Harris v. Pinellas County, Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JAY HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2459-TPB-TGW

PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on the following motions:

Defendant Bob Gualtieri’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated

Memorandum of Law” (Doc. 17);

Defendant “Pinellas County’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Incorporated

Memorandum of Law” (Doc. 23); and

“Defendants Jesus Gonzalez and Chief Judge Shawn

Crane’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint and Incorporated Memorandum of Law” (Doc.

35).

Plaintiff Jay Harris filed responses in opposition. (Docs. 28; 33; 36). After

reviewing the motions, responses, court file, and the record, the Court finds as

follows:

Background1

Plaintiff is a deaf resident of Pinellas County, Florida, who relies on

American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreters to communicate. On June 30, 2024,

Plaintiff was arrested and charged with mortgage fraud. According to Plaintiff, he

was denied access to qualified ASL interpreters during this arrest. He also alleges

that he was denied access to interpreters at other arrest and detention proceedings,

court hearings, and public training workshops in Pinellas County from 2022

through 2025. Plaintiff alleges that despite requesting the interpreters, no

qualified interpreter was provided, and that he experienced significant delays and

technical difficulties with other auxiliary aids. For example, Plaintiff claims that on

August 21, 2024, his interpreters left midway through his court proceedings without

explanation, forcing the hearing to be rescheduled. He also allegedly experienced

confusion and distress at a post-arrest proceeding on November 15, 2024, when he

did not receive a functioning TTY (teletypewriter) device.

Plaintiff initially filed a complaint on October 23, 2024, which was amended

on January 22, 2025, and again on February 24, 2025. (Docs. 1; 6; 10). Plaintiff

asserts claims for a violation of Title II of the ADA (Count I), a violation of § 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act (Count II), violations of §§ 413.08, 413.081, and 760.07, F.S.,

(Count III), and disability-based discrimination (Count IV). He requests both

1 The Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the second amended complaint for purposes

of ruling on the pending motion to dismiss. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the

factual allegations contained in the complaint.”). The Court is not required to accept as

true any legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986).

injunctive relief and monetary damages. Defendants seek dismissal of all counts.

See (Docs. 17; 23; 35).

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). While Rule 8(a) does not demand “detailed factual

allegations,” it does require “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, factual

allegations must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Id. at 570.

When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, review is generally limited to the four

corners of the complaint. Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 232, 233

(M.D. Fla. 1995). Furthermore, when reviewing a complaint for facial sufficiency, a

court “must accept [a] [p]laintiff’s well pleaded facts as true, and construe the

[c]omplaint in the light most favorable to the [p]laintiff.” Id. (citing Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). “[A] motion to dismiss should concern only the

complaint’s legal sufficiency, and is not a procedure for resolving factual questions

or addressing the merits of the case.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Mosaic

Fertilizer, LLC, 8:09-cv-1264-T-26TGW, 2009 WL 10671157, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2009)

(Lazzara, J.).

As Plaintiff in this case is proceeding pro se, the Court more liberally

construes the pleadings. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2018).

However, a pro se plaintiff must still conform with procedural rules and the Court

does not have “license to act as de facto counsel” on behalf of a pro se plaintiff.

United States v. Padgett, 917 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019).

Analysis

Defendants advance three primary arguments in support of dismissal: (1)

Plaintiff lacks standing to seek prospective injunctive relief; (2) the second amended

complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading; and (3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Defendants Chief Judge Shawn Crane and Jesus

Gonzalez additionally argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

Standing

Because standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, the Court addresses

it as a threshold matter. See Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris,

D.D.S., P.A., 781 F.3d 1245, 1250 (11th Cir. 2015). To establish Article III standing,

a plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

favorable decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “Only an

alleged harm that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical’ is enough to show that a party ‘has a case or controversy

rather than, say, a strong and abiding interest in an issue, or a desire to obtain

attorney’s fees.’” Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 48 F.4th

1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190,

2206 (2021)).

Since injunctions “regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek

injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and

immediate . . . threat of future injury.” Wooden v. Board of Regents of Univ. System

of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). “In ADA cases,

courts have held that a plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief unless he

alleges facts giving rise to an inference that he will suffer future discrimination by

the defendant.” Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001). “District

courts must consider the totality of all relevant facts to determine whether a

plaintiff faces a real and immediate threat of future injury.” Longfellow v. Lee

Mem’l Health Sys., No. 2:14-CV-142-FTM-29, 2014 WL 4682080, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 19, 2014).

Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendants to provide him

with qualified ASL interpreters at all future proceedings, develop ADA and § 504

compliance policies, train all court and jail personnel on ADA requirements,

implement an on-call interpreter system, and employ 24/7 ASL interpreters. In

support of such injunctive relief, Plaintiff cites to various instances where he was

purportedly denied access to qualified interpreters or other auxiliary aids that

would allow him to effectively communicate, which he alleges Defendants are

responsible for providing. Defendants respond that the second amended complaint

only discusses the past conduct of Defendants and therefore fails to allege a “real

and immediate” threat, which is required for prospective injunctive relief. See

Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081.

“While past wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and immediate

threat of injury necessary to make out a case or controversy, the plaintiff's exposure

to illegal conduct in the past is nonetheless evidence bearing on whether there is a

real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Houston v. Marod Supermarkets,

Inc., 733 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Still, the Court must evaluate standing “based on the facts alleged in the complaint,

and [it] may not ‘speculate concerning the existence of standing or piece together

support for the plaintiff.’” See Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081 (quoting Cone Corp. v. Fla.

Dept. of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1210 (11th Cir. 1991)).

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege that he faces a real

and immediate threat of future harm. Specifically, he does not discuss whether any

of his cases are ongoing, and whether those cases are likely to have future court

dates. He also does not discuss any impending deprivation of access during his

detention or at upcoming training workshops. As a result, the Court finds that the

second amended complaint fails to establish standing to the extent it seeks

injunctive relief. The motions to dismiss are granted as to this ground. However, in

an abundance of caution, the Court will grant leave to amend, if Plaintiff may do so

in good faith.2 See Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.

2018).

2 The Court notes that it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff would be entitled to a broad

injunction overhauling Defendants’ training policies or compelling the creation of an “on-

Shotgun Pleading

Defendants also argue that the second amended complaint should be

dismissed because it is a shotgun pleading. A shotgun pleading is one where “it is

virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which

claim(s) for relief” and the defendant therefore cannot be “expected to frame a

responsive pleading.” See Anderson v. Dist. Bd. Of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cmty.

College, 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four

primary types of shotgun pleadings:

(1) complaints containing multiple counts where each count adopts

the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive

count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a

combination of the entire complaint;

(2) complaints that do not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all

preceding counts but are guilty of the venial sin of being replete

with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action;

(3) complaints that commit the sin of not separating into a different

count each cause of action or claim for relief; and

(4) complaints that assert multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which of the defendants are

responsible for which actions or omissions, or which of the

defendants the claim is brought against.

call” interpreter system to be available to him 24/7. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,

531-32 (2004) (“Title II does not require States to employ any and all means to make

judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities. . . . It requires only ‘reasonable

modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided . . . [or]

impose an undue financial or administrative burden.”). Even if Plaintiff were afforded

injunctive relief, it would likely be limited to ensuring he has qualified interpreters or other

adequate methods of communication at future court proceedings. Plaintiff should therefore

think carefully consider the relief he is requesting in any future amended complaint.

See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th Cir.

2015).

Defendants specifically contend that the second amended complaint qualifies

as a shotgun pleading under the second, third, and fourth categories because

Plaintiff appears to apply every stated fact to all Defendants, none of whom are

connected to any particular act or omission causing the purported violations. The

Court agrees.

Even though Plaintiff separates each of his four counts by statutory violation

and provides some factual context for those violations, dismissal is warranted

because Plaintiff does not specify the role each Defendant could have played in

causing each alleged violation. See Smith v. Knipe, No. 6:23-cv-1718-WWB-LHP,

2024 WL 988853, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2024), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 6:23-cv-1718-JSS-LHP, 2024 WL 1619412 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2024)

(dismissing complaint as a shotgun pleading where plaintiff failed to “delineat[e]

the roles or alleged wrongs attributable to each of the [] named Defendants.”); Pyatt

v. Gimenez, No. 1:20-CV-20827, 2020 WL 4003495, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2020)

(dismissing complaint where it “suffer[ed] from the second and fourth ‘sins’ of

asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of

the defendants is responsible for which acts or omissions and of alleging conclusory,

vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of

action”). The motions to dismiss are granted as to this ground. However, the court

will grant an opportunity to amend.

In any amended complaint, Plaintiff is directed to set out separately

numbered counts as to each of the different Defendants, indicating which Defendant

the count is against. Within each count, Plaintiff should assert a single theory of

recovery against only that Defendant, clearly identifying the acts and omissions he

believes that particular Defendant is responsible for committing.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants next argue that each of Plaintiff’s counts fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.

Counts I and II

To establish a disability discrimination claim under Title II of the ADA or §

504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff must establish that he: (1) is a qualified

individual with a disability; (2) was either excluded from participation in, or denied

the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) that the

exclusion or denial of benefit was because of Plaintiff’s disability.3 See Silberman v.

Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1134 (11th Cir. 2019). A defendant does not

need to accommodate a plaintiff who has meaningful access to the benefit at issue.

See Ambrose v. St. Johns Cnty. Sch. Bd., 664 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1331-32 (M.D. Fla.

2023) (citing Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, to

establish these claims, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he lacks “meaningful

access” to a public benefit to which he is entitled because of his disability. See id.

3 “Given the textual similarities between the two statutes, the same standards govern” Title

II and § 504 claims. Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir.

2019) (citing T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th

Cir. 2010)) (internal quotations omitted)).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, Plaintiff must also

plead and prove that Defendants engaged in intentional discrimination.4 See

Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1134 (citing Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d

334, 348 (11th Cir. 2012)). To prove intentional discrimination, Plaintiff must show

deliberate indifference – that Defendants “knew that harm to a federally protected

right was substantially likely” and “failed to act on that likelihood.” See id. (quoting

Liese, 701 F.3d at 344). This conduct must also independently violate the

Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157-58 (2006)

Nat’l Assln of the Deaf v. Florida, 980 F.3d 763, 771 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020). And to

hold a government entity liable, Plaintiff must allege that an “official who at a

minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute

corrective measures on the [entity’s] behalf” had “actual knowledge of

discrimination in the [entity’s] programs and fail[ed] adequately to respond.” See

Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1134.

The second amended complaint describes the various roles of Defendants and

the general ways in which Plaintiff contends they are responsible for ensuring his

access to court proceedings, among other things. But critically, Plaintiff never

alleges a lack of meaningful access. He does not allege that Defendants

intentionally failed to provide him interpreters. Nor does he allege that Defendants

had actual knowledge of discrimination and failed to respond. Indeed, Plaintiff fails

4 As previously discussed, Plaintiff fails to establish standing to seek injunctive relief under

these statutes. See Wood v. President and Trs. of Spring Hill Coll. in City of Mobile, 978

F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 1992).

to make any allegations about the acts or admissions of any particular Defendant,

which is wholly insufficient.

Furthermore, the Court notes that it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff can

bring a damages suit against Chief Judge Crane, who appears to have been acting

exclusively in his official judicial capacity. See Shapiro v. Ingram, 207 F. App’x 938,

940 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from

damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless

they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”). It is also not clear to the Court

that Chief Judge Crane is the proper defendant for this type of suit, but because the

motions did not raise this argument, the Court does not further address it.

In sum, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for damages in Counts I and II, and

motions to dismiss are therefore granted as to this ground. The Court will

nevertheless permit amendment, if Plaintiff may do so in good faith.

Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for violations of §

413.08, F.S., which broadly covers the rights of disabled persons and prohibits

discrimination in “public accommodations;” § 413.081, F.S., which applies to

interference with a service animal; and § 760.07, F.S., which provides various

remedies for unlawful discrimination subject to the exhaustion of administrative

remedies. Again, Plaintiff fails to specifically identify the actions or omissions of

any single Defendant that caused the alleged violations, which makes it difficult – if

not impossible – to determine whether he has stated a claim for relief under any of

these statutes. Plaintiff does not say when, how, and by whom these specific

statutes were violated and instead leaves the Court to speculate as to the facts that

may support these claims. For example, Plaintiff mentions nothing at all about a

service animal within his pleadings. Consequently, Count III fails to state a claim,

and the motions to dismiss are granted, but the Court will grant leave to amend. In

any amended complaint, Plaintiff must specify which Defendants violated which

statutes and how they did so.

Count IV

Regarding Count IV, the Court finds it duplicative of Counts I through III.

To the extent Plaintiff is alleging discrimination under Title II of the ADA, § 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act, or any Florida statutes, he should include the relevant

factual details and allegations in the counts specifically pertaining to those

statutory violations. As pled, the Count does not appear to raise an independent

claim for relief. The motions to dismiss are granted as to this ground, with leave to

amend.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants Chief Judge Crane and Jesus Gonzalez additionally argue for

dismissal on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

pursuant to the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq., which states in relevant part that

“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To exhaust his administrative remedies, an

inmate must properly comply with all steps or processes set up by the agency so

that it can address issues raised by the inmate on the merits. See Halpin v. Crist,

405 F. App’x 403, 407 (11th Cir. 2010).

However, the Supreme Court recently clarified that “PLRA exhaustion is ‘not

jurisdictional.’” Perttu v. Richards, 145 S. Ct. 1793, 1801 (2025) (quoting Jones v.

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)). In so doing, the Supreme Court further

emphasized that exhaustion “is not a ‘pleading requirement,’ which is why ‘inmates

are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaint.’”

Perttu, 145 S. Ct. at 1801 (quoting Jones, 549 U.S at 216). The motion to dismiss is

therefore denied as to this ground. This does not preclude Defendants from raising

this issue as an affirmative defense. See Perttu, 145 S. Ct. at 1801 (“PLRA

exhaustion is a standard affirmative defense.”).

Pro Se Warning

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that even pro se plaintiffs must conform with

procedural rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules

of the Middle District of Florida. Litigation − particularly in federal court − is

difficult, and Plaintiff should consider hiring an attorney. If he is unable to afford

counsel, she should consider the resources available to pro se litigants, including the

Legal Information Program operated by the Tampa Bay Chapter of the Federal Bar

Association, and the Middle District of Florida’s guide to assist pro se litigants

proceeding in federal court, which is located on the Court’s website.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

1. Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 17; 23; 35) are hereby GRANTED

IN PART. The motions are granted to the extent that the second

amended complaint is dismissed without prejudice as set forth herein,

with leave to amend.

2. The motions are otherwise DENIED.

3. Plaintiff Jay Harris is DIRECTED to file a third amended complaint on

or before September 16, 2025. Failure to file a third amended complaint

will result in this Order becoming a final judgment.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 26th day of

August, 2025.

VAP. BAL.

TOMBARBER iiss—S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 14 of 14