The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
LATRICE WALKER, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-0258
VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
JULIAN WHITTINGTON, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant Bossier Parish
Policy Jury (“BBPJ”) (Record Document 36) and Defendant Sheriff Julian Whittington
(“Sheriff Whittington”) (Record Document 38). Plaintiffs Latrice Walker and Holly Rouse
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) opposed both Motions. See Record Documents 47 & 48. The
BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington replied. See Record Documents 50 & 54. For the reasons
set forth below, both Motions are GRANTED. All claims asserted by Plaintiffs against the
BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
A full recitation of the facts can be found in the Court’s previous Memorandum
Ruling. See Record Document 56. The Court will summarize the instant Motions for the
purposes of this Ruling.
(a) The BPPJ’s Motion (Record Document 36).
In the BPPJ’s Motion, it asserts that Plaintiffs’ Monell claim should be dismissed.
See Record Document 36-1 at 9. The BPPJ contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations are
conclusory rather than factual. See id. at 12. It argues many of Plaintiffs’ allegations
strongly undermine any Monell claim because they illustrate how the BPPJ took
numerous actions to ensure adequate health care for inmates. See id.
The BPPJ points out that pursuant to Plaintiffs’ own allegations, it employed at
least three educated, trained, and licensed nurses to provide medical care to inmates,
which strongly undermines an assertion that the BPPJ was deliberately indifferent to
inmates’ medical needs. See id. at 12–13. The BPPJ contends it had a procedure for
deputies to request EMS to come to the facility and transport a prisoner to a medical
facility. See id. at 13. Under Plaintiffs’ own allegation, the BPPJ had an alcohol withdrawal
protocol, but the correctional officers were never placed on notice. See id.
The BPPJ avers that all of Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding unconstitutional
customs, policies, and practices are conclusory and fail to adequately allege an
unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice. See id. The BPPJ goes through each specific
allegation. With respect to paragraph 29, it maintains that Plaintiffs have pled no facts in
support of this allegation despite the chance to amend their Original Complaint. See id.
The BPPJ argues Plaintiffs have failed to allege any prior similar incidents at Bossier Max
involving nurses employed by the BPPJ who demonstrated a deliberate refusal to provide
transportation for an inmate to a hospital. See id. As to paragraph 30, the BPPJ asserts
that this allegation is also conclusory and provides no factual support this alleged policy
exists. See id. at 14.
Additionally, the BPPJ submits that Plaintiffs’ state law claims, if any, should be
dismissed. See id. The BPPJ argues it is unclear whether Plaintiffs seek to hold it
vicariously liable for these claims under the theory of respondeat superior based upon
their reservation with respect to Defendants Molli Lyles, Jennifer Johnson, and Jennifer
Grimm (collectively, the “Nurse Defendants”). See id. However, it points out that this Court
has previously dismissed the state law claims against the Nurse Defendants. See id. As
such, the BPPJ advances that any state law claim seeking to hold it vicariously liable for
the alleged medical malpractice of the Nurse Defendants must also be dismissed. See id.
at 14–15.
The BPPJ also asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”) should be dismissed. See id. at 15.
It contends that Plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the ADA and RA are merely the same
medical negligence claims as alleged in the Original Complaint and have been
repackaged and rebranded. See id. at 16. The BPPJ maintains that these new claims
contain legal conclusions and do not establish intentional disability discrimination. See id.
at 16, 17.
Plaintiffs oppose the BPPJ’s Motion, arguing that their Monell claim is sufficiently
pled because all Defendants “could have obtained emergency transport.” Record
Document 47 at 18. Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he policy-making official deliberately intended
to make all efforts to avoid the medical care cost and thus not provide emergency
transport to a medical facility[], and that custom policy caused [McCoy’s] injury.” Id.
Plaintiffs claim this custom of reducing expenses has been in effect since 2018, and they
cite to Fletcher v. Whittington. See id. at 19. Plaintiffs contend that “[a]lthough [they] need
not show specific examples, they show a de facto policy of no emergency care for a
detoxifying detainee exists.” Id.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs advance they “can allege in good faith that none of the
nurses were disciplined by their supervisors with the [BPPJ] in any fashion although they
violated the constitutional rights of McCoy in the most ultimate way by their deliberate
indifferent to his serious medical needs.” Id. at 20. Plaintiffs maintain they can also “allege
in good faith that there were no changes in custom or practice after [] McCoy’s death;”
therefore, they argue “there is constructive notice to the policymakers.” Id. at 20–21.
Moreover, they submit all Defendants “in following this custom or policy, delayed calling
for emergency care for [] Plaintiff[s] to determine if medical care could be denied all
together without a charge to either entity.” Id. at 21.
Plaintiffs assert that at the time of McCoy’s death, Molli Lyles (“Nurse Lyles”) was
the Medical Administrator at Bossier Max. See id. at 22. As the Medical Administrator,
Plaintiffs advance that she is the authorized, final decisionmaker regarding the provision
of medical care by BPPJ. See id. They maintain Nurse Lyles adopted and approved the
course of inaction and deliberate indifference towards McCoy, which lead to his death.
See id. at 22–23. Plaintiffs aver that Nurse Lyles, as the chief medical officer for the BPPJ,
binds the BPPJ for her deliberate indifference and failure to provide medical care. See id.
at 23.
With respect to their ADA claim against the BPPJ, Plaintiffs argue McCoy’s alcohol
withdrawal and delirium tremens qualify as a disability under the ADA. See id. at 26. As a
result of delirium tremens, McCoy experienced auditory and visual hallucinations,
delusions, shaking, seizures, high temperature, and profuse sweating. See id. Plaintiffs
contend that “these conditions create a substantial impairment of the major life activities
of consciousness and the ability to perceive reality.” Id. Plaintiffs cite to certain June 2023
“Guidelines for Managing Substance Withdrawal in Jails,” which the Court notes is not
included in their First Amended Complaint. Id.
Plaintiffs assert that Sheriff Whittington, acting through his deputies and nurses,
prevented “jailers” from providing emergency transport for alcohol withdrawal due to cost.
See id. at 28. Thus, Plaintiffs claim there is a failure to accommodate McCoy and also
intentional discrimination due to his disability. See id. They contend that “[i]t was obvious
to any jailer that [] McCoy was unable to manage his own affairs, had lost his ability to
perceive reality and care for himself.” Id. at 30. They submit that “there is an outright
denial of any medical services until [] McCoy stopped breathing.” Id. To support their
arguments, Plaintiffs reference specific Department of Justice documents and ADA
regulations, which are not specifically alleged in their First Amended Complaint. See id.
at 31. Alternatively, Plaintiffs ask for an opportunity to amend their First Amended
Complaint. See id. Plaintiffs claim they can make more detailed allegations supporting
their arguments against the BPPJ. See id. at 32.
In its reply, the BBPJ contends Plaintiffs argue for the application of an outdated
12(b)(6) standard because their opposition quotes and cities multiple cases that pre-date
Twombly and Iqbal. See Record Document 50 at 1. Additionally, the BBPJ argues
Plaintiffs’ reference to allegations that have not actually been made in their First Amended
Complaint should be disregarded. See id. The BBPJ submits that Plaintiffs have failed to
plead any facts showing that it had a custom, policy, or practice of attempting to avoid the
cost of medical care or undercutting medical care to inmates to reduce expenses. See id.
at 3.
Additionally, the BBPJ points out that at the time of the 2017 death, which resulted
in Fletcher, it did not directly provide medical care to inmates at Bossier Max. See id. at
4. Thus, the BBPJ avers that events at Bossier Max which occurred before it took over
direct provision of medical care could not have put the BBPJ on notice of any problems
with its customs, policies, or practices with respect to the direct provision of medical care
at Bossier Max. See id. at 5. Moreover, summary judgment was granted in favor of BBPJ
in the case of Fletcher; therefore, the BBPJ advances that this case supports dismissal.
See id. Furthermore, the BBPJ maintains that the previous 2019 death mentioned by
Plaintiffs in their First Amended Complaint should be disregarded for similar reasons. See
id.
The BBPJ also argues that Plaintiffs’ Monell claim based on its failure to discipline
its employees and failure to change it medical care customs, policies, or practices after
McCoy’s death is not pled in the First Amended Complaint. See id. at 7. Rather, the BBPJ
emphasizes that the First Amended Complaint asserts these allegations against only
Sheriff Whittington. See id. However, even if these allegations were asserted against the
BBPJ, it submits they would fail on the merits. See id.
Additionally, the BBPJ submits that Plaintiffs’ ADA and RA claims should be
dismissed. See id. at 9. The BBPJ avers that Plaintiffs’ opposition largely addresses their
ADA and RA claims against Sheriff Whittington rather than the BBPJ. See id. However,
to the extent that Plaintiffs’ arguments address their claims against the BBPJ, it contends
that these arguments confirm their claims against the BBPJ are for inadequate medical
care rather than discrimination. See id. at 10.
(b) Sheriff Whittington’s Motion (Record Document 38).
Sheriff Whittington submits that the Monell claim against him should be dismissed
because Plaintiffs’ allegations are conclusory rather than factual. See Record Document
38-1 at 8, 10. Sheriff Whittington points out that Plaintiffs’ own allegations state that
corrections officers were not placed on notice of the medical staff’s plans. See id. at 10.
He asserts that all of Plaintiffs’ reiterated allegations regarding unconstitutional purported
customs, policies, and practices are conclusory and still fail to adequately allege an
unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice. See id.
Sheriff Whittington analyzes and dismantles certain allegations against him. He
argues the allegation contained in paragraph 29 is conclusory, and Plaintiffs have not pled
any facts to support this allegation despite their chance to amend. See id. Additionally, he
advances that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any prior similar incidents at Bossier Max
wherein there was a deliberate refusal to provide transportation for an inmate to a
hospital. See id. at 11. Furthermore, Sheriff Whittington avers that the bare, conclusory
allegations in paragraph 30 relative to a settlement entered into in another case is
irrelevant. See id. He contends there are no allegations pled which would relate that
matter to this one, nor are any of the similarities pled so as to establish this link. See id.
Additionally, Sheriff Whittington asserts that all ADA and RA claims should be
dismissed. See id. He maintains that these claims are merely the same medical
negligence claims as alleged in Plaintiffs’ Original Complaint and have just been
repackaged and rebranded. See id. at 13. He argues these allegations are insufficient to
establish intentional disability discrimination by Sheriff Whittington. See id.
Plaintiffs oppose Sheriff Whittington’s Motion, asserting that their Monell claim
plausibly alleges facts that “support an inference that customs and policies were the
‘moving force’ behind the deliberate indifference that led to [] McCoy’s death.” Record
Document 49 at 10. They submit that “[a]llowing arbitrary delays in emergency treatment
or transport to determine if the prisoner can be released from [Sheriff Whittington’s]
custody first constitutes such a custom where it is obvious that a constitutional violation
will occur.” Id. at 12. Plaintiffs maintain that “[d]elay for any reason unrelated to the need
for medical care implicates deliberate indifference to the serious, known medical needs
of the prisoner.” Id. at 13. They compare Sheriff Whittington’s policy or custom to an
“under staffing policy or practice.” Id. Plaintiffs submits that had Sheriff Whittington and
the BPPJ “not arbitrarily understaffed nurses and eliminated the nursing staff from the
night shift, then [] McCoy’s server alcohol withdrawal that began at 1900 hours could have
been averted.” Id. Plaintiffs cite to courts outside of the Fifth Circuit to support their
arguments. See id. at 14–15.
Additionally, Plaintiffs aver that this custom of reducing expenses has been
ongoing since 2018. See id. at 15. They claim they can allege in good faith that Sheriff
Whittington “agreed to a reduction in nurse staffing” and cite to Fletcher. Id. Plaintiffs
assert that none of the deputies involved were disciplined or counseled by Sheriff
Whittington although they allegedly acted with deliberate indifference towards McCoy’s
serious medical needs. See id. at 17. Furthermore, they argue there were no changes in
custom or practice. See id.
With respect to their ADA claim against Sheriff Whittington, Plaintiffs provide similar
arguments to their opposition to the BBPJ’s Motion. They submit McCoy’s alcohol
withdrawal and delirium tremens qualify him as disabled under the ADA. See id. at 21.
Again, Plaintiffs cite to specific Department of Justice guidelines and case law that were
not provided in their First Amended Complaint. See id. at 21–22.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs ask for the opportunity to amend their First Amended
Complaint. See id. at 24. They claim they can allege more details regarding the “efforts
to release McCoy from jail to avoid the cost.” Id. Plaintiffs argue Sheriff Whittington “had
a policy of avoiding medical expenses for ‘short timer’ offenders: that is, for prisoners who
were scheduled to be released in the near future. This effort was done in compliance with
an effort to reduce costs.” Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs advance than can make additional
allegations if given the opportunity to amend. See id. at 24–25.
Sheriff Whittington replies, asserting that Plaintiffs rehash their conclusory
allegations rather than raising new issues. See Record Document 54 at 1. Sheriff
Whittington points out that Plaintiffs suggest Nurse Lyles did not call for immediate
transportation to a health care facility, not the corrections officers. See id. at 2. He submits
there are no new claims, arguments, or facts to overcome Plaintiffs’ failure to plead an
adequate claim against him. See id.
With respect to the ADA claim asserted against Sheriff Whittington, he contends
that inadequate medical treatment for a disability should not be confused with intentional
discrimination because of a disability. See id. He maintains there is no proof of intentional
discrimination against Plaintiffs or McCoy. See id. at 2–3.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Pleading and Dismissal Standards.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) governs the requirements for pleadings
that state a claim for relief and requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
The standard for the adequacy of complaints under Rule 8(a)(2) is now a “plausibility”
standard found in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), and
its progeny. Under this standard, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level…on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555, 1965. If a pleading only contains
“labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,”
the pleading does not meet the standards of Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows parties to seek dismissal of a
party’s pleading for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court generally “may not go
outside the pleadings.” Colle v. Brazos Cnty., Tex., 981 F. 2d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 1993).
Additionally, courts must accept all allegations in a complaint as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. However, courts do not have to accept legal conclusions as
facts. See id. Courts considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are only
obligated to allow those complaints that are facially plausible under the Iqbal and Twombly
standards to survive such a motion. See id. at 678–79, 1949–50. If the complaint does
not meet this standard, it can be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. See id.
II. Analysis.
(a) Monell Claim.
Plaintiffs allege that “[a] delay in providing transport to a hospital was caused by
deliberate indifference to McCoy’s serious medical condition created by [Sheriff
Whittington’s] and [the BPPJ’s] policy and practice of attempting to avoid the cost of
medical care even when it is obvious medical care is required.” Record Document 27 at
¶ 29. Plaintiffs aver that the actions of Sheriff Whittington and the BPPJ “caused [McCoy]
to suffer more pain and punishment, and extreme stress to his cardiac system leading to
this death.” Id. at ¶ 30.
Plaintiffs assert that Sheriff Whittington and the BPPJ “have a practice or policy of
saving the expense of providing medical services to inmates by undercutting and
withholding medical care to save expenses.” Id. Beginning in 2018, they claim that Sheriff
Whittington, “wanting to avoid the cost of medical care[,] contracted with the [BPPJ] to
supply nurses.” Id. However, Plaintiffs claim this program was terminated in an effort to
save medical expenses. See id. As a result, they allege “there was a reduced nursing
staff which was only on duty during the week from around 6am until around 6-7pm each
day.” Id. After 7:00 p.m. on weekdays and all-day during weekends, Plaintiffs claim the
“deputies began requesting increased emergency medical assistance in the form of EMS
more frequently, increasing costs.” Id. Thereafter, Sheriff Whittington allegedly “instituted
practices to reduce emergency services including delaying requests for emergency
transport to unnecessarily verify the need.” Id.
Plaintiffs point to a settlement in 2022 involving the death of Collin James Fletcher
(“Fletcher”) in 2017 and the death of Randall Layne Abraugh (“Abraugh”) in 2019 to
support their arguments. See id. at ¶¶ 30A, 30C. They argue Sheriff Whittington and the
BPPJ “have consistently failed to attend to the serious medical needs of inmates,
including alcohol withdrawal.” Id. at ¶ 30D. They allege that the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s
Office knew “its employees were not providing adequate medical care, but they continued
to employ them nonetheless.” Id.
“A suit against a government officer ‘in his official capacity’ is the same as a suit
against the government entity of which he is an agent.” Holmes, 718 F. Supp. 3d at 604
(internal quotation marks omitted). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983;
rather, municipalities are liable under § 1983 “‘when execution of a government’s policy
or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may facilely
be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury….’” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Municipal liability under § 1983 requires three elements: “‘(1) a policymaker, (2)
an official policy or custom, and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving
force” is that policy or custom.’” Id. A plaintiff seeking Monell liability “must ‘identify a
municipal policy or custom that caused [his] injury.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“‘The existence of a policy can be shown through evidence of an actual policy, regulation,
or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by lawmakers or others with
policymaking authority.’” Id. (quoting Valle v. City of Hous., 613 F. 3d 536, 542 (5th Cir.
2010), citing Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F. 3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003)).
With respect to the second prong, “‘A pattern is tantamount to official policy when
it is “so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
policy.’” Jordan v. Gautreaux, 593 F. Supp. 3d 330, 353–54 (M.D. La. 2022) (internal
quotation omitted). “Where prior incidents are used to prove a pattern, they ‘must have
occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to
the governing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected,
accepted practice of city employees.’” Id. at 354 (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, a
plaintiff “must demonstrate ‘a pattern of abuses that transcends the error made in a single
case.’” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “‘A pattern required similarity and specificity…[and]
must point to the specific violation in question.’” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Additionally, a pattern requires “‘sufficiently numerous prior incidents,’ as opposed to
‘isolated instances.’” Id. The Fifth Circuit has previously held that 27 complaints between
2002 and 2005 did not constitute a pattern since the majority of the incidents involved
“‘small crimes,’ and the police force was large.” Id. See Peterson v. City of Fort Worth,
Tex., 588 F. 3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009).
As to the third prong, “‘a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken
with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between
the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.’” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
This standard of deliberate indifference is a high standard and showing simple or
heightened negligence is insufficient. See id. Furthermore, a plaintiff must also “‘meet the
heightened standard of causation in order to hold a municipality liable under § 1983.’” Id.
A plaintiff is required to demonstrate “that the municipal policy was the ‘moving force’ that
caused the specific constitutional violation.’” Id. (internal quotation omitted). “To establish
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that officials ‘refused to treat him, ignored his
complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that
would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.’” Goldstein v.
Wood, No. 23-00899, 2024 WL 1270434, at *7 (W.D. La. Mar. 8, 2024) (quoting Domino
v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F. 3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Here, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint fails to meet these heightened standards
to satisfy a Monell claim against the BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington. The only specific
allegations asserted against the BBPJ within their First Amended Complaint are contained
within paragraphs 29, 30, and 30A. Plaintiffs mainly “point the finger” at Sheriff
Whittington. Plaintiffs claim the BBPJ, in conjunction with Sheriff Whittington, have a
“policy and practice of attempting to avoid the cost of medical care even when it is obvious
medical care is required.” Record Document 27 at ¶ 29. They maintain that Sheriff
Whittington’s and the BBPJ’s “acts or omissions…caused [McCoy] to suffer more pain
and punishment, and extreme stress to his cardiac system leading to his death.” Id. at ¶
30. They allege that Sheriff Whittington and the BBPJ “have a practice or policy of saving
the expense of providing medical services to inmates by undercutting and withholding
medical care to save expenses.” Id.
Plaintiffs fail to identify a policymaking official who acted with deliberate
indifference towards McCoy in an effort to avoid the cost of EMS transportation in
accordance with a specific practice, policy, or custom. In their opposition, Plaintiffs state
that Nurse Lyles was the final decision-maker; however, this allegation was never
asserted in their First Amended Complaint; thus, the Court will not accept this allegation
as true. Plaintiffs also cite to several cases in which a court “found a Monell claim was
established and pled where there was a denial of medical care due to attempts to save
costs.” Record Document 47 at 18–19. However, none of these cases are controlling or
binding on this Court because they fall outside of the Fifth Circuit.
Furthermore, Fletcher and Abraugh do not support Plaintiffs’ arguments. In
Fletcher, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s
Office and Sheriff Whittington. This Court concluded that defendants “maintained policies
and procedures to ensure that inmates were provided with appropriate medical care.”
Fletcher, No. 18-1153, 2022 WL 3643513, at *9 (W.D. La. Aug. 23, 2022). Moreover, in
the instant case, Plaintiffs assert that Sheriff Whittington agreed to provide policies and
training for alcohol withdrawal in 2022. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 30C. McCoy’s
death occurred in 2024; therefore, the policies, or lack thereof, in place during Fletcher’s
death and Abraugh’s death are not the same as those in place at the time of McCoy’s
death. Thus, Fletcher and Abraugh do not demonstrate that Sheriff Whittington and the
BBPJ “had actual or constructive notice of a pattern of similar constitutional violations
caused by the policy.” Blanchard-Daigle v. Geers, 802 Fed. Appx. 113, 117 (5th Cir. 2020).
Additionally, while Plaintiffs claim that these unconstitutional practices or polices
have been implemented, they have failed to plausibly allege culpability and causation. At
8:30 a.m. on March 6, 2024, Nurse Lyles noticed McCoy was not breathing and called for
emergency help. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 20. CPR was attempted, but McCoy
ultimately died around 9:30 a.m. See id. at ¶ 25. This chain of events all occurred within
a one-hour time frame, which in the Court’s eyes, is short. While Plaintiffs allege there
was significant delay, emergency transportation was called once McCoy stopped
breathing. Plaintiffs do not point to an official policy stating how long it should take EMS
transportation to arrive. From their perspective, the delay was too long because of the
ultimate result; however, their opinion on how the situation should have been handled is
irrelevant for Monell liability purposes.
As the Court has previously explained, Plaintiffs’ allegations of deliberate
indifference are only sufficient with respect to the night shift deputies. See Record
Document 56. Plaintiffs have failed to causally connect the BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington’s
implemented policies to the conduct of the night shift deputies. The Nurse Defendants
and the day shift deputies did not act improperly in accordance with a specific policy
implemented by the BBPJ or Sheriff Whittington. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not sufficiently
address these elements of culpability and causation. The Court fails to see how this
alleged delay connects to a specific practice, policy, or custom of the BBPJ or Sheriff
Whittington. Their allegations are uncorroborated and speculative. Both the BBPJ’s
Motion (Record Document 34) and Sheriff Whittington’s Motion (Record Document 38)
are GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Monell claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(b) Louisiana Fault and Negligence Claim.
Plaintiffs submit that all Defendants, including the BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington,
violated Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 32. Plaintiffs
attempt to reserve their medical malpractice claims against the Nurse Defendants. See
id. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ “failure to provide adequate medical assistance to
[McCoy] under the circumstances was below the standard of care of jailers in a jail
setting.” Id. at ¶ 33. Rather than transporting McCoy to a “health care provider,” he was
placed in a WRAP which allegedly aggravated his symptoms. See id.
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations against the BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington
contain improper legal conclusions that provide a mere recitation of the elements for a
negligence claim. Article 2315 is a generic code article dealing with liability for acts
causing damages; it does not set forth a certain duty or standard of care. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2315. Additionally, their First Amended Complaint does not assert specific
allegations against certain Defendants; rather, Plaintiffs group all Defendants together
under this claim. The Court is unable to ascertain and decipher which specific allegations
relate to which Defendant, which is problematic at the pleading stage.
To the extent that Plaintiffs are attempting to assert a claim against the BBPJ and
Sheriff Whittington for the alleged acts and omissions of the Nurse Defendants, the Court
will not address such arguments. As stated in a previous Memorandum Ruling, the state
law negligence claims against the Nurse Defendants have been stayed pending a
resolution of the Medical Review Panel proceeding. See Record Document 56. Therefore,
the BBPJ’s Motion (Record Document 36) and Sheriff Whittington’s Motion (Record
Document 38), with respect to the Louisiana state law fault and negligence claim, are
GRANTED. This claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(c) ADA and RA Claims.
With respect to their ADA claim, Plaintiffs allege Sheriff Whittington and the BPPJ
failed “to provide inmates with disabilities with basic reasonable accommodations to
ensure equivalent access to all of the programs, activities, and services offered at the
jail.” Record Document 27 at ¶ 36. Plaintiffs claim this failure “not only denies [prisoners]
access to prison programs and services, but also substantially increases the risk that they
are injured in an emergency or are the victim of violence or abuse from other prisoners.”
Id. Moreover, they submit this failure “results in the provision of inadequate mental health
care.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Whittington and the BPPJ “have executed systemic
and willful discrimination against and failure to provide reasonable accommodations in
programs, services, and activities to, inmates in the Jail who have, or are perceived to
have, disabilities” for years. Id. at ¶ 37. They claim McCoy “either had or was perceived
by Jail, deputy and nursing staff to have, present physical impairments that qualified as
disability” because “he had a long-standing history of substance use disorder, the disorder
substantially limited his major life activities, such as consciousness, walking,
communicating and awareness and he exhibited behaviors consistent with such a
diagnosis.” Id. at ¶ 38. Plaintiffs assert “McCoy was denied access to services, including
but not limited to, appropriate health care services; and he was denied reasonable
accommodations for his disabilities, including but not limited to, additional safety checks,
medical monitoring, or other security, medication-assisted withdrawal treatment,
emergency transport to a medical facility, and regular medical assessments, because of
his actual or perceived substance use disorder.” Id. at ¶ 39.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs advance that this “lack of adequate policies and procedures
makes inmates with disabilities vulnerable to exploitation by other inmates and increases
their risk of serious injury or death.” Id. at 42. Plaintiffs allege Sheriff Whittington and the
BPPJ have “an affirmative obligation to create and maintain a system to identify and track
individuals with disabilities and the accommodations they require, particularly those with
serious alcohol or drug withdrawal symptoms.” Id. at ¶ 43. They maintain that Sheriff
Whittington’s and the BPPJ’s failures to fulfill this obligation results “in the denial of
accommodations mandated by federal law, placing inmates at risk of discrimination,
injury, and/or exploitation.” Id. at ¶ 46.
With respect to their RA claim, Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs one through 48 of
their First Amended Complaint. See Record Document 27 at ¶ 49. Additionally, they point
out that like the ADA, the RA requires the recipients of federal funds to reasonably
accommodate persons with disabilities. See id. at ¶ 50. Plaintiffs assert that Bossier Max
“is believed and, therefore alleged to receive federal funds.” Id.
“Both the ADA and the [RA] require public entities—or private entities receiving
federal funding—to provide reasonable accommodations to assist disabled person [sic]
in accessing public programs and services.” Borum v. Swisher Cnty., No. 14-127-J, 2014
WL 4814541, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2014). A successful prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA requires a plaintiff to prove the following:
(1) that he is a qualified individual under the ADA; (2) that he
is being excluded from participation in, or is being denied
benefits, services, programs, or other activities for which a
public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of
his disability.
Id. Additionally, the ADA “imposes on public entities an affirmative obligation to make
reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals—including prisoners—who take
advantage of a public entity’s services or programs.” Borum v. Swisher Cnty., No. 14-127-
J, 2015 WL 327508, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015). “This ‘reasonable accommodation’
theory of discrimination is different from, yet related to, the prima facie case of disability-
based discrimination discussed above.” Id. For example, “a plaintiff can satisfy the second
and third prongs of the prima facie case of disability discrimination by establishing that
the public entity has failed to make reasonable accommodations for a disabled person
who uses the services provided by the public entity.” Id.
The RA “is operationally identical to the ADA in that both statutes prohibit
discrimination against disabled persons; however, the ADA applies only to public entities
while the [RA] applies to any federally funded programs and activities, whether public or
private.” Id. at *9. A court may analyze these types of claims together. See id. The
Supreme Court has held:
[C]onfinement in a jail is a program or service under the ADA
and RA because “[m]odern prisons provide inmates with many
recreational ‘activities,’ medical ‘services,’ and education and
vocational ‘programs,’ all of which at least theoretically
‘benefit’ the prisoners (and any of which disabled prisoners
could be excluded from participation in).”
Borum, 2015 WL 327508, at *5 (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 542 U.S. 206, 210,
118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998) (emphasis omitted)).
In the instant case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead a plausible
claim under both the ADA and the RA. In their opposition, Plaintiffs reference the
Department of Justice’s Guidelines for Managing Substance Withdrawal in Jails; however,
this reference is not mentioned once in their First Amended Complaint. See Record
Documents 47 at 26 & 49 at 21. Furthermore, their allegations under the ADA and the RA
mainly restate the same arguments made under their § 1983 inadequate medical care
claim and Monell claim. Therefore, the Court agrees with the BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington
that Plaintiffs confuse inadequate medical treatment with intentional disability
discrimination.
McCoy was held at Bossier Max from March 3, 2024 until his death the morning of
March 6, 2024, which equates to less than three days. McCoy was a detainee at Bossier
Max, not an inmate. Plaintiffs’ general and conclusory allegation that the BBPJ and Sheriff
Whittington “fail[] to provide inmates with disabilities with basis reasonable
accommodations to ensure equivalent access to all of the programs, activities, and
services offered at the jail” is an insufficient legal conclusion. Record Document 27 at ¶
36. Their assertion that the BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington “have executed systemic and
willful discrimination” is another improper legal conclusion. Id. at ¶ 37. There is no
sufficient factual evidence that anyone knew the depth of McCoy’s alcohol withdrawal
history while housed at Bossier Max for less than three days. Plaintiffs’ claim that the
BBPJ and Sheriff Whittington have an “affirmative obligation to create and maintain a
system to identify and track individuals with disabilities and the accommodations they
require…” is uncorroborated and conclusory. Id. at ¶ 43.
Significantly, Plaintiffs also misstate that the Nurse Defendants observed McCoy’s
rapid decline. See id. at ¶ 47. None of the Nurse Defendants were on duty throughout the
night as McCoy’s symptoms worsened. Plaintiffs’ allegations on what should have been
done are speculative and unsupported. Therefore, the BBPJ’s Motion (Record Document
36) and Sheriff Whittington’s Motion (Record Document 38), with respect to Plaintiffs’ ADA
and RA claims, are GRANTED. These claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(d) Amendment.
Federal Rule 15(a) “provides that ‘leave to amend shall be freely given when
justice so requires,’ but only ‘applies where plaintiffs “expressly requested” to amend.’”
U.S. ex rel. Jamison v. Del-Jen, Inc., 747 Fed. Appx. 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2018). Moreover,
“a district court is justified in denying leave to amend when a plaintiff has ‘fail[ed] to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed.’” Id. Here, the Court will not give
Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their First Amended Complaint.
On May 8, 2025, Magistrate Judge Hornsby stayed all discovery and allowed
Plaintiffs until May 27, 2025 “to file an amended and restated complaint that pleads their
best case with respect to the claims against the individual defendants (in anticipation of
their qualified immunity defense) and with respect to any other claims, including those
challenged by the [old] pending Rule 12 motions.” Record Document 22 at 1–2. In May
of 2025, Defendants had all filed Rule 12 motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, which
asserted similar arguments to the currently pending motions to dismiss. See Record
Documents 9, 10, 11, & 14. These previously filed motions to dismiss were handled by a
joint order entered by the undersigned; however, Plaintiffs were put on notice and
cautioned that they needed to assert more specific allegations and anticipate the qualified
immunity defense. See Record Documents 22 & 32.
Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint once again to cure the same problems
previously mentioned by this Court and Defendants. Even though they have alleged they
can provide additional facts to support their arguments, these facts are uncorroborated
should have been included in their First Amended Complaint. The Court find further
amendment would be futile; therefore, Plaintiffs are not permitted to amend their First
Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
The BBPJ’s Motion (Record Document 36) and Sheriff Whittington’s Motion
(Record Document 38) are GRANTED. All claims asserted by Plaintiffs against the BBPJ
and Sheriff Whittington are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs are not permitted
to amend their First Amended Complaint.
An Order accompanying this Ruling shall issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 25th day of August,
2025.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR JUDGE
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