Washington v. The People of The State of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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Jamel Washington,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

25-CV-02070 (DG) (TAM)

-against-

The People of The State of New York, et al.,

Defendants.

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DIANE GUJARATI, United States District Judge:

On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff Jamel Washington, proceeding pro se and then incarcerated,

filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against

Defendants The People of The State of New York; Alexander B. Jeong, Richmond County

Criminal Court Judge; Michael E. McMahon, Richmond County District Attorney; and Kate C.

Malloy, Richmond County Assistant District Attorney. See Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1.1

The action subsequently was transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York. See ECF Nos. 3, 4; see generally docket.

The Complaint appears to be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”).2

Because the Complaint does not specify whether the Section 1983 claim as against the individual

Defendants is brought against them in their individual capacities, in their official capacities, or in

both capacities, see generally Compl., the Court construes the Complaint to be bringing the

1 When citing to the Complaint, the Court uses the page numbers generated by the Court’s

electronic case filing system (“ECF”). When quoting from the Complaint, the Court retains the

original capitalization, spelling, and punctuation.

2 In the section of the preprinted complaint form directing Plaintiff to state the federal legal basis

for his claim, Plaintiff checks the box for “Violation of my federal constitutional rights.” See

Compl. at 2.

Section 1983 claim against each of the individual Defendants in both capacities. In addition, the

Court construes the Complaint’s reference to The People of The State of New York to be

intended to indicate that Plaintiff seeks to bring the Section 1983 claim against the State of New

York.3

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis.

See ECF No. 7; see also ECF Nos. 8, 9. The Court grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma

pauperis and, for the reasons set forth below, dismisses the Complaint in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

In the section of the Complaint titled “Statement Of Claim,” Plaintiff alleges – in

conclusory fashion and without distinguishing among the various Defendants – the following:

I. The Defendants did deprive the Plaintiff of his Constitutional Right to due

process of the law in violation of his fundamentally guaranteed 5th

Ammendment of The United States Constitution by virtue of prosectuing a

facially insufficient accusatory instrument, to witt the alleged

attatchment.4

II. The Defendants did deprive the Plaintiff of a Speedy Trial, and Public

Trial, as guaranteed by the 6th Ammendment of The United States

Constitution in that they ignored Plaintiff’s New York Criminal Procedure

Law 30.30(1)(a) motion/legal pleading. Additionally, Defendants failed to

hold a hearing pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 30.30(5) to determine

actual readiness of the prosecution.

III. The Defendants did deprive Plaintiff effectives assistance of counsel as

guaranteed by the 6th Ammendment of The United States Constitution, in

that they denied Plaintiff’s right to act as his own counsel, as well as

forcing Plaintiff to be represented by counsel that had no desire to

represent him.

IV. Defendants did impose excessive bail upon the Plaintiff, thereby inflicting

cruel and unusual, as well as cruel and indifferent punishment in violation

of the 8th Ammendment of The United States Constitution, in that the

3 In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s filings in this action.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

4 Notwithstanding the Complaint’s reference to an attachment, no attachment was filed. The

absence of the attachment is not material to the Court’s decision herein.

Plaintiff’s bail is $450,000.00

V. Defendants did deny Plaintiff the right to face his accusers in violation of

the 6th Ammendment of The United States Constitution

VI. The Defendants did deny Plaintiff his reasonable expectation to privacy in

that an illegal search was executed and the findings thereof were used

against the Plaintiff in violation of 4th and 5th Ammendments of The

United States Constitution.

VII. The Defendants did deny the Plaintiff the ability to have a speedy trial by

virtue of the fact that they never held hearings to verify the veracity of The

People’s contention of readiness for trial in violation of the 5th and 6th

Ammendments of The United States Constitution.

VIII. Defendants did deny Plaintiff full disclosure of the discovery material, to

witt, failing to produce all Civilian Complaint Review Board, Internal

Affairs Beareau, and Police Misconduct Records, both substantiated and

unsubstantiated, as well as the witness contact information, Expert

Witness educational information, body worn camera evidence of arrest,

search warrants for Plaintiff’s property, oath and affirmation supporting

the legal warrant and more, in violation of the 4th; 5th; and 6th

Ammendments of The United States Constitution.

IX. Defendants did deny the Plaintiff the right to appear and testify at his

Criminal Grand Jury proceeding in violation of the 5th Ammendment and

14th Ammendment of the United States Constitution.

See Compl. at 4-5.

Plaintiff seeks the following relief:

I. Immediate dismissal of all charges and the accusatory instrument for

procedural defects, and facial insufficiency.

II. The immediate release of Plaintiff, whereas any incaceration is illegal, for

various reasons.

III. Punitive Damages in the amount of $20,000,000.00, or any amount that

this Court deems just and proper, for mental cruelty, vicious verbal

slander, and for pain and suffering.

IV. $60,096,750.00 in Compensatory Damages, as well as any amount that

this Court deems just and proper in Nominal Damages.

See Compl. at 6.5

5 Plaintiff appears to have been convicted in state court since the time he filed the Complaint in

the instant action and Plaintiff (who filed the Complaint as a pretrial detainee) appears to no

longer be detained, see Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 10. The Court addresses herein

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim to the extent that it seeks monetary relief against Defendants and

STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v.

Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

In reviewing a pro se complaint, a court must be mindful that the plaintiff’s pleadings

“must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also,

e.g., Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, “[e]ven after Twombly,” courts

“remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”).

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a district court to screen civil

complaints brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or against an officer or employee

of a governmental entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), and requires a district court to dismiss a

plaintiff’s complaint if it: “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,”

notes that Plaintiff’s requests for non-monetary relief appear to be moot. See Gregory v.

Ricigliano, No. 12-CV-04372, 2014 WL 119475, at *6 (E.D.N.Y Jan. 10, 2014) (noting that

“courts have held that when a state court criminal defendant brings an action in federal court

seeking to enjoin any part of the state criminal proceedings, the federal action becomes moot

once the state criminal case proceeds to judgment” and collecting cases); Davis v. Thompson,

No. 23-CV-00705, 2024 WL 1018495, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024) (noting that “judgment

has already been entered in plaintiff’s underlying criminal case” and that “Plaintiff’s request

that the Court grant an injunction dismissing his criminal case is now moot”); Crevelle v. U.S.

Marshals, No. 12-CV-05873, 2012 WL 6212703, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (noting that

plaintiff’s release from custody renders his request for release from incarceration moot).

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The in forma pauperis statute requires courts to dismiss for the same

reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639-40 (2d Cir.

2007) (applying both § 1915A and § 1915(e)(2) to a prisoner’s complaint in a case in which the

prisoner proceeded in forma pauperis).

When conducting the review required by the PLRA and the in forma pauperis statute, a

court must “accept all ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ in the complaint as true.” See Lynch v.

City of N.Y., 952 F.3d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Larkin

v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that a court must “accept all of the facts

alleged in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor” when reviewing a

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Leybinsky v. Iannacone, No. 97-CV-05238, 2000 WL

863957, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 2000) (noting that “[f]or purposes of considering a dismissal

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true”). “Even in

a pro se case, however, although a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v.

Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Section 1983 “provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred,’

including under the Constitution.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).6 To sustain a claim brought under Section

6 In pertinent part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of

1983, “[t]he conduct at issue ‘must have been committed by a person acting under color of state

law’ and ‘must have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.’” Id. (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d

Cir. 1994)).

Here, even liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim must be dismissed because

each Defendant enjoys immunity as set forth below.

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim as against Defendant State of New York is barred by

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Ying Jing Gan v. City of N.Y., 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir.

1993) (noting that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment, with few exceptions, bars federal courts from

entertaining suits brought by a private party against a state in its own name”); see also Dean v.

Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 193 (2d Cir. 2015), and

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim as against Defendants McMahon, Malloy, and Jeong in their

official capacities also is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Ying Jing Gan, 996 F.2d

at 529 (noting that “[t]o the extent that a state official is sued for damages in his official capacity,

such a suit is deemed to be a suit against the state, and the official is entitled to invoke the

Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state”); see also Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d

62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); Smith v. Troulakis, No. 22-CV-03441, 2022 WL 3139118, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

Aug. 5, 2022) (noting that “Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state officials acting in

their official capacities, including an assistant district attorney”); Davis v. Thompson, No. 23-

CV-00705, 2024 WL 1018495, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024) (noting that claims against state

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

court judges in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity).7

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim as against Defendants McMahon and Malloy in their

individual capacities is barred by prosecutorial immunity. See Shmueli v. City of N.Y., 424 F.3d

231, 236 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that it is well established that “a state prosecuting attorney who

acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution” is “immune

from a civil suit for damages under § 1983” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410,

431 (1976)); Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim as against Defendant Jeong in his individual capacity is

barred by judicial immunity. See Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting

that “[i]t is well settled that judges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money

damages for their judicial actions” and that “the Supreme Court has generally concluded that acts

arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature”);

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (noting that immunity may only be overcome where

the challenged actions were “not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” or the actions, “though

judicial in nature, [were] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction”).

In light of the above, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is dismissed, without prejudice. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 7, is granted.

For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed in its entirety,

7 The exceptions to sovereign immunity do not apply here. See Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 F.

App’x 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that “[i]t is well-established that New York has not

consented to § 1983 suits in federal court and that § 1983 was not intended to override a state’s

sovereign immunity” (citations omitted)); Smith, 2022 WL 3139118, at *3.

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).8

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order

would not be taken in good faith and therefore denies in forma pauperis status for the purpose of

an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment, mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff,

and close this case.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Diane Gujarati __

DIANE GUJARATI

United States District Judge

Dated: August 26, 2025

Brooklyn, New York

8 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s pro se status, such dismissal is without leave to amend as the Court

finds that amendment would be futile in light of the deficiencies set forth above, which cannot

be cured by better pleading. See Haynes v. Foschio, No. 21-1767, 2022 WL 433337, at *2 (2d

Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (noting that “[b]ecause additional pleading could not overcome the

defendants’ immunity, the district court properly denied leave to amend as futile” (citing

Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000))).