious that Dudley has a substantial interest in her degree:

The revocation of a degree that has already been publicly

awarded is perhaps the most dramatic and far-reaching

discipline that a university can impose on one of its students.

Nonetheless, BSU argues that Dudley’s constitutional

interest in her degree was equivalent to her interest in her

SOCWRK 481 grade because Dudley needed to pass

SOCWRK 481 to graduate. There is some logic to BSU’s

position—if Dudley failed to pass SOCWRK 481, she

likewise failed to satisfy the requirements for graduation,

and she should not have been awarded her diploma. But this

linear reasoning equating a grade in a required course to a

resulting degree would make that degree only as “important”

as any of an alumna’s underlying grades, assignments, exam

answers, or other academic prerequisites. And such an

argument commits the fallacy of continuum, because it

cannot distinguish between the grade and the degree. BSU,

like every other American university, surely lavishes

students with praise and regales them with “Pomp and

Circumstance” when they graduate; we doubt that it does so

whenever they pass SOCWRK 481 or turn an assignment in

on time. At graduation, BSU awards students with diplomas

that attest to their academic achievement; we doubt that it

doles out any equivalent recognition for earning a “B+” or

writing a good exam answer. BSU’s degrees represent far

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 19

more than any grade in one class. Dudley’s interest in her

degree was substantial, and it far outstripped her interest in

her SOCWRK 481 grade. That means that we should not

undervalue Dudley’s BSU degree by focusing on her grades.

More importantly, we reiterate that a BSU degree, unlike

a grade in a single class, has collateral value. It is the

gateway to licensure as a social worker in Idaho. Without “a

baccalaureate degree in social work from a college or

university,” such as BSU, Dudley is not eligible to be a social

worker. Idaho Code § 54-3206(3). Dudley has strong

interest in retaining her degree, and that gives her a strong

interest in seeing that she has a full and fair opportunity to

contest any charges before BSU strips her of her diploma.

b. BSU’s interest in revoking Dudley’s degree

BSU obviously had its own significant interest in the

outcome of any decision to revoke Dudley’s degree: the

integrity of its degrees was at stake.

BSU argues that, because it revoked Dudley’s degree for

“academic,” rather than “disciplinary reasons” it “need not

hold a hearing.” As the Supreme Court has observed, there

is a “significant difference between the failure of a student

to meet academic standards and the violation by a student of

valid rules of conduct. This difference calls for far less

stringent procedural requirements in the case of an academic

dismissal.” Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86.

But we do not think that Dudley’s degree revocation

implicates BSU’s “constitutional right to academic

freedom.” As Horowitz explained, “[a]cademic evaluations

of a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear

little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact-

finding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached

20 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

a full-hearing requirement.” 435 U.S. at 89. BSU did not

revoke Dudley’s degree over a purely “academic” dispute

about whether her course work was deserving of an “A” or a

“C,” or whether she exhibited sufficient care in her personal

appearance to meet the requirements for interacting with

patients in a lab. Cf. id. Those questions involve the kind of

academic judgment that is “not readily adapted to the

procedural tools of judicial or administrative

decisionmaking.” Id. at 90; see al-Dabagh v. Case W.

Reserve Univ., 777 F.3d 355, 360 (6th Cir. 2015); Brown v.

Li, 308 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Hennessy v. City of

Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 250–51 (1st Cir. 1999).

By contrast, BSU conducted an affirmative

“investigation” into whether Dudley violated “state and

federal privacy laws,” among other rules. This makes BSU’s

revocation decisions seem “disciplinary” rather than based

on Dudley’s mere failure to satisfy academic standards.

Additionally, Dudley’s alleged misconduct occurred during

an off-campus practicum in which she was supervised and

evaluated by IDHW employees, not BSU professors.

Moreover, BSU asserted that Dudley violated professional

ethical norms that applied to both IDHW employees and

BSU’s social work students. Had Dudley been a full-time

employee whom IDHW fired for cause, we have little doubt

that she could have requested both administrative and

judicial review of the claim that she had violated IDHW

rules when she viewed confidential files without

authorization. That claim would be appropriate for judicial

review.

BSU has an additional interest here that cannot be easily

classified as “academic” or “disciplinary”: its relationship

with IDHW. The record does not disclose how many BSU

students accept internships at IDHW or other state or

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 21

municipal agencies. If IDHW loses confidence in BSU’s

programs because, for example, BSU students are allowed

to commit ethical violations with academic impunity, it

might decline to accept future BSU interns. Having been

notified by IDHW of Dudley’s misconduct, BSU was

obligated to respond, even though Dudley’s misconduct

occurred while she was under IDHW’s, not BSU’s, direct

supervision.

Nevertheless, we think that BSU’s broader reputational

concerns weigh in favor of resolving disputes like Dudley’s

properly, and not just expeditiously. Given the rarity of

degree revocation and the centrality of conferring degrees to

BSU’s mission, this was not a decision that BSU could take

lightly. BSU, which has more than 20,000 degree-seeking

students, 4 also has an interest in not arbitrarily denying or

revoking students’ diplomas. Surely, imposing arbitrary

discipline would do more to harm than to preserve BSU’s

reputation.

We have little difficulty concluding that BSU has a

strong interest in accurately resolving the charges against

Dudley, and that the charges against her, despite having an

academic component, are primarily disciplinary in nature.

c. The process due and the risk of error

We have determined that both Dudley and BSU have a

strong interest in accurately resolving the charges against

Dudley. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579–80. Having reached this

conclusion, we turn to “[t]he final, and perhaps most

important, Mathews factor,” which is “the risk of erroneous

deprivation and the probable value of additional procedural

4

See Boise State University, Facts and Figures - About Boise State,

https://www.boisestate.edu/about/facts/ (last accessed August 26, 2025).

22 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

safeguards. As we evaluate this factor, we ask ‘considering

the current process, what is the chance the [university] will

make a mistake?’” Humphries v. Cnty. of L.A., 554 F.3d

1170, 1194 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d in part on other grounds,

562 U.S. 29 (2010). Dudley challenges separately the two

decisions BSU made to revoke her degree. We consider

BSU’s first revocation of Dudley’s degree, and then BSU’s

second revocation of Dudley’s degree following its conduct

hearing.

BSU first revoked Dudley’s degree in November 2022

by sending her two letters. The first letter, signed by Interim

Dean Tony Roark, informed Dudley that BSU retroactively

changed her SOCWRK 481 grade from passing to failing,

and that this rendered her transcript “invalid.” The second

letter, which was signed by BSU Registrar Mandy Nelson,

and which came the next day, informed Dudley that BSU had

“rescinded” her degree because she no longer satisfied the

requirements for graduation. A week later, and only after

BSU told her it had revoked her degree, Assistant Dean Kate

Law advised Dudley that BSU would hold a “conduct

hearing.”

Dudley argues that she was entitled to notice and a

hearing before BSU revoked her degree. Given each side’s

substantial interest in accurately resolving this dispute, we

agree that BSU should have given Dudley prior notice of its

intent to revoke her degree and an opportunity to contest the

potential revocation. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.

371, 378–79 (1971) (emphasizing the “root requirement that

an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he

is deprived of any significant property interest.”). BSU’s

belated decision to provide Dudley with a hearing after it

first revoked her degree suggests that it recognized its error

and attempted to rectify it. Although Dudley obtained a

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 23

TRO to prevent the December 2022 hearing, BSU eventually

provided her with a hearing in February 2023. This

subsequent hearing mooted Dudley’s equitable claims

stemming from her first degree revocation. See Ming Kuo

Yang v. City of Wyoming, 793 F.3d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 2015)

(“Post-hearing notice alone may satisfy due process so long

as the interested party still has another meaningful

opportunity for a hearing. The subsequent hearing ‘cure[s]’

any lack of notice . . . .”) (alteration in original) (citations

omitted); Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th

Cir. 1991) (explaining that due process received in a post-

deprivation hearing may cure earlier deficiencies). 5

BSU revoked Dudley’s degree again in March 2023 after

giving her notice and holding a “conduct hearing” to

“review” the “charges” against her. Dudley challenged

many aspects of this process before the district court. The

district court rejected these challenges and concluded that

Dudley was not entitled to any additional procedural

safeguards. The district court found that Dudley’s

“disagreements with the process itself” were “largely

immaterial” because “BSU provided notice, an

informational meeting and packet, and a hearing.” BSU

makes a similar argument on appeal, asserting that

“Dudley’s disagreement with how the hearing was

conducted does not mean she was deprived of due process.”

On appeal, Dudley challenges nearly every aspect of the

“conduct hearing” that preceded her second degree

revocation. We will not address all of Dudley’s claims, many

of which are duplicative or not developed. We instead

address Dudley’s four potentially viable claims: that (1) she

received insufficient notice of the hearing; (2) she was given

5

We discuss Dudley’s damages claim in Section III.C.

24 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

insufficient time to present her case at the hearing; (3) she

was not allowed to cross-examine BSU’s principal witness,

Law; and (4) BSU violated the separation of functions when

Law was in the room with the Student Conduct Board

deciding Dudley’s case.

(1) Insufficient notice. Due process requires that the

government provide notice that “give[s] the charged party a

chance to marshal the facts in his defense and . . . clarif[ies]

what the charges are, in fact.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 564 (1974). Dudley argues that BSU denied her due

process by failing to provide her with adequate notice of the

“specific underlying policies or laws” that she allegedly

violated. However, BSU provided Dudley with at least three

written notices that apprised her of the violation and the

consequences. First, Law sent Dudley a letter on November

10, 2022, that identified the provision of the Student Code of

Conduct that BSU accused Dudley of violating; summarized

the IDHW investigation; scheduled the first conduct hearing;

and offered a pre-hearing meeting. Second, Raymond

Mullenax, BSU’s Director of Field Education, sent Dudley a

letter on December 1, 2022, that enumerated specific NASW

Code of Ethics standards and BSU local policies that BSU

believed Dudley violated. Finally, Law sent Dudley a new

notice of hearing on January 9, 2023, that repeated the

information in the November 10, 2022, letter. These letters

fully advised Dudley of the grounds for discipline, the facts

supporting the charge, and the consequences for her alleged

conduct. If there was any remaining ambiguity, Dudley

should have requested clarification or a meeting with Law,

as Law offered in her initial letter. BSU provided fair notice.

(2) Insufficient time to present her case. In discussions

prior to her February 2023 hearing, Dudley objected that

BSU would only provide her with ten minutes to present her

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 25

case, ten minutes to question witnesses, and five minutes for

summation. She allegedly requested 45 minutes to present

her case, 25 minutes to question each witness, and 45

minutes for summation. Dudley alleges that she in fact had

25 minutes for her defense, thus “substantially complying”

with the time restrictions for the hearing—this was her first

meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against

her. 6

We have no firm principles for prescribing time limits for

such a hearing. The lack of quantifiable standards

notwithstanding, Dudley’s alleged ten-minute time

allotment for presenting her case, plus ten minutes for

questioning witnesses and five minutes for summation,

strikes us as unreasonably restrictive. Dudley’s allegations

imply that she in fact received more than ten minutes to

present her case given that she had a total of twenty-five

minutes and she was unable to question any witnesses. But

going into the hearing, she would have been aware of BSU’s

harsh time constraint and had to prepare accordingly. For all

the reasons we have described above, this was a serious

hearing, with much at stake for both Dudley and BSU. We

recognize that an administrative body such as the Student

Conduct Board must be able to control its own proceedings,

including the time allowed for the parties’ presentations.

The board retains discretion to determine, for example,

6

BSU’s Student Conduct Board hearing is one piece of an informal

administrative process. The charge was summarized in the letters from

Roark and Law. Law offered to meet with Dudley to go over the

university’s process and Dudley’s rights and responsibilities. In such a

meeting, Dudley might have asked, informally, about the proof against

her, but Dudley declined the invitation. As a result, the Student Conduct

Board was Dudley’s first real opportunity to challenge the evidence

against her.

26 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

whether a party’s perspective has been fully and fairly aired

and any further evidence would be duplicative. We will not

prescribe a time for Dudley’s presentation but expect that

BSU will offer Dudley a more reasonable time for her

presentation in any new proceeding.

(3) Cross-examination. Dudley alleges that BSU

violated her due process right by allowing “witnesses to

present written testimony” at her hearing “without being

subjected to cross-examination.” The DOS Complainant to

the Student Conduct Board allegedly presented three

relevant pieces of evidence: a sworn affidavit from IDHW’s

Mike Dixon, a letter from BSU’s Raymond Mullenax, and

the investigative report prepared by Law. Dudley alleged

that Dixon and Law declined her requests to appear at her

hearing in person. Dudley also alleges that she decided

against trying to examine Mullenax.

Cross-examination is an important procedural safeguard.

“In almost every setting where important decisions turn on

questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Goldberg,

397 U.S. at 269. In American adversarial proceedings,

“[c]ross-examination has always been considered a most

effective way to ascertain truth.” Watkins v. Sowders, 449

U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (footnote omitted); see also Black

Coal. v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1973) (suggesting that a school district could not expel

high school students without allowing them to “cross[-

]examine adverse witnesses”). Not every hearing requires

live testimony, and not every live witness must be subjected

to cross-examination. But where a “university is faced with

competing narratives about potential misconduct, the

administration must facilitate some form of cross-

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 27

examination in order to satisfy due process.” Doe v. Baum,

903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018).

We hold that Dudley has a due process right to ask

questions to adverse witnesses affiliated with BSU—and, in

particular, Law. Law does not have first-hand knowledge of

Dudley’s conduct; that witness would be Dixon, who

declined to testify in person but submitted a sworn

statement. 7 Yet Law’s investigation is the foundation for

BSU’s complaint, and Dudley should be able to question her

about the people she spoke with, the evidence she gathered,

and her diligence in establishing the facts. Without the

ability to question Law, Dudley can only proffer her own

account of the events; that testimony is critical to her

defense, of course, but an opportunity to testify in her own

defense is not the same as being able to probe the strength of

the university’s case against her.

BSU and Dudley have a shared interest in reaching the

truth. BSU does not further its institutional interests by

erroneously revoking a diploma. We can see little burden to

BSU to make Law available for questioning since she was

already present at Dudley’s hearing. It is surely not a severe

“fiscal and administrative burden[]” that BSU has a strong

interest in avoiding. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

Although Law’s primary task was investigating Dudley, Law

allegedly created an evidentiary “hearing packet” that

“included documents that [Law] had drafted” herself. Law

thus plausibly acted as a witness, in addition to a prosecutor

(and, possibly, an adjudicator) in Dudley’s case. Because

Law was intimately involved in Dudley’s case, we conclude

7

We decline to hold that due process required BSU to procure a subpoena

or otherwise compel unaffiliated witnesses such as Dixon to be available

for questioning.

28 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

that making her available for questioning would

substantially reduce the likelihood of “erroneous

deprivation.” See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.

We recognize that requiring BSU to permit cross-

examination in this case makes the proceeding more formal

in nature, but it does not convert the proceeding into a formal

hearing. Informal administration proceedings, even where

cross-examination is permitted, are not subject to the same

rules we follow in formal judicial proceedings. In particular,

the proceedings are not subject to the rules of evidence. See

Fairbank v. Hardin, 429 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1970) (“Of

course, the technical rules of evidence, applicable in civil

trials, are not employed in administrative hearings.”). We do

not mandate the exact form that cross examination must take,

but we do hold that due process in this context means

permitting Dudley to probe the university’s case by putting

questions to Law.

(4) Separation of functions. Finally, Dudley argues that

BSU denied her due process by permitting Law to both

investigate and adjudicate her case. Specifically, she alleges

that “[a]t the conclusion of the hearing, Ms. Dudley left, and

Defendant Law remained with the Student Conduct Board as

they deliberated.” In administrative boards, “the

combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does

not, without more, constitute a due process violation . . . .”

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975). Indeed, “[i]t

is . . . very typical for the members of administrative

agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve

the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting

enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the

ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure . . . does not

violate due process of law.” Id. at 56 (footnote omitted); see

Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 567 (6th

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 29

Cir. 2011) (“[D]ue process is not necessarily violated when

the school official who initiates, investigates, or prosecutes

charges against a student plays a role in the decision to

suspend the student.” (citations omitted)); Humphries, 554

F.3d at 1197 (declining to adopt the proposition that

decisionmakers “who participate in an investigation are

disqualified from adjudicating” (citation omitted)). We

cannot conclude that Law’s alleged presence in the room

with the Student Conduct Board violated Dudley’s due

process rights.

Dudley also argues that BSU denied her due process by

adopting Law’s Investigation Report in its ultimate

findings. 8 But BSU’s alleged adoption of the Investigation

Report, per se, did not deny Dudley due process. See

Midland Banana & Tomato Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

104 F.3d 139, 142 (8th Cir. 1997) (determining that a litigant

“considerably overplay[ed] his hand by suggesting that any

uniform adoption of one party’s proposed findings signifies

‘bias’ and supports a conclusion that there has been a due

8

Dudley also argues that Law’s allegedly biased investigatory actions

denied her due process. Dudley makes a litany of claims: She alleges

that Law adopted allegations from Roark’s letter revoking Dudley’s

degree; failed to interview Dudley or witnesses she asserted were

relevant; “withheld, mischaracterized, altered, and fabricated evidence

against Dudley;” included irrelevant assertions that “cast Dudley in a

poor light;” and investigated Dudley only to ratify Roark’s initial

revocation of Dudley’s degree. Yet due process does not guarantee an

unbiased investigation. Instead, “[t]he mere fact that [certain] charges

may be unfair or untrue does not give rise to a Constitutional claim: ‘The

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee

against incorrect or ill-advised [] decisions.’” Portman, 995 F.2d at 908

(quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976)). If Dudley thinks

the investigation has been in error, the hearing before the Board is

Dudley’s opportunity to set the record straight.

30 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

process violation.”). The Student Conduct Board reviewed

the evidence and reached a conclusion, and that conclusion

is entitled to a presumption of regularity. As “policymakers

with decisionmaking power,” Student Conduct Board

members enjoy a “presumption of honesty and integrity,”

and even “[a] showing that the Board was ‘involved’ in the

events preceding [its] decision . . . is not enough to

overcome [that] presumption.” Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist.

No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 496–97

(1976).

Dudley’s objections to Law’s investigation, her

complaint that Law remained a part of the decisionmaking

process, and her claim that the Board agreed with Law’s

conclusions are, without more, not founded in the Due

Process Clause.

***

We conclude that BSU’s first revocation of Dudley’s

degree without any notice or hearing deprived her of due

process. And, on balance, we further conclude that BSU’s

alleged artificial restrictions on Dudley’s time for presenting

her case and its alleged refusal to allow her to examine BSU-

affiliated witnesses also deprived her of due process. Both

of these decisions go to the heart of the Student Conduct

Board’s truth-finding function and, thus, given the important

interests at stake here, we conclude that those procedures

created an unacceptable risk of an erroneous result.

By contrast, we conclude that Dudley failed to plausibly

allege that BSU violated due process by giving her

insufficient notice prior to her conduct hearing, or by

allegedly allowing Law to remain in the room with the Board

when it deliberated its decision. We offer no views on the

merits of BSU’s dispute with Dudley and hold only that

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 31

Dudley properly pleaded that certain elements of BSU’s

process were inadequate. Insofar as the district court

dismissed Dudley’s claim stemming from BSU’s alleged

failure to provide Dudley with sufficient time to present her

case or directly or indirectly cross-examine witnesses, we

reverse the district court.

B. Substantive Due Process Right to an Occupation

We next consider whether Dudley plausibly alleged that

Defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive

due process right to pursue an occupation in social work. We

agree with the district court that Dudley failed to state a

claim. Dudley, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 1284.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the liberty

component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause includes some generalized due process right to

choose one’s field of private employment.” Conn v.

Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999). That right “is

nevertheless subject to reasonable government regulation.”

Id. The contours of this generalized right, however, have not

been clearly set forth, either by the Supreme Court or by our

court. In Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 478

F.3d 985, 997 (9th Cir. 2007), we held that “a plaintiff can

make out a substantive due process claim if she is unable to

pursue an occupation and this inability is caused by

government actions that were arbitrary and lacking a rational

basis.”

However, we have only recognized occupational liberty

claims in “extreme cases, such as a ‘government blacklist,

which when circulated or otherwise publicized to

prospective employers effectively excludes the blacklisted

individual from his occupation, much as if the government

had yanked the license of an individual in an occupation that

32 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

requires licensure.’” Id. at 997–98 (quoting Olivieri v.

Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997)). “[I]n order

to bring an occupational liberty claim, a plaintiff must show

that the ‘character and circumstances of a public employer’s

stigmatizing conduct or statements are such as to have

destroyed an employee’s freedom to take advantage of other

employment opportunities.’” Id. at 998 (quoting Bordelon v.

Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir.

2000)). This standard “ensures that substantive due process

protects the right to pursue an entire profession, and not the

right to pursue a particular job.” Id.

We dealt with the Engquist standard more recently in

Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058 (9th Cir. 2022). In that

case, Armstrong alleged that she suffered “‘a loss of 13 years

of future employment, . . . loss of a clean employment file,

and loss of a neutral recommendation to possible future

employers.’” Id. at 1081 (omission in original). We held

that this was insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. She

could not allege facts that would show that the defendants

engaged in “conduct rising to the level of a government

blacklist or the revocation of a license to practice a particular

profession.” Id.

Here, Dudley has not alleged that BSU subjected her to

anything resembling a “government blacklist.” See id.

Instead, Dudley makes a barebones argument that “BSU

arbitrarily revoked her BSW degree without due process and

informed [the Idaho Division of Occupational and

Professional Licenses] so that Dudley would lose her BSW

license—making her unable to pursue her chosen

occupation.” Dudley further argues that it can be

“reasonably inferred that Appellees’ intent behind revoking

Dudley’s course credit and BSW degree, and expelling her,

was to prevent her from being eligible for a BSW license.”

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 33

We reject Dudley’s argument for two reasons. First,

BSU’s decision to revoke Dudley’s degree and report that

revocation to the Idaho Division of Occupational and

Professional Licenses, while procedurally infirm, was not

substantively “arbitrary and lacking a rational basis,” given

the severity of IDHW’s allegations. See Engquist, 478 F.3d

at 997. Any conclusion to the contrary would risk subjecting

all professional licensure schemes and professional

education program enrollment decisions to arbitrary-and-

capricious review. See Aka v. United States Tax Court, 854

F.3d 30, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding that there is no

“substantive due process right to bar membership or against

unduly harsh disbarment”).

Second, as BSU observes, even if Dudley’s allegations

were true, she has not alleged that she is unable to pursue a

career in the broader social work profession without a

license or degree, and she never alleged that she cannot

pursue a social work education elsewhere. Dudley thus

failed to allege that BSU’s revocation of her degree was

anything more than a “brief interruption” in her social work

career, much less “a complete prohibition of the right to

engage in a calling.” See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 997 (citation

omitted). We therefore agree with the district court that

Dudley failed to state a claim that BSU deprived her of an

occupational liberty interest.

C. Qualified Immunity

The district court dismissed Dudley’s claims to the extent

they seek monetary relief, concluding that even if Dudley

had alleged a due process violation, Defendants are

protected by qualified immunity. Dudley, 732 F. Supp. 3d at

1287–89. Dudley argues this was error because ISBOE

Policy § III.B.2.iii.3 requires that BSU give students “due

34 DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY

process” and hold them accountable “using academic

standards and institutional procedures.” Although we have

concluded that Dudley sufficiently alleged that BSU denied

her due process when it revoked her degree following a

deficient hearing, we affirm the district court’s decision that

Defendants are protected by qualified immunity because

they did not violate any clearly established right.

“Public officials are immune from suit [for damages]

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless they have ‘violated a

statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established

at the time of the challenged conduct.’” City and County of

San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015) (citation

omitted). “We do not require a case directly on point, but

existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

Dudley cites no caselaw that establishes that a

university’s analogous conduct violated a graduate’s rights

under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Even though Dudley plausibly alleged that Defendants did

deprive Dudley of her degree with insufficient process, “[a]

procedural due process analysis that requires a complicated

balancing test is sufficiently unpredictable” such that it was

not clearly established that BSU was required to provide

Dudley with certain procedural protections. See Humphries,

554 F.3d at 1202.

D. Preliminary Injunction

Finally, we dismiss as moot Dudley’s appeal of the

district court’s 2022 denial of a TRO extension, which we

construe as denial of a preliminary injunction. See

Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017)

(treating “an order styled as a TRO” as a preliminary

DUDLEY V. BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY 35

injunction when the order “was strongly challenged in

adversarial proceedings before the district court and [] it has

or will remain in force for longer than [a] fourteen-day

period”); Barbaria v. Blinken, 87 F.4th 963, 976 (9th Cir.

2023) (treating a “denial of a TRO” as “tantamount to the

denial of a preliminary injunction” (citation omitted)); see

also Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960,

963 (9th Cir. 2013).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district

court’s dismissal of Dudley’s procedural due process claim

insofar as Dudley alleged that Defendants denied her due

process by not allowing her sufficient time to present her

defense and by refusing to allow her to cross-examine or

otherwise question adverse BSU-affiliated witnesses at her

conduct hearing, and we REMAND for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the district

court’s dismissal of Dudley’s substantive due process claim.

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment granting

qualified immunity to the Defendants as to Dudley’s claims

for monetary relief. Finally, we DISMISS Dudley’s appeal

of the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

DISMISSED IN PART, and REMANDED.